Issued down to Divisions
(for distribution down to Battalions)
T.9.
NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 7.
GERMAN ATTACK NEAR GIVENCHY, APRIL 9th, 1918.
From captured German orders and the attached map which shows the dispositions and plans of the 4th Ersatz Division, it appears that the following method of attack was adopted by the enemy:-
1. A very careful study was made of our defences in this locality. It is noteworthy that three days before the attack the enemy issued to platoon commanders detailed information gathered from air reconnaissance carried out at low elevation on that day, together with a note indicating not only the force expected to oppose the attack but also the estimated quality of the opposition anticipated. As a result of his reconnaissance, the enemy seems to have based his plan on avoiding the strong locality at Givenchy itself, penetrating our line on either flank, and turning inwards so as to take Givenchy from the right rear (south-west and south). The attacking force was divided into two portions, a northern and a southern. The northern attack was undertaken by four battalions, of which two were in front line, one in support and one in reserve. The southern attack consisted of two battalions, one being in the front line and one in support. In these attacks, the leading battalions were ordered to push straight forward, while the supporting battalion of the southern attack was to turn north and to take Givenchy in flank and rear from the south-west and south, and the supporting battalion of the northern attack was to deal similarly with Festubert from the south. This method of dealing from the flank and rear with strong points which are not attacked frontally has been conspicuous in the German operations since the 21st of March 1918.
2. Our defences consisted of defended localities each of which was held by a complete unit of not less than a platoon; other platoons especially detailed for counter-attack were kept in support. The garrisons of the defended localities had received orders to hold on at all costs – orders which were carried out in every case – and the platoons in support had been instructed to counter-attack as soon as the occasion arose without waiting for further orders. Each defended locality was prepared and wired for all round defence. Many of the communication trenches were wired, and lines of wire running perpendicularly and obliquely to the front had been erected to check any lateral advance in the event of local penetration. These obstacles proved of great assistance in preventing the enemy from extending his flanks after he has forced his way into portions of our front defences.
3. The attack was launched in a heavy mist, which greatly assisted the enemy. The parties of Germans, however, which succeeded in penetrating our positions were held up by the garrisons of the defended localities. As soon as the enemy’s advance was thus checked, the platoons in support counter-attacked and worked round the flanks of the parties which had pressed forward into our line. The enemy was engaged, therefore, by fire and bayonet from all sides. Several hundred prisoners and a large number of machine guns were captured, and our line was maintained intact. There was very little bombing.
4. The failure of the enemy’s attack upon these defences was due to the stubbornness of the defence maintained by the garrisons of the defended localities, and to the promptitude and skill with which the supporting platoons made their counter-attacks. We employed the same tactics against the enemy as he was endeavouring to employ against us. No frontal counter-attack was delivered, but the enemy was defeated by a succession of immediate counter-attacks delivered from the flanks.

Full advantage was taken of counter-attacking platoons of their knowledge of the ground, with the result that the enemy was outmanoeuvred as well as outfought.

From a study of this engagement the fact emerges clearly that an enemy penetrating into gaps in our positions is very much at a disadvantage until he can widen the flanks of the gaps; if the defending troops strengthen the flanks of these gaps and hold on to their positions tenaciously, he is bound to be caught between two fires, and forced to surrender what he has gained.

April 24th 1918.

Printed in France by Army Printing and Stationary Services. PRESS A-4/18.-6188S-3,500.

K.J. Bunting Capt.
Issued down to Divisions
(for distribution down to Battalions)
T.9
NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 6.
MACHINE GUNS.
(Issued by the General Staff)
1. The following translation of a German document (I/a48580) indicates good dispositions and handling of our machine gun units, during the fighting in March. It emphasises again the value of the disposition of machine guns in depth – both in attack and defence. In the attack, security against counter-attack is thereby given to the flanks; in defence, provision is thereby made for resistance to the enemy’s attempt to widen any gap into which he may penetrate.
2. Fire effect is the essential. Therefore, an extensive field of fire (1,000 yards or more) is required for machine guns; direct fire must be a primary consideration; and the employment of guns singly should be avoided. Generally, forward guns should be employed in pairs, and guns in rear should be in pairs or groups of four, so as to facilitate control of a considerable volume of fire.
3. In defence, the disposition of machine guns in depth must be based on definite plans for restricting the area into which an attacker might penetrate. The enemy generally attempts to effect penetration at the weaker portions of the line and to take our more strongly prepared positions in flank and reverse. This should be anticipated and should not necessitate bringing our machine guns into action in unforeseen directions as has sometime occurred.
4. Single guns with hostile infantry may be dealt with in previously prepared defences by single 18-pdrs in advanced positions, and on all occasions by the fire of rifles and Lewis guns used boldly in front of the main position.
Ia/48580
TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT.
C.G.S. of the Field Army
Ia/II Nr. 82373 op. 30-3-18.
1. During the course of our offensive, the principal resistance was offered by the machine gun nests distributed in depth. Their total destruction by the artillery bombardment prior to the assault, even when this was of considerable duration, was not achieved and cannot be expected. We must be satisfied with the neutralization of as large a number as possible of these nests by means of heavy artillery fire and bombardment with blue cross gas shell.
The engagement of those machine gun nests which remain in action will then be carried out by single guns (of light Minenwerfer), which are under the orders of the most advanced infantry, follow this infantry as close as possible and fire over open sights at close range (1,1000 yards). It is advisable that batteries allotted to individual battalions should always be the same. Under the protection of the fire of these guns (or Minenwerfer), the infantry will advance by bounds with quite weak groups, the light machine guns forming part of these groups.

The heavy machine guns should generally be employed to keep down the occupants of the objective of the attack during the infantry attack, and to follow the latter up by large bounds. They also afford security against the enemy’s counter-thrusts.

The method outlined above has apparently not been employed universally, but where it has, it has been successful and casualties have been light. I request that steps be taken to ensure that this method is brought to the knowledge of all units as early as possible. The idea of compelling success by the employment of masses of troops must be absolutely eradicated. This merely leads to unnecessary losses. It is fire effect which is decisive, and not numbers.

2. The extraordinary moral and explosive effect of the medium and heavy Minenwerfer has been once more proved during the attack on the 21st March. The selection of the position of the Minenwerfer companies during the advance must be based on the consideration that they must be able to bring their medium Minenwerfer into action as soon as the attack comes to a standstill, especially against defended villages, farm buildings etc. There is no question of employing heavy Minenwerfer and Flugelminenwerfer in open warfare; there is therefore all the more reason to make use of them in trench warfare. Apart from the preparatory bombardment prior to the actual attack, their principal task will always be to annihilate the enemy’s infantry. Villages which lie within range form, on account of their strong garrisons, particularly suitable targets.

(Signed) LUDENDORFF.
GENERAL STAFF,
GENERSAL HEADQUARTERS,
19th April, 1918.

Printed in France by Army Printing and Stationary Services. PRESS A-4/18.

George Ryan’s letter home dated 15 April 1915

1945. ‘D’ Co

9^th Middx

Barrackpore

Bengal

India.

15 April 1915

Dear M & F,

Your letter of March 18^th received.  Glad to hear Dad has been a bit busy but I suppose it won’t last long.  Hope his feet are better.

I had a letter from Bert this week; he must be having a jolly rough time. He doesn’t seem to think the war will be over just yet, not before next Christmas, he says.  I suppose they discuss it every other day in the trenches the same as we do here.  I think I’ve told you before that I’ve got a rupee (1^s/4^d) bet on with another fellow that it’s over by Oct 31^st.  I hope I shall win it.

Well we are going to Darjeeling at last, 19 of us from this Co. We leave here to-morrow, Wed 14. (I’m writing this Tues 13^th).  It will be a change for us.  We’ve got to put on warm clothing! & take 2 extra blankets.  The temperature up there is about 45^o whereas it was over 100^o here yesterday.  So I expect we shall feel pretty cold the first few days.

I’m sending some photographs by this mail. They are only groups taken at Dinapore & as I don’t want to cart them up to Darjeeling I’m sending them home.  I would have sent them long ago only I’ve been going to have some done of myself alone but have not done so yet.  I was going to send them all to-gether.  I will tell you what the groups are next week & whether there’s anybody else you know in them.  They are at the bottom of my box at present.

Hope you are all well.

Yr loving son

George

Thank May for her letter of 18 Mar. Will answer it next week.

They are ¼^d stamps on the envelope.  P.C.s go for ¼^d out here, letters ½^d (Inland)

P.T.O.

Just turned out photographs. They are not up to much, not worth sending in fact but as I’ve paid for them I might as well send them.  The big one & the P.C.s is No 1 Section, (my section) & the other is just an odd group.  I enclose the P.C.s.  C.A.S. is in both of them.  The chap sitting on the form on the extreme left of the Section photo was the one that was billeted with me in Sittingbourne.  G.W.R.

George Ryan’s letter home dated 8 Apr 1915

Barrackpore

Bengal

India.

8 April 1915

Dear M & F,

Your letter of March 12^th received.  I sent my insurance card to the Society about the 2^nd or 3^rd week we were here so they must have got it soon after sending that notice.

I have not come across any place where I could get a parrot; but you need not reckon on me bringing one of those things home. I don’t suppose we could if we wanted too.  We shall have quite enough to manage as it is.  As our Colour Serg^t says this is not a tea-party, we are out here as soldiers.

We are at Ishapore again this week on guard. There’s no upper floor to the guard-room so we find it very hot.  It is a job to get any sleep at night time.  We generally have a couple of hours sleep in the afternoon, that is if we are not on duty.  It’s too hot to do anything else.  It’s very nice this morning as I write this, on the bank of the river Hooghly; the one place where it’s a bit cool here.  There’s a nice breeze blowing.

I went to Calcutta again last Sat.  It’s a treat to see a little of town life now & again.  We had a ride round in a 1^st class garrey as far as St Paul’s Cathedral.  We had a look in there; it’s a fine building but very small for a Cathedral.  We came across an English watch maker so I’ve left my watch with him to be mended.  It’s going to cost me 5 or 6 “chips” (7/- or 8/-).

I think we shall go to Darjeeling next week I hope so at any rate.

I had some more papers from Holt this week.

Hoping you are all well.

Your affec son

George

George Ryan’s letter home dated 6 April 1917

Scouts Section,

1/9^th Middlesex Reg^t

Ambala,

India.

6 Apl 1917

Dear Ma,

I have written to Mr Walker this week (about time too, I expect you’ll think) & asked him to send you what remains to my credit at the office, so that the monthly amounts will dis-continue. Please invest it in War Loan – you will know best which Stock – & let me know the particulars.

To-day, being Good Friday, we should have had a Church Parade but we’ve got a holiday instead, owing to the outbreak of measles.

Hoping you are all well &with best love & kisses from

Your loving son

George

V – W – X – Y – Z

SECRET

42^nd Inf. Bde.

S6/117 B.M.

******************

5^th Oxf & Bucks L.I.

5^th Shrops L.I.

9^th K.R.Rif.C.

9^th Rif Brig.

42^nd Machine Gun Company.

42^nd Trench Mortar Battery.

No. V Group R.F.A.

1. W day will be April 5^thY             do           7^th
2. Z             do         8^th
3. X             do          6^th
4. The Artillery bombardment will be continuous on V, W, X and Y days, except for pauses given in paras 3 and 4.
6. Pauses will take place during the bombardment on the whole Army front for the purpose of photography:-W day             10 a.m. – 10.30 a.m.             3 p.m. – 3.30 p.m.
7. X day              10.30 a.m. – 11 a.m.            3 p.m. – 3.30 p.m.
8. V day              11.30 a.m. – 12 noon          4.30 p.m. – 5 p.m.
9. During the preparatory bombardment the Brigade will send out patrols, each under an officer, at stated times during each period of 24 hours to investigate state of enemy wire and strength of enemy in his trenches. The G.O.C. Brigade will decide on the time at which these patrols will go out during each period of 24 hours, and points which they will reconnoitre.
11. All patrol reports will be sent by Special D.R. to Brigade Headquarters as soon as they have been written and seen by the Commanding Officer, who will state in a covering letter the degree of accuracy which he considers that each report possesses.
12. The work of these patrols is of great importance, more especially regarding the examination of enemy wire and the accuracy of their reports on its condition. Capt,42^nd Inf. Bde.A Patrol under 2/Lt. Anderson capture and *** Machine G un.4^th April 1917
14. NOTE.
15. Bde Major,
16. B . Taget
17. Officers in charge of patrols should be informed that the Offensives has now begun, and that all work in connection with it is of the highest importance, more especially as regards details such as preparatory patrolling.