Copy No ….2
SECRET.
XXII CORPS OPERATION ORDER NO 7.
—————————

19th July, 1918.

1. Reference XXII Corps Operation Order No. 6, para. 4, of to-days date.

ZERO Hour will be 8 AM 20th July.

2. ACKNOWLEDGE.

P.H.Hausin
Major G.S.
B.G., G. S.,
XXII Corps
Issued at 10.40 pm
Copy to all recipients C.O.O., No. 6.

SECRET. Copy No. 13

XXII CORPS OPERATION ORDER NO. 6.
————————–

19July, 1918

1. In accordance with orders received from Fifth French Army (a copy of which has been given to Divisions concerned), the XXII Corps will attack to-morrow (20th July) on both banks of the River ADRE.

2. The attached map shows assembly position, objectives and Corps and Divisional boundaries.

3. The 62nd Division will be on the right and the 51st Division will be on the left. The River ADRE will form the dividing line between Divisions.

4. The attack will start at Zero hour, which will be notified later communicated separately

5. The attack will be covered by a creeping barrage provided by the artillery now in the line.
The Divisional Artilleries of the 51st and 62nd Divisions will support the attack beyond the limits of range of the artillery finding the barrage.

6. The rate of barrage will be 100 metres in 4 minutes. It will halt for 20 minutes 150 metres in front of the line marked in GREEN on the attached map.

7. The Corps Mounted Troops will be in Corps Reserve and each Division will hold one Battalion in reserve which will not be used without reference to Corps H.Q.

8. A joint Divisional Headquarters will be established at ST IMOGES.

9. Advanced Corps Headquarters will be established at HAUTVILLERS from 12 midnight to-night 19th July.

10. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.
C.W. Gwynn
B.G., G.S.
XXII Corps
Issued at 3 p.m. to:-
Copy No 1 War Diary 7 C.E. 13 82nd Squad R.A.F.
2 G.S. File 8 G.H.Q. (South) 14 Brit Mission 5th Fr Army
3 A.D.C. 9 Brit Mission G.A.C. 15 A.D. Sigs
4 G.O.C., R.A. 10 51st Division 16 D.D.M.S.
5 ‘Q’ 11 62nd Division 17Ig.
6 ‘A’ 12 XXII Corps Mtd Tps. 18 A.P.M.

Copy No …..6
SECRET. XXII Corps
18th July 1918.

XXII CORPS WARNING ORDER NO. 2.
———————————————

1. The relief of the II Italian Corps by the XXII Corps is cancelled.

2. The XXII Corps will be prepared to concentrate during the night 19th/20th July in forward positions immediately behind the line now held by the II Italian Corps with a view to an advance on the morning of the 21st July.

3. The 51st Division on the left, and the 62nd Division on right will move into forward concentration areas on the night of 19th/20th July. Concealed positions of assembly will be reconnoitred to-morrow. Guides for the night march will be provided on application by the 120th and 14th French Divisions. Routes selected should be marked in addition as far as possible.

4. The general line of demarcation between Divisions will be NANTHEUIL – ST IMOGES – LA NEUVILLE all inclusive to the 51st Division.

5. The MESNIL Brigade, 51st Division, and rear units of the 62nd Division will be closed up to the line of the MARNE to-morrow morning (19th inst.) moving in small columns with a view to shortening the night march.

6. Pontoons of both Divs will be pooled and will be concentrated in the area of the PIEERY Brigade Group of the 51st Division to-morrow with a view to their being placed at the disposal of the French, if required. All pontoons to be placed under the Command of one Field Company of the 51st Division.

7. ACKNOWLEDGE.
Signature unreadable.
B.G., G.S.
XXII Corps.
Issued at 11.20 p.m. to:-
Copy No. 1 51st Division
2 62nd Division.
3 C.E.
4 G.O.C. R.A.
5 Q
6 82nd Squad R.A.F.

22nd Corps ‘G’
——————–

1. It would appear that the Corps may shortly be engaged in operations of the nature of open warfare.
2. The following scheme is submitted for approval for more efficient aerial co-operation than has formerly been possible.
3. The system does not entail the use of any apparatus beyond the Popham panneau and ground strips already provided.
4. It is anticipated that should the scheme be adopted and the units on the ground be able to carry out their part. The Squadron would have no difficulty whatever in (a) keeping Corps informed of exact positions of units down to Brigades, and dropping messages to these formations; (b) in receiving messages from formations for transmission to Corps (thence to Divisions if required).
5. The scheme is easily capable of elaboration to include units down to Battalions, but it is considered that owing to the very short notice which it will be possible to give, it would probably be inadvisable to attempt to deal with smaller formations than Brigades.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

1. Corps dropping station indicated in any suitable ****** – say “XII”
2. Divisional H.Q. to be indicated by Popham panneau with one of the letters W X Y or Z placed at 9 o’clock to the panneau. Divisional calls would thus simply W X Y or Z.
3. Brigade H.Q. will be indicated by popham panneau together with a call letter placed opposite one of the four corners “W X Y or Z” position. Calls of Brigades of W Division to be WW WX WY WZ and for ‘X’ Division XW XX XY XZ and so on.

PROCEDURE.
1. A unit seeing a contact ‘plane in its neighbourhood and wishing to report its position, will merely expose its popham panneau and call letter in an approximate position. Machine will acknowledge, for example “XWRT”. If the unit wishes to communicate with a machine, it will open popham panneau in the normal manner and procedure will be as usual.
2. Corps wishing to communicate with a unit will forward message to Squadron giving as far as possible approximate location. The ‘plane will fly in direction of unit required sounding call letter on klaxon. Unit will expose panneau and call letters and machine will drop message.
3. In the event of a unit losing its popham panneau, or the situation preventing its being exposed, the call letter in ground strips will be sufficient indication.
4. In extreme cases when neither panneau nor strips can be exposed, it is suggested that units should fire four Very’s lights in rapid succession as a signal that it is the unit to which the plane is calling.

ADVANTAGES OF SYSTEM.

1. The procedure above outlined presents no difficulty whatever from the air point of view at least and will enable higher command (a) to locate its units at any time; (b) to communicate with the unit; (c) to receive messages from the unit.
2. Code calls are reduced to one or two letters only which are all made with straight ground strips.
3. The scheme is systematic in that units belonging to the same formation have the same initial letter in their call.
4. In the event of a particular unit being undiscoverable there should be little difficulty in locating a neighbouring unit and communicating with it instead.
5. Owing to the message having no “addressed to” but only a call letter address, little information is given to the enemy should they fall into wrong hands.
Note:
“Addressed to” will not be required. Normally all messages received from the ground will be dropped at Corps. “Addressed from” not required; call letters give sufficient indication.

J.M. S***
Major,
Commanding, No 82 Squadron,
Royal Air Force.
In the Field.
17th July 1918.

SKELETON SCHEME
FOR
CO-OPERATION OF THE R.A.F. CORPS SQUADRONS
WITH OTHER ARMS DURING A MOVING
BATTLE
********************************
NARRATIVE.

1. Introductory. Whether the move is an advance or a withdrawal, the problems to be solved are much the same: the latter case however, is the more difficult operation, and is herein dealt with. The principles can be applied to an advancing battle mutatis mutandis.

2. Role of Squadron. Provided Liaison with the ground can be efficiently maintained the functions of the Corps Squadron are properly –
(1) Battle Reconnaissances.
(2) Artillery work with surprise targets.
(3) Liaison Reconnaissance to identify, and communicate to with other Arms.

Systematic bombing and shooting up of live targets is more properly the role of Army Squadrons and reinforcing Brigades.

3. General Idea. If these duties are to be carried out, it is essential that the energies of the Squadron should not be taken up by moving daily from place to place: a situation must therefore be taken up well in rear, and touch kept with other Arms by means of advanced landing grounds occupied in turns.
A Map of all feasible grounds (in rear of a large sector of the front, to legislate for possible cases of divergent lines of retirement) should be compiled by R.A.F. Brigades, kept up to date, and issued to all concerned. If this is not available, the duty of selecting suitable sites, lies with the R.A.F. Officer attached to a report centre.

4. Main Report Centre. The first essential is to establish a Main Report Centre (M.R.C.) in close proximity to Corps H.Qrs. (Advd H.Qrs): It is a sine qua non that this Centre should be on a practicable landing ground.
This M.R.C. would be in charge of the Corps Squadron B.I.O., and its position notified to all units (if necessary by message dropping). All aeroplanes of the Squadron would land in the early morning at this Centre, and function from there throughout the day, returning to the base aerodrome in the evening.
A Wireless Station, a few small spares, petrol and oil, and a Corps D.R. service, would be installed at this M.R.C.

5. Move of M.R.C. In the event of Corps H.Qrs., continuing to move backwards a new landing ground will be taken up, and if possible installed before the first ground was abandoned. (see 7 below)
As soon as a move is contemplated an arrow would be put out near the T on the landing ground, pointing in the general direction of the new site. When the forward ground is finally vacated, the T is taken up, and the arrow left out.
It is hoped by this means to ensure constant Liaison between Corps and Squadron H.Qrs.

6. Artillery Work. Fire on targets notified from the air will largely be the task of the Divisional Artillery. Owing to the withdrawal of the bulk of Siege Batteries, and to the lack of means of communication from Corps H.A., to batteries, it is likely that H.A. H.Qrs., and the C.B.S.O. will cease to operate with large formations, and that their position will approximate to Corps H.Qrs. Mobile Heavy Artillery Brigades will be attached to Divisional Artillery.
All units must remember the absolute necessity of moving the personnel and material of their Wireless Station, and of erecting same whenever possible.
Artillery Units ready for action with aeroplanes, should keep out the ground strips of their calls, except in presence of Enemy Aircraft.

7. C.W.S become A.R.C. When Corps H.A., H.Qrs., ceases to function tactically the Central Wireless Station (C.W.S.), will remain as an advanced report centre (A.R.C.), for work with Divisions.
It will be under the charge of one of the Squadron wireless Officers, and will be equipped in the same way and will function in the same manner as the M.R.C.
When withdrawal becomes necessary the A.R.C., will move past the M.R.C., and will take up its position near the new Corps Advd H.Qrs., where the B.I.O., will again take command, it will thus become itself the Main Report Centre, while the old M.R.C., becomes the A.R.C.
One of these two Stations is thus likely to be in action and both will have landing grounds in their vicinity.
Communication between M.R.C., and the A.R.C., will be maintained by wireless.

8. Liaison Reconnaissances. The services of the R.A.F., will be of extreme value in identifying and reporting positions of unit Headquarters: they supplement other means of communication in this respect, or at times supplant them in the absence of telephone facilities, and during periods of road congestion. An efficient Air Service should be able to keep the Corps Commander informed of the position of his units and should be able to transmit his orders to them.
A whole Flight should be detailed for this important service (This Flight could reinforce the Battle Reconnaissance or Artillery Flight in the event of the withdrawal being premeditated and leisurely).
Every H.Qrs., should be provided with ground strips to form a two or three letter code call (only those letters should be used which can be formed into straight strips) and a Popham Panel. The code calls should not be arbitrary, but should have their index letter such as to indicate to the aeroplane, the nature of the formation to which they belong.
The Observer would then know for instance, that he had located 2 out of 3 Divisions – could inform a Division of the situation of a neighbouring H.Qrs., etc. etc., by means of message bags. (See Note).
If the importance of carrying and displaying these strips is impressed on units, it should be possible for an aeroplane flying over an area and calling by means of Klaxon Horn, or Very’s Lights, to rapidly accumulate valuable information as to the positions of units throughout the day.
This form of Liaison should be infallible, whereas, Wireless inter-communication may fail owing to lack of experience, delicacy of instruments, lack of trained signallers, running down of accumulators, etc.

9. Attachment of R.A.F. Observers to Formations. In order that the possibilities of Aerial Co-operation outlined above may be taken full advantage of, it would appear essential for a proportion of the Observers of a Squadron to live, and move with units of the Corps.
It is suggested that:-
2 Liaison Officers should be attached to Corps H.Qrs.
1 Battle Reconnaissance Observer to each Divisional H.Qrs.
1 Artillery Observer to each Divisional Artillery H.Qrs.
These Observers would be informed by the unit Commander, as to what particular information is desired: they would then proceed to the nearest Report Centre, and pick up the aeroplanes detailed for the service. It must however, be pointed out, that the R.A.F. cannot provide transport for each of these Observers. The essential principle of the whole scheme proposed, is that it should be possible to carry it out with the means at the disposal of every Corps Squadron in the Field, and the transport allotted is barely sufficient for present requirements.
If units desire the services of an attached Observer, they must when occasion demands, find some means of transport, horse, bicycle, motor bicycle, etc, to enable him to reach the nearest aeroplane landing ground.
The information obtained by these special Observers, though primarily for the benefit of their own formation, will be in every case transmitted to the M.R.C.: the Pilot will be responsible that this is done when the aeroplane lands on the advanced instead of Main Report Centre.

10. To sum up the essentials of the scheme proposed are:-
(1) A rearward location of Squadron aerodrome, and Administrative H.Qrs., to avoid constant movement and road congestion.
(2) Forward tactical landing grounds.
(3) The division of the Squadron into Battle Reconnaissance, Artillery, and Liaison Flights.
(4) The utilisation by of all units of ground strips to denote their positions.
(5) The attachment of R.A.F. Observers to units for Liaison work.
(6) No extra transport or material required, beyond that now in possession of Corps Squadrons.
(Details as far as at present worked out, are attached).

J.A. C****
Lieut Colonel,
Commanding 15th Wing,
Royal Air Force.
In the Field.
11/7/18
JAC/JWC

NOTE III ON ARTILLERY WORK.

1. Wireless Stations. It is most important that all wireless stations held by artillery units should be used to their fullest extent. It should be realised by all concerned that the wireless station must be erected at the very first opportunity and not left to be erected until after arrangements for every other means of communication have been made.
Close co-operation with aircraft is of vital importance during a moving battle, as few batteries have wire oft time available to ensure good communication with ground O.P’s and aircraft are the first and frequently the only means of discovering concentrations of the enemy just prior to an attack. If all units have wireless sets working, such concentrations can be successfully dealt with by means of LL and GF calls. During the last withdrawal some such concentrations were successfully fired on and dispersed in this manner but in a great many cases wireless was not working at the critical moment and opportunities of inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy were missed. In many cases for lack of any other means of attack such concentrations have been dealt with by means of bombs and M.G. fire from the air.
It is of course impossible during hurried changes of position to avoid the loss of a certain amount of material but – once the vital importance of a serviceable wireless set is realised by all – it should always be possible to bring away the essential parts of a wireless set i.e. tuner, aerial and earth mat. Masts, if lost, can always be improvised by using trees, buildings or even short R.E. signal poles. A sheet of corrugated iron can be used to replace a missing earth mat or at a pinch any metallic earth such as a jack knife or earth pin can be utilised.
Efforts are being made to reduce the weight and bulk of a wireless station so as to render it more easily portable by Field Artillery units; even at present the essential portions, referred to above, can and should always be carried in the firing battery. They will then be immediately available and the station can normally be ready to take in messages within a few minutes of guns getting into action.

2. Field Artillery. Field Artillery during a moving battle will form a large proportion of the available artillery for engaging surprise targets. As Brigade Commanders may be out of communication with a proportion of their batteries, it is essential that as many Field batteries as possible should be equipped with wireless stations. This can only now be done by withdrawing stations from Siege batteries when no longer required. Squadron Commanders should make early arrangements with their Corps H.A. to withdraw the stations from those Siege batteries which are least likely to require them and reissue them to R.F.A. brigades for allotment to batteries. This must be done under Corps arrangements as R.A.F. transport is inadequate to deal with the situation.

3. Map references and calls from the air. The importance of having squared maps of the back areas ready marked up with zones has been touched on above: without security on this point Artillery will hesitate to fire and golden opportunities will be lost. Another cause of trouble is here dealt with. Owing to the small amount of wireless sending going on calls have in past moving battles been picked up from two map sheets away: the danger of this will be readily seen as the correct zone will not preclude the possibility of the call being taken in and acted on by batteries who should not have been affected: it is essential therefore in moving warfare for the Squadron call to precede any signal sent from the air including SOS, LL, GF, and NF, calls. The Squadron call and battery calls will remain unchanged during the whole period of movement.

4. Message Dropping. Pilots must not hesitate to use message bags to indicate favourable targets to our guns if the wireless produces no response: this practice has a great future before it. Pilots must not forget that if by any means concentrated artillery fire can be brought on to living targets far greater effect will be produced than by a few small bombs.

J.A. C****
Lieut Colonel,
Commanding 15th Wing,
Royal Air Force.
In the Field.
11/7/18
JAC/JWC

Note II on LIAISON WORK,CALLSIGNS etc.

X = Corps Headquarters Station, i.e. Main Report Centre.

X = Divisional Dropping Station sign, as authorised.
Divisional calls might be
DW)
DX) (Note D is formed by strips)
DY)
DZ)
So that in event of loss of some strips the letters above would indicate a Division.

= Brigade Headquarters as authorised, and calls might be
WW)
WX) for W Division’s Brigades.
WY)
WZ)

XW)
XX) for X Division’s Brigades.
XY)
XZ)
Etc., so that in the event of loss of the special signal the letter alone would indicate a Brigade.

D = Battalion Headquarters and call signs might be any starting with earlier
letters of the Alphabet, so that in the event of the special sign being lost they would still be recognised as Battalion Headquarters though the Division would not be known to the Airman.

All Artillery formations to which calls are allotted will use the prefix N if not in action as regards aerial observation, L if they are ready to fire with a plane.

All Infantry formations will display their signals as usual on the call by aeroplane of a series of A’s on KLAXON and a white Very Light.
All Artillery formations will display their signals as usual on the call by aeroplane of a series of B’s from KLAXON and a green Very light.
——————–

Strips of formations at some distance from the battle line will be more visible if a flare is burnt near them or a smoke fire lit.
———————–

A special unit may be demanded by its call letters on KLAXON
———————–
The aeroplane will acknowledge having seen strips by repeating the call letters with R.D. or by diving on the strip.

—————————————-
Popham panel work will be carried out as usual with the accepted code.
—————————————————

Any formation which is about to move should put out its strips and add an arrow to its strips giving the direction in which it will proceed.

N.B. the French System of Ground Panels has much to recommend it. It is reproduced below:-

FRENCH SYSTEM OF GROUND SIGNALS.

CORPS. –

DIVISION. –

BRIGADE. –

REGIMENT. –

BATTALION. –

(Each sign is 3 metres over its maximum diameter Squares or bands 4 centimetres wide)

J.A. C****
Lieut Colonel,
Commanding 15th Wing,
Royal Air Force.
In the Field.
11/7/18
JAC/JWC

NOTE 1.

CORPS SQUADRON COMMANDERS ACTION.

All possible arrangements as detailed below must be worked out beforehand, so that as soon as orders are received by S.C. “Moving warfare action” he can take the following measures, (Orders for move of Squadron to rear aerodrome will be issued by the Wing). –

1. Turn 1 Artillery Flight into a Liaison Flight.

2. Issue to Flight Commanders for distribution (if not already done) squared maps of the rear areas. These must have been previously marked up with the zones e.g. QA, QB, QC, QD or KW, KX, KY, KZ, etc. If this is not done, Pilots may get careless once they get off their C.B. Map, and will send Zone calls with the wrong Zone with disastrous results. All Pilots and Observers must be cautioned to be careful in this respect.

3. Despatch 1 Light Tender to C.W.S. with 3 Artillery, and 3 Reconnaissance Observers for attachment to Divisional Artillery, and Divisional H.Qrs.
All personnel will have two days rations, tin helmets, gas masks, and a minimum of kit (not exceeding 30 lbs).
All ranks must know what their duties are, to which unit they are attached, and where it is situated. Any spares required to complete the C.W.S. to the standard A attached (establishment of M.R.C., or A.R.C.) will be taken on this tender.
At least 20 gallons M.T. petrol, and 2 gallon M.T. oil, will be carried. A rifle and 100 rounds S.A.A. will be taken. Any spare space will be filled with aero petrol and oil.

4. Despatch 1 Light Tender and 1 motor bicycle with S.C. to Corps H.Qrs., with B.I.O., and limited staff, (2 men), and 2 Liaison Observers. This is to form the M.R.C.
Other details as above.

5. Arrangements for all aeroplanes to operate from Main Report Centre as soon as established – Pilots travelling solo to load up with petrol and oil in cans, and ammunition in drums and belts. – a fitter and a rigger with a few tools and patching material to be sent over with the first planes of each flight daily, returning at night – tail weights to be provided for solo work.

6. The administration of the Squadron must be largely left in the hands of the R.O., and E.O. – the Squadron Commanders place by day is mostly at the M.R.C., in close touch with his Corps and his aeroplanes.
J.A. C****
Lieut Colonel,
Commanding 15th Wing,
Royal Air Force.
In the Field.
11/7/18
JAC/JWC
LIST A.
Main or Advanced Report Centre.

COMPLETE RECEIVING STATION FOR RECEIVING AEROPLANE
SIGNALS CONSISITS OF:-
—————————————————————————————————————-

Mast 30 Ft. complete.
Tuner, short wave Mk. III.
Canvas carrying bag.
8 Ground Strips.
125 ft. Aerial Wire.
2 Insulators.

Weight of above approx 120 lbs.

Could be packed in a space 4’ 6” x 16” x 16”
——————————————–

C.W. Transmitting and Receiving.

Mast 30 ft. complete.
150 ft. Aerial Wire.
2 Insulators.
Transmitter.
Receiver.
3 Sets of accumulators.
Wavemeter. Hetrodyne.
H.T. Unit or H.T. Batteries.
Weight of above with H.T. unit – 163 lbs.
Weight of above using H.T. Batteries instead of H.T. unit 197 lbs.

—————————————————-

One pair of Earth Nets would do for both stations.

1 Officer, and 4 Operators – a few spares – Time token to erect – ½ hour.
dismantle ½ hour.

1 B.I.O. and 2 Clerks for M.R.C.

——————————————

Transport.

1 Motor Cycle and Side car.
1 Light Tender.

GRAND QUATIER GENERAL
—————————————– 10 Juillet 1918.
Aéronautique & D.C.A.
——————————-
No 12.927.
L’AIDE-MAJOR GENERAL
Chef du Service Aéronautique
au Commandant de l’Aéronautique du G.A.C.
au Commandant du C.I.A.C.B., FERME de PERTHE.

Le Commandant de l’Aéronautique du G.A.C. assurera l’organisation d’un réseau de signalisation dans la zone du G.A.C.

Cette organisation, destiné à faciliter et à intensifier le travail de nos avions de bombardement et de reconnaissance de nuit comprendra :
– 1o) le repérage des Itinéris,
– 2o) la signalisation des terrains d’atterrissage de nuit,
– 3o) le balisage des chenaux de sécurité.
–
Elle sera établio :
– 1o) Suivant les besoins des Commandants d’Escadres de Bombardement de nuit et
des Commandants d’Aéronautique d’Armée ayant des Unités faisant vol de nuit, qui fourniront toutes les indications utiles.

– 2o) D’accord avec les Commandants de la D.A.C. des Armees intéressées, en ce qui concerne la décence contre les avions ennemis.

Pour réaliser cette organisation, le Commandant de l’Aéronautique du G.A.C. disposera, comme moyens matériels :

– 1o) de la Section de Phares No 1, attache a l’Escadre 11, et qui pourra être
éventuellement renforcée.
– 2o) de projecteurs qui seront demandes au G.Q.G. si la nécessite de leur
emploi est reconnue.
– 3o) de moyens de signalisation spéciaux employés a titre exceptionnel
(Voitures Photographiques), mis provisoirement a sa disposition par les
Unites de Bombardement ou par le G.Q.G. dans la mesure des
disponibilités.

D’autre part, le Lieutenant de Vaisseau BABIN, du C.I.A.C.B. est mis a la disposition du Commandant de l’Aéronautique du G.A.C., pour la réalisation du réseau de signalisation demande.

P.O. Signe : PUJO.
GROUPE D’ARMEES DU CENTRE.
————————————————
Etat-Major Q.G., le 18 Juillet 1918.
——
Aéronautique.
————–
LE CHEF DE BATTAILLON ORTHIEB
charge de l’Aéronautique au G.A.C.

aux Commandantes de l’Aéronautique des 4o – 5o – 6o –
9o Armees, aux Commandants des Escadres, Groupes et
Escadrilles de Bombardement du nuit.

En exécution des prescriptions de la Lettre No 12.927 de l’Aide-Major General Chef du Service Aéronautique au G.Q.G., en date du 10 Juillet 1918 :

Le Lieutenant de vaisseau BABIN, mis a la disposition du Commandant de l’Aéronautique du G.A.C. par le G.Q.G. sera charge, a dater d’aujourd’hui, de tout qui concerne la signalisation lumineuse de nuit dans la zone du G.A.C.
La S.P.G.P.1. (Section de Phares a grand puissance No 1), personnel et matériel, actuellement stationnée au Parc Aéronautique de NUISEMENT sera placée sous ses ordres, ainsi que la S.P.G.P. No 2 des que celle-ci sera constitue.
Les Commandants d’Escadres ou de Groupes de Bombardement de Nuit lui adresseront directement leurs desiderata en ce qui concerne les améliorations à apporter au Réseau de Signalisation de Nuit. Il aura seul qualité pour faire allumer, éteindre ou changer de place les feux.
De son cote, le Lieutenant de Vaisseau BABIN tiendra les Groupes de Bombardement de Nuit et les D.C.A. d’Armée au courant de toutes modifications survenues dans la signalisation de nuit.

Signe : ORTHLIEB

Vo Armée Au Q.G.A. le 20 Juillet 1918.
———-
Commandement
de
L’Aéronautique
———–
No 5386

Copie confirme notifiée a :
Aéronautique de C.A.
Toutes Escadrilles et
Compagnies d’Aérostiers.
G.C. 11, G.C. 12
Le Chef de Bataillon Commandant l’Aéronautique.
GUILLEMENEY

SECRET. Copy No 8
15th WING OPERATION ORDERS No 101.
In the Field
2/7/18.

1. Intentions. The 4th Australian Division is to attack HAMEL, and the ridge to E. and S.E. on Z day. Zero hour will be promulgated at noon on Y day.
O.C. 3 Sqd., A.F.C. will send an Officer to Anzac Corps Headquarters at 1 p.m., and 7 p.m. on Y day, to synchronize his watch.
Other Squadrons will work to signal time.

2. Army Squadrons. The 3rd Brigade R.A.F. is extending their Army Patrol area for the purpose of this operation to the River SOMME – and the 9th Brigade, and 22nd Wing will have strong Patrols at varying heights from MORLANCOURT to MOREUIL throughout operations.

3. Contact Patrols. No. 3 Sqd. A.F.C. O.C. No. 3 Sqd A.F.C., will arrange Contact Patrols from zero till dusk – flares will be called for at zero + 90 minutes at which time 2 machines should be on the line to avoid failures.

4. Counter Attack Patrols No. 3 Sqd A.F.C. O.C. No 3 Sqd A.F.C. will arrange Counter Attack Patrols from zero + 90, til dark. Counter Attacks are less likely on the Northern side as the Valley of the SOMME is marshy, and open to our observation.
The WARFUSEE – CERISY valley should be specially observed as a likely assembly position.
The responsibility for observation of Counter Attacks up to the line MARCELCAVE – BAYONVILLERS – CHIPILLY – MORLANCOURT rests with O.C. 3 Sqd A.F.C. This will be partly the duty of Artillery Patrols & Counter Attack Patrols. Beyond the line stated the Army Squadrons will take up the work of observation.

5. Artillery Patrols. No. 3 Sqd A.F.C. O.C. 3 Sqd .A.F.C., will arrange to keep Artillery Patrols on the Corps front throughout the day from zero till dark.
Certain Batteries have been detailed for M.Q.N.F. work, but until after zero + 2 hours, smoke is likely to interfere with serious shooting, and Pilots will be best employed on NF, GF, and LL calls.
Normal conditions will be resumed under instruction from C.B.S.O. Australian Corps.
O.C. 35 Squadron R.A.F. will arrange to extend his Artillery Patrol area on Z day, as far S. as MORLANCOURT.

6. Ammunition Dropping No 9 Sqd R.A.F. O.C. No 9 Squadron will detail 12 machines for ammunition dropping work to start dropping at zero plus 3 hours, in accordance with orders already issued.

7. Bombing etc No 3 Sqd A.F.C. All machines crossing the line except ammunition carrying machines will carry 25 lb bombs, and will drop them on favourable living targets – and will engage such targets with M.G. fire from a low height.
In default of favourable living targets, bombs will be dropped on any of the targets shown in Bombing Map attached.
No. 6 Sqd D.F. No. 6 Sqd D.F.)
No. 9 Sqd. No. 9 Remaining Flight) will work as one formation by arrangements to
be mutually fixed, and will cross the line at approximately 5-30 a.m., and 2 p.m. to bomb.
They will descend at intervals to 3,000 feet to look for living targets – if found they will bomb and machine gun them from a low height. If no favourable targets seen, bombs will be dropped on one of the bombing targets shown on map North of the SOMME.
No. 82 Sqdn R.A.F. Working as 2 formations will cross the line to bomb at approximately 8-30 am, 10-30 am, 5 pm and 8 pm.
Their orders are as for No. 6 Detached Flight above, except that bombing targets (other than living targets) will be selected from those South of the SOMME.
NOTE
I. All bombs will be 25 lbs.
II. Formations must be kept.
III. Great care must be taken if targets are seen nearer that 500 yards East of the final objective owing to the danger of attacking our own troops.

8. Orders for the day or days succeding Z day, will be issued later, O.C. 3rd Squadron, A.F.C. will in any case ensure that Michelon Flare reconnaissances and patrols keep the line without further instructions.

9. Acknowledge.

J.A.C***
Lieut. Colonel,
Commanding 15th Wing,
Royal Air Force.
Copies 1 to 3 5th Brigade, R.A.F. Time issued…..
No 4 3rd Squadron, A.F.C.)
No 5 No 6 Sqdn Det Flt )
No 6 No 9 Squadron ) Time issued…………
No 7 No 35 Squadron )
No 8 No 82 Squadron )
No 9 & 10 Filed
Time issued

Zero day 4/7/18
“ Hour 3.10 AM