Headquarters 178^th Infantry Bde. stamp.

Issued down to Divisions

(for distribution down to Battalions)

T/9

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 17.

(Issued by the General Staff)

The attached German document gives a detailed description of the enemy’s tactical procedure and arrangements during the recent operations. Although in previous notes attention has been drawn to the majority of the points on which emphasis is laid in this document, the following should be particularly noted.

1. Great stress is laid on the fact that it is necessary for the attacking troops to be thoroughly trained in open warfare.
2. It is pointed out that the most rigorous secrecy is vital, and that the time and place of the attack should not be communicated to the troops until the last moment.
3. Special injunctions are given as to the thorough reconnaissance of the sector to be attacked.
4. The minimum objective is definitely laid down as the defender’s artillery positions. The infantry, after passing beyond the limit of the barrage zone, is instructed to push forward rapidly, relying on infantry weapons (including light and heavy machine guns), and supported by light trench mortars and by the field artillery placed at the disposal of the regimental commanders. From the outset of the attack distribution in depth is enjoined.
5. The need of the personal initiative of subordinate commanders, and the necessity for the exploitation to the utmost of any success, are emphasised.
6. The aim especially set before the infantry is the overcoming of strong points and centres of resistance by envelopment combined with concentration of machine gun and artillery fire, rather than by direct attack, reserves being only employed at points where initial success has been obtained.
7. As soon as a hostile counter-attack has been repulsed, an immediate counter-thrust is prescribed. It is laid down as the principal concern of commanders that the general forward movement should be promptly resumed and the defenders pressed as closely as possible.
8. Reference is made to the difficulties caused by the defender’s centres of resistance in splitting up the attacking troops.In order successfully to meet an attack on the lines laid down, the essentials are constant observation in order to guard against surprise, organization of depth in defence, economical distribution of troops in forward positions, and determined resistance with a view to the retention of tactical localities and strong points between which the enemy may succeed in penetrating, combined with counter-offensive action.9^th of July, 1918.Printed in France by Army Printing and Stationary Services.                                                                 PRESS A-7049 & 7018S-7/18.

TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT.

[S.S. 723]                                                                                                                  Ia/51522

Issued by German G.H.Q.

at the beginning of 1918.

NOTES ON THE BREAK-THROUGH, FOR BRIGADE, REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION COMMANDERS.

• – PREPARATIONS.

• The preparations in the position itself are usually made by the division in line (Stellungs-division). The objective will be kept secret. Instructions should be given in good time regarding the nature, extent and state of these preparations. If the preparations are not sufficiently advanced, the attacking troops will, if necessary, lend their assistance.

• A thorough training of the attacking troops in open warfare and offensive tactics is the most important point. The attacking infantry must be trained to co-operate with machine guns and trench mortars, and with the artillery accompanying it. To keep close up to the creeping barrage and to assault immediately “on top of” the supporting fire of the machine guns are two principles which must become second nature to the infantry. Training should be carried out with blank ammunition. The creeping barrage is, nevertheless, not the principle thing; it assists the infantry in the close combat, but cannot entirely obviate the latter. The infantry should, in principle, advance under the protection of the heavy machine guns ready to place a barrage in front of it. The tactics should be those of assault troops; massed formations should be avoided. Subordinate commanders must be thoroughly trained. The first requisites are discipline and a firm attitude on the part of officers. Superior commanders must know their subordinates thoroughly, in order to be able to employ them judiciously. The moral of the troops and of the subordinate commanders, and their elan and determination must be raised. During training, the men should wear their full equipment. The fighting strength of the infantry should be checked (men on detachment). As rapidity of movement is of the utmost importance, the men’s equipment for the attack should often be reduced.

• During training, the various means of communication should be employed; all ranks should be trained in their use. Too many men should not be employed on this duty.

• Rigorous secrecy must be maintained. The time and place of the attack should not be communicated to the troops until the last moment. The notification of zero hour at the last minute should be practiced. All cases of indiscretion should be severely dealt with, even in the case of officers. Any elements which are suspected should be kept in rear and watched without their being aware of it.

1. 1. The men must be constantly instructed to take cover from air and ground observation.

• The equipment of the men, harness of the horses, the vehicles, and the defensive measures against gas, must be inspected. The troops must not take any unnecessary baggage with them. Men must be trained to load vehicles in accordance with definite instructions, and to calculate weights. The kits of officers and Feldwebel must be inspected. Text books and papers must be reduced to the absolute minimum. The first line transport and travelling kitchens should be provided with good teams, if necessary from the regimental transport.

1. 1. The kit which the men are to carry for the assault should be thought out in detail. Any unnecessary reduction of kit does more harm than good.

• Supply of rations. Iron rations must be checked. Every man should go into battle well provided with food and drink. Vegetable rations are unnecessary. Full use should be made of all stores and supplies captured from the enemy. These should be carefully guarded. Tobacco should be provided. On days of heavy fighting alcohol should be issued.

1. 1. The supply of water in the forward area will be difficult, and men should, therefore, carry two water bottles. A reserve supply of water should be maintained with the first line transport. During the first few days of an offensive, it will scarcely ever be possible to send up supplies of rations.

• Supply of maps. Maps, air photographs, oblique photographs, and sketches of the zones of attack and of the enemy’s battery positions should be issued down to platoon commanders. Uniformity must be secured in the type of map and the conventional signs used by the infantry and artillery, and also by the air service.

• Reconnaissance of the sector to be attacked. This should be carried out by the commanders in conjunction with the divisions in line. Movements of all officers or staffs, which might attract the enemy’s attention should be avoided. The sectors of attack selected by the higher commanders mainly from the map should be located on the ground by means of prominent features. The sectors of attack should not all be made equally wide. Where the conditions are more favourable for a rapid advance, the sector should be made narrower.

1. 1. The positions of the enemy’s strong points, woods, etc., the capture of which necessitates special measures (such as an artificial smoke screen, envelopment, etc.), should be noted. Special assault detachments should be detailed in advance for the capture of particular strong points. The troops for holding the captured ground should be detailed in advance.

• Brigade, regimental and infantry battalion commanders must receive detailed instructions as to the preparation of the attack by artillery, trench mortars, aircraft and, if necessary, tanks, and as to the support which they will receive from these arms. Every subordinate commander must have a general idea of the arrangements. The artillery commander should give the infantry commanders a short explanation of his proposed course of action.

• The meaning and use of all visual and flare signals, including those of units on the flanks, must be absolutely clear. Their allotment and the method of employing them must be settled in detail.II – THE ASSEMBLY.

• Guide detachments (Einweisungskommandos) should be detailed. The routes of approach and the assembly positions should be carefully and inconspicuously reconnoitred, distributed and marked out for the following:-

1. The attacking infantry, with light machine guns distributed as for assault troops. The machine gun group is the tactical unit of the infantry.
2. The heavy machine guns and light Minenwerfer (generally with their battalions). Machine guns and trench mortars should not be massed. From the outset, the heavy machine guns must be ready to protect the attacking infantry by their fire, and must not be kept in reserve in rear. Machine guns should be detailed from the outset for anti-aircraft defences.
3. The artillery accompanying the infantry, with a detachment of pioneers (battery commander with the regimental commander).
4. Carrying parties and police detachments. Means for crossing trenches protected by wire (lengths of duck board, about 13 feet long, are useful). Preparations must be made for the supply of rifle, machine gun (filled belts) and light trench mortar ammunition, rifle grenades and hand grenades; horsed transport and hand-cart echelons.
5. First line transport. Arrangements must be made for its concentration and for bringing it forward. The most rigorous march discipline must be enforced. Subordinate commanders should check the concentration.

• Supernumerary officers and N.C.O.s, intended to replace casualties, should be warned in advance and sent forward. A company does not generally need more than one officer, in addition to the company commander, for the first attack.

• Vehicles with material for crossing obstacles and shell holes should be provided, e.g., fascines and, with the batteries, portable bridges. The requirements must be thought out beforehand. The men of the first line and regimental transport should be trained beforehand in overcoming difficulties of ground.

• Brigade and regimental command posts in the assembly positions must be fixed, and arrangements made for communication.It is important that the commander should be able to overlook the ground to be attacked.Wireless communication must be established between the regiment and the battalions and artillery sub-groups, as well as with the brigade or the “signal communication head” and from the brigade to the division.Increase of signal traffic before an attack should be avoided. Strict discipline must be enforced in regard to telephone conversations and wireless messages. The “Signal Service Traffic Regulations” must be observed.

1. 1. The subsequent extension of the system of communication intended during the attack must be worked out in advance, and the main lines must be marked out on the map (see para. 23). The whole Staff must have a thorough knowledge of these arrangements and not only the technical officer.
   2. Communication by lamp and signals must be arranged.
   3. Telephonic communication should be established between the regiment and the brigade, between the latter and the division and the artillery groups. In establishing these communications, the arrangements which will be required, as the attack progresses must be taken into account. If the division has pushed its “signal communication head” (Meldekopf) in advance of brigade headquarters, the regiment will establish communication with the division instead of with the brigade (see para.23).
   4. These command posts should be pushed as far forward as possible.

• Arrangements must be made to organize the first attack in depth, and to form regimental and brigade reserves. The machine guns must be allotted, and each machine gun must be detailed to a special task. The sectors of attack must also be allotted. 

1. III- THE ATTACK.
2. Each unit must have its objective assigned to it in detail e.g., the capture of particular positions, machine gun nests and dug-outs. Positions which are to be passed by and taken by means of a turning movement must be specially indicated. Arrangements must be made to protect the flanks and to “mop up” trenches. Officers’ watches must be repeatedly synchronized; the hands must be correctly set; it is not sufficient merely to note that a watch is so many minutes fast or slow.

• Regiment in Front Line.

• Watches must again be synchronized shortly before the attack.

• The infantry should penetrate the enemy’s position simultaneously with the fall of the last rounds of artillery and trench mortars. Everything which might disclose prematurely the hour of the attack must be avoided (no machine gun fire, no cheering etc.).

1. 1. A rapid advance affords the maximum degree of security and ensures success. Beware of traps (ruses). The covering fire of machine guns must always be ready (also that of rifles, rifle grenades, trench mortars and the artillery accompanying the infantry).

• The minimum objective is the enemy’s artillery position. Consequently, the enemy’s positions should be overrun without a halt, isolated battery positions penetrated and the advance continued beyond the latter positions. The quicker the gun positions are reached, especially those of the heavy artillery situated on reverse slopes, the fewer will be the casualties.

• From the outset, distribution in depth should be immediately established from rear to front (in echelon, flank defence).

• The batteries accompanying the infantry should be pushed forward as single guns or by sections, from sector to sector, in such a manner that they are never all out of action at the same time. Sufficient ammunition must be taken forward. A few guns with plenty of ammunition are of more value than a large number of guns with little ammunition. The same applies to the trench mortars. The section commanders of the artillery should open fire on all favourable targets on their own initiative.

1. 1. Infantry regimental and battalion commanders must be acquainted with amount of ammunition carried by their accompanying artillery, in order that ammunition may not be wasted on targets of secondary importance. All reserves, whether they have been specially detailed for this purpose or not, must of their own accord make every effort to assist in getting forward guns and ammunition.

• The reserves must be brought up closer than is usual in open warfare, but they must not be engaged too soon.

• The position of commanders must be clearly marked (flags).Brigade and regimental commanders should select positions from which they can see the ground. These positions should be moved forward by bounds to the next point from which observation can be obtained. (Take horses forward.)

1. 1. Command posts should be used as long as possible, otherwise communication fails and command becomes impossible. Commanders should push as far forward as possible, in order that they may exert their personal influence on the troops which they hold in reserve. If necessary, a commander must himself intervene in the conduct of the operations, or must send an officer from his own staff or from his own reserve of officers to any point in the front line where his presence may be required.
   2. The battalion commander accompanies his troops on the battlefield, his place as a rule being in the vicinity of the company reserve.

• Communication during the attack.

• During the attack, communication within the regiment, and from the regiment to the brigade, to the artillery in position and artillery accompanying the infantry, to the aeroplane, and to the units on the flanks, is indispensible. As direct telephonic communication in the forward fighting zone cannot generally be relied on, the transmission of information must be effected by other means (liaison officers, mounted orderlies and cyclists).

• The division will push forward continually, and as far as possible, on the general alignment of regimental headquarters, a report centre (“signal communications head”) which will be connected by telephone to the division through the brigade. It will, in addition, be plentifully provided with every other means of communication. All orders and reports will be sent through this report centre, which will ensure their transmission. It is essential that all information regarding the successive positions of the regimental command posts should be notified to this report centre. When command posts move, someone must be left at the old headquarters to receive orders until such time as the new headquarters is completely established. The report centre will establish telephonic communication with the regiment as soon as the forward movement has come to a standstill.

• Communication within the regiment, and from the regiment to neighbouring regiments and to report centre, will be carried out by mounted orderlies.

1. Communication with the artillery in position will be carried out through the artillery liaison officer who is attached to each battalion. Each battalion must be in possession of a signalling detachment.
2. Communication with the artillery accompanying the infantry must be established either direct with the commander concerned or through the artillery liaison officers. (In addition, the artillery staff must be able to observe for themselves.)
3. Communication with aircraft will be carried out by laying out cloth signals near the command posts and message dropping stations, as soon as the infantry aeroplane appears.
4. The troops in front line will lay out cloth signals as soon as they have reached their objective, or, if the advance has come to a standstill, as a rule only when the aeroplane calls for them.

• The progress of the attack will not be uniform. Reserves must only be employed at points where an initial success has been obtained; this initial success should be extended by a turning movement or by rolling up any portions of the line which still hold out. This systematic enveloping movement should be continued with the assistance of the supporting troops, the leading assault waves continuing to press forward in their sector of attack. The personal influence of infantry commanders and their own spirit and initiative are frequently decisive. The centre of gravity of the attack must always be clearly recognised. It is important to occupy high ground; massing should be avoided; cover should always be taken from air observation.

• Machine guns, artillery and trench mortar fire should be rapidly concentrated upon centres of resistance which are successfully holding up our advance from a flank; assault troops should be pushed forward to attack from a flank by means of an enveloping movement; too large a force should not be used for this purpose, nor must the general direction of the attack be lost sight of.

• Centres of resistance and hostile artillery battery positions tend to split up the attacking troops, and all ranks must immediately endeavour to regain touch with their commanders. It is the duty of the latter to collect and reorganize their forces repeatedly, and to re-establish the distribution in depth. New reserves should be formed.

• The most distant objective should be allotted to the first wave, which should push forward as far as possible. The first and second waves should overrun the hostile trenches. It is expressly forbidden (for these troops) to take prisoners or clear dug-outs.

• Troops must not collect in villages or in woods, but should go round the edges of them. As soon as the attack of a village has succeeded, the majority of the troops should be at once withdrawn. A protective garrison should be left behind.

1. 1. Deep dug-outs and caves should be searched at once, in order to discover enemy nests and isolated stragglers.

• The necessity for co-operation between battalions and regiments must never be lost sight of. They should not, however, wait for one another, but care should be taken that the flanks of elements which are advancing independently are protected by supporting troops and, above all, by machine guns.

• Arrangements must be made for the supply of ammunition for machine guns (filled belts), trench mortars and artillery, and for the supply of hand grenades and of water for machine guns. The various echelons of horsed transport and hand-carts must follow up the attacking infantry.

1. Repairs to machine guns should be carried out at the wagons. Belts must be filled. Empty boxes and belts should be returned to the wagons.

• Regiment in Support.

• The general task of the regiment in support is to carry forward the attack when the forces of the initial blow becomes spent. As a general rule, it should not intervene in the battle unless ordered to do so by the brigade: it is the duty of the regimental commander, however, to act entirely on his own initiative in an emergency.

• The later the regiment is engaged, the better. Its spirit must not be daunted in the event of small local reverses. It should only be engaged at points where the attack progresses.

• It must maintain visual communication with the front line regiment. The commander of the support regiment must be able, personally, to view the battlefield, otherwise it will be impossible for him to command his regiment.

• Communication with the brigade (in the event of the unit being divisional reserve, with the division) with the artillery, etc., as laid down in para. 23.

• A reconnaissance of the ground with a view to bringing forward the troops in 2^nd line must be carried out from the assembly position. The final decision as to the roads of approach and the formation to be adopted for the attack will depend on the fall of the enemy’s fire. Areas which are not swept by fire must be utilized; if the formation is temporarily lost, it should be re-established.

• The scattered elements of the front line regiment must be collected, reorganized and brought up as a reserve to the second line. For this purpose, energetic officers should be kept in readiness. The company Feldwebel, with the first line transport, should collect stragglers and control wounded.

1. 1. IV. REPULSE OF HOSTILE COUNTER-ATTACKS.
   2. Police measures should be very strict behind the front.
   3. A study of the hostile position, of the ground, and of the attitude of the enemy during raids carried out by patrols and during minor operations undertaken by divisions in line, gives the best indication regarding the position of the enemy’s main line of resistance. Counter-attacks carried out by local reserves need only be expected in the main line of resistance; counter-attacks by larger forces need only be anticipated behind the main line of resistance.
   4. The points where hostile counter-attacks and tank attacks are likely to be delivered should be the subject of careful previous consideration.

• If distribution in depth is continually maintained, counter-attacks are almost certain to be repulsed. In repelling a counter-attack, the co-operation of machine guns, batteries accompanying the infantry, light Minenwerfer and trench mortar companies is necessary; in this respect, heavy machine guns should be employed in dominating positions in rear in a similar manner to the batteries accompanying the infantry, in order to afford protection by their fire to the advancing infantry. They should advance rapidly in echelon from one position to another; they should be distributed chequerwise. The forward companies will employ their light machine guns in the front line.

• As soon as a counter-attack or a hostile attack has been repulsed, an immediate counter-thrust should be delivered. The principle concern of commanders is to see that the general forward movement is immediately resumed and that the enemy is pressed as closely as possible. In particular, the fresh reserves which have been engaged to repel the counter-attack must continue the forward movement; new reserves must be constituted by collecting together all available units.V. – ACTION TO BE TAKEN WHEN THE OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN GAINED.

• A formation should be rapidly adopted which will ensure the maintenance of the ground which has been gained against the enemy’s counter-attacks, until the attack can be continued. Units should be organized in considerable depth in the formation which will eventually be necessary for the continuance of the attack. The reserves will then form the counter-attack troops required for the defence of the position. Small parties should be pushed forward to act as a screen; reconnaissance must be continually carried out. Arrangements must be made to secure flanking fire from the machine guns sited at points which cannot be seen by the enemy; these points are frequently situated on low-lying ground. Flanks must be secured; touch must be maintained and co-operation effected with neighbouring units. Machine guns must be brought into position for defence against aircraft.

• Order must be re-established in units, reserves detailed, and communication established with higher formations and with units on the flanks. New commanders must make themselves known by name to subordinate commanders, and the latter must make themselves known to the men.

• Communication must be established with the artillery, which should rapidly organize the artillery defence (artilleristische Abwehr). It is important that the artillery should have direct observation, so as to be able to detect the hostile counter-attack and break it up the moment it is launched. All points which would form good observation posts should be immediately reported to the artillery. All results of infantry observation should be communicated to the artillery by the most rapid means available.

• The supply of ammunition and food must be ensured and the travelling kitchens brought up.

• Construction of the position. – Units should dig themselves in as rapidly as possible. The exact trace of the line will not be settled until later. Attention must be paid to the distribution of the forces engaged, and to arrangements for reliefs and rest. Protection against aerial observation is of very great importance.

• Medical services.

• In certain circumstances, units which have suffered heavily should be relieved in good time.

• As soon as his counter-attacks have been repulsed, the enemy should be attacked immediately and pursued with fresh forces.All the above arrangements must be made in close agreement with the artillery and the units on the flanks.VI – SUCCESSFUL PENETRATION OF THE ENEMY’S POSITIONS.

1.  
2.  
4. As soon as the enemy’s positions and artillery have been captured, the fighting assumes more the character of open warfare. Methodical preparations come to an end and personal initiative and vigorous action take their place.The commander’s place is well forward. Columns of route must be rapidly formed, and the artillery accompanying the infantry and the light Minenwerfer must follow closely on the roads.
5. Assert and exploit German superiority in open warfare.
6. The pursuit of the enemy should be rapid and uninterrupted. He must be given no respite, even during the night. One unit should not wait for another. At the same time, effective measures must always be taken to overcome by fire any unforeseen resistance (machine guns, artillery in position). There must be close co-operation with the artillery. Sections of artillery or single guns should move with the advanced guard.
7. Reconnoitring patrols should be sent out at once to the front and flanks; these should have mounted orderlies and cyclists attached to them. The flanks should be covered by reserves in echelon, and especially by machine guns.
8. Communication must be maintained with higher formations and with units on the flanks as described above. Communication must also be maintained with the first line transport.
9. Attention must be paid to the supply of ammunition and rations. The supply officer and N.C.O.s of the train must, on their own initiative, keep in constant touch with the battalion staff.
10. Arrangements must be made beforehand to give the troops rest during the short halts. The travelling kitchens should be brought up, or orders given for the iron rations to be consumed. Iron rations consumed must be replaced immediately.VII. – ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY’S REARWARD POSITIONS.
12. The enemy’s rearward positions are best carried by the first vigorous pursuit. Such attacks must be supported by fire. A short concentration of fire by machine guns, trench mortars and the artillery accompanying the infantry will often prove sufficient. If the capture of these positions is delayed, it usually involves heavier casualties.Single heavy guns should be brought rapidly forward, as their action is frequently decisive.
13. In principle, patrols should be pushed forward to the attack well in advance of the troops. Such patrols will often dislodge the enemy if he is already shaken, and, in any case, they should carry the enemy’s outpost zone.
14. If the enemy has had time to garrison his rearward positions with fresh reserves, he should first of all be driven from the zone in front of those positions, so that the ground necessary for the development of the subsequent attack can be thoroughly consolidated.A co-ordinated attack, after an artillery preparation, will then be carried out under the orders of the higher command. General Headquarters,
15. 4^th July, 1918.
16. General Staff (Intelligence),
17. The procedure in this instance is similar to, but more rapid than, that for the first attack.
18. A thorough close reconnaissance must be made to find out the situation and depth of the enemy’s position, and the method of holding it. Where is the weakest point? Which is the easiest line of approach?

8^th July 1918

BEF

Dear F & M

Just a line to say I am going on all merry and bright I think I must be a little late in writing this time but I had a touch of the Flanders grippe a few days ago and of course one doesn’t feel too energetic or have the inclination to write. Fortunately I only had a slight dose & managed to stick at it without going sick.  Nearly everyone has had a touch of it just like measles.  Some have a worst time than others.  However I am quite OK again how’s Mar’s cold hope she’s A1 again ere this.  There is very little to write about.  Oh I don’t know whether I told you Lt. Halsall came into our place about the end of Febry his cable section was doing some work with us.  I only noticed him just as he went out so didn’t get a chance to have a word with him. I don’t know how he went on in the Somme affair.  Had a letter from Will the other day he seems all merry and bright.  Suppose Geo is still with the Sammies we have a few with us learning the game.  They seem a great lot.  Let us hope they are as good as the (Aussies) (That the Australians).  They are a fine lot.  They have some funny phrases.  They call each other Digger. Is Gladys still winding the clock up in the Town Hall or has she resumed her studies again.  Who can this wonderful maiden be who admires men of 33 hush I must be careful or else I shall start rhyming which is a certain sign of this most dreadful disease which is sweeping through the family.  I am on night duty tonight just made some tea luckily I managed to buy a tin of Lyles Golden Syrup so it’s lovely and sweet.  I don’t know if you’ve tried it but it’s the goods.  Well my hearties I think this is all at present hoping you are all A1 including Le chien and all the other herbs.

Cheerhio

Gus de Grabbit

Or is it otherwise nowadays

Letter to Rev. R.M. Laporte Payne 5 July 1918

Egypt

5. VII. 18

Dear Mr Payne,

I seem to be always writing letters in my spare time but find it difficult to get through my list of those to whom I should write, while the number I send away is far in excess of those I receive.  Possibly a considerable amount of correspondence goes astray, which is not to be wondered at when one sees the tremendous amount of organization required to keep up communications in a country almost devoid of roads and railways.

I have not received any letters from home for nearly two months but I have been told that there are some on the way and I am hoping that there may be one from you giving me some news of school of which I have heard nothing since the receipt of the January magazine.

During the past few weeks I have been in hospital, or to use the military term “dock”, but am pleased to be convalescent now and should not be surprised if I am returned to duty during the next few days.  I have had an attack of dysentery, fortunately very slight, so that my period in hospital has given me a good rest.  Needless to say I am not anxious to go back to the line just yet as the heat there is almost intolerable, while here in Alexandria the sea breezes have a tempering effect upon the weather.

While in the line we have had some very anxious moments and there has been some fine work put in by the battery.  “Johnny Turk” is not a foe to be despised but we find that the climate is a greater enemy, which soon affects adversely even the strongest.

Work in the line is dreadfully monotonous, all days being the same, even Sundays.  Padres are scarce in our neighbourhood and church parades are almost unknown.  In fact we have had only one parade since we left home, but in order that Sunday should be specially marked a few of us have managed to meet together for prayer & Bible reading each Sunday which has proved a considerable help.  On such occasions one is forcibly reminded of our Lord’s words, “When two or three are gathered together in my name etc” especially as our little meetings are often carried on to the accompaniment of the guns which are seldom quiet, while one never knows where or when the next shell in coming from the enemy’s lines.

In Alexandria there are plenty of facilities for attendance at Holy Communion & ordinary services, and of course arrangements are made in the camps & hospitals.  Last Sunday I was able to attend the evening service at St Mark’s and to be able to take part once again in our beautiful Church Service, in an English church and with an English congregation was a privilege & joy which words fail to describe.  It was “Home & home”.

I have not had the opportunity to visit many places of Biblical interest, but I hope I shall be able to visit Jerusalem & neighbourhood before I come back.  Unfortunately my sickness will postpone my leave of seven days, which was due this month, so that I shall probably have to wait until the remainder of the battery have taken theirs.  This would have meant a trip to Cairo but I do not think I have much cause to grumble as I am having a fairly good time at the Convalescent Depot.

It might interest you to learn how much the work of the Red Cross Society is appreciated here by both wounded and sick.  The journey from the line to the base hospital takes several days and covers between four and five hundred miles.  this is done in stages; and on the train & in the “stationary” hospitals there is a supply of all kinds of comforts, trifling in themselves, but which mean so much to the men suffering from wounds or disease.  If people at home could only see the relief which is afforded by the Society, as well as the pleasure, I feel sure that their pockets would be opened to give it all the support possible.

I trust the work at school is going on satisfactorily, so far as circumstances will permit.  I imagine the Staff must be severely handicapped in a variety of ways owing to the abnormal conditions but if difficulties can be overcome I feel that the ladies at Stanhope Rd will accomplish it.

Please remember me to the children, who are constantly in my thoughts & prayers, while I am looking forward to the time when I may “build” & not “destroy” in my old workshop.  Tell them that the soldiers want their prayers and that several daddies have told me that they find it a great help to think that their boys and girls send out a daily prayer for them.

I saw a notice some time ago that Mr Mannering had sailed for B.W.A. and I trust that he arrived safely.

With kindest regards to yourself & Mrs Payne & trusting you are keeping well during what must be an exceptionally arduous time for you.

I remain

Yours sincerely

A.E. Smith

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY of 9^th CANADIAN ARTILLERY BRIGADE

From June 1^st 1918 – To June 30^th 1918

AMETTES

1.6.18 to 16.6.18      Batteries carried on their usual training during this period.  On the 3^rd June, the Brigade held Sports in a field near BAILLEUL-les-PERNES.  All events were keenly contested: the Headquarters winning the driving contest.  The 33^rd Battery C.F.A. won the largest number of points in the total events.

On the 4^th the Brigade moved to FLECHIN to carry on further manoeuvres in the BOMY AREA.  The Brigade remained in this area until the 11^th instant.  A considerable number of successful manoeuvres were carried out in conjunction with the infantry.  Aeroplanes, cavalry and tanks co-operated with the Artillery and Infantry in these manoeuvres.

BOESGHEM

16.6.18 to 19.6.18    On the 16^th instant the Brigade received orders from 5^th D.A. (Imperials) under whose command we had been placed, to proceed to BOESEGHEM, which is just North of AIRE.  On the 17^th instant the Brigade moved as per orders.  Brigade Headquarters and one section per Battery moved forward to the vicinity of LA MOTTE.  The Headquarters were located in a Chateau; the batteries occupying positions in the Forest of NIEPPE.

On the 18^th the batteries registered and the remaining two sections of the batteries of the Brigade were ordered to remain at their wagon lines, the operation being postponed.  On the 19^th the Brigade received orders to move to the Wagon Lines at BOESEGHEM.

On the morning of the 20^th the Brigade moved, under orders of the 5^th D.A. to QUIESTEDE, where it remained under G.H.Q. Reserve until the 25^th instant.

QUIESTEDE

20.6.18 to 25.6.18   On the 25^th the Brigade moved under orders, to their old wagon lines at BOESEGHEM.  Hdqrs and the guns of the brigade moved into action during the afternoon, in their old positions.

CHATEAU D.30.c.90.60

26.6.18         Orders were received today for the operation in which we are supporting the Infantry of the 5^th Division, which is to take place on the 28^th instant.  Batteries re-registered and completed the drawing of their ammunition.

27.6.18          Batteries completed their registration during the day.  On the evening of this day the enemy shelled the vicinity of the Chateau with H.E. and a new H.E. gas shell which caused respirators to be worn off and on until after midnight.

Lieut M.H. McKay, 31^st Btty and Lieut A.D. Mason, 33^rd Battery were detailed to act as F.O.O. and Liaison Officer, respectively to the K.O.S.Bs.

28.6.18          The barrage opened at 6.00A.M. and within a few minutes afterwards, our F.O.O. and L.O. began sending in information of great value.  This information continued throughout the operation and was practically the only source through which the rear formations obtained any idea as to how the operation was proceeding.  About 9.00 A.M. all objectives were reached on our front.  Many of the enemy were killed and several officers and over 100 prisoners were taken.  Our casualties were light.  From shortly after the final objective was gained until after midnight our F.O.O. and L.O. sent through three S.O.S. calls to which the Batteries of the Brigade responded, some minutes ahead of the batteries on the front.

29.6.18          Visibility continues fair.  Several German “whiz-bang” batteries were reported by our L.O. firing within 1000 yards of his front line.  Several enemy low-flying aeroplanes observed during the day.

• This morning at 3.30 an S.O.S. went up on our front to which our batteries immediately responded. No hostile infantry action followed. At 2.45 A.M. the batteries of the Brigade carried out a counter-barrage lasting until the S.O.S. was sent up.  During the morning the area about 1000 yards N.E. of the CHATEAU was very heavily shelled with 5.9s.  During the after(noon) the C.F.A. called at Bde Hdqrs to bid farewell to the Brigade and to compliment them very highly on our part in the operation.

Operational Orders were issued by the 5^th D.A. for the Brigade to move to the Wagon Lines at BOESEGHEM tonight at 8.00 P.M.  On the following day the Brigade will march south to join the 3^rd Canadian Division.

During the above operation at PLATE BEQUE the brigade had the following casualties:-

One killed.  13 wounded.

The following decorations have been awarded during the month:

Major L.V.M. Cosgrave                      45^th Battery                 M. in D.

Lieut. E. Philpott                                33^rd Battery                 M. in D.

Lieut. D.L. Teed                                 36^th Battery                 Military Cross

Cpl. B.L. Broughton                           36^th Battery                 D.C.M.

Cpl. Donnelly. C.H.                           45^th Battery                 M. in D.

WAR DIARY of 20 Siege Battery for June 1918

Place       Date    Hour                                                Summary of Events and Information

In the field

BETHUNE

JUNE

1^st to 10^th         Guns in same positions as at the end of May i.e. 3 guns at E.11.c.5.3 (Sheet 36B N.E.) & 3 guns at E.17.d.3.2 (36B N.E.).

Both sections almost entirely engaged on Counter Battery destructive shoots with aeroplane observation. 1200 rounds fired & 17 Ys obtained during ranging.

Battle casualties 1 OR.

R.G. Percival Lt.

For

O.C. 20 Siege Bty R.G.A.

20^th                  LH.E.WELLS R.F.A. attd to Battery.

25^th                  Lt. (A/CAPT) J.C. THOMPSON appointed to command & Lt. A. A. HANHART as second in command of Battery.

25^th – 26^th        ”CAMOU” Tactical Exercise by I Corps H.A.

27^th                  Battery withdrawn to rest, handing over positions to 265 SB (9.2” Hows) 22 Bde R.G.A. & taking over their reserve positions near HOUCHIN.

Fairly *** month – C.B. destruction shoots & neutralisation in support of raids. Total rounds fired approx 4000, chiefly on Hostile Batteries in neighbourhood of LACOUTURE & VIELLE CHAPELLE, & on VIELLE CHAPELLE Bridge.

WAR DIARY of 2/6^th Sherwood Foresters for June 1918

Place       Date    Hour                                                Summary of Events and Information

Fighting Strength Officers 10   O.R.s  43

BOUR     1/6/18 to 16/6/18               Training of Staff carried out.

H.34.b.9.7. (44B) 17/6/18  6.0 am     Battalion Training Cadre marched to FONTAINE-lez- BOULAN.

FONTAIN-lez-BOULAN

18/6/18 to 30/6/18             Part of Staff assisting 59 Div School in training, and remainder assisting 13^th Bn (G) W.R. Regt.

F.29.d.8.8 (44C Eastern Half)

Fighting Strength Officers 10 O.R.s 43

July 1918

The German Spring Offensive

The Battle of Le Hamel was fought on the 4^th July 1918 and was a victory for the Allies. The Australian 4^th Division was the main attack force with four companies of the United States Infantry as supporting troops and had the assistance of 60 Allied tanks and machine gun units. The aim for the attack was to straighten a German-held salient bulging into the Allied line. The carefully planned attack was a complete surprise to the Germans and the salient was won and closed up within approximately 90 minutes, with casualties on the Allied side of about 1,000. Almost 1,500 Germans surrendered.

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The Second Battle of the Marne was fought from 15^th July to 6^th August 1918. It was intended as a diversionary attack either side of Reims to cross the river Marne and draw the Allied reserves away from Flanders, where the German High Command was planning to make another offensive to break through the Allied line once and for all. The battle consisted of a series of offensives, launched by Ferdinand Foch the Allied Supreme Commander, which eventually halted the German advance leading up to the Allied One Hundred Days Offensive. The Allies suffered 107,000 casualties while the Germans suffered 168,000 casualties.

The Champagne-Marne Offensive was fought from 15^th to 18^th July 1918 and was the last of the German five offensives of 1918 that had come close to breaking through the Allied lines. The earlier German advances had created a new salient in the French lines around the fortified city of Reims. The German High Command decided to launch a two pronged attack to the west and east of Reims. Three German Armies and fifty two Divisions were allocated to the Champagne-Marne Offensive. West of Reims was their Seventh Army. To the east were their b First and Third Armies and facing them were two French Armies, the Sixth to the west of Reims and the Forth Army to the east. The French were well aware the Germans were proposing to attack, and preparations were underway to launch a massive counter-attack on the Marne Salient. On the 18^th July 1918 the Allied counter-attack, comprising French, British, American and Italian troops pushed the Germans back.

The Battle of Château-Thierry was fought on the 18^th July 1918, and was one of the first actions of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) under General John J. ”Black Jack” Pershing. Initially a German offensive was launched on the 15^th July 1918 against the AEF, an expeditionary force of troops from both the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. On the morning of the 18^th July 1918, the French and American forces between Fontenoy and Château-Thierry launched a counter-assault against the German positions. The allied forces managed to keep their plans secret and their 04.45 attack took the Germans completely by surprise when the assault troops attacked without a preparatory artillery bombardment. They followed closely behind a rolling barrage and the French and American troops were successful with their attack and captured the town. Although generally inexperienced, some individual American units exercised great initiative, despite the fact that the impact of the Americans had previously been hindered by Pershing not allowing his troops to be commanded by either French or British officers.

The Battle of Soissons was a battle waged from 18^th to 22^nd July 1918, between the French, with American and British assistance against the Germans. The offensive was launched on the 18^th July 1918 using 24 French divisions, 2 British and 2 U.S. divisions under French command. They were supported by approximately 478 tanks which sought to eliminate the salient that was aimed at Paris. The battle ended on the 22^nd July 1918 with the French recapturing most of the ground lost to the German Spring Offensive of May 1918. Adolf Hitler, the future Führer of Nazi Germany was awarded the Iron Cross First Class at Soissons on the 4^th August 1918.

On the 18^th July 1918, the French led counter-attack began after the defeats and retreats at the Second Battle of the Marne. The Germans retreated to the Hindenburg Line where they began their Spring Offensive in March 1918. The German Spring Offensive failed for several reasons. There were serious command errors. The German High Command squandered their chance at victory by missing British logistical targets, and lost a grip on the operations, and repeatedly reinforcing mere tactical successes. The German army’s material, manpower and mobility limitations called into question whether it was capable of defeating the British and French. These enemies were tough and eventually learned from the tactical mistakes which had contributed to their reverses after the Battle of Passchendaele. The German High Command was accused of squandering a chance of a negotiated peace with a military operation doomed to failure. Certainly, the offensives hastened the German defeat. The million U.S. soldiers who had arrived in France by July 1918 covered the Allied heavy losses. By contrast, the German army had no reserves to replace its nearly one million casualties and was stretched out on a front longer than in March 1918. Its fittest and best-trained troops had disproportionately perished in the failed operations. Officers and soldiers were exhausted and demoralised. From the 8^th August 1918, the Allied forces began what is known as the ”Hundred Day Offensive” ended with the Armistice of November 1918.

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The Western Front

On the Western Front in July 1918, Britain lost two flying aces whilst flying over France. Both earned the Victoria Cross (VC) for their actions.

On the 9^th July 1918 at 1300 hours, James McCudden collected a SE5a fighter aircraft from Hounslow for delivery to France. Somehow he became disorientated and at 1800 hours he landed at a small airfield in France known as Auxi-le-Chateau and asked a member of the ground crew directions to his designated airfield. McCudden took off again and at a height of about 70 feet his engine cut out, and he crashed heavily into a wooded area at the side of the airfield. He sustained very serious injuries including a fractured skull. He was immediately taken to No. 21 Casualty Clearing Station where he died three hours later. He was buried the following day with full military honours in the small Waverns Military Cemetery. He was only 23 years of age and had just been promoted to Major. McCudden was born in Gillingham, Kent in March 1895 and on the 26^th April 1910 aged 14 years he enlisted in the Royal Engineers as a Boy Bugler. After basic training he was sent to Gibraltar. After returning to the U.K. he was transferred to the newly formed Royal Flying Corps (RFC) as Air Mechanic 2^nd Class and was posted to Farnborough. On the 1^st April 1916 he was promoted Air Mechanic 1^st Class. At the outbreak of the war McCudden was sent to France and his squadron was involved in the retreat from Mons and Le Cateau. In the spring of 1915 he was promoted to Flight Sergeant and about this time he started to fly as an air gunner. In December 1915 McCudden was recommended for pilot training after having had experience as an air navigator. He was promoted Second Class Flyer in May 1916 and by June 1916, McCudden had been posted to No. 20 Squadron in France as an operational fighter pilot. He received steady promotions up to Captain from September 1916 and at the time of his death he had accumulated 57 victories. During his flying career McCudden had been awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) and bar, Military Cross (MC) and bar, Military Medal (MM) and on the 2^nd April 1918 he was awarded the Victoria Cross.

On the 26^th July 1918, Edward ”Mick” Mannock died whilst leading the inexperienced Lt. Donald Inglis into a storm of small gun fire whilst over the German trenches in France. As they zig-zagged away from the scene, Inglis noticed a small bluish flame on his major’s engine cowling. Then the left wing of Mannock’s aircraft fell away and he plunged into a death spin. Exactly what happened to Mannock remains a mystery. He was buried in an unmarked grave by a German soldier, who returned his identity discs, notebooks and personal effects to his family through the Red Cross. The pristine state of his identity discs suggest that Mannock had been throw clear of his aircraft before it was consumed by fire. It may be that he fulfilled his pledge to shoot himself at the first sign of fire. The truth will never be known. “Mick” Mannock was the highest-scoring and most highly decorated British fighter pilot of the Great War and was eventually credited with 73 combat victories or ”kills”. Furthermore, he transformed himself from someone who initially came across as arrogant and brash into one of the greatest legends in RAF history. Mannock was born in Brighton on the 24^th May 1887 but when he was 13 years old his wayward Irish father abandoned the family, leaving them desperately short of money. Mannock was forced to leave St. Thomas School in Canterbury and take a series of menial jobs before eventually joining his brother, Patrick, who worked for the National Telephone Company. When Mannock was 27 he moved to Turkey as leader of a telephone cable-laying gang when the Great War broke out. When Turkey entered the war on Germany’s side, he and other British workers were imprisoned. When he tried to escape, he was recaptured and put into solitary confinement but his health deteriorated and an American consulate secured his release. Back in Britain, Mannock was listed as “unfit for military duties”. In July 1915, he re-joined as a sergeant in the Territorial unit of the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) in which he had served before going to Turkey. On the 1^st April 1916, Mannock was commissioned as a 2^nd lieutenant in the Royal Engineers. Then in August 1916 he was transferred to the Number One School of Military Aeronautics at Reading, and after further training qualifying as a pilot in November 1916. He was posted to France in April 1917, and on the 7^th May 1917 he claimed his first success when he and five others shot down a gas filled balloon five miles behind German lines. He did not have to wait long for his first enemy “kill” for in early June 1917 he shot down a German Albatross D.III. By mid-October 1917, Mannock had been awarded the Military Cross (MC) and a bar and by January 1918 he recorded his 21^st official “kill”. After returning home for a rest he was back in France on the 3^rd March 1918. His Comrades noticed a new bloodlust, but he never let it cloud his judgement in the air and his number of kills rapidly escalated. However, amid all the success he remained a realist, never taking off without his revolver, resolving to shoot himself at the first sign of any flames. In May 1918. Mannock learnt he had been awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) and he was promoted to major and chosen to command 85 Squadron. Nearly a year after his death the London Gazette announced he had been awarded the Victoria Cross. This was brought about by considerable lobbying from those who served with and under him. He was also awarded posthumously his second and third DSO to go with his original award.  His astonishing medal group of VC, three DSOs and two MCs, all awarded for bravery over 15 months, makes Mannock the most highly decorated man in the newly formed Royal Air Force of the Great War.

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Other Theatres

The Battle of Abu Tellul was fought on the 14^th July 1918 during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign after German and Turkish Empire forces attacked the British Empire in the Jordan Valley. The valley had been occupied by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) from February 1918 when Jericho was captured. Bad feelings arose between the two allies after the Turks violated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and aggressively expanded the Turkish presence in Georgia. A German and Turkish force attacked the Australian Light Horse units defending the heights at Mussallabeh and Abu Tellul on the edge of the Jordan Hills, while a German force attacked those defending the Wadi Mellaha midway between Abu Tellul and the Jordan River. While these attacks were taking place on the western bank of the river, on the eastern side the Turkish Caucasus Cavalry Brigade deployed two Turkish regiments, to attack the bridgeheads at the fords of El Hinu and Makhadet Hijla. However, the Turkish formation was overwhelmed by a combined force of British and Indian troops before it could launch its attack, and the outcome was a victory for the British Empire. These were the last attacks against the British in this campaign. The defeat was a severe blow to German prestige, German prisoners captured at Abu Tellul claimed they had been betrayed by their Turkish allies who should have supported their flanks.

In Russia, the Bolsheviks executed Tsar Nicholas II on the 17^th July 1918. Following the abdication of Nicholas on the 15th March 1917, Alexander Kerensky’s Provisional Government evacuated the Romanovs (Nicholas and his family) to Tobolsk in the Urals, to protect them from the rising tide of revolution during the Red Terror. In early March 1918, the Provisional Government placed Nicholas and his family under house arrest in the Alexander Palace at Tsarkoe Selo, 24 km (15 miles) south of Petrograd. After the Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917, the conditions of their imprisonment grew stricter and talk of putting Nicholas on trial increased. The Romanovs were moved during April and May 1918 to Yekaterinburg, a militant Bolshevik stronghold, as the White counter revolutionary movement gathered force, which was to lead to a full-scale civil war by the summer of 1918, During the early morning of the 17^th July 1918, Nicholas, his wife Alexandra, their children, their physician and several servants were taken into the basement and shot. Although there is a lack of hard evidence it is believed the order came directly from Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (known as Lenin) in Moscow. The execution may have been carried out on the initiative of local Bolshevik officials, or it may have been an option pre-approved in Moscow should White troops approach Yekaterinburg. It is also believed that Lenin’s bodyguard personally delivered the telegram ordering the execution and that the evidence was to be destroyed. The execution brought about the end of the Russian Romanov Dynasty.

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Timetable July 1918

Spring Offensive

4^th July                              Battle of Le Hamel

15^th July/6^th August         Second Battle of the Marne

15^th – 18^th July                  Champagne-Marne Offensive

18^th July                          Battle of Chateau-Thierry

18^th -22^nd July                 Battle of Soissons

18^th July                          French counter-attack at the Second Battle of the Marne

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The Western Front

9^th July                              James McCudden VC died in a flying accident over France

26^th July                           Edward Mannock VC killed in action over France

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Other Theatres

14^th July                          Battle of Abu Tellul

17^th July                          The Tsar and his family executed by the Bolsheviks

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