F Hammond Field Post Card 15 May 15

FIELD SERVICE POST CARD

 

To E. Hammond, 9 Countess St. Stockport,

 

Postmarked Field Post Office 28 15 My 15

 

Reverse

 

I am quite well.

I have been admitted into hospital

            Sick                             and am going on well.

            Wounded                    and hope to be discharged soon.

I am being sent down to the base.

I have received your letter dated….  Telegram… parcel

Letter follows at first opportunity.

I have received no letter from you lately  for a long time.

 

Signature only  F. Hammond

 

Date   14 May 1915

 

H.M.S. “ALBION” 10 May 15

H.M.S. “ALBION”

10th May 1915

 

Relieved “GOLIATH” at noon on right flank.  No French troops East of stream in Kereves Valley.  At 1 p.m. opened fire on Turks in trenches just East of Kereves Dere, coming under fire 3 minutes later.  Worked Ship as requisite to avoid injury.  Continued process throughout the afternoon, frequently driving the Turks out of the advanced trenches.

 

Rather misty over Chanak.  Saw little traffic on Suandere Road.

 

Saw two steamers and believed one Torpedo Boat off Chanak.  Not certain about Torpedo Boat.  Unable to locate batteries that fired at “ALBION” except battery in 160.P which was seen firing at 7 p.m.

 

Expenditure of ammunition, 6” 51, 12 pr 65.  enemy fired 27 rounds at Ship.  No hits.

 

 

  1. Watts Jones

CAPTAIN (Act)

 

The Vice Admiral Commanding,

and the Rear Admiral Commanding

Divisions.

 

Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,

H.M.S. Albion 8 May 15

H.M.S. “ALBION”

8th May 1915

 

In accordance with orders “ALBION” relieved CANOPUS on right flank at 8 p.m. 7th May.  Situation was as follows.  French line extended from 169.I5, 169.N2, 169.T2, 169.U7.  Turks line 169.P5, 169.K5, 169F4 and behind this line appears to be four trenches.

 

Nothing of importance occurred during the night, and at 5 a.m. when relieved by “MAJESTIC”, the flanking station had nothing fresh to communicate.

 

 

  1. Watts Jones

CAPTAIN (Act)

 

The Vice Admiral Commanding,

and the Rear Admiral Commanding

Divisions.

Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,

H.M.S. Albion 2nd Report 8 May 15

H.M.S. “ALBION”

8th May 1915

 

Relieved “GOLIATH”, and at 5.18 informed that French held trenches vacated by Turks at bottom in valley of Kereves Dere, and later that French had not advanced farther than stream in Kereves Dere.

 

6.45 opened fire from Asiatic Side; worked ship to avoid injury.  7.5 opened fire, and fired occasionally on batteries both on Asiatic and on European side assisted about 9.5 by aeroplane, and occasionally catching Turks in the open.  Under occasional fire during most of the forenoon.  Had considerable difficulty in distinguishing objects which military desired fired on.  At 9.50 sighted a mine; believed sunk later by French trawler.  Observed large numbers of wagons and some mounted troops moving along road close to beach, east of Suanders.  All seen in forenoon going Eastward, largest number about 11.40 a.m.  range too far for “ALBION’s” 6”.  Fired a few rounds 12”, but did not get on target; suggest this road may be worth attention.

 

Ammunition expended up to noon, 12” 4, 6” 83, 12 pr 45 common 13 shrapnel.  Enemy fired 33 rounds at “ALBION”, no hits.   LATOUCHE TREVILLE also supported right flank.  One French kite float seen in Mendere Bay.

 

The shore signal station asked that an Officer from the Ship might be sent to see the position; replied suggesting that military Officer should be sent on board, and passed request on to MAJESTIC.

 

Damaged compartments apparently not much affected by firing.

 

Quantity of water which entered perhaps double harbour amount.

 

 

  1. Watts Jones

CAPTAIN (Act)

 

The Vice Admiral Commanding,

and the Rear Admiral Commanding

Divisions.

 

Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,

H.M.S. Albion Reoprt 4 May 15

H.M.S. “ALBION”

4th May 1915

 

2nd May; At 4.30 a.m. 7 miles off entrance course East, 14 knots observed heavy firing on shore.  At 5 a.m. Action.  5.15 arrived off Totts Battery; observed VENGANCE firing and under accurate fire, and came under fire on closing her.  Observed French retiring everywhere, but whether a retreat or retirement uncertain.  Told by VENGANCE to keep out of the way.  Dropped back off Morto Bay, and asked R.F. station for situation.  Received optimistic reply.  6.10 VENGANCE signalled us relieve.  Closed.  6.20 came under fire.  6.27 VENGANCE communicated situation as follows; from position about 163.F:- ”At present our troops have advanced to the ridge beyond yellow hollow on cliff joining west side Kereves Dere.  This position is best for close work like this, but it is exposed to Suandere River Guns at range of 12,000 yards from 7.B. battery.  Best post for general work and view is 163.0.  Three Asiatic disappearing Howitzer Batteries, a little Field Gun, and big howitzer hunt you everywhere”.  Asked for position of big  Howitzer and yellow hollow, but did not get them.  6.25, opened fire on relieving VENGANCE.  Remained under fire until about 8 a.m. firing at Turks on ridge.  7.40 hit Port side abreast B.2. Gun.  7.53 firing at small bodies of Turks advancing.  All forenoon firing occasionally at trenches as required.  Did not succeed in establishing signal communication for spotting, working ship as requisite.  At 12.30 concentrated fire on trenches.  Saw Turks running.  12.50 under fire, from whence not ascertained, about 1.5 hit twice, one in same place as at 7.40 the other Starboard side of boat deck.  Fired on Suandere on chance.  Went astern to change range.  AGAMEMNON signalled thought battery in 178.L but not certain.  Under fairly accurate intermittent fire until 5.36.  Hit Port side at 2.25, abreast of Y.I casemate.  Curiously enough this Shot, the first that has killed a man on board “ALBION” at the same time cut the Ensign Halliards and half-masted the colours.

 

Noticed some British and Indian troops on Hill 236.  1.50 fired on battery in position given by Totts, that was firing at them, and on supposed positions of guns that were firing at “ALBION” , occasionally.   2.50 noticed Ship had listed slightly; reported fact, stating relief not necessary at present.  Wells dry.  4.43 observed LATOUCHE TREVILLE under fire and firing.  5.33 Relieved by GOLIATH.  Turned over orders, and messages recently received from Military and proceeded to anchor in Billet 162 P off Seddul Bahr.  Ammunition expended 12” 6, 6” 151, 12 pr 272.  Enemy’s shot or Salvoes 76, including some heavy projectiles four hits.  Their fire as on 28th, apparently regulated according to the movements of their infantry, and our fire on the latter.

 

Casualties Ply/12797 Sergeant Edwin Kershaw R.M.L.I. killed.

 

Damage as far as then ascertained Wing Compartment 48 to 60 flooded, 30 ft Cutter smashed, 24ft Gig holed, Main Derrick Purchase and topping lift wires badly stranded, and engine damaged.  Main derrick slightly holed; Shelter and upper deck holed, other minor damage.  Reported same.  Received two cutters by order of R.A.I., ordered by R.A.3, to proceed to Mudros and make good defects.  Discharged Major A.F. Thomson, R.A. to Shore.  This Officer was not on board on 25th from no fault of his own, but has been of much assistance to me on the succeeding days, stationing himself in the Control position and exposed on 28th April and 2nd May to considerable danger.  9.30 proceeded at 7 ¼ knots, a cutter in tow, as boats falls shot through.  4.45 stopped.  Committed body of Sergeant Edwin Kershaw, R.M.L.I. to the deep.  6 a.m. anchored in Mudros.  Sent down diver; diver report armour plate (240 lbs) cracked and adjacent seams opened.  Some water found in wing bunker abaft 60.  Divers caulked seams.  Shored sluice valves; commenced pumping.  Later commenced cleaning bunker abaft protective deck.  6.15 p.m. examined compartment.  Damage as ascertained; outside superficial cracks on armour plate, plate pushed in about ½ inch.  Inside **** protective deck, side plating bulged but not fractured, many rivets gone; “B” Seacock and tranches off forward to C.O. 2 Rooms and Magazines, extensively damaged.

 

By 3 p.m. 4th May, bunker was sufficiently clear to examine above protective deck, when further damage as follows was found.

48 to 60 Armour driven in about 2”.  Below protective deck: – Lightened plate frames 3 in Number under protective deck much buckled, many connecting rivets sheared.

 

Side plating buckled for two frame stations, indented to about 6” from original line, and butt straps damaged, many rivets loose and fractured.  (B) Seacock, Downton Discharge, and Master Flood of C.O. 2 valves extensively damaged.

 

Above Protective Deck:- I Bulkhead much buckled, Z frames (3 in No) behind armour buckled, gusset plates torn from seating and distorted; armour bolts 6 in No appear to have had severe strain.

 

Compartments flooded Wing 48 to 60 stations

Reserve Coal Bunker, 60 to 68.

 

  1. Watts Jones

CAPTAIN (Act)

 

The Vice Admiral Commanding,

and the Rear Admiral Commanding

Divisions.

Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,

MAY 1915

The 2nd May 1915 saw the commencement of the Gorlice in the Carpathian Mountains and Artois, France offensive by the Central powers of Germany and Austria/Hungary. Included in the summer offensive was the sinking of the American Tanker “Gulflight” by a German U-Boat in the Mediterranean Sea near Sicily on the 1st May 1915.

 

2nd/4th May 1915, on the Eastern Front a combined German and Austro-Hungarian offensive began against the Russian Army at Gorlice and Tarnow in Galicia. The defences of the weakened Russian Army were broken down by a massive 700,000-shell bombardment. With the Russians suffering from a shortage of artillery shells and rifles, German and Austro-Hungarian forces broke through the Russian lines on the 4th May 1915. The Russian Army began a disorganised retreat.

 

The German submarine U-20 was patrolling the southern entrance to the Irish coast off Kinslade Old Head. On the 7th May 1915, the submarine Commander Schweigher sighted the Cunard Liner “Lusitania” on her final leg of her passage to Liverpool from New York.

Three months prior to the sighting of “Lusitania”, Germany had declared all waters around the British Isles a “war zone”.

Approximately 2.10pm the submarine fired two torpedoes at the “Lusitania”. The first torpedo struck the “Lusitania” causing a massive explosion. Within 20 minutes, the liner had keeled over and sunk. Aboard the “Lusitania” were approximately 2,000 passengers. Of the 1,198 that perished were 291 women and 94 children. Neutral America protested strongly at the death of 128 American citizens. An inquest was carried out after the victims bodies had drifted into Kinslade. The coroner’s court of Ireland (then part of the United Kingdom) gave a verdict of wilful murder against the German Kaiser.

Both combatant and neutral states were now aware of the deadly and ugly nature of modern warfare. The sinking of the “Lusitania” was the first of a number of reasons, which started to sway the American resolve toward the Allied cause.

 

On the 9th May 1915, the first divisions of the British Expeditionary Force New Army departed for France. When war was declared on the 4th August 1914 Field Marshall Earl Horatio Herbert Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, was almost alone in believing the conflict would last longer than the general response that the “war would be over by Christmas”. Anticipating a longer campaign Kitchener was in a position to do something about it. He received authorisation from Parliament to raise a new army of 100,000 men and on the 7th August 1914, he appealed to the nation for volunteers to boost the 150,000 regular troops of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF).  Within 3 weeks, Kitchener received his 100,000 volunteers. By early October 1914 over 760,000 young men had volunteered and before the end of the year the one millionth volunteer had been achieved.

In 1914, the army was short of officers and NCOs to train the New Army. They were also short of arms, equipment, accommodation, uniforms, food and supplies. These difficulties were slowly overcome and the first divisions of the British New Army began arriving in France in early May 1915.

 

Chief of French General Staff Joseph Joffre was one of the most experienced soldiers of France. On the 9th May 1915 Joffre launched an offensive in the Artois region. The offensive was centred on Vimy Ridge, which began with an artillery bombardment of 1,200 guns. The French were able to advance 4km (2.1 miles) to overlook the Douai Plain.

With French reinforcements 11.2 km (7 miles) away, the Germans were able to stabilize their line, the French having lost the opportunity to capitalise on their advance. The battle ended in mid June 1915 with little success on both sides. The overall losses were horrendous with the French sustaining 100,000 casualties and the Germans 75,000 casualties.

After the Vimy Ridge encounter the French realised they needed to reappraise their offensive tactics, the same way the British had modified their tactics after the Battle of Aubers Ridge.

 

On the 9th May 1915, in an effort to take Aubers Ridge, the BEF attacked over the same Neuve Chappelle battlefield of March 1915. Since the battle of Neuve Chappelle the Germans had improved and strengthened their front lines. Dug-outs were added to shelter the troops and trenches had been re-inforced. German barbed wire had been increased in depth, and their heavy guns were adequately positioned to repel any Allied attack. Because the German’s were aware of an imminent attack, reserves of ammunition were increased.

On the 9th May 1915 at 5.00am, the British guns began their bombardment and at 5.40am, the infantry advanced. The bombardment had been insufficient to destroy German machine guns and consequently the BEF sustained huge losses. The BEF consisted of British and Indian troops. By the evening of 9th May 1915, the BEF had gained some positions in the German front line trenches. The BEF did not have sufficient troops to exploit the successes. This was due to the heavy casualties taken together with the lack of artillery fire owing to the shortage of ammunition.

 

The battle of Aubers Ridge was abandoned at 20.00 hours on the 10th May 1915.

 

On the 15th May 1915, the Battle of Festubert began with the fifth, sixth and Garhwal (Indian) brigades attacking 1,700 yards of German trenches. Longer and systematic artillery bombardment began on the 13th May 1915 and continued for 36 hours. The Battle of Aubers Ridge, a few days before, had taught the BEF a valuable lesson. The attack was to be realistic and not too ambitious with orders to advance 1000 yards. The German front line trenches were 300 yards behind a 12-foot ditch away allowing the Allies to capture German held rear area. Although there was a shortage of heavy artillery, considerable success was obtained. The attack began at 11.30pm on the 15th May 1915 with the sixth brigade reaching the German front line and capturing ground behind the enemy trenches, without a shot having been fired.

North of the sixth brigade attack, the element of surprise was lost. When the fifth and Garhwal brigades advanced, the Germans lit up “No Mans Land” and bombarded the advancing troops with shells, machine gun and rifle fire. Only half of one battalion reached the German front line trench close to the left of the sixth brigade, leaving its flanks exposed.

Attacks and counter-attacks continued until the 25th May 1915 when the order given to abandon the offensive operation of the British First Army.

 

On the 22nd May 1915, Italian General Luigi Cadorna was officially appointed Commander in Chief of the Italian army, although from June 1914, he was Chief of the Italian General Staff. Italy declared war on Austro-Hungary on the 23rd May 1915 after having mobilised the Italian army the day before on 22nd May 1915. A new 600 km Front line opened up with the Italian declaration of war. The border between Italy and Austria is mostly mountainous. Although Italy was able to mobilise 1.2 million men they were only able to equip 732,000 men, because they were not a fully industrialised power.

After declaring war, the Italians advanced into the South Tyrol  region and onto the Isonzo River. Austria-Hungary resisted the Italian advance with their defensive tactics learnt from nearly twelve months of fighting against Russia. Treacherous and snow clad mountains made the region unsuited for offensive operations. Despite several quick Italian successes, the whole operation settled into a stalemate, similar to that on the Western Front.

 

On the 25th May 1915, Liberal Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith formed a coalition government with the Conservative opposition party. A political crisis was developing in the British Government. The major reasons for the coalition were the “shell scandal” together with the lack of success in the Dardanelles and Gallipoli peninsular. Kitchener had been tasked to raise and equip a new army of one million men to bolster the “Old Contemptables” of the professional BEF, as well as being Minister for the supply of artillery shells.

Field Marshall Sir John French – Commander of the BEF complained bitterly at the lack of artillery shells, which impeded his forces on the Western Front. The lack of progress at Gallipoli helped the government to become impatient with Kitchener. Liberal David Lloyd George was appointed Minister of Munitions under the new coalition government. This appointment resulted in Kitchener having his ministerial powers reduced. As the new Minister of Munitions, Lloyd George was successful in persuading the unions to drop their restrictive practises for the duration of the war. Lloyd George also gave the militant Suffragettes the right to work. Many Suffragettes were brought into the shell factories and many more were enlisted to perform tasks that were previously male dominated employment.

 

Also on the 25th May 1915, Japan loyally entered the war as Great Britain’s ally, annexing Shantung. She was able to profit by turning the whole of China into a colony of her own.  This colony was the beginning of the creation of the Japanese Empire that ultimately encouraged Japan to attack America in Hawaii during the Second World War.

 

German Kaiser Wilhelm II, on the 12th February 1915, expressed a wish that war in the air should be carried out against England.The 31st May 1915 saw the first German airship raid on London. The German High Command responded by authorising raids on England but they were to be confined only to military bases and barracks. The London docks and fuel, ammunition, and military stores were also to be a target for the raids. Royal residences and residential areas were not to be included in the list of military targets.

The German fleet of airships was available owing to the vulnerability of the airships over the Western Front from anti-aircraft fire.

The initial raid on London saw residential areas being bombed instead of military or dockland areas. This was the result of a navigational error coupled with the airship flying too high. Twenty-eight people lost their lives and many were injured during the raid.

 

F Hammond letter 30 Apr 15

30th April

Bordon

Easter 1915

 

Dear M & P

Just a few more things I don’t think I shall need.  We expect to leave here for Winchester.  We are all mobilised and were inspected today.  Our Section are the Telegraphists for the 28th Brigade which consists of 10th Highland Light Inf, 11th HLI, 9th Scottish Rifles and 6th Kings Own Scottish Borderers.  Allcock and myself are at Headqrs with the General.  So we should be OK.

Do not know if we shall have any leave before going away.

Will drop you a line when we move.  Hope Gladys is better and did well in her exam.  What is George doing now?  Well I want to catch this post so bye bye for present

Burgy

H.M.S. Albion letter 30 Apr

 

H.M.S. “ALBION”

30th April 1915

 

At 4.45 a.m. on 28th April, weighed, and proceeded to take up position 170. W to support right flank as ordered.

 

At 6.10, came under fire, replied about 6.12; under occasional fire until about 7 a.m.  Observed white screen in Domuz Deresi valley probably an aiming mark.  At 8.50 observed French troops advance from Totts Battery; their line then wheeled to left and faced about W.N.W.  At 9.5 fired on enemy on ridge up Kereves valley.  For remainder of forenoon took station about 163.F, in order to see up Kereves valley.  At 9.45 Totts signalled that enemy were advancing in Square 176.T, the position recently shelled by “ALBION”.  About 9.40 observed and sank a mine.  At 9.50 noticed French troops facing to their right towards Achi Baba, then saw they were under gun fire.  Continued firing at intervals.  At 11.0 right gun, Fore Turret, valve box cracked.  At 11.20 shot struck near stem, went astern, apparently no damage.

 

At noon opened heavy fire on body of Turks seen in former position, and continued supporting French Flank.  Frequently under fire sometimes from heavy guns which we could not locate.

 

At 12.55, “LORD NELSON” coming up to relieve, 1.0 proceeded, at 1.3 hit aft port side.  Ammunition expended for day, 12” 7, 6” 165, 12 pr. 134 largely on Turks in the open.  Enemy fired 54 rounds at “ALBION” including many heavy shells.

 

On arrival at North Side of Rabbit Island, ordered TEES alongside, and DEMETIAN to proceed to Gaba Tepe; saw RIVERSDALE anchored south side.  Noticed that “ALBION” was holed before collision bulkhead; sent down divers to examine who reported that plating had parted 11 ft by 2” horizontally, 2 ft by 2” vertically; a split 2 ft by 2”, and several rivets out.  Ship side badly bulged.

 

Ceased taking in ammunition, but continued getting out empties and reported damage.  Directed by Rear Admiral to complete with ammunition and rejoin Flag, unless orders to the contrary were received from the Vice Admiral, and later by Vice Admiral to proceed to Mudros if necessary.  Considered it necessary, and proceeded at midnight arriving at Mudros at 5 a.m. 29th, and sent down divers to wedge and plug as necessary.  Obtained one diver from HUSSAR; RELIANCE carries none.  Obtained services of Engineer Captain.  Ammunitioned from BONDICAR, very little shrapnel obtainable.  Coaled from QUEENSLAND TRANSPORT, and received stores from CARDSWELL.  Sent defective 12” valve box to RELIANCE.

 

About 1 a.m. 30th, outside work sufficiently advanced to commence pumping, but could only get hand pumps to bear, and they would not reduce water.

 

About 7 a.m. 30th, sent diver down to Cofferdam between 7 and 8 to take off manhole in steel deck.

 

Drained water into bilges abaft.  Considerable vibration of bulkhead between Bosn’s store and Cofferdam owing to air; shored up as necessary.  Pumps got water under about 1 p.m. on 30th.  All compartments forward of 7 and part of cofferdam between 7 and 8 had been flooded, and the damage consisted of the following:- The 80 lb Protective Plating was found to have been split at the rivet holes on lower edge and forced inwards to about 4 ins.  The two thicknesses of 20 lb plating behind protective plating were found to be extensively damaged, one plate being turned inwards to approximately 9”, all rivets being sheared.  The protective deck was forced down 2” in frame space, many rivets sheared.  The collision bulkhead was buckled at boundary port side, many rivets sheared, length approximately 2 ft in depth.  The cofferdam bulkhead only slightly damaged at boundary angle; three rivets started.

 

In repairing the damage, divers placed wedges in fracture, and drove in oakum plugs where it was possible to do so effectively.  The water was then pumped out by Main Suction of Ship, taking about 6 hours.  The fracture was filled in with blankets, oakum, stiff red lead, and possible wedges.  Three cofferdams were constructed, consisting of cants 6” x 6” bolted to stiffeners of bulkheads, and planking of 3” deal boards bolted to them; the space was filled in with concrete up to deck, and whole securely caulked.  Shores were then placed from Starboard side to cofferdams.

 

Only small leakage of water discovered when compartments were closed down; quite within the pumping capacity of ship.

 

After various too sanguine estimates, defects were completed and compartments closed up, and ship sailed to rejoin Flag at 9.15 p.m. on 1st, but was later recalled to pick up lapping gear, and returned to outer anchorage.

 

Sailed after receiving gear about 12.30 a.m; arrived off Dardanelles and proceeded to relieve VENGANCE.

 

  1. Watts Jones

CAPTAIN (Act)

 

The Vice Admiral Commanding,

and Rear Admiral Commanding Divisions,

Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,

 

 

 

H.M.S. Albion Appendix to letter 29 Apr 15

APPENDIX I

H.M.S. “ALBION”

29th April 1915

 

LIST OF VOLUNTEERS IN LAUNCH AND SAILING PINNACE

 

P.O. 2Cl Fredk. Gibson, R.F.R. O.N. C/191025, Coxswain of launch, jumped overboard with a line, and got his boat beached.  He then took wounded to the RIVER CLYDE under heavy fire.  Witnessed by Lieut. Tysdale, R.N. Division and many of the Dublin Fusiliers.

 

H.T. Morrison. Smn. R.N.R., 1495. D. was of great assistance to P.O. Gibson, carrying out orders with coolness and alacrity.

 

Frank Dawe, A.B. D/231502, as Cox’n of the Sailing Pinnace showed courage in trying to beach his boat, until having to retire wounded.

 

Samuel Forsey, A.B., R.F.R., S.S.D/2059, took charge of sailing pinnace after Cox’n had been wounded; he succeeded in securing his boat to a lighter, eventually beaching her, and assisted to get pontoons in position for troops to land.

 

Jesse Lovelock, Ord. Sea. C/J 28798, assisted A.B. Forsey in securing boat to lighter and beaching her, then assisted in getting pontoons in position, also helped wounded on the beach and in boats to reach the “RIVER CLYDE”.

 

Samuel Quick. Sea. R.N.R. 3109.B.)

Jas. Rice. Smn. R.N.R. 1519D.        )             Volunteer Launch’s Crew.

Daniel Roach. Smn. R.N.R. 1685D.)

 

Wm. Thomas. Smn. R.N.R. 2208B.   )           Volunteer Sailing Pinnace’s Crew.

Wm. H. Kitchen. Smn. R.N.R4330A )

 

  1. Watts Jones

CAPTAIN (Act)

 

H.M.S. Albion letter 29 Apr 15

H.M.S. “ALBION”

29th April 1915

 

 

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following account of such of the operations an 25th and subsequent days as came under my notice.

 

In accordance with orders, “ALBION” anchored S.10.E true, 1300 yards from Cape Helles on the morning of 25th.  At 5a.m. there was a slight mist especially between Seddul Bahr and No. 1 Fort, and hardly light enough to distinguish objects.  ”ALBION” opened fire at 5.4, and from then onwards fired deliberately into all objects overlooking ”V” Beach that seemed to be of military importance.

At 5.25 as the smoke over Area “A” was very thick, and no boats were approaching, checked fire.  Expenditure of ammunition up to this time being 6” 121 rounds, 12 pr. 54 rounds, 12” 2 rounds, both latter having been fired into S.W. Tower of Seddul Bahr Castle.

 

At 5.33 opened fire again, and continued as before.  At 5.50 observed boats from EURYALUS passing SWIFTSURE.  RIVER CLYDE and Fleet Sweepers approaching; increased rate of fire whenever boats seemed to be coming, decreased again when they proved not to be for ”V” Beach.

 

At 6.5 RIVER CLYDE passed to Starboard, but later dropped back.  Observed boats on “W” beach were under heavy fire.

 

At 6.25 SAPPHIRE signalled that our shot was falling on her landing party, (“Y” Beach).  ”ALBION” had fired at a trench on crest of hill close to Fort No. 1.  Checked fire accordingly.

 

At 6.33 observed ”CORNWALLIS” approaching with boats, and opened heavy fire, but checked again at 6.35 on observing the boats were not loaded.

 

At 6.37 observed loaded boats approaching, re-opened heavy fire.  The boats passed astern, and about this time “ALBION” received signal from “EURYALUS” to support “RIVER CLYDE”, and “RIVER CLYDE” passed astern.

 

At 6.44 observed fire on boats off “V” Beach.  At 6.45 boats were close to beach, checked fire, and then observed they were under heavy fire on the beach, from whence unknown.  At the same time “RIVER CLYDE” beached under heavy rifle and machine gun fire.

 

At 6.49 “ALBION” opened a continuous deliberate fire over head of boats.  At 6.50 boats cast off tow, and at 6.53 troops were landed on “V” beach with heavy loss, only a few men succeeding in crossing the beach and reaching the shelter afforded by the foreshore.

 

Many boats were drifting about helplessly, some broadside on to the beach with men in the water sheltering behind them.  “V” beach, and especially a rocky spit off the starboard bow of “RIVER CLYDE” being strewn with dead and wounded.  The lighters were ahead of “RIVER CLYDE” mostly on her Port bow.

 

In spite of the heavy cross fire on “V” beach, a few boats of the first tow got back, and at 7.5 observed them approaching “CLACTON”.

From about 7.15 onwards, disabled boats some with dead and wounded continued to come alongside ”ALBION”.  Dealt with boats as necessary and despatched them when ready to “CORNWALLIS”, and continued passing signals or information received.

 

About 8.10 an Officer of the Naval Division, and later the Beach Master came on board, and from them learnt that the “RIVER CLYDE” and “ARGYLE” were 50 ft apart, and that troops could not disembark, and that our troops were nowhere more than 100 yards from shore.

 

At 8.15, “QUEEN ELIZABETH” arrived; and informed her of situation.

 

At 9.10 having obtained permission from “QUEEN ELIZABETH”, hoisted out launch and pinnace manned by volunteer crews and loaded them with casks lashed under thwarts to form bridge, and sent them in tow to “RIVER CLYDE”.  Boats reached “RIVER CLYDE” at 9.50, but were apparently unable to get into place owing to heavy fire.

 

Throughout the forenoon continued firing on enemy’s supposed positions, occasionally checked by signal or reports, some of them inaccurate, old, or ambiguous, receiving wounded, and dealing with boats as requisite.

 

At 11.30 a.m. “EURYALUS” ordered boats for “V” beach to be diverted to “W” beach.

 

In afternoon continued the same as in forenoon, “ALBION” firing as desired by RIVER CLYDE.  By 4.30 p.m. rifle fire had considerably diminished, and “RIVER CLYDE” signalled asking for barrel pier.

 

At 5.35 ordered by Rear Admiral to attack hill 141, and directed fire accordingly.  At 6.30 ordered to weigh and close shore.  At 7.2 anchored in 10 fathoms, C. Helles N.28.W. 800 yards.  Could now see N.W. Side of wall of Seddul Bahr castle and more into the gullies below, and to eastward of Fort No. 1.  At 7.10 ceased fire.

 

At 7.30 “NEWMARKET” came alongside; discharged 23 dead and 45 wounded to her; all being troops or beach parties, including Captain Johnson of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, wounded, and the body of Mr. Handiman, Midshipman, late of  “CORNWALLIS” who died of his wounds on board “ALBION”.  About 8 p.m. Major Thomson, R.A., joined.

 

At about 9 p.m., I learnt from some of our boat keepers who had returned, that they had got the launch into position so that the troops from “RIVER CLYDE” could land.  About this time, a boat was sent to Cliff under Fort No. 1 to search for wounded seen in boat there, but could not find them.

 

Situation at dark as seen from “ALBION”.  “W” beach troops on hill 138, and at C. Helles signal station.  “V” beach troops dug in along fore shore, or in RIVER CLYDE, and under Seddul Bahr Castle wall, and behind Fort No. 3 earthworks.

 

S.W. Borderers visible along wall of Totts Battery.  The situation apparently precarious.

 

The expenditure of ammunition for day. All into Area “A” :- 12” 12, 6” common 604, shrapnel 294.  12 pr. Common 903, shrapnel 327.

 

All ranks and ratings of  “ALBION” did their duty, but mostly lacked the opportunity of distinguishing themselves.  I give however in Appendix I the names of volunteers who manned the launch and pinnace, particularly that of Petty Officer 2nd Class Frederick Gibson, R.F.R., O.N. C/191025, who, as I understand from several sources, behaved most gallantly.

 

Able Seaman Frank Dawe, O.N. D/231502 was wounded while coxswain of the Sailing Pinnace.

 

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

  1. Watts Jones

CAPTAIN (Act)

 

The Vice Admiral Commanding

Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,

H.M.S. “QUEEN ELIZABETH”.

& Rear Admiral Commanding

Divisions.