November 1918

November 1918

Hundred days Offensive

On the 1^st November 1918, with the Germans in full retreat, the Battle of Valenciennes was an offensive carried out by the British Third Army to advance to the French-Belgian border and the city of Valenciennes. The city was captured by Canadian troops on the 2^nd November 1918. On the 4^th November 1918, the Battle of Sambre was a continuation of the Allied advance of Field Marshall Haig’s Army coming from the direction of Valenciennes. The Allied troops advanced from the Condé Canal on a 30 mile (48 km) front towards Maubeuge-Mons. The offensive included the Second Battle of Guise from 4^th to 5^th November1918.

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As part of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the American and French armies began their final pursuit to Sedan on the 1^st November 1918. After clearing the Argonne Forest on the 31^st October 1918, they reached the River Aisne. American troops captured German defences at Buzancy, allowing the French to cross the River Aisne, whereby they rapidly advanced capturing Le Chesne on the 1^st November 1918. In the final days the French took Sedan and its railway hub during the Advance to the Meuse the 6^th November 1918. From the 6^th to 11^th November 1918 the Americans captured all the surrounding hills.

FOOTNOTE. The Americans had arrived and their vast numbers of troops began their offensives. It was a massive morale booster to all the war weary Allied forces. They took the pressure off the Allies by their involvement at the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. However, there was a cost to pay. At over 26,000 deaths the Americans suffered during their involvement in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive they were mainly caused through the inexperience of many of their troops. Also the tactics used during the early phase of the operation were similar to the tactics used by the British and French forces earlier in the war which had been discarded.

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Other Theatres

On the Italian Front, the Armistice of Villa Giusti ended the war between Italy and Austro-Hungary when the armistice was signed on the 3^rd November 1918 outside Padua in northern Italy. In the final stages of the Battle of Vittorio Veneto the Austro–Hungarian troops were defeated and began a chaotic withdrawal. The Austro-Hungarians sought to negotiate a truce but hesitated to sign an armistice, but then the Italians reached Trieste. On the 3^rd November 1918 the Italians threatened to break off negotiations and the Austro-Hungarians accepted the terms. The cease fire was scheduled to start at 3.00 pm on the 4^th November 1918 but an order from the Austro-Hungarian high command demanded the fighting stop on the 3^rd November 1918.

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On the Western Front, Wilfred Edward Salter Owen MC was killed in action on the 4th November 1918 during the crossing of the Sambre-Oise Canal, one week before the signing of the Armistice. He was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant the day after his death. With church bells ringing out in celebration on Armistice Day, his mother received the telegram informing her of his death. Owen was born in March 1893 and became one of the leading poets of the Great War. He discovered his poetic vocation during a holiday in Cheshire. In 1904 he took employment as a private tutor in English and French. In October 1915 he enlisted in the Artists’ Rifles, Officers’ Training Corps. and in June 1916 he was commissioned as second lieutenant in the Manchester Regiment. When posted to the front line he fell into a shell hole and suffered concussion. He was also blown up by a trench mortar and spent several days unconscious on an embankment. He was diagnosed with shellshock and sent to Craiglochhart War Hospital for treatment and finally discharged to return to active service in July 1918. At the end of August 1918 he returned to the front line. On the 1^st October 1918 he led units of Second Manchester’s to storm a number of enemy strong points, for which he was awarded the Military Cross.

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On the 9^th November 1918, Germany’s Chancellor Prince Max of Baden announced the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II. When the civilian uprising in Berlin and the Imperial Navy mutinied Wilhelm accepted he must abdicate, especially after the leaders of the army told him he had lost their support also. The abdication ended the German Imperial State, where the Kaiser was all powerful, and a Republic power took its place. On the 10^th November 1918, the former Kaiser took a train across the border into the Netherlands. He remained in exile at Doorn in the Netherlands until his death on 4^th June 1941, at the age of 82.

At two minutes past midnight on the 11^th November 1918, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Supreme Allied Commander, summoned Admiral Sir Rosslyn Weymyss and French General Maxime Weygand, Permanent Military Representative, to attend a meeting with German delegates to finalise discussions for an armistice. The meeting was held in a railway carriage in the Forest of Compiègne. The Germans made one last desperate effort to modify the negotiated agreement, stating that there was revolution in Germany, the navy had mutinied and the Kaiser had abdicated. When the arguments were exhausted, Foch’s reply, through his interpreter, was to remind the German gentlemen of Bismarck’s words at the end of the Franco-Prussian War that – “Krieg ist Krieg – War is War! I now say the same words to them, La guerre est la guerre” At 5.30 am in the morning the Germans signed the Armistice of Compiègne, which was distributed at 6.00 am. Weymyss signed on behalf of Great Britain, then Weygand signed, Foch last of all. Foch pointed to the door saying, ”Well Gentlemen it is finished. Be off with you.” Hostilities would cease at 11.00 am, the eleventh hour, of the eleventh day, of the eleventh month.

On the stroke of 11 o’clock, on the 11^th November 1918, bugles sounded the ceasefire and the guns went silent. In one instance, opposite the 15^th Scottish Division, a German machine-gunner stopped firing, took off his hat to his opponents and walked away. Although the war had ended, the casualties continued. The wounded still died of their wounds and the Spanish Flu, which had broken out during the fighting, was to be the next catastrophe to be dealt with. Millions of people died from the pandemic both civilian and military personnel of all nations.

For the British the war had turned full circle when the retreating German 17^th Army made a brief stand at Mons on the 10^th November 1918. Canadian troops advanced on the German defenders from the front and flanks, but at approximately 5.00 pm the main German force began to evacuate Mons. At about 2.30 on the morning of the 11^th November 1918, Canadian advance patrols attacked and destroyed the last machine-gun posts in the town. The main advancing Canadian force marched into Mons and at 11.00 am they were within 100 yards of where the first engagement was encountered in 1914. It is generally accepted that Private John Parr of the Middlesex Regiment was first British soldier killed in action at Mons on the 21^st August 1914. Private George Ellison of the 5^th Irish Lancers and George Price of the 28^th Battalion Canadian Infantry are believed to have been the last Commonwealth combat casualties of the war in Europe. Price fell to a sniper’s bullet dying at 10.58 am, just two minutes before the ceasefire. All three are buried at St. Symphorien Military Cemetery at Mons in Belgium. Here the war had begun and here it finally ended for the British Expeditionary Force.

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9th Canadian Artillery Brigade Operation Order No 155

Nov8

Copy No._______

SECRET

9^TH CANADIAN ARTILLIEY BRIGADE OPERATION ORDER NO 155

7^th November 1918

7^th Canadian Infantry Brigade have orders to make good the village of THULIN and exploit beyond it, and if possible patrols find the village strongly held to-night, a creeping barrage will be put down by the Field Artillery on the morning of the 8^th instant at a time to be notified.

9^th Brigade will be prepared to lay down barrages as follows:-

Initial Barrage – N.26.d.15.90. to N.26.a.30.70.

Final Barrage – N.22.d.30.50. to N.22.b.00.50.

Northern Boundary – N.26.a.30.70 – N.21.c.40.30 – N.22.b.00.50.

31^st Battery CFA will barrage the LEFT one half.

33^rd Battery CFA will barrage the RIGHT one half.

36^th Battery CFA will be superi[m]posed as in para 5.

LIFTS 9^th Bde C.F.A. 5 Minutes on Initial Barrage. 13 lifts of 100 yards each at 4 minute intervals then 100 yard lifts at 3 minute intervals to final line. On reaching Final Line batteries will cease fire.

RATES OF FIRE

Initial barrage and first five lifts INTENSE.

3 lifts………………………… RAPID.

5 lifts…………………………. NORMAL

Remainder…………………….. SLOW.

36th Battery CFA will be distributed over the Brigade front 300 yards beyond the 18-pdr barrage. Special attention will be paid to all roads within the Brigade Zone.

Batteries will sweep so as to cover the whole front.

33^rd Battery CFA which is detailed to move forward in close support of the P.P.C.L.I will maintain Liaison with that Battalion and will be prepared to move forward immediately it has fired out the barrage.

AMMUNITION – Shrapnel till SLOW rate commences, then H.E.

Zero Hour will be notified later.
Watches will be synchronised from this office by telephone.
O.Os 31^st Battery CFA will supply an F.O.O who will work with the P.P.C.L.I Battalion.

ACKNOWLEDGE

(sgd) D.A. McKinnon Major

A/O.C. 9^th Canadian Artillery Brigade.

WAR DIARY of 20 Siege Battery for October 1918

Nov1

WAR DIARY of 20 Siege Battery for October 1918

Place Date Hour Summary of Events and Information

In the field Officers of the Battery

Lt. (A/Major) J.C. THOMPSON M.C. (SR)

Lt. A/CAPT A.A. HANHART (SR)

Lt. H.L. PAUL (TF)

[Lt. W.F. FOX A/STAFF CAPT I Corps H.A. (SR) ]

[L H.E. WELLS I CORPS RANGING OFFICER (SR) ]

Lt. E.B. LOACH (SR)

Lt. R.G. PERCIVAL (SR)

Lt. F.W. DAVIS (SR)

Lt. C.H. BATEMAN (SR)

²/Lt. W.H. CHAPMAN (SR)

²/Lt. B.W. TURNBULL (SR)

²/Lt. E.O. DAVIES (SR)

²/Lt. A.E. COCKFIELD (SR)

Battery Positions 3 guns at ANNEQUIN

3 guns 1000 yards due S of PHILOSOPHE

Rest Billets MINX

Counter Battery shoot by ANNEQUIN Section on Battery in SALOME.

Explosions in Enemy country gave first indications of the LENS-LABASSEE-ARMIENTERES retirement.

3^rd Rest billets in PHILOSOPHE.

5^th ANNEQUIN Section moved to position in LA BASSEE – DOUVRIN Road.

6^th PHILOSOPHE Section moved to position in CITE ST ELIE – HAINES Road.

8^th Bombardment of Pillboxes & BAUVIN Church by N. Section.

9^th BAUVIN Church tower destroyed by N. Section. PROVIN Church tower hit by S. Section.

10^th MERCHIN Church tower destroyed by N. Section.

Section moved to position at CITE DE DOUVRIN on LA BASSEE – HAISNES Road (Registered MEURCHIN C.H. on 12^th )

15^th Both Sections pulled out of action & guns parked beside road owing to early retirement from HAUTE BELUIL Canal. Personnel withdrawn to PHILOSOPHE.

PHILOSOPHE

25^th Battery moved to CARVIN & guns parked in Square.

26^th Half battery moved to PONT-A-MARCQ & parked.

27^th Half battery moved from PONT-A-MARQ to BERCO. Guns remaining parked.

29^th Remaining half battery from CARVIN recovered, with column, to RUPILLY CHATEAU, near CAPPELLE.

Guns remaining parked.

Lt. H.E. WELLS rejoined owing to dispersal of I Corps Ranging Group.

30^th 2 Guns under Lt. E.B. ROACH put into position near BASSE RUE.

War Diary 9th Canadian Artillery Brigade October 1918

Nov1

WAR DIARY

CONFIDENTIAL

9^th CANADIAN ARTILLERY BRIGADE

From OCTOBER 1^st. – To OCTOBER 31^st. 1918

RAILLENCOURT & SAILLY

1.10.18 For three hours commencing at 0600 the Batteries fired a barrage to support another advance of the 3^rd Canadian Division Infantry towards RAMILLIES. By 1000 Infantry had advanced as far as wood in S.17.c. & d, but later in the day pressed by a Counter attack had to retire and establish their line in Rear of this, holding a system of trenches in S.22.c & d., east of TILLOY. At 1700 Lieut. Devine L.O. with 43^rd Battalion came to Brigade H.Q. with the news that the enemy had RETAKEN BLECOURT AND SANCOURT from our 2^nd Division on our Left and that the 29^th Battalion was advancing to retake SANCOURT. He also reported that Infantry had had very heavy casualties and the enemy putting up a stiff fight.

In the morning C.O. Brigade and Os.C. Batteries reconnoitred forward Areas with a view to selecting new positions in the event of a move forward. 36^th Battery sent out a forward Section under Lieut. Alexander which took up a position near the CAMBRAI-DOUAI Road, in S.26.b, and keeping in close touch with 43^rd, 58^th, and 2^nd C.M.R. Battalion, fired in all 186 rounds, on various targets. The Batteries fired a great deal during the day on a request of the L.O. at Infantry Brigade and at 1915 laid down a counter preparation.

Lieut Harrison was at Brigade O.P. and with him Lieut Neville worked, keeping in touch with Battalion Hqrs. and 7^th C.I.B. Report Centre.

A great deal of ammunition was hauled during the day by the Batteries and the D.A.C. hauled to their positions in all 3000 rounds 18-pdr, and 600 rounds 4-5” Howitzer.

During the night Battery limbers and teams harnessed “stood to” in case of emergency, as the situation on the left seemed very uncertain.

31^st Battery had one Gunner wounded.

RAILLENCOURT & SAILLY

2.10.18 Counter preparation was fired by the Brigade at three separate times 0430, 0500 and 0530.

The day proved rather quieter than had been anticipated.

Lieut Harrison at Brigade O.P. at 1630 observed a hostile How. Battery firing. Through the L.O. at Infantry Brigade he got a 60pdr. Battery on to it and a direct hit on one of the guns was obtained. Lieut Neville Established a forward O.P. in the vicinity of TILLOY to which a wire was run. Major MacKinnon relieved Lieut-Col Ralston as L.O. with Infantry Brigade at 1400. On information from an enemy deserter that a hostile attack was imminent a counter preparation was ordered for 1830. At 1825 enemy began shelling our battery areas rather heavily and just as our counter preparations started our S.O.S. was reported on Brigade Zone by Lieut Harrison. Firing continued on Counter preparation and later S.O.S. at normal rate for 35 minutes, the O.P. reporting during this period many enemy RED and GREEN Lights on our front. Later it was learned that the enemy had advanced to attack in three parties totalling some 400 men, that they had been caught in our barrage, very much cut up and many killed, leaving three prisoners in our hands. Lieut-Col Coghlan arrived back from ENGLAND to-day, He will stay tonight at the wagon lines and tomorrow take over from Lieut-Col RALSTON as GROUP Commander, Lieut. Col Ralston will become A/C.R.A. in place of Brig-General STEWART who goes on leave. 5^th C.I.B. took over tonight. Major MacKinnon remains as L.O. with them.

Lieut-Col Coghlan arrived at Brigade Hqrs. At 0930. He now Commands RALSTON’S GROUP which consists of 9^th and 10^th Brigades C.F.A., and 147^th Army Brigade R.F.A. under 2^nd The Group and 9^th Brigade will be run from the Hqrs in the SAILLY QUARRY. The Batteries to-day reconnoitred and established separate O.P.s to be manned during the hours of daylight. Observation of enemy forward areas is difficult owing to low ground and trees along the Canal DE ST-QUENTIN. Arrangements were made for the establishment of a Composite Battery consisting of one gun from each of the 18-pdr. Batteries and one How. from the 36^th Battery to be pushed forward to do the bulk of the firing for the Brigade. Lieut Harris will be in Command of this Composite Battery and will be connected by telephone to O.P.s and Brigade Hqrs.

Two Counter Preparations were laid down in the early hours of this morning. The day has been rather quiet except for the enemy’s scattered shelling of our forward areas and some fire from his heavies on

Battery Areas. At 2310 a bombardment of our guns started up away in the South and continued for an hour. Our front remained quiet.

Lieut Alexander at Brigade O.P. Lieut Gall, L.O. with 24^th Battalion.

Major Cosgrave returned this morning to the 45^th Battery.

RAILLENCOURT & SAILLY

4.10.18 The Composite Battery came into position last night in front of SUNKEN Road in A.I.b. North of ST.OLLE. Lieut. HARRIS in charge with Lieut. Case assisting him. The attitude of the enemy seems very nervous as though he anticipated an attack by us. He has done considerable scattered shelling of Battery Areas and put an occasional burst of fire on TILLOY and various other points up forward.

Lieut. Alexander at Brigade O.P.

Brig-General Panet C.R.A. 2^nd C.D.A. paid Lieut-Col. Coghlan a visit to-day.

5.10.18 Enemy’s attitude has been increasingly nervous during the day. He has put many bursts of fire from 7.7cm guns and 10.5 cm Hows on the Forward Areas. Brig-General Panet paid Col. Coghlan another visit this morning and informed him that it was likely that several more Brigades would be brought into the Group, and that a further forward move would probably take place in the near future. He requested that the forward area should be reconnoitred with a view to the pushing up if necessary of four whole Brigades. Accordingly the O.C. brigades reconnoitred the ground in the vicinity of the CAMBRAI-DOUAI Road near ST NEUVILLE-ST-REMY, and found that there was sufficient room for positions for the four Brigades, though he noted at the time that the area was heavily shelled.

Lieut. Devine at Brigade O.P. to-day. Order received at 1730 that 9^th Brigade was to relieve 26^th Brigade R.F.A. the next night, and that advance parties would go forward in the morning to look over the Battery positions which were located South of OISY LE VERGER, the relief to be mutual.

6.10.18 Advanced parties consisting of an Officer and N.C.O. from each Battery and A.R.O. and an N.C.O. from Bde Hqrs, proceeded in the morning to 26^th Bde. R.F.A. H.Q. in Q.30.b South of OISY-LE-VERGER. The three 18 pdr. positions proved to be good. No Howitzer position existed and 36^th Officer reconnoitred for one. The order for this relief had been cancelled by 1600, after the C.O. 26^th Brigade had been over to 9^th Brigade H.Q. and the 9^th Brigade was to stand fast in its present positions.

Lieut. Devine Brigade O.P. Lieut Neville L.O. 25^th Battalion.

At 2140 an S.O.S. on Brigade Zone, was reported by one of 10^th Brigade Batteries and our guns fired for about 20 minutes at slow rate and then stopped as there was no confirmation of an S.O.S. from Brigade O.P. and our front was reported to be quiet,

RAILLENCOURT & SAILLY

7.10.18 The enemy artillery was increasingly active all day shelling both forward and rear areas with many bursts of fire. The Composite Battery received considerable attention from him during the morning, but succeeded in doing a great deal of firing in spite of that fact.

Three new Brigades, namely, the 6^th Brigade CFA, and the 29^th and 32^nd Brigades RFA, have come into RALSTON’S GROUP. These three have been formed into a Sub-Group, under the Command of Lieut-Col McParland, O.C. 6^th Brigade. Tomorrow morning the 3^rd. Army is to attack and capture high ground South East of CAMBRAI. This is to be followed, if successful, by an attack of the Canadians to the North of the City.

Lieut. Longworth at Brigade O.P. and Lieut Neville remained as L.O. with 25^th Batt.

In order to be able to cover far enough forward for the barrage to be fired in support of our Infantry’s advance after the Third Army attack, the 36^th Battery under charge of Capt. Creig, moved at 1930 to a new position just to the Right of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road, and immediately in rear of ST. OLLE. After 4 guns had been dropped into position, and while horses were not yet clear, and the Battery personnel were on the position, three or four enemy shells dropped right amongst them. Casualties resulted as follows – Lieut. Shreve and 4 O.R.s killed. Capt. Creig, Lieut. Livingstone and 8 O.R.s wounded, 20 animals killed or of necessity shot and 6 wounded, 2 guns put out of action. Later remaining guns were pulled back to the old position from which they were able eventually to cover the first phase of the Canadian Attack which was all that was necessary as the 2^nd phase was cancelled.

Major MacKinnon was relieved as L.O. with the 5^th. C.I.B. by Major Young of the 10^th Brigade, and returned to the 36^th Battery. The Composite Battery was discontinued in the evening.

8.10.18 The attack of the 3^rd Army was successful and resulted in the capture of NIERGNIES and the high ground between that Village and AWOINGT. Our Batteries fired on their zones as a demonstration in connection with this attack, which began at 0430; Visibility was good and Lieut Case at Brigade O.P. in S.25.d (sheet 51A) saw a great deal of movement along roads in enemy rear areas. Where possible our 18 pdrs were used on Opportunity Targets with good effect, and in other cases, Lieut. Case was able through the L.O. Line to get in touch with the heavies and observe their fire. The attack of the 5^th C.I.B. was stated at first to be taken place at 2130, 2^nd phase including joining up on East side of CAMBRAI with the 3^rd Army being scheduled for 0530 the morning of the 9^th. In the evening, the 2^nd Phase was cancelled and the 1^st Phase postponed till 0130 9^th inst.

RAILLENCOURT & SAILLY

9.10.18 At 0130 our barrage opened, the heavies in the rear commencing about 20 seconds too soon. It was a complete success but there was evidence that the enemy had intended to evacuate. After the barrage, the Batteries moved up to a new position well forward, in the neighbourhood of NEUVILLE-ST-REMY. The 5^th C.I.B. Hqrs was early moved to MORENCHIES Chateau and Hqrs. BALSTON’S GROUP at Noon moved to TILLOY, where good quarters had been located in a furnished house and several cellars. The other Brigades of the Group also moved forward and were distributed in depth between DOUAI-CAMBRAI Road and RAMILLIES. In the afternoon O.C. Brigade was informed that the 9^th Brigade would go into rest the following day ay 1200- that he could either treck back to an Area near INCHY-EN-ARTOIS or remain in the vicinity of CAMBRAI.

At about 2315 O.C. Group was informed by telephone that there was to be an attack the following morning by the 4^th C.I.B., and was requested to proceed immediately to MORENCHIES Chateau to confer with the O.C. 4^th C.I.B. concerning a barrage to be fired in support of the attack.

TILLOY

10.10.18 O.C. Group left the O.C. 4^th C.I.B. and O.C. 6^th C.F.A. at midnight at MORENCHIES Chateau; later with O.C. 6^th Brigade he spent four hours at 6^th brigade Hqrs. across the Canal working on Operation Order and Barrage tracings for the attack which took place at 0600. In all 21 copies of each were prepared and despatched in time to the Batteries of the 29^th, 32^nd and 147^th Brigade R.F.A. and 6^th. Brigade CFA. The 5^th C.I.B. succeeded in capturing its objectives namely, the high ground just west of the river ERCLIN, but the 6^th Brigade on its left did not succeed in capturing IWAY.

At Noon RALSTON’S GROUP ceased to exist as it had been, and the 9^th. Brigade CFA went into rest, wagon lines moving up to last Battery positions occupied, near ST NEUVILLE ST REMY, and Brigade Hq. wagon lines moving to TILLOY. Lieut. Neville returned from Battalion.

11.10.18 The morning was passed quietly, H.Q. and Batteries arranging their quarters in prospect of some days out of the line. At noon Lieut-Col RALSTON A/C.R.A. called at 9^th. Bde H.Q. and informed O.C. that the Brigade was to go into action again immediately, taking over Battery positions of the 58^th brigade R.F.A., in the vicinity of BLECOURT and BANTIGNY and H.Q. of the 26^th brigade RFA at BLECOURT. O.C. Brigade visited 26^th. Brigade H.Q. and Battery Officers the Battery positions they were to take over. One section from each Battery was to relieve one Section of a battery of the 56^th Brigade at night, but through some mistake, the orders received by the 26^th Brigade, the 45^th Section was the only one which was able to be put into action.

TILLOY

12.10.18 The Batteries moved by day to their new positions; A good new Brigade H.Q. was located in BANTIGNY at the North corner of the Village. By 1700 telephone connections had been established between this Hqrs and all Batteries also with Division and Hqrs of 26^thBattalion which is in the Line and being covered by both 9^th and 10^th Brigades CFA. The 33^rd Battery is in position between BLECOURT and Railroad at S.8.b.10.40.; the other three Batteries are distributed along the River RAVIN DE BATIGNY in the North East of BATIGNY Village.

Lieut. Smith at Brigade O.P. Lieut. Case L.O.

13.10.18 In the morning O.C. Brigade visited Batteries and O.P.s A new Brigade O.P. has been established in a house in ABANCOURT. 26^th Battalion moved back their H.Q. to BANTIGNY about 200 yards away from 9^th Brigade H.Q. to which a wire has been run. O.C. Brigade visited O.C. 26^th Battalion with reference to S.O.S. 26^th is being relieved in the Line tonight by 27^th Battalion which will cover a frontage of something over 5000 yards. Each Battery is putting out a detached gun to do some of the firing. The main Battery positions in the RAVIN have barely flash cover from WAVRECHAIN-sous-FAULX. The front is quiet save for some scattered shelling by enemy of forward areas and a certain amount of shooting on ABANCOURT, BATIGNY and BLECOURT. The enemy has good observation from the crest running through FRESSAIN North of the Canal DE LA SENSEE. Some movement is seen in his back areas. Brigade O.P. Lieut. Smith. A Harassing Fire Programme received from 3^rd C.D.A. calls for fire every hour day and (night).

BANTIGNY

14.10.18 Quiet day. Enemy shelled forward areas a little and also CUVILLERS and BANTIGNY. Lieut. Harris at Brigade O.P. Batteries manned their own O.P.s Batteries fired on Road leading South from WASNES-AU-BAC in an endeavour to prevent the destruction by mine of road and bridge, but without success. An Infantry Patrol reconnoitred the bridge at 1400 hours and reported it blown up and impassable. The C.O. and Adjutant visited the Batteries and Brigade O.P. Lieut. H.M. McKay arrived back from leave and was attached to Brigade Hqrs.

15.10.18 C.O. visited Battalion H.Q. BANTIGNY was shelled with bursts of gas and H.E. Lieut. Harris was at Brigade O.P.

BANTIGNY

16.10.18 Visibility was poor all day and enemy artillery was quiet except for bursts of fire on ABANCOURT and one on BANTIGNY. Lt-Col Coghlan visited Corps Headquarters regarding preparations for starting of the Canadian Corps Artillery School which he is to Command. Brigade Major visited Brigade H.Q. and went up to HEMLENGLET with Lieut. Smith. It was decided to place a 6” Newton in the Village. 27^th Battalion was relieved in the Line by 28^thBattalion. Lieut. A.E.G. Knight was posted to 31^st Battery. Lieut. A.B. Manning was at Brigade O.P.

Quiet day with very little enemy shelling. Our Batteries were ordered to stop firing except on special orders as the Infantry were putting out patrols. A temporary S.O.S. Line was laid out East and West through M.3.4 & 5 central. In the evening Batteries were ordered to reconnoitre Positions in M.17 & 18 at dawn, as a move was anticipated. Col. Coghlan visited HABARGUE South West of ARRAS where the Artillery School is to be located and he returned at 1930. Major Cosgrave in Command of Brigade during the C.O’s absence. Lieut. Stearns was on duty at Brigade O.P. Lieut. H.B. Devine reported to 29^th Battalion as L.O. to go forward with them in proposed advance.

HEMLENGLET

18.10.18 29^th Battalion moved forward at 0130 crossed Canal and worked up to the high ground in M.5 & 6 and N.I without opposition. During the morning they pushed over the crest into the Valley in G.35 & 36 and H.31 & 32 meeting with machine gun fire from the ridge to the North and some artillery fire. Shortly after dawn Batteries of the Brigade moved forward to cover the advance of 29^th Battalion. 33^rd Battery moved to M.23.central and later in the day moved again to M.16.b.85.15. 36^th Battery moved forward to M.16.b.50.10, 31^st Battery moved forward to M.18.b.6.6. close to PONT RADE where they were subjected to considerable harassing fire. 45^th Battery took up a position at M.18.d.1.7. Brigade H.Q. moved to M.16.c.95.95 in HEMLENGLET. By 1030 hours telephone communication was established with Division, with all Batteries and with Lieut. Devine L.O. with 29^th Battalion at their H.Q. in WASNES-AU-BAC. Lieut. Knight at Forward O.P. was connected with Brigade and he and Lieut Devine sent back much useful information. At 1500 hours the Brigade fired a barrage of 18 minutes duration to support further advance of the 29^th Battalion toward BOUCHAIN-AUBERCHICOURT Road. The Infantry met with heavy Machine Gun fire and a good deal of shell fire and did not succeed in taking all the high ground South West of the Road. During the day the enemy paid much attention to Roads and probable Battery positions and the 31^st Battery had 6 horses killed and 2 men wounded. Brigade H.Q. also suffered the loss of Driver McCoy who died on the way to the dressing station. The Batteries fired some harassing fire during the night but it was stopped in the early morning as Infantry patrols reported that they were meeting with no opposition and would endeavour to push forward. Orders were received that Brigade would come out of action at 1200 hours 19^th October and would later take over from 51^st Divisional Artillery covering the LIEU ST AMAND Front, but Brigade was not to move until word was received that the Front was covered by the 5^th C.D.A. Lieut. Col Coghlan left the Brigade for Canadian Corps Artillery School at 0800 and Major Cosgrave took over Command of the Brigade.

19.10.18 Our Infantry, and Divisions on Right and Left worked forward during the day meeting with no opposition and owing to the changed situation, and the possibility of 51^st Division being pinched out, and the Brigade moving North in stead of taking over from the 51^st Division, the Brigade remained in the HEMLENGLET Area out of action. By 2130 news came that the Infantry had passed through DENAIN.

Orders were received in the evening that the Brigade would move on the following day to WANDIGNIES-HAMAGE (Sheet 44, T.11.a). Brigade with would then move East and take over the front from the 1^st Brigade C.F.A. and would come under direct orders of 7^thI.B. who were relieving 1^st C.I.B.

WANDIGNIES-HAMAGE

Brigade moved in the morning ahead of the Column passing the start point, the bridge over CANAL DE LA SENSEE, South of WASNES AU BAC at 0800 and marched via MARQUETTE and SOMAIN to WANDIGNIES HAMAGE, which was reached at 1500 hours. Here Brigade was received with Open arms by civilians who could not do enough for Canadians. The C.O. reported to G.O.C. 7^thI.B. and arrangements were made for two Forward Batteries, the 31^st and 45^th to work directly with the 42^nd. And R.C.R.s Battalions respectively in the further advance through FORET DE VICOIGNE and the FORET DE RAISMES. Lieut. Knight from the 31^st Battery and Lieut. Doiron 45^th Battery reported as L.O.s to 42^nd Battalion and R.C.R.S Battalion at CATAINE.

Shortly before midnight the 31^st Battery moved forwards to a position of assembly in the vicinity of CATAINE. Shortly before midnight the 31^st Battery moved forward to a position of assembly in the vicinity of CATAINE.

WANDIGNIES-HAMAGE

At 0230 the 45^th Battery moved forward to a position of assembly at CATAINE and later moved on with the R.C.R.s and came into action at O.36.b.00.10. (Sheet 44) at 0530. The 31^st Battery moved with the 42^nd Battalion at 0730 and took up a position of readiness in O.36.a. Brigade H.Q. moved to 7^thI.B. Hqrs at HASNON arriving at 0700. Forward Sections under Lieuts. Gall and Devine from the 31^st and 45^th Batteries accompanied the support Companies of the Battalions throughout the day. Great difficulty was experienced in finding passible roads Eastwards on account of mines blown by the enemy on almost every cross road. Finally a good route of approach was located through O.36.c., V.I.a, P.31.d, P.32.c. The main 31^st Battery moved forward at 1000 to a position of readiness in P.27.c. The 45^th Battery moved at 1030 to a position of readiness in P.32.c. and was in touch by phone with R.C.R. H.Q. at P.32.d.50.80. and Brigade Report Centre at the same place. Forward Sections from these Batteries took up positions at this time along the ST AMAND-RAISMES Road. The 33^rd and 36^th Batteries leaving WANDIGNIES at 0730 and followed to CATAINE with the two support Battalions and at 1400 they moved up to a position of readiness near LES CORBETS. Our Infantry met with very slight resistance in the Woods, and the R.C.R. on the Right made very rapid progress. The 42^nd Battalion, however, on their Left were held up at intervals, as the 8^th.Imperial Division on the Left was having a good deal of difficulty in their advance. By the late afternoon the R.C.R. had advanced from 9 to 10,000 yards and were emerging at the Eastern side of the FORET DE RAISMES and at 1700 Batteries moved forward to cover the front. The 33^rd and 36^th Batteries to P.36.d., the 45^th to P.34.c. with a forward Section at P.30.c. and the 31^st Battery to P.20.b.80.20. At dusk Brigade H.Q. moved to P.27.a.90.40 close to 7^th C.I.B. H.Q. which moved at the same time to P.27.a.6.8.

NOTRE DAME D’AMOUR

23.10.18 The 33^rd and 36^th Batteries took over the woods with R.C.R. and 42^nd Battalions respectively the remaining two Batteries standing fast in their positions. 36^th Battery moved to Q.20.d.10.30. with a forward section at Q.14.c.30.20. The 33^rd Battery Forward section took up a position at Q.21.d.20.00, both forward sections were located near the H.Q. of the Battalions which they were supporting. Both forward sections did a small amount of firing on targets of opportunity and targets given them by the Infantry. At 1700 hours the 45^th Battery moved forward to P.30.b.40.40. and the 31^st Battery to Q.20.c.50.40.

NOTRE DAME D’AMOUR

24.10.18 By 0800 the main 33^rd Battery had moved to P.36.d.50.00. and the 45^th Battery had moved a Section Forward to Q.20.b.60.10. Late in the afternoon the 33^rd Forward section under Lieut. McGillivray moved forward to Q.23.d.5.3. 36^th Forward Section under Lieut. Longworth moved forward to Q.14.c.60.30. All forward sections engaged many targets of opportunity throughout the day and did harassing fire during the night, and Brigade Report Centre was established at Foresters House Q.14.c and was in communication with all Batteries. The C.R.A. and the Brigade Major visited the Battery positions.

25.10.18 Our Infantry had succeeded in establishing an Outpost Line along the Railway in Q.9., Q.4.11, 12 & 13 and held the villages of FRESNES and ESCAUTPONT with the enemy holding the Canal Line in considerable strength. The low lying ground in the vicinity of the Canal up to the 20 metre contour was under water due to the dams places across the canal at various points by the enemy and gave him a very strong position as all bridges were destroyed. 45^th. Battery forward section in charge of Lieut. Doiron moved in the early morning to Q.23.d. close to R.C.R.s H.Q. and established an O.P. in the outpost line in FRESNES and engaged many targets of opportunity and M.G. Posts during the day. Lieut. R. Fleet left to take up position of Adjutant at Canadian Corps Artillery School at HABARCQ under Lieut-Col Coghlan.

NOTRE DAME D’AMOUR

26.10.18 The Brigade S.O.S. Line was laid along LESCAUT FLEUVE and LA HAISNE from R.26.d.60.10. to Q.6.c.60.40. a distance of 6000 yards divided equally between the Batteries.

Readjustments of the Batteries were made as follows – 31^st Battery remained at Q.27.c.70.60. The 33^rd main Battery moved to P/30.b.40.40 with a forward section at Q.17.d.80.20. The 45^th main Battery moved to Q.26.b.50.80. with a forward section at Q.23.d.55.40. The 36^th main Battery to Q.14.c.70.30. with a forward section at Q.9.b.30.05. This kept the Batteries well spread out and distributed in depth, as forward sections would do all the firing except in case of operations or S.O.S. O.P.s were established at R.19.b.90.50, and R.13.a.05.25 from which good observation was obtained of the front to the North East and East. Battery wagon lines were along the RAISMES – ST AMAND Road but forward sections had their horses well up towards the East of Forest. The 3^rd Section of the 3^rd C.D.A.C. which was attached to the Brigade was at P.31.c.70.20. and all ammunition for the Brigade was drawn from it. The forward sections did considerable firing on enemy movement and M.G. Posts, but enemy Artillery was not very active.

NOTRE DAME D’AMOUR

27.10.18 Fairly quiet day with a little firing done by forward sections. The 8^th C.I.B. relieved the 7^th C.I.B. during the afternoon and night; the 2^nd C.M.R.s. taking over from the R.C.R. on the Right and the 1^st C.M.R.s from the 42^nd Battalion on the Left. Roads and approaches to the Canal were reconnoitred by Battery Officers in case of a further advance on this front.

ETOILE DE CERNAY

28.10.18 8^th C.I.B. extended to the South and took over part of the front held by 9^th C.I.B. 9^th Artillery Brigade area was also extended South to the Grid Line between Q & W and our S.O.S. Line at 1800 hours now ran from R.31.c.50.00. along L’ESCAUT FLEUVE to Q.5.d.50.95. All the ground for a considerable distance on both sides of the Canal being flooded except R.14.b & d, where the enemy still had a number of posts.

29.10.18 At 1200 hours, Brigade reverted to control of C.R.A. and 3^rd Section of 3^rd C.D.A.C. reverted to control of 3^rd C.D.A.C. Enemy artillery was fairly active on forward areas and our forward sections engaged enemy Trench Mortars and M.G. Posts and working parties. The C.R.A. visited the Brigade H.Q. and Batteries.

30.10.18 The C.O. visited Battery wagon lines during the morning. At 1400 hours Brigade H.Q. moved to ETOILE DE CERNAY (Q.31.b.90.60.) in order to be closer to the Batteries. Enemy artillery fairly active with harassing fire on forward areas and roads near Batteries. Our forward sections engaged movement and did harassing fire.

31.10.18 The enemy appeared nervous and did a good deal of harassing fire during the day on approaches and during the night on possible concentration areas. Our forward sections engaged M.G. Posts and Trench Mortars which were more active than usual. The enemy had apparently learned of our proposed attack South of VALENCIENNES and feared that an attack was also to be made on our front. At 2200 hours he put in a burst of fire on the 45^th Battery and Capt. D.N. McCallum was wounded in the arm and leg. Shortly after report centre at Q.20.d.25.35. was hit, but only one horse was killed and two wounded.

Major.

A/O.C. 9^th Canadian Artillery Brigade

Timetable November 1918

Nov1

Timetable November 1918

Hundred Days Offensive

1^st to 2^nd Nov Battle of Valenciennes

4^th Nov Battle of Sambre

4^th Nov Second Battle of Guise

…………..

1^st Nov Battle of Chesne

1^st to 6^th Nov Final pursuit and capture of Sedan

6^th to 11^th Nov Advance to the Meuse

—————————

Other Theatres

3^rd Nov Austro-Hungary signed armistice with Italy

……………

4^th Nov Poet Wilfred Owen killed in action

……………

9^th Nov Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicate

10^th to 11^th Nov BEF advance into Mons

11^th Nov Germany signs the Armistice of Compiègne

11^th Nov End of fighting and the guns go silent at 11.00 am

—————————

Letter to Frank Springett 25 October 1918

Oct25

Tabors Cottages

Horsmonden

Kent

England

Oct 25^th 1918

My Dear Son Frank,

It was with great thankfulness we received your letter. We were delighted & we will dispatch you a parcel as soon as we are permitted to do so. We are so pleased to know you are in a good camp & that your health is A1.

I am pleased to tell you we are all very well in health & Sid & Ted & myself have plenty in hand, I have started a new job not far from the old job & I am seeing a great deal of the War in all its realities. We trust it will soon be over.

I have written to Winchester & to the Red Cross London & believe me Frank we are doing everything for you that we can.

I have tried hard for months & the various replies will be interesting reading to you when it is all over & you are home again.

I suppose you have my photo & Ted’s. Well your Mother & the Girls will send you some on.

Your Sisters are getting big Girls now & Winnie & Little Jim are a couple I tell you. It would do you good to hear them sing. The capers they cart me is something to reckon with.

Miss Walters got your card first & you may look for a good parcel from us independent of the Red Cross. I shall send money to them to send you a few things you want & I trust you will receive them safely.

I have received a letter from Charlie Smith’s mother & she had a letter from him in Bavaria. He was wounded in the neck & he wrote home & sent our address; I have written to him & will send him something if I can.

The weather is getting cold & wet, which of course is common about this time of year. I might tell you I had 7 letters come back from France, parcels as well. Well my Boy I must now close. I will write after & send you what I can. I have an idea what would be useful to you & you shall have it. Or it will be no fault of mine if you do not receive it. We shall be looking forward for the day when you come home. Dad will kill the fatted calf. So with love & best wishes for you I will conclude this letter trusting the day will not be far distant when we shall be united again.

There are signs that peace & goodwill on earth will soon be an accomplished fact again. May it be soon.

Your letter arrived on Sat Oct 19^th.

From Your Loving & Aff Father

J. Springett

Cover to Kriegsgefangenensendung,

British Prisoner of War 1006

No 205166 Rifleman Frank W. Springett,

16^th K.R.R. Camp *

Friedrichsfeld near Wesel.

Germany

Postmarked 25 OC 18. Rest of stamp unreadable

OPENED BY CENSOR P.W. 963

Alf Smith Postkarte received 18 October 1918

Oct18

POSTKARTE

Kriegsgefangenensendung

Senders address

Name Smith Christian name Alfred

Rank Private Camp No. E.K. 6

Regiment 53^rd M.G.C. Regtl No 27521

Camp of Friedrichsfeld near Wesel.

Postmarked FRIEDRICHSFELD bei WESEL. 17.9.18 and London Oct 16. 18.

Mr. T. Smith, 100 Arcadian Gardens, Wood Green. London North England.

Sept 2^nd 18 Friedrichsfeld My Dear Father,

I am delighted to tell you that I have just received Jessies welcome letter. It was a great pleasure to know you are all well & that you got my letter before you went away I hope you all had a good time & benefited by the change. I had already written a card to you but your letter arrived just in time I will answer it next time as I have written to Albert in answer to one received from him I have had three letters now but you can see they take a long time to get through. Love to all Alf.

Letter to Miss Dillon 16 October 1918

Oct16

British Embassy

Rome

16^th Oct 1918

My dearest Lillie,

I wish you a very happy birthday and many happy returns. I am sorry it is impossible to send anything in the shape of a gift by post from here, but, like Bertha, I will give you a photograph when I return to London. I have also one for Anna. They arrived a short time ago as I think I told you. They are very good, and what’s more, they never sent the bill!

I noticed you had made that cheque payable to me, so I cashed it to-day. Very many thanks. I hope to be able to return it in a few days when I get my allowances from the 21^st May onwards! I was glad to get Anna’s letter of the 9^th Oct yesterday.

I am glad she is satisfied with her new car.

I started out to call on Countess Salazar today, but it was raining so heavily that I had to turn back. I have discovered the address of a Countess Salazar so I hope it is the right one. I shall sally forth again to-morrow. We are having really wintry weather now.

Don’t you find night duty very trying? I hope you will not overwork.

I think the war will be over in about six months.

Have you seen anything of Miss Cobb since! Her friends here have been very kind to me.

With best love to you and Anna and best wishes for the 27^th

from Willie

with cover addressed to Miss de C. Dillon, M.T. ASC No I Reserve Depot, Grove Park, Lee, London S.E. 12 with ARMY POST OFFICE ?? 17 OC 18 postmark Passed by Censor *93 cachet signed W.Dillon

Letter to Rev. R.M. Laporte Payne 10 Oct 1918

Oct13

Letter to Rev. R.M. Laporte Payne 10 Oct 1918

CHH/PW.

Headed notepaper

Administrative Headquarters

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCES

130, Horseferry Road

LONDON S.W. 1

Replied 11/10/18 giving facts.

The Rev Laporte Payne

Christ Church Vicarage

Finchley, N. In reply quote A.C. 2367/13/29. 10^th October 1918.

Re 26711 PTE McFARLANE, J. 14^th Bn.

Dear Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 23^rd ult. I have to inform you that the above mentioned soldier has been arrested and has admitted obtaining the sum of £1 from you, and also to being indebted to Mrs Roberts as stated in your letter.

He is being tried by D.C.M. on charges of absence and of obtaining money by valueless cheques.

I would be glad if you would say whether you wish to include obtaining the sum of £1 as a charge against him. The soldier states that he will pay you as soon as the money which he is expecting from Australia arrives.

Yours faithfully

H***** Major

for Brig-General

Commandant.

Report on Operations 2nd Tank Brigade 5 October 1918

Oct5

O.C. Signal Company R.E. 2^nd Tank Bde.

SECRET COPY NO 37

2^ND TANK BRIGADE

REPORT ON OPERATIONS

27^TH SEPTEMBER, 1918

CONTENTS

General Plan.
Preliminary Preparations.
Approach Marches.
Rallying Points.
Casualties : Personnel. Casualties : Tanks
Anti-Tank Defence.
A.F. Co-operation.
Lessons & Suggestions.

2^nd TANK BRIGADE: REPORT ON OPERATIONS; 27^th September 1918

Reference Maps : Sheets 57.c.NE & SE., and 57.b. NW.

GENERAL PLAN.

The 2^nd Tank Brigade, consisted of 15^th Tank Battalion, No 1 G.C. Company, No 2 Tank Supply Company, and a Composite Company of 8 Mark IV Top Towing Gear Tanks.

(i). 15^th Tank Battalion was allotted to Corps as under:-

VI Corps, Two Companies,

XVII Corps One Company.

(ii) Corps sub-allotted Tanks as under:-

VI Corps (3^rd Division, Two Coys (“A” & “C”) less One Section of 4 Tanks. (Guards Division, One Section (“C” Company 4 Tanks.

XVII Corps (63^rd Division, Two Sections, (6Tanks.) “B” Company.

(52^nd Division, One Section, (4 Tanks). “B” Company.

(iii). Tanks of No. 1 G. C. Company and No. 2 Tank Supply Company were allotted to Corps as under:-

VI Corps. (9 Tanks of No. 1 G.C. Company,

(9 Tanks of No. 2 Tank Supply Company.

XVII Corps. 9 Tanks of No 2 Tank Supply Company.

(iv). Five Supply Tanks were allotted to 15^th Tank Battalion, (4 from No. 1 Tank Supply Coy. and One from No 2 Tank Supply Coy.)

(v). The Composite Company of 8 Mark IV Top Towing Gear Tanks (attached to No 1 G.C. Company) remained in Third Army Reserve at H.21.b.0.3.

The General Schemes of VI and XVII Corps were as under:-

XVII Corps. (a) Capture of RED Objective, by the 52^nd Division on the Right, and the 63^rd Division on the Left; Dividing Line – MOEUVRES-GRAINCOURT Road (inclusive to 52^nd Division). This Attack was to be carried out in two Phases –

First Phase. Capture of CANAL DU NORD as far South as E.26..b.7.6., and the trench running through E.27.b., E.28.a.,E.22.d. and E.23.a.

Second Phase. Capture of remainder of RED Objective. The 52^nd and 63^rd Divisions were timed to start the second phase at ZERO plus 180 minutes.

(b). Capture of BROWN Objective by 63^rd Division. This included the capture of the Villages of GRAINCOURT and ANNEUX. The troops detailed for the capture of GRAINCOURT were to start of the commencement of the Second Phase, – (see above) – and go right through. The Barrage was timed to lift off the South Eastern corner of GRANDCOURT at ZERO plus 270 minutes.

(c). Capture of BLUE Objective. The 57^th Division was ordered to pass through the 63^rd Division on the BROWN Objective at approximately ZERO plus 300 minutes for the capture of CANTAING & FONTAINE. The 57^th Division was also ordered to keep one Brigade in hand for the purpose of exploiting its advance as far as the CANAL D’ESCAUT and of securing the Crossings.

VI CORPS

(a). The3rd Division, with the exception of its extreme Right and the Guards Division, were to attack together at ZERO Hour, and were to advance under a creeping barrage to capture the First Objective, (RED). (Pace of barrage – 100 yards in 4 minutes)

The Guards Division were to be prepared to maintain a defensive flank to the North up to the First Objective, until the XVII Corps had joined up and cleared the trenches to the North.

(b). At ZERO plus 110 minutes, 3^rd Division, with the exception of its extreme Right and the Guards Division, were timed to advance to the BROWN DOTTED Objective, which included the capture of FLESQUIERES and the trenches in its vicinity, (Pace of barrage – 100 yards in 4 minutes)

(c). At ZERO plus 180 minutes, 3^rd Division and the Guards Division were to advance to the capture of the BROWN Objective. The 42^nd Division (IV Corps), was also to advance in conjunction with the Right of the 3^rd Division.

The BROWN LINE East of FLESQUIERES, was timed to be reached at ZERO plus 210 minutes.

The Left of the Guards Division was to capture the BROWN Objective when the 63^rd Division (XVII Corps), had taken GRAINCOURT.

(d). At ZERO plus 270 minutes, the 3^rd and Guards Divisions were ordered to be prepared to advance to exploit to the BLUE DOTTED LINE, capturing RIBECOURT,PREMY CHAPEL and the GRAINCOURT Line.

(e). The 62^nd and 2^nd Divisions would them move forward from their Assembly Positions behind the 3^rd and Guards Divisions respectively as the advance progressed, so as to be in position either-

(i). To complete the capture of the BROWN LINE should the leading Divisions not have succeeded,

(ii) To take up the advance from the BROWN LINE should the leading Divisions not have advanced beyond this Line, or

(iii) To pass through the leading Divisions on the BLUE DOTTED LINE to capture the BLUE Objective, and afterwards to exploit success to the GREEN DOTTED LINE.

For this purpose, not less than one complete Brigade was ordered to be kept in hand by the Divisional Commanders concerned.

A Map showing the various Objectives and Areas of Tank Action is attached, (See Map “A”). Not with this archive.
The action of each Tank Company is dealt with in the succeeding pages.

PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS.

The General Plan of projected Tank Operations was stated by G.S.O. 1, Tank Corps, at a Conference of Tank Brigade Commanders, held at 2^nd Tank Brigade Headquarters, COUTURELLE CHATEAU, on morning of September 19^th 1918.

I was informed that this Brigade would not take part in the Battle, with the exception of 15^th Tank Battalion (Mark V and Mark V Star) which would be placed under the Command of 1^st Tank Brigade. I accordingly detached 15^th Tank Battalion to 1^st Tank Brigade.

On 23^rd September I was notified that this Brigade would take over 15^th Tank Battalion again, and that I would be responsible for all Tank Operations on VI and XVII Corps fronts.

I therefore got into immediate touch with the G.Os. C., VI and XVII Corps, also visiting Third Army Headquarters and G.O.C. 1^st Tank Brigade.

I instructed my Staff to render every assistance to the 15^th Tank Battalion in the preparations for the Battle.

2^nd Tank Brigade Headquarters opened at GOMIECOURT, (A.23.d.central) on morning of September 25^th.

RECONNAISSANCE.

Preparations.

The time for preparations being short, reconnaissance for these Operations had to take a very general form.

R.O’s were relieved by Section Commanders and Assistant R.O’s of most of the reconnaissance connected with Approach Marches, and were thus enabled to concentrate on the Forward Area.

The Area can be looked on as a simple one; the Country retains a good deal of its peace-time appearance, landmarks are plentiful, features like BOURLON WOOD being unmistakeable general guides to direction. Some R.O’s, Tank and Section Commanders were already familiar with the Area, having taken part in the First Battle of CAMBRAI in November 1917.

During the reconnaissance for Approach Marches, Tank and Section Commanders had ample opportunity to see something of the enemy country in advance, and they were all familiar with their Objectives in advance. One O.R. was employed on “Z” day in an O.P., and was able to send back useful information about the progress of the Attack.

Issues of Maps, Photos etc.

Maps were issued in adequate quantities on 1.20,000, 1/40,000 and 1/100,000 scales. The 1/20,000, 57.c.NE., New Edition, was received on “Y” Day. The 1/20,000 Sheet was used as the Battle Map. Barrage Maps were obtained from Corps to allow of an issue of one to each Tank and Section Commander.

Photographs. 12^th and 13^th Squadrons were visited, and very useful oblique photographs were obtained, covering the sectors of each Company. In addition there were the photographs used in the First Battle of Cambrai. No fault can be found with the supply of oblique photos. Battalion and Coy. R.O’s should not issue to their Tank Commanders photographs which do not concern their Area, but should select one or two good photographs taking in the necessary Objectives, and Landmarks, for each Tank Commander. There were several excellent mosaics of the CANAL DU NORD, a particularly useful one being obtained from 13^th Squadron on “X” Day. Landmark sketches, Notes on the Canals and Country ahead, as well as Obstacle Maps showing Sunken roads etc., were supplied by 2^nd Tank Brigade. Locations of all derelict tanks in the Area were given to 15^th Tank Battn. before operations, and Tank Commanders marked them on their Maps.

CANAL DU NORD.

This was expected to be a serious, if not insuperable, Obstacle. Fortunately only one Company of the 2^nd Tank Brigade had to cross it in action, the others crossing at the tunnel during Approach Marches. From photographs and other information, the most likely crossings were selected, and named “A”, “B”, “C”, “D” and “E”. Those were discussed by Company concerned, 15^th Tank Battalion, and 2^nd Tank Brigade H.Q., and finally settled on. XVII Corps and Divisions were informed of the location of these Crossings, and all Tank Commanders concerned were made acquainted with them. The Crossings selected for the Northern Sections were all satisfactory, but Tanks were able to cross with comparative ease between “A” and “B” Crossings. The Canal was passable in many places as the walls had fallen in or been broken by shell-fire, and it was not the Obstacle expected.

It is worthy of note that the Germans, with the exception of one Landmine at “A” Crossing, had not turned the Canal into a more serious Obstacle on this Brigade front, probably because they are not yet fully conversant with the capabilities of Heavy Tanks. There was a case of attempted Tank Obstacle construction in incomplete portions of the Canal, North of 2^nd Tank Brigade Front. This described in Notes issued 1^st Tank Brigade.

GENERAL.

Tank Commanders on the whole maintained direction well. The avoidance of sky-lines still leaves something to be desired. There were again several cases of Tanks being knocked out through unduly exposing themselves on the sky-line. The importance of this matter cannot be too often or too strongly impressed on all Officers.

There were one or two cases of ditching, principally due to the numerous trenches.

REPORT on OPERATIONS: “A” COMPANY 15^th Tank Battn. (Major ALLEN)

27^th September 1918

“A” Company, 15^th Tank Battalion, (8 Mark V and Mark V Star Tanks) was ordered to work with 3^rd Division, VI Corps.

The orders given to O.C “A” Company were (i) to assist the Infantry in capturing RED LINE, ( between HAVRINCOURT and FLESQUIERES) and (ii) to assist in the capture of the BROWN LINE ( 1,000 yards East of FLESQUIERES).

APPROACH MARCHES.

All Tanks reached Starting Points, but the Approach March was rendered difficult by congestion of traffic, ammunition dumps, light railways and our own batteries, and heavy hostile gas and H.E. shelling Yorkshire Bank.

ACTION OF TANKS.

No 1 Section, (3 Tanks), No. 2 Section, (3 Tanks), and No 4 Section, (2 Tanks), Total – 8 Mark V Star Tanks, started at ZERO from K.27.a.

Nos 1 and 4 Sections proceeded down PUTNEY AVENUE with no 2 Section on their left. Two Tanks became ditched in Sunken Road K.22.c., but were ultimately unditched with the aid of 40 German prisoners. 6 Tanks reached FLESQUIERES and East of the Village.

The 6 Tanks went forward, passing the Infantry 200 yards West of first Objective. SILHEM CHAPEL and WOOD SWITCH (first Objective), were packed with enemy infantry who were in great confusion, unable to move one way or the other. All Tank guns were brought to bear on them and great losses were inflicted, case shot being fired at point-blank range.

In the HINDENBURG Support Line in K.16.d., a number of Germans were seen standing on the fire steps, firing at our advancing infantry. One tank took these by surprise from the rear with the result that our infantry occupied the trench.

The Tanks then proceeded slightly beyond the First Objective, finally coming back under cover of the Ridge to prepare for the advance on to the Second Objective.

Ten minutes later the Tanks left the First Objective, accompanies by the Infantry towards FLESQUIERES. Some enemy machine-guns and infantry were mopped up en route. In FLESQUIERES there was heavy fighting and many of the enemy were killed coming out of the houses, all Tanks again having excellent targets. One Tank of No 1 Section was knocked out by a direct hit in FLESQUIERES.

The remainder of the Tanks then continued the advance to the BROWN LINE, 1,000 yards East of FLESQUIERES, preceding the Infantry, who co-operated very well the whole time. In K.24.b., and L.19.c. our Infantry were held up by hostile machine-guns. Tanks went forward and silenced a number of these in SCULL SUPPORT and KAISER TRENCH, whereupon the advance continued.

On the BROWN LINE, magnificent enemy targets were seen and they were engaged by all tanks with Hotchkiss and 6-pounder case-shot. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy, which has since been confirmed by the numbers of dead in this area. One tank then proceeded 250 yards East of the BROWN Line. One Tank received a direct hit at L.13.c.8.8., and another became out of action at L.13.c.7.4. with mechanical trouble. The remaining tanks rallied.

All Tank Commanders were much impressed with the way in which our Infantry attacked, and the rapidity with which they advanced. They co-operated extremely well with the Tanks, indicating targets, and seizing the opportunities created by tanks.

The good mutual co-operation between Tanks and Infantry undoubtedly contributed largely to the success of this operation. O.C. “A” Company reports that the machine-gun fire from KAISER TRENCH and SCULL SUPPORT was intense, and without the assistance of Tanks it would have been difficult to gain a footing there.

3^rd Division reached BROWN LINE up to time, and alone took over 2,500 prisoners, besides killing and wounding very large numbers of the enemy.

The following letter was received at 2^nd Tank Brigade Headquarters, from Major-General C.J. DEVERELL, C.B., Commanding 3^rd DIVISION.

General Staff, 3^rd Divn. GS. 1804

“To G.O.C. 2^nd TANK BRIGADE

All ranks, 3^rd DIVISION, are united in their admiration of the work done yesterday by the two Companies (“A” and “C”) of the 15^th Battalion, Tank Corps, co-operating with the Division.

They played a great part in the success gained, and their gallantry and determination to assist us to their utmost was much appreciated by all ranks of the Division.

(Sgd) C.J. DEVERELL

Major-General

Comdg. 3^rd DIVISION

28^th September 1918

REPORT ON OPERATIONS: “B” COMPANY, 15^th Tank Battn.

ALLOTMENT OF TANKS.

52^nd Division: 4 Tanks (Capt. Forster’s Section).

XVII CORPS

63^rd Division: 6 Tanks ( Capt Hutton’s Section)

(Capt. Gibson’s Section)

PLAN of OPERATIONS for TANKS.

The main role of the 4 Tanks allotted to 52^nd Division was to assist the Infantry in capturing the HINDENBURG LINE (West of the CANAL DU NORD) in E.26.b. & d., K.2.b., to junction with VI Corps (Guards Division). After these trenches had been cleaned up, the Tanks were to endeavour to cross the Canal near the CAMBRAI Road, and assist in the further advance.

The 6 Tanks allotted to the 63^rd Division were required to operate as follows:- 4 to cross the Canal as soon as possible after ZERO, and assist the Infantry in capturing the HINDENBURG Support Line. The other two Tanks (under Captain Gibson) were to go forward with the ANSON Battalion from TADPOLE COPSE and assist in the Second Phase of the Operations.

APPROACH MARCH.

The Approach March was successfully carried out, but crews were much inconvenienced by hostile gas shelling in the neighbourhood of MOEUVRES. Some of the men were affected by this, & several cases of vomiting and sickness occurred.

ACTION.

Section with 52^nd One Tank developed serious mechanical trouble during the Approach March, and could not start. Three Tanks started from E.25. at Z plus 5 minutes. They first of all assisted in dealing with wire and portions of trench in E.26.a. They then turned right and proceeded down the HINDENBURG LINE, returning repeatedly to maintain touch with the Infantry, of whom they got ahead on several occasions. Considerable opposition was met with in this Sector the whole time. All three Tanks got right down the HINDENBURG LINE as far as the CAMBRAI Road, and one crossed it five times. Enemy machine-guns were very active from all directions, but particularly so from SPOIL BANK in E.23.c. Field guns and shell-fire generally directed against Tanks was heavy, and one Tank received a direct hit early on in the morning, wounding the Tank Commander and all his crew, but he carried on the action until only he and one of his crew were fit to stand, when the Tank received another direct hit and became out of action. Both the remaining Tanks were put out of action in the HINDENBURG LINE in E.25.d., one receiving three direct hits and the other two. Of three Officers and 23 Other Ranks who went into action with these three Tanks, one was killed and19 wounded, some slightly. Although these Tanks all finally became casualties, they reached the most important of their Objectives first, and inflicted severe damage on the enemy. One Tank succeeded in establishing touch between 52^nd and Guards Division South of CAMBRAI Road.
Action of 6 Tanks with 63^rd The Four Tanks of “B” Company allotted to 63^rd Division specially for the First Objective all started from SAND LANE South of MOEUVRES, intending to pick up the Infantry near the Canal in B.15.c. One Tank caught fire in Sunken Road in E.20.c. and was completely burnt out. Of the remaining 3, two started at ZERO, and immediately proceeded towards the Canal Crossing “B”, B.15.c.2.4. They saw none of our Infantry, but were heavily machine-gunned by the enemy. They then turned towards MOEUVRES to look for the Infantry, who were then advancing from there. Having gained touch with these, they then went straight for the Canal ahead of the Infantry, and crossed it between “A” and “B” Crossings in E.15.c. They saw a Tank of the 7^th Tank Battalion blown up in “A” Crossing. When they reached the Eastern side of the Canal they were well ahead of the Infantry and were fired upon heavily by hostile machine-guns. The splash was particularly bad inside the Tanks. They then went up and down LYNX TRENCH as arranged, firing their guns at hostile machine-gunners and who were on top of the parapet and in the open. Many machine-guns and crews were dealt with and 6-pounders were used most effectively against these. One machine-gun and its crew were run over and squashed. On the whole the German machine-gunners in this part put up a good fight. The furthest point reached by these Tanks was E.22.b. Both Tanks later developed mechanical trouble one autovac and one gear. these defects could not be remedied and necessitated the Tank periodically halting. On returning to Rally one got a direct hit and became out of action. At 7 a.m. one of these Tank Commanders sent a pigeon message from well East of the Canal regarding his gear trouble, which was received at 2^nd Tank Brigade H.Q. The remaining Tank of this Section proceeded North East of SAND LANE to pick up its Infantry East of MOEUVRES as arranged, but at E.20.b.3.0. it caught fire in the Sunken Road. This delayed the advance of this Tank, but as soon as the fire was got under control and extinguished, it proceeded towards “C” Crossing and while looking for it became badly ditched in LOCK STREET TRENCH. This Tank was therefore unable to cross the Canal, but both the Tank Commander (Lieut. THOROUGHGOOD) and his crew got out of the Tank with their machine-guns and helped to support the advance of the Infantry by their fire. The Tank Commander reports that he and his crew assisted by one Corporal (Corporal CLARKE) and one other rank of the 1/7^th Scottish Rifles (52^nd Div.) to capture 35 Germans who were holding out near Lock No. 5.
The two Tanks (Capt. GIBSON’S Section) who had to participate in the attack towards GRAINCOURT and ANNEUX, arrived at their Starting Point (TADPOLE COPSE) at 4-20 a.m. where they were unable to find the Infantry with whom they were to advance. At ZERO plus 15 the Section Commander decided to send his Tanks on along the pre-arranged route in spite of the fact that he could not find the Infantry, hoping to pick up these somewhere on route. The Tanks were delayed in reaching the Canal, by the numerous trenches they had to cross, and did not arrive there until 6-45 a.m. Here they found both “A” and “B” Crossings blocked; the former by 7^th Battalion Tank which had struck a land-mine and was out of action; the latter by Artillery who were passing through. The Section Commander decided that it was necessary to tow the disabled tank of the 7^th out of the way. This was done, resulting in further delay. Touch with the Infantry not having been established, the Section Commander ordered the two tanks to proceed down LYNX TRENCH, mopping up any enemy who might be there, and then to rally at the Advanced Rallying Point in E.27., where they were to await orders. He then returned to MOEUVRES, where his Company Commander was, to obtain his instructions regarding these two tanks. These having been obtained, he returned to his two tanks, which in the meantime, having encountered no enemy, had reached the Rallying Point, where they were approached by the G.S.O. 3 of the 63^rd Division, who asked if they could assist in mopping up the trenches at the junction of KANGAROO TRENCH and the HINDENBURG SUPPORT. This was agreed to, and at 2-15 p.m. they went over accompanied by Infantry, who were led by a Lieut-Colonel. The enemy ran away from behind the HINDENBURG SUPPORT LINE in E.28., fired on by a Tank Hotchkiss and 6-pounder, also by the Guards Div. from the Right Flank.

Our Infantry occupied their Objective and pushed on beyond it, towards ANNEUX and GRAINCOURT.

The G.S.O. 3, 63^rd Division, who had followed up the Attack, then thanked the Tank Section Commander, (Captain GIBSON), for the good work these two Tanks had done.

At this point Tanks had only a little petrol left.

About 4-30 p.m. the G.S.O 3 63^rd Division, brought up a Brigadier-General (Brigade not ascertained) who asked if Tanks could go forward with his Brigade, who were then about to resume the advance. He was informed that they had very little petrol left, but would go on if he (the Brigadier-Genl.) would accept responsibility for Tanks being stranded right forward without petrol. The Brigadier-General agreed to this, and said he wanted to get his Brigade on to the MARQUION Line.

The 2 Tanks went forward and picked up the Infantry in E.29.c. (North of GRAINCOURT). From this point they preceded the Infantry and passed through between ANNEUX and GRAINCOURT, encountering practically no opposition.

About F.26.c. Tanks came under a lot of machine-gun fire from the direction of FONTAINE-NOTRE-DAME. Both Tanks were turned broadside on and fire was brought to bear on the German machine-guns in order to support the Infantry advancing on the left. Parties of the enemy who were seen coming over the crest towards the MARQUION Line were engaged by all Tank guns which could be brought to bear. The enemy ran away and many casualties were caused.

Soon after this some heavy shells, believed to have been fired from trench mortars, fell very close to the Tanks. These two Tanks reached a point about 1,000 yards from CANTAING before completing their work.

Petrol was then almost finished, crews were much exhausted, having left the final lying-up place about 12 midnight, 26/27^th September. The work required of the Tanks was completed, so they were withdrawn to a point well East of the Canal, where they had to remain, as the petrol had entirely given out.

Some petrol was later obtained, from a casualty tank of the same Company, and these two tanks returned to Rallying Point on September 28^th.

The following telegram was received from G.O.C. 63^rd Division on the evening of 27^th:-

“Most grateful for splendid assistance given this Division by “B” Company’s two Tanks to-day under Captain GIBSON.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS: “C” Company, 15^th Tank Battalion.

(7 Mark V Tanks). Major SKEGGS.

“C” Company left HAVRINCOURT at 1 a.m. on 27^th Sept., following in rear of “A” Company.

The Approach March was a difficult one, owing to several sunken roads and battery positions having to be crossed. Heavy shelling was encountered in K.32.b., where one Officer and 3 Other Ranks were killed. One Tank got ditched in K.27.a. owing to inability to swing due to the failure of the epicyclics.

This Tank took three quarters of an hour to get out, and took considerable time to catch up the Infantry.

The role of “C” Company, (7 Tanks), was as follows:-

(a). One Section (4 Tanks) under Captain MANSFIELD, was detailed to operate with the Guards Division with the following orders:- (a) Rendez-vous in Sunken road K.9.d. by ZERO plus 1 hr. (b) Section Commander to meet O.C. 1^st Battalion Grenadier Guards, at Lock No. 7, K.9.c., and will advance under his orders to assist in the capture of PREMY CHAPEL.

(c) Should the advance of the leading troops of the 1^st Guards Brigade be held up during the Approach March of the 3^rd Guards Brigade to the BROWN LINE, O.C. 1^st Battalion, Grenadier Guards will send Section of Tanks forward to assist in overcoming opposition and give them a place of rendez-vous where they will meet him afterwards.

(d) If possible, however, the Section will be left fresh for the attack on PREMY CHAPEL.

One Section of 3 Tanks (Captain McKERSIE) was ordered to support the Attack of the 3^rd Division on to the Northern edge of FLESQUIERES Village, in conjunction with the two Tanks of “A” Company of the same Battalion, but not to become more deeply involved than necessary, as the Section would subsequently be required to assist the Guards in their Attack on PREMY CHAPEL.

ACTION.

Captain McKERSIE’S SECTION, (with 3^rd Division), co-operated with the Tanks of “A” Company in the capture of FLESQUIERES Village, dealing particularly with the Northern end.

One Tank Commander with some men of the 1^st Battalion Gordons, (3^rd Division), reached the BROWN LINE, doing great execution en route, and was also responsible for running over and squashing several machine-guns with their crews. This Tank received a direct hit in L.13.b.,and was knocked out.

Of the other two Tanks of this Section, one became badly ditched early in the attack, and the other was hit and had mechanical trouble on the West side of FLESQUIERES, but subsequently rallied late in the afternoon. There were therefore no Tanks of this Section left to continue the advance towards PREMY CHAPEL with the Guards Division.

Captain MANSFIELD’S SECTION, (with Guards Division).

Captain MANSFIELD was unfortunately killed before reporting to O.C. 1^st Battalion, Grenadier Guards at Lock No 7.

The Section was then ordered by Major SKEGGS to assemble about K.18.a.9.0., to await the arrival of the Grenadier Guards.

Whilst waiting here, an appeal for assistance was received from a Company Commander of the 1^st Gordons, (3^rd Division). The Acting Section Commander responded without waiting for orders, and proceeded to assist in cleaning up of FLESQUIERES, performing excellent work and having good targets. One Tank reached the BEETROOT FACTORY in L.13.c where particular execution was inflicted on the enemy.

All 4 Tanks having completed their tasks, they rallied North of FLESQUIERES, ready to advance with the Guards Division as detailed in orders.

O.C. “C” Company (Major SKEGGS), met Lieut-Colonel Viscount GORT, Commanding 1^st Battalion Grenadier Guards, at the pre-arranged Rendez-vous and preceded with him through the Village of FLESQUIERES to arrange details of the Attack upon PREMY CHAPEL. These having been decided upon, the 4 Tanks were ordered by Major SKEGGS to proceed round the Northern edge of the Village to pick up the Infantry in L.13.c. and L.19.a.

All 4 Tanks reached the vicinity of the BEETROOT FACTORY in L.13.c., where they came under heavy Artillery fire. A 77 mm, field gun is reported to have opened direct fire on them from ORIVAL WOOD.

One Tank proceeded down the Sunken Road towards PREMY CHAPEL, and received several direct hits in L.13.d.

Three of these four Tanks were knocked out by Artillery fire in the BEETROOT FACTORY Area, and most of the Crews were wounded. The fourth was damaged but eventually rallied.

Of the 7 Tanks of this Company which started, 4 were completely knocked out, one was ditched, one had mechanical trouble, and one rallied. Two of the above subsequently rallied on 28^th September.

Tank Commanders in this Company were also unanimous in their praise of the gallantry of the infantry.

CONDITIONS.

Conditions were distinctly favourable. The weather, although somewhat uncertain prior to “Z” Day, was fine and clear on “Z” day itself. There was heavy rain on Y/Z night, which however ceased at 3 a.m.

The ground was dry and surface provided good going. The most serious Obstacles were the CANAL DU NORD, the numerous Sunken roads, and the wide trenches of the HINDENBURG LINE and Support Line. Most of the main Obstacles were located in advance.

APPROACH MARCHES.

These took place as follows:-

“A” & “C” Coys. Sep.22^nd. BEHAGNIES to VELU WOOD, 12.000 yards.

15^th Tank Bn. 24^th/25^th. VELU WOOD to HAVRINCOURT WOOD, P.12.b., 6,000 yards.

15^th Tank Bn. 26^th/27^th. HAVRINGCOURT WOOD, P.12.b., to Starting Points, K.26.b. and K.27.a., 4,000 yards.

“B” Company, Sept. 22^nd. BEHAGNIES to LAGNICOURT 10,000 yards.

15^th Tank Bn. 24^th/25^th. LAGNICOURT to South of QUEANT, D.14., 3,000 yards.

26^th/27^th S. of QUEANT, D.14, to Starting Point, E.25, South of MOEUVRES, 5,500 yards.

Considerable gas shelling and traffic congestion were experienced in the latter stages of Approach Marches, but apart from this, they took place without incident.

RALLYING POINTS.

These were selected as far forward as possible, consistent with safety, and were as follows:-

“A” Company, CHAPEL WOOD, K.23.c.

“B” Company, E.27.b.7.6.

“C” Company K.15.b.5.4.

K.18.a. Advanced R.P. for Section to operate with Guards Division towards PREMY CHAPEL.

On “Z” morning and afternoon, Rallying Points were visited by myself and other members of my Staff, and the position as regards fitness of Tanks and Crews, and their experiences, ascertained.

COMMUNICATIONS.

Communications were maintained by the following means:-

(a). Telephone and telegraph.

(b). Wireless

(c). D.R’s.

(d). Pigeons.

(e). Aeroplanes.

(f). Runners.

TELEPHONE and TELEGRAPH.

The practice, emphasised in former Reports, of maintaining direct communication between Brigade H.Q. and Units was necessarily somewhat modified owing to the short space of time available for construction and the distances involved.

Some Units were therefore put on to the nearest Divisional or Corps Exchange and were then available through VI Corps.

Brigade was in direct telephonic communication with VI Corps, 1^st Tank Brigade, 2^nd Tank Supply Coy., and all the necessary formations through VI Corps.

VI Corps was unable to allot a line for the exclusive telephone use of Brigade to 15^th Battalion, but a direct sounder circuit was arranged, which proved most useful.

15^th Battalion was in direct telephonic communication with 3^rd Division. “B” Coy. detached, was in direct telephonic communication with 63^rd Division.

Wireless proved most useful and a number of messages were received both at Brigade H.Q. and 15^th Battalion H.Q. by this means.

A Wireless Station was erected at 15^th Battalion Advanced H.Q. (J.29.a.1.0.) with one set working back to Brigade H.Q. on one wavelength and another working forward to sets in “B” Coy. and “C” Coy. (in a Tank) on another wavelength. As the Sounder Circuit gave trouble for some hours during the early part of the day, messages were sent between Brigade and Battln. By Wireless.

At ZERO, Communication between “C” Company and Battalion was obtained. The set was then moved to K.15.d.8.9., whence several messages were transmitted.

“B” Company’s set was erected at D.24.a.central under difficult circumstances owing to hostile shelling and communication was established about three-quarters of an hour after ZERO. Not much use was made of this Set during the battle, but it proved valuable during the afternoon of September 27^th.

It seems doubtful whether a Set remaining at Company H.Q. is of real value. It should have a tank available to take it forward to a Rallying Point.

(c). DESPATCH RIDERS.

Two D.Rs were allotted to 15^th Battalion for use under Battalion arrangements.

Two or three runs a day were made from Brigade to all Units.

(d). PIGEONS.

16 Pigeons were available from XVII Corps Loft at GOUY for “B” Company.

15^th Battalion (“A” & “C” Coys.) were allotted 24 pigeons from VI Corps Loft at BARLY.

They were very useful. Messages took about 1 ½ hours to reach Brigade Headquarters, and were repeated to Advanced H.Q. 15^th Tank Battalion.

The standard of messages received from Tank Commanders was well above the average.

CASUALTIES

UNIT Date Killed Died of wounds Wounded Missing

O.R. O. O.R. O. O.R. O. O.R.

15^th Tank Battn. 27 Sept. 2 12 1 – 6 47 0 1

No 1 G.C. Coy 27 Sept. – 2 – – – 2 – –

2^nd Tank Bde. 26 Sept. – – – – – 1 – –

Signal Coy.

TOTAL…. … 2 14 1 0 6 50 0 1

2^ND TANK BRIGADE

TANK STATE. 24.9.18 to 29.9.18

See attached spreadsheet.

ANTI-TANK DEFENCES.

Named it their order of danger to Tanks, the enemy Anti-tank Defence measures encountered were as follows:-

Field and Heavy Guns.

It was particularly noticeable that heavy guns were specially detailed for use against Tanks, directed by capable observers.

Field guns frequently used battery fire, the shells arriving almost simultaneously, indicating that the whole battery was firing on the target.

Machine-guns.

German machine-gunners were active against tanks, principally from close quarters. There were not many cases of penetration, but splash was unusually prevalent.

Trench Mortars.

There was every indication that trench mortars were being used against tanks.

Pits.

Large numbers of pits had been dug in the Area, dimensions 5’ x 12’ x 20’. Some of them were wired over, prepared for camouflage.

Land-mines.

No Tanks of 15^th Tank Battalion were put out of action by these, but one of 7^th Battalion’s tanks encountered one at “A” Crossing, CANAL DU NORD.

Other Land-mines have been discovered in the Area, and a full description of these will follow.

Anti-tank rifles.

A number of these were found but they were not used to any extent, nor did they do material damage.

No new enemy Anti-tank measure was brought to light in the course of these operations, so far as has at present been ascertained.

R.A.F. CO-OPERATION.

No 8 Squadron and No 73 Squadron, R.A.F., co-operated with 2^nd Tank Brigade during Operations on September 27^th.
A number of messages were dropped on Battalion and Company Headquarters during the Battle, while fresh Machines leaving the Aerodrome dropped consolidated Reports of information gained by the previous patrol, on 2^nd Tank Brigade Headquarters.

This system worked well.

The large number of derelict Tanks from the First Battle of CAMBRAI made the spotting of Tanks actually engaged in this Operation somewhat difficult.

Companies must again realise that they will not get messages unless they lay their ground strips out properly.
It is suggested that in future operations Flight Commanders responsible for Tank protection should visit the Tank Companies with which they are co-operating prior to “Z” Day, when the action of Tanks could be discussed with reference to special help required from aeroplanes on particular bits of ground.
The arrangements which were made for Tank Commanders to put out Red Ground Flares when fired on by Anti-tank guns though sound in principle, did not on this occasion work out in practice. Several cases occurred of Tank Commanders using these Flares North East of FLESQUIERES while being heavily shelled. No Aeroplanes were flying at the time and no action resulted.

SUGGESTIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED.

The success of the operations of 15^th Tank Battalion with 3^rd Division proved the value of previous training with Infantry.

15^th Battalion had carried out training with the 8^th, 9^th and 76^th Infantry Brigades (3^rd Division) on 13^th and 14^th September.

One Company from each Battalion of each Brigade acted as a Demonstration Company, whilst the remainder of each Brigade watched the operations.

3 Complete Sections of Tanks, working in relays, were employed, thus enabling the training to be continuous.

The value of a Wireless Set carried in a Tank was clearly demonstrated.
Instructions were issued that Company and Section Commanders would keep a reserve of pigeons for sending back information gained at Rallying Points and in the course of the Battle. As a result of this, valuable information as to the number of Tanks rallied and fit was received at Brigade Headquarters at an early hour.
It is suggested that a white arrow disc be provided on each Tank to be used in conjunction with the red flares to indicate to aeroplanes the direction of fire from anti-tank guns.
Tank Commanders considered that the proportion of smoke in their barrage, viz:- 1/6^th and 1/10^th, was insufficient to screen their Tanks. The clearness of the atmosphere, and the breeze, no doubt partly accounted for this.
In the event of Tanks detailed for special work failing for some reason to find their infantry at the Starting Point, it is the duty of these Tanks to proceed in the pre-arranged direction until they gain touch with their infantry or with the enemy.
Battalions should always make arrangements for the provision of hot meals at Rallying Points for crews coming out of action.
The green and white flag (signal to “Come on”) should only be used in cases where our infantry have been held up and the Tanks have been sent forward to deal with some particular point. These signals should not be used when the attack is proceeding satisfactorily.
In forwarding the following suggestion from 15^th Tank Battn., I am of the opinion that every case must be judged on its merits and that no hard and fast rule regarding the position of Rallying points should be laid down. The advantages claimed by O.C. 15^th Battalion for the final point of deployment as the final Rallying point are indisputable, if other conditions admit.

“Tactical. In regard to the settlement of the Rallying Point at the final conclusion of Tank operations, I am of the opinion that unless the advance is very considerable, and the strength of the Battalion permits of the provision of an adequate number of spare crews, so as to enable complete reliefs to be effected, the R.P. is best fixed at the final point of deployment. In the event of a further call being made on the Tanks, any advantages that may accrue from having the R.P. further forward so as to shorten the next approach march, are fully out-weighed by the greater promptitude with which the processes of rest and re-organisation may be undertaken in an atmosphere comparatively free, not only from hostile shelling and gas, but also from the noise and general disturbance due to the close proximity of our own guns. Communications, moreover, on which the promptitude and efficiency of the work of re-organisation largely depend, must of necessity be unreliable to a more forward R.P., in that the roads and tracks for a period succeeding operations are frequently passable by day only with difficulty, and after dark, if passable at all, only with great delay and uncertainty.

SUPPLY TANKS.

If possible, when tanks are going to work with the Infantry, an infantry Officer should be attached to the Tanks for a period of, say, 4 days before ZERO, in order that he can keep the Tank Commanders informed of the probable movements and requirements of the infantry.

In the case of the 62^nd Division, this was done, and was found very useful.

G.M.F. Sacks

Lieut.-Colonel

Commanding 2^nd Tank Brigade

H.Q. 2^nd Tank Brigade,

5^th October 1918

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Category Archives: 1918

November 1918

9th Canadian Artillery Brigade Operation Order No 155

WAR DIARY of 20 Siege Battery for October 1918

War Diary 9th Canadian Artillery Brigade October 1918

Timetable November 1918

Letter to Frank Springett 25 October 1918

Alf Smith Postkarte received 18 October 1918

Letter to Miss Dillon 16 October 1918

Letter to Rev. R.M. Laporte Payne 10 Oct 1918

Report on Operations 2nd Tank Brigade 5 October 1918