An appreciation of the situation from point of view affecting 64th Inf. Bde

Loose in p 56.

SECRET

B.M. 577

AN APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION FROM POINT OF VIEW AFFECTING 64^TH INF. BDE.

The two recent successes during September drove the enemy back from elaborately prepared positions running approximately North and South through HOOGE and GLENCORSE Wood respectively. The German line now rests on the main PASCHENDAAL ridge. For the defence of their previous positions the Germans were able to assemble troops for the attack in a comparatively safe area east of the PASCHENDAAL ridge. This assembly place still exists for them (so far as this brigade is concerned it is to northwards of BECELAERE), but it is no longer a safe position. The eastern slope of the ridge where counter-attacking troops would have to form up will be within our standing barrage when we have occupied our second objective, and will be in view of our advanced posts.

The morale of the German troops cannot be otherwise than badly affected by their recent adverses. They have seen themselves driven back on both occasions when we attacked and they have seen their counter-attacks smashed and the limited successes which have occasionally attended these counter-attacks have been invariably nullified shortly afterwards. Troops coming up to replace shattered divisions have heard their comrades’ stories, and recent voluntary surrenders have shown the effect of these on newly arrived regiments.

The objective of the Brigade is the extreme left (Southend) of the high ground of the German position. From the starting off point, the ground falls till it reaches POLYGONE BEEK. The ground on either side of this is marshy and churned up by shells. The beek is narrow but has water in it. Unless however, there is heavy rain the ground is passable at a slow rate. The fact that Germans have been able to counter-attack across this ground proves this. On the right boundary of the **** advance, the road which crosses the beek will probably assist matters. On the east of the beek, the ground rises fairly steeply up to the top of the ridge which is reached on the first objective.

The advance to the second objective is on the top of the ridge. The chief obstacle to this advance are the village of REUTEL and the line of block-houses running northwards from east end of village.

As this is the left of the German line on the ridge top, we must expect that its defences will have been carefully and strongly prepared, and success will, to a great extent, depend upon the assaulting troops keeping right up to the tail of the barrage.

The strong points in the POEZELHOEK Valley are likely to be well equipped with machine guns, which may harass our advance from the right flank. Special artillery arrangements have been made to deal with this matter.

As regards counter-attacks.

The troops which capture the first objective may expect immediate counter-attacks by local reserves from REUTEL unless these have been shattered by our barrage fire. The supporting companies should be able to deal easily with such attacks if the front line has failed to do so.

The troops on the first objective must also be prepared to deal with a larger counter-attack coming from direct east. This attack should however, be completely broken up by our barrage fire.

On the second objective troops must be prepared for immediate counter-attacks on a large scale. The German main reserves are probably dug in on the slopes North of BECELAERE and in position to advance at once. Our advanced posts should be able to give due warning of such an attack, which must be dealt with by rifles and machine guns. The standing artillery barrage will also in this case help to break up the attack.

Later on – possibly at dawn on day after our attack – organised counter-attacks on a large scale must be expected. By this time our positions will have been further consolidated and troops re-organised and readier to beat off attacks.

The plan for the attack is based on an attack in depth. The narrow front (250 yards) allotted to the Brigade permits of this. One battalion attacks and occupies first objective, and a second battalion assisted by one company of support battalion attacks and consolidates second objective. Two more companies of the support battalion move up to positions of readiness east of POLYGONE BEEK and the remaining company holds our original front line. The reserve battalion remains in position behind.

The battalions have been detailed for their special jobs but each battalion must be prepared to carry out any of the allotted tasks. The difficulties of communications make it more than ever essential that commanders on the spot must act on their own initiative to meet any situation which may arise. This applies to platoon, company and battalions commanders equally. Whenever any unit moves and acts contrary to its ordered actions, the commander must take care to pass back information of what he has done to his immediate superior and other commanders affected by the change in dispositions.

The Brigade enters the battle at a late stage and is faced with the difficulties necessarily attendant to such conditions as regards preparation of trenches and dumps etc., and forming up for the attack. But such difficulties are far from being insuperable and in no way tend to mar success. The morale of all ranks is high. We go into the battle with the will to win. On either flank we have first class divisions. The Germans in front are fully conscious of, and affected by their constant reverses and retirements.

There is therefore, every reason for all ranks to feel confident and determined to add one more chapter to the great record of our Brigade and Division.

H.R. Headlam

Brigadier General

Commanding 64^th Inf. Bde.

1.10.17

APPENDIX “Z” to OO 143 1 October 1917

Oct1

APPENDIX “Z”

MOVES TO ASSEMBLY POSITIONS.

Units will move to assembly positions on the night 3^rd/4^th Oct. as under, so as to be in position by 5 a.m. –

(a). 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. in depth 180 yards from present front line.

(b). 15^th Durh. L.I. in depth 180 yards and 30 yards West of 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. Battn H.Q. with H.Q. 9^th K.O.Y.L.I.

(c). T.M. Battery and carriers and 4 Machine Guns and carriers 20 yards behind 15^th Durh. L.I.

(d). 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. 20 yards behind T.M. Battery.

(e). 1^st E. York R. immediately West of GLENCORSE Wood.

O.C. 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. will mark out by white tape the line where rear of his battalion will rest.

O.C. 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. will mark out where his front line will rest.

Units will take the greatest care to make as little noise as possible when forming up.

64TH INF. BDE O.O. NO 143. 1 October 1917

Oct1

Pp 56-58.

SECRET.

Copy No. 2

64^TH INF. BDE O.O. NO 143.

Ref Maps 1:10,000 S

OOSTHOEK

WESTHOEK

KRUISEBECKE

SHREWSBURY FOREST

Oct 1^st 1917

(a). The Second Army will attack on a day to be notified later against the high ground REUTEL – NOORDENDHOEK – MOLENAALELSTHOEK – NIEUWE MOLEN.

(b). The 5^th Division will attack on the right of the 21^st Division – objective the line J.21.d.65.95 – J.16.d.8.6. – J.17.a.2.2. – J.11.c.55.05.

(c). The 7^th Division will attack on the left of the 21^st Division – objective, the line J.12.a.1.5. – J.6.c.35.20. – J.5.b.7.0. – J.5.b.30.15.

The names of the actual units on flanks of the Brigade will be notified later.

The objective of the 21^st Division is the line J.11.c.55.05 – J.11.d.2.3. – J.11.d.65.75. – J.11.b.95.15. – J.12.a.1.5.

The duty of the 21^st Division is to form a defensive flank facing South, South-East and East with a view to protecting the Southern flank of the attacking troops on the North, and obtaining observations of the REUTELBEEK Valley and the spur running S.E. to BECELAERE.

The 64^th Inf. Bde. on the right and the 62^nd Inf. Bde. on the left will carry out the attack. The 110^th Inf. Bde. will be in Divisional Reserve.

Brigade boundaries will be as follows:-

Southern. J.16.b.1.9. (approx) – J.11.c.55.05.

Northern. J.10.d.2.5. – J.11.c.40.55 – J.11.d.2.7. – J.11.d.65.75.

5.As soon as the final objective has been reached:-

(a). Posts will be pushed out to obtain the necessary observations.

(b). The final objective will be consolidated as a front line.

(c). REUTEL Village, the block-house on the line J.11.d.1.3 to J.11.d.20.68 and thence N.N.E. to about J.11.b.5.4. will be consolidated as a support line. (see air photographs).

(d). In the event of the attack on the second objective being successful, the S.P. at J.11.c.6.3. – J.11.c.6.7. – JUDGE Trench to J.11.a.85.10. and thence due North to boundary will be consolidated as a reserve line.

Should the Second Objective or the attack of the 5^th Division on our right be unsuccessful, the line J.11.c.2.5. – JUDGE Trench and thence as above will be consolidated.

The objectives for the Brigade are as follows:-

1^st Objective. – The line of the road J.11.c.55.05. TO J.11.c.63.57.

2^nd Objective. – The line J.11.c.35.55. – J.11.d.2.3. – J.11.d.65.75.

The Brigade will attack as follows:-

(a). The 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. will attack and capture the first objective.

(b). The 15^th Durh. L.I. will go through the 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. and attack and capture the second objective.

(c). The 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. less 1 company will be in support. One company will be attached to 15^th Durh L.I. and move under orders from O.C. 15^th Durh L.I.

(d). The 1^st E. York R. will be in reserve. Altered night of 3/4 Oct.

(e) The 64^th M.G. Coy will detail four guns for the following objectives:-

Two guns will go to J.11.d.4.6. (approx) and two will go to J.11.c.9.2. (approx). The officer in charge will be with O.C. 15^th Durh L.I. and will not move forward until news has been received that the objective has been taken. The location of the guns will not be altered, unless, on arrival in the area, better tactical positions can be found to cover our new front.

(f). The 64^th T.M. Bty will detail four guns to be attached to the 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. These guns will move forward as soon as the first objective is taken. A percentage of VARLEY Bombs will be carried. Ammunition is to be husbanded and no rounds are to be fired until definite objectives which are holding up the advance are located. The special task for these guns is to be prepared to deal with the strong points at West end of REUTEL and prevent Germans here interfering with the advance of 15^th Durh L.I. These strong points will not be under artillery fire after the first objective is taken.

Units will move as follows at Zero:-

(a). 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. will advance to first objective.

(b). The 15^th Durh. L.I. will follow close behind the 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. and form up East of the POLYGONEBEEK and as close as possible to line of first objective, ready to advance to the assault of the second objective.

(c). 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. less 1 Coy will remain in assembly position until it is ascertained that the first objective is captured. As soon as this is known, two companies will go forward, cross the POLYGONEBEEK, and dig in facing S.E. along line of road in J.10.d.9.4. and J.11.c.3.5. An officer with two orderlies from each of these two companies will proceed to advanced H.Q. of 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. and 15^th Durh L.I. respectively. The above is not to prevent O.C. 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. moving his battalion to a safer position forward if it is found that hostile barrage comes down on his assembly position. These two companies will be available either separately or together if necessary, to support either of the above battalions. The above orders are in no way to check the O.C. these two companies immediately moving forward on his own initiative to support the front line if it is counter-attacked. If the two companies, (or one of them) move forward. O.C. 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. will immediately go forward with his reserve company and occupy the position on East of the POLYGONEBEEK vacated by these companies. If he does this, Bde H.Q. and O.C. 1^st E. York R. will be immediately informed, and O.C. 1^st E. York R. will send a company to occupy our original front line.

(d). 1^st E. York R. will remain in its assembly position. An officer with orderlies is to be at H.Q. 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. to keep in touch with the situation.

Each assaulting battalion will be responsible for guarding its own flanks.

All ranks must be thoroughly impressed with the importance of assisting any unit held up in the advance. X

Each battalion will detail two men to search dug-outs in the captured territory. These men will wear “INTELLIGENCE” brassards. Orders re sending back documents have already been issued. D

Bayonets are to be fixed a few minutes before Zero. Care is to be taken that they are fixed quietly and do not glitter in the moonlight. X

The compass bearing of their objective must be known by all officers. It is of utmost importance that proper direction is maintained. X.

O.C. units will ensure that:-

(a). No officers or men take into action any maps showing our trenches or dispositions or letters or clues to identification except identity discs.

(b). That all ranks know that the word “RETIRE” is never used and if heard will on no account be acted upon. X

Tanks will co-operate in the attack on second objective and their programme will be issued later. Infantry will, however, in no way depend on action of Tanks.

Tanks will carry S.A.A. which will be thrown out, if Tank gets stopped. X.

Situation reports must be sent regularly each half hour to Bde. H.Q. and whenever anything of special importance occurs.

Positions of dumps will be notified later.

Commanding Officers must ensure that their men get food and hot tea before attack commences.

19.Great coats of 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. and 15^th Durh L.I. will be tied in bundles and left at positions occupied before assembly. Men must be warned not to leave any of their private property in the coat pockets.

Great coats of 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. and 1^st E. York R. are to be tied in bundles and left at battalion transport lines and will be brought up later if required. No private property to be packed in the coats.

Great coats will be worn “en banderole”. X

Hour of Zero will be notified later.

Watches of 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. and 15^th Durh L.I. will be synchronised by telephone at 12 midnight 3^rd/4^th October.

The 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. and 1^st E. York. R. will each send an officer to Bde. H.Q. on their way to their assembly position to synchronise watches.

The following will be carried by all battalions:-

(a). The unexpired portion of Z day’s and Z + 1 day’s rations.

(b). So far as issue permits every man exclusive of rifle grenadiers will carry one rodded Mills (No 23) or other kind of bomb, and two blank cartridges. These grenades will be considered as a reserve for the rifle grenadiers, or if the situation demands it can be used as a bomb.

(c). With the exception of companies named below, every man will carry 170 rounds S.A.A.

The two leading companies of 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. will carry 120 rounds only.

(d). 250 shovels will be carried per battalion. These will be carried down the men’s backs. X

(e). Each man will carry 4 sand bags. X

Instructions as to the lighting of flares by front line troops will be issued later. All ranks are to be made to understand the extreme importance of lighting these flares.
Slightly wounded officers and men will remain with their battalion and “carry on”. It is forbidden to assist wounded men back to our lines. This order is to be made known to all ranks.

The following Appendices are attached or will be forwarded later:-

Appendix “A” Artillery arrangements.

“ “B” Administrative arrangements.

“ “C” Signalling arrangements.

“ “D” Medical arrangements.

“ “E” Machine Gun arrangements.

“ “F” Employment of R.E. and Pioneers.

“ “Z” Moves to assembly positions.

Bde. H.Q. will open in the crater at J.13.c.65.10. at 6 p.m. Oct 2^nd.
Acknowledge.

A.F. Macdougall

Major,

Bde. Major, 64^th Inf. Bde.

Issued at 10 p.m. to:-

Signals. Copy No. 1.

1^st E. York. R. Copies Nos 2 – 6.

9^th K.O.Y.L.I. “ “ 7 – 11

10^th K.O.Y.L.I. “ “ 12 – 16

15Durh. L.I. “ “ 17 – 21

64^th M.G. Coy “ “ 22 – 23

64^th T.M. Bty. Copy No. 24.

21^st Division. “ “ 25.

62^nd Inf. Bde. “ “ 26.

110^th Inf. Bde. “ “ 27.

Inf. Bde. “ “ 28.

126^th F. Co. R.E. “ “ 29.

14^th N.F. (Pioneers) “ “ 30.

No 1 Coy “A” Bn. Tanks. “ “ 31.

War Diary etc. Copies Nos 32 – 40.

War Diary of 2/6th Sherwood Foresters for September 1917

Oct1

WAR DIARY of 2/6^th Sherwood Foresters for September 1917

Place Date Hour Summary of Events and Information

of WINNEZEELE 1.9.17 to 19.9.17 Fighting Strength

J.2.b.8.8. Officers 18. O.R.s 816

(Sheet 27) Training in accordance with Fifth Army letter S.G. 840/7 dated 24.8.17.

FORGE 20.9.17 to 22.9.17 Marched from J.2.b.8.8. to L.7.d.5.3. and arrived there at 12 Noon. The Battn was L.7.d.6.3. (Sheet 27) billeted, and Coy Training was carried out.

VLAMETRINGHE 23.9.17 & 24.9.17 Marched to H.11.b.8.3 and arrived in a Temporary Camp for the night.

H.11.b.8.3. Practice attack which was carried out at 5.50 am Sep 26^th.

(Sheet 28) 24.9.17 10 am to 12 Noon Battn marched to Trenches. Fighting Strength 21 Officers 609 Other Ranks. A training nucleus of 5 Offrs and 108 Other Ranks were left behind at the Q.M. Stores. Relieved 2/5^th South Staffs in front line running from

10 pm. GRAVENSTAFEL ROAD (D.13.d.80.85.) to DOWNING TRENCH (D.14.c.35.40.)

25.9.17 6 pm. To 6.30 Artillery practiced barrage for operations on the 26^th. Battn fairly heavily shelled. 2 O.R.s wounded.

Taped Kicking off positions

26.9.17 5.50 am. After heavy Artillery Barrage Battn left its kicking off positions, with 2/7^th S.F. on the left and the 177 Bde on the right.

The objective which was from D.14.d.3.6 inclusive to GRAFENSTAFEL ROAD (exclusive) was reached about 7.30 am. A number of prisoners were taken.

The enemy shelled our positions during the day.

27.9.17 8 pm. Shelled heavily during the day.

Relieved the 2/5^th Bn S.F. in the front line who had held the 2^nd objective.

29.7.17 9 pm. Battn relieved by the Anzacs and took up position in the old British Front Line in the rear of WIELTJE.

Total Casualties 11 Officers 220 O.R.s

Major

Cdg. 2/6^th Bn Sherwood Foresters.

War Diary of 9th Canadian Artillery Brigade September 1917

Oct1

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY Of 9^th CANADIAN ARTILLERY BRIGADE

From September 1^st 1917 – To September 30^th 1917

References LOOS 1/10,000, LENS 1/10,000

FIELD M.4.c.00.30.

1.9.17 11 p.m. The visibility today was fair. Six enemy balloons were up in the early morning as well as a great many enemy planes, but all activity ceased after 9.00 a.m. Several of the enemy were seen about a mile behind the front line and they were immediately fired on and dispersed. Enemy artillery was fairly quiet during the 24 hours, but as usual he did some counter-battery work.

2.9.17 The visibility today was fair. No enemy balloons were observed today, but four enemy planes patrolled their own lines in the early morning, two of which crossed our lines and flew over our rear area for about half an hour, flying very high. Enemy movement appeared to be below normal today, but a considerable number of trains were observed in the rear area between MEURCHIN and CARVIN. Enemy artillery was below normal, except for some heavy counter-battery work which they carried out in the neighbourhood of the LOOS CRASSIER.

Operation Order Number 105 was issued today relating to the relief of the 9^th Brigade C.F.A. by the 6^th Divisional Artillery R.F.A. to take place on the night of the 4^th/5^th September.

3.9.17 The visibility today was good. Five enemy balloons were observed up during the day and several enemy planes were also seen, but they did not attempt to cross our lines. Enemy movement was practically nil during the whole day. Enemy artillery was very active during the night on our support trenches and in the vicinity of the Town of LOOS, shooting intermittently with bursts of fire. During the night there was considerable artillery activity on both sides on the zones to our right and left, although our front remained normal.

4.9.17 The visibility today was fair. Five enemy balloons were again observed on our front and stayed up most of the day. Enemy planes were not so active and were only seen in the morning during which time they remained well behind their own lines. Movement of men in the enemy lines was almost nil, but considerable horse and motor movement was observed in the rear country. During the night the enemy at different times put up a spectacular display of rockets, using green, red, orange and white lights. They also bombarded the area between LOOS and MAROC with about 10,000 gas shells mixing in a large number of High Explosive shells. The bombardment started at 12 p.m. and continued for about two hours and was the most intense concentration of hostile artillery ever experienced by this brigade. The new German gas (mustard) was used and while we had no serious casualties, many men the next day found their eyes seriously affected and a small number developed bronchitis.

Operation Order Number 106 was issued today. This refers to the 31^st and 36^th Batteries leaving the LOOS Area and going into action under RALSTON’S BRIGADE in the VIMY area. The Headquarters, 33^rd and 45^th Batteries with the 35^th and 39^th Batteries of RALSTON’S BRIGADE are to proceed to Rest Camp in the rear.

5.9.17 From this date to the 22^nd inst. the Headquarters and four batteries mentioned herewith were in rest at MAGNICOURT, a small village nestling among some rolling hills. The men had a splendid rest during this time and many parties were sent for the day to ST POL. In addition an Infantry band was engaged on three different occasions which was very much appreciated. General sports for the men were held on two occasions and some Indian Cavalry billeted near here very kindly offered to assist in the days sports. Their horsemanship and other feats were magnificent and filled our men with surprise and admiration.

22.9.17 Operation Order No 107 was issued today under which this Brigade moved to new Wagon Lines near VILLERS au BOIS. The Brigade remained at rest at this point until the end of the month most of the time being devoted to cleaning equipment and grooming horses. On the afternoon of the 29^th a half holiday was declared, the men attending the Corps Sports held at VILLERS au BOIS. These were very much enjoyed by all ranks.

Major

A/C.O. 9^th Carscallen’s Brigade C.F.A.

(9^th Brigade C.F.A.)

October 1917

Oct1

October 1917

Passchendaele

The Battle of Broodseinde began on the 4^th October 1917, using the “bite and hold” tactics of September 1917, which General Sir Herbert Plumer utilised with the successful attacks on the Menin Ridge and Polygon Wood. The battle was the last assault launched by Plumer in good weather. The operation’s aim was to complete the capture of Gheluvelt Plateau and occupy Broodseinde Ridge. The British attacked along a 14,000 yards front and by coincidence, Australian troops met attacking troops from the German Reserve Division in no man’s land. The Germans were attempting to re-capture their defensive line when the assaults commenced simultaneously. The Germans had reinforced their front line in an effort to delay the British capturing their forward positions, until reserve divisions could intervene. The German reinforcements were in the most vulnerable area to British artillery who inflicted devastating casualties on the Germans opposite. The capture of Zonnebecke and Broodseinde was another advance that had been made into the German positions, which seemed at long last, to be on the verge of collapse. Plumer had achieved remarkable success. Inflicting three major defeats in two weeks and creating enormous damage to the German Army. The Germans began to plan for a slow withdrawal from the Ypres salient, even at the risk of uncovering German positions further north and the Belgian coast.

At the Battle of Poelcappelle on the 9^th October 1917, the French First Army and British Second & Fifth armies attacked on a 13,500 yards front, from south of Broodseinde to St. Jansbeek. They advanced halfway from Broodseinde Ridge to Passchendaele, on the main front. Both sides suffered many casualties. Advances in the north of the front were retained by the British and French troops but most of the ground taken in front of Passchendaele and on the Becelaere and Gheluvelt spur was lost to the German counter-attacks. The return of the heavy rain and resulting mud was the main cause of the failure to hold captured ground. The fighting strained German fighting power to the limit but the German forces managed to prevent a breakthrough although it was becoming far harder to replace their losses.

The First Battle for Passchendaele, starting on the 12^th October 1917, was another Allied attempt to gain ground around Passchendaele. Heavy rain and mud again made movement difficult and little artillery could be brought closer to the front. Allied troops were exhausted and morale was beginning to falter. After a modest British advance, German counter-attacks recovered most of the ground opposite Passchendaele. There were 13,000 Allied casualties, including 2,735 New Zealanders, 845 of whom had been killed, wounded or missing. This was the worst day for losses in New Zealand history. At a conference on the 13^th October 1917, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig and the army commanders agreed attacks should stop until the weather improved and roads could be extended. On the 22^nd October 1917, the 18^th Division of XVIII Corps attacked the east end of Passchendaele, while the XIV Corps alongside the 34^th & 35^th Division attacked northwards into Houthulst Forest. The attack was supported by a regiment of the French 1^st Division on the left flank of the 35^th Division. The intention was to block a possible German counter-attack on the left flank of the Canadian Corps as they attacked Passchendaele and the ridge. The artillery of the Second and Fifth armies conducted a deception bombardment to simulate a general attack. Poelcappelle was captured but the attack at the junction the 34^th & 35^th divisions was repulsed. German counter-attacks pushed back the 35^th Division in the centre. The French attack captured all its objectives. Attacking on ground soaked by rain and cut up by bombardments, the British had struggled to advance in places and lost the ability to move quickly to outflank German pillboxes. The 35^th Division infantry reached the fringes of Houthulst Forest but were pushed back in places after being outflanked. German counter-attacks made after the 22^nd October 1917 were at an equal disadvantage and were also costly failures. The German 4^th Army was prevented from transferring troops from the Fifth Army and from concentrating its artillery fire on the Canadians as they prepared for the next Battle for Passchendaele.

Four divisions of the Canadian Corps had been transferred from Lens to the Ypres salient in preparation for the Second Battle for Passchendaele. The Canadians relieved the Australian II Anzac Corps on the 18^th October 1917, and the operation was scheduled to be three limited stages. On the 26^th October 1917, the Third Canadian Division captured its first stage objective at Wolf Copse, then swung back its northern flank to link with the adjacent division of the Fifth army. The Fourth Canadian Division captured its objectives but was forced to retire from Decline Copse. The German counter-attack and the failure of the communication between Canadian and Australian units was the cause of the Canadian retirement. The second stage began on the 30^th October 1917, to complete the previous stage and gain a foothold for the final assault on Passchendaele. The attackers on the southern flank quickly captured Crest Farm and sent patrols beyond the final objective into Passchendaele. The attack on the northern flank met with exceptional German resistance. The Third Canadian Division captured the two farms, Vapour and Furst, together with the crossroads at Meetcheele but remained short of its objective, which was the devastated village of Passchendaele. The Battle continued into November 1917.

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Western Front

On the 17^th October 1917, the Battle of La Malmaison began. The Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig had requested numerous times that the head of the French Army General Philippe Pétain should begin the long-delayed French attack on the Chemin des Dames. The French artillery preparation started on the 17^th October 1917 and on the 23^rd October 1917, their Sixth Army commanded by General Paul Maistre began the attack. The German defenders were swiftly defeated. The French advanced 3.7 miles (6.0 km) capturing the village and fort of La Malmaison, gaining control of the Chemin des Dames Ridge. As the French paused to prepare their second attack, the Germans thinking they had the French beaten launched a counter-attack. They ran headlong into the second French barrage and were forced back. The Germans withdrew to the north of the Ailette Valley early in November 1917. On the 25^th October 1917, Pétain called a halt to his operation as he believed he had achieved all that was requested of him. Haig was pleased with the French success but regretted the delay as it had kept Allied forces at Passchendaele maintaining support for the French at La Malmaison.

On the 21^st October 1917, the first American soldiers entered combat when units of the U.S. Army 1^st Division were assigned to Allied trenches in the Luneville sector near Nancy in France. The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) had started to arrive in June 1917 and they were sent to training camps as the troops were untrained, ill-equipped and far from ready for fighting on the Western Front. Commander-in-Chief of the AEF General John Pershing established bases in France to train his new arrivals with their new British and French supplied equipment. Each American unit was attached to a corresponding French unit. On the 23^rd October 1917, Corporal Robert Bralet of the 6^th Artillery was the first U.S. soldier to fire a shot in anger when he discharged a French 75mm gun into a German trench. On the 2^nd November 1917, Corp. James Gresham and Privates Thomas Enwright and Merle Hay of the 16^th Infantry became the first American soldiers to die when the Germans raided their trenches near Bathelemont, France.

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Other Theatres

On the morning of 15^th October 1917, Mata Hari was taken from her prison cell in Paris to an army barracks for her execution. Dutch born Margarethe Zelle had married a Dutch army officer but the marriage failed. She took on the name of Mata Hari in the role of an Indian Temple dancer and moved to Paris. By 1914 her exotic dances had allowed her to become a successful courtesan to many high ranking military officers and politicians. With Holland being a neutral country she was able to cross European borders freely. The French secret police induced her to travel to Spain to develop relationships with German naval and army attachés and report back to Paris any intelligence she received. The French secret police suspected her of being a double agent and on her return to Paris in February 1917 she was arrested, and charged with being a German spy. At her trial in July 1917 she was found guilty of being a spy, convicted and sentenced to death. She was executed by firing squad on the 15^th October 1917.

……………………

In the East African Campaign, the Battle of Mahiwa was fought from the 15^th to 18^th October 1917, between German and British Imperial forces. The battle began when the South African and Nigerian troops engaged a column of German forces at Mahiwa in German East Africa, which is present day Tanzania. With German Major-General Kurt Wahle’s force at Nyangao separated from Commander General Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck’s main body, the British hatched a plan to cut-off and surround Wahle’s column by flanking it with their Nigerian force. They would then commit a large body of troops on a frontal attack and encircle the force. Three battalions of Nigerians, of Lieutenant General Jacob van Deventer’s South African army, were sent against Wahle’s troops at Nyangao and engaged him there on the 15^th October 1917. Von Lettow-Vorbeck brought up re-enforcements to support Wahle. The Nigerians were soon threatened with encirclement and suffered severe casualties. A larger force had been sent by the British to attack the Germans from the opposite side. This was met with stubborn resistance while the Germans withdrew from Nyangao on the 16^th October 1917 and dug in at Mahiwa 2 miles (3.2 km) from the their previous position. Despite attacks from the newly arrived British force, the Germans were able to hold their ground and counter-attacked on the 17^th and 18^th October 1917. The British Imperial forces were defeated taking over 2,700 casualties, out of 4,900 men involved, and were forced to withdraw. Although von Lettow-Vorbeck had inflicted the greater number of casualties on the Allies, the battle did not go as he had hoped. The German army suffered between 500 and 600 casualties, which was over thirty per cent of the force engaged. German supplies were extremely limited and four days of fighting had expended nearly all of their supply of smokeless cartridges. Without sufficient ammunition for their modern weapons the Germans were reduced to using rifles which fired black powder cartridges. Low on supplies and fearing another attack, von Lettow-Vorbeck decided to withdraw from German East Africa and continue his guerrilla war by invading Portuguese East Africa where he hoped to regain strength by capturing supplies from the ill-prepared Portuguese Army.

……………………

The Battle of Caporetto, also known as the 12^th Battle of the Isonzo, began on the 24^th October 1917 along the Austro/Italian front near the town of Kobarid (now in NW Slovenia). All previous battles of the Isonzo were Italian offensives along the Austrian border. In a bid to keep Austro/Hungary in the war Germany had to help defeat the Italian army. A new 14^th Army was formed using Austrian and German divisions, commanded by German Otto von Below. The battle was a demonstration of the effectiveness of the use of Stormtroopers and infiltration tactics. The use of poison gas by the Germans also played a key role in the collapse of the Italian Second Army. In September 1917, three experts from the German Imperial General staff went to the Isonzo front to find a suitable site for a gas attack. They proposed attacking the quiet Caporetto sector, where a good road ran west through a mountain valley to the Venetian plain. Foul weather delayed the attack for two days but on the 24^th October 1917 there was no wind and the front was misted over. At 02.00 am, 894 metal tubes dug into the reverse slope were triggered electrically to simultaneously fire canisters of chlorine-arsenic agent and diphosgene, smothering the Italian trenches in the valley in a dense cloud of poison gas. Knowing their gas masks could protect them only for less than two hours, the defenders fled for their lives, creating a gap in the line, though 500-600 were still killed. At 6.41 am, 2,200 guns opened fire, targeting Italian reserves who were advancing to plug the gap. At 08.00 am two large mines were detonated under Italian strong points on the heights bordering the valley and the Austro/German infantry attacked. Soon they penetrated the almost undefended Italian fortifications in the valley, breaching the defensive line of the Italian Second Army. Forces had to be moved along the Italian front in an attempt to stem von Below’s breakout, but this only weakened other points along the line and invited further attacks. At this point the entire Italian front was threatened. The attackers in the Valley marched almost unopposed along the road toward Italy. Either side of this road, the Italians were able to force back the attacking troops, but the Italian Second Army commander Luigi Capello realized that his forces were ill-prepared for this attack and were being routed. Capello then requested permission to withdraw back to the Tagliamento. He was overruled by Chief of Staff General Luigi Cardorna who believed that the Italian force could regroup and hold out. Finally, on the 30^th October 1917, Cardorna ordered the majority of the Italian force to retreat to the other side of the Tagliamento.

On the 30^th October 1917, Paolo Boselli resigned as Prime Minister of Italy. Following Italy’s entry into the Great War against Austro-Hungary in 1915 Boselli made an important speech in support of giving full powers to Premier Antonio Salandra. After the Austrian offensive of May -July 1916, Salandra’s government fell and 78 year old Boselli became premier. He formed a coalition government and after recovering territory lost in the Austrian offensive, Italy had declared war on Germany in August 1915. Following Italy’s disastrous defeat at Caporetto, Boselli’s government fell. Boselli resigned and on the 30^th October 1917, Vittorio Emmanuelle Orlando became Prime Minister, and continued in that role through the rest of the war.

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Middle East

The Battle of Wadi Musa was fought on the 23^rd October 1917, when Ottoman soldiers were sent to deal with the Arab Sharifan Army, the military force behind the Lawrence of Arabia led Arab Revolt. The Sharifan Army was camped at Wadi Musa in Jordan. The Ottoman Army was based at Ha’an in Jordon and was sent to deal with the North Arab Army. Turkish General Djemal Pasha ordered his forces to secure the Hejaz Railway by “any and all means”. Before the Ottoman forces reached Wadi Musa they were intercepted and ambushed by 700 Arab troops under the command of Maulood Mukhlis. 400 Ottoman troops were killed and another 300 were captured. The remaining Ottoman forces retreated leaving the railway intact and uncaptured.

Early in the morning of the 31^st October 1917, Allied forces under the command of General Sir Edmund Allenby launched an attack on Turkish positions at Beersheba, in Palestine, beginning the Third Battle of Gaza. With Allenby’s appointment to command the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) in the wake of two failed attacks at Gaza in March and April 1917, he was tasked by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George with the capture of Jerusalem by Christmas 1917. In order to ensure the fall of Jerusalem however, Allenby needed first to break the Turkish line at Gaza-Beersheba overseen by the recently arrived Erich von Falkenhayn, the former German Army Chief of Staff. The previous two attacks at Gaza had to some extent foundered on account of water shortages. Allenby understood that establishing command of water supplies would be a key factor in his wider plan of capturing Jerusalem. Reinforcements were called in, including Italian and French troops, to support a renewed offensive against the Gaza-Beersheba line, which stood formidably between the Allies and the all-important city of Jerusalem. For nearly a week before the attack, three artillery divisions with over 200 guns bombarded the Turkish troops in order to trick the latter into believing that a full frontal attack would follow, similar to the previous offensives. The bombardment was the heaviest artillery attack of the war outside of Europe. Instead of a frontal attack, Allenby’s men launched a surprise attack at dawn of the 31^st October 1917. Allenby sent 40,000 troops, which included the Light Horse Brigade of Australian Desert Mounted Corps, against the damaged Turkish lines. At 4.50 pm on the 31^st October 1917, the Light Horse Brigade was in position and assembled behind rising ground 6 km south-east of Beersheba. The Australian Light Horse was used purely as cavalry for the first time, and though they were not equipped with cavalry sabres their long bayonets were equally effective. The Light Horse moved off at a trot, and almost at immediately quickened into a gallop. As they came over the ridge and onto the long open slope to Beersheba, they were seen by the Turkish gunners, who opened fire with shrapnel. After 3km Turkish machine-guns opened fire from the flank, but they were detected and silenced by British artillery. The rifle fire from the Turkish trenches was wild and high as the Light Horse approached. The front trench and the main trench were jumped and some men dismounted and attacked the Turkish defenders with rifle and bayonet from the rear. Some galloped ahead to seize the rear trenches, while other squadrons galloped straight into Beersheba. Beersheba and its crucially important water supply were captured that same day, before the Turks could execute a plan to contaminate it. Falkenhayn was forced to pull his Turkish troops back into the hills north of Jerusalem. The capture of Beersheba meant that the Gaza-Beersheba line was now occupied by the Allies. The casualties for the Light Horse were thirty-one killed and thirty-six wounded, and they captured over 700 Turkish defenders. Gaza fell a week later.

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THE GREAT WAR – OCTOBER 1917

Oct1

THE GREAT WAR – OCTOBER 1917

Passchendaele

4^th Oct Battle of Broodseinde

9^th Oct Battle of Poelcappelle

12^th Oct First battle of Passchendaele

26^th Oct to 19^th Nov Second Battle of Passchendaele

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Western Front

21^st Oct The first American troops entered trenches at Nancy

23^rd Oct to 10^th Nov Battle of La Malmaison

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Other Theatres

15^th Oct Execution of Mata Hari

15^th to 18^th Oct Battle of Mahiwa

24^th Oct Battle of Caporetto

30^th Oct Italian PM Boselli succeeded by Orlando

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Middle East

23^rd Oct Battle of Wadi Musa

31^st Oct Third Battle of Gaza- Beersheba

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Passchendaele

4^th Oct Battle of Broodseinde

9^th Oct Battle of Poelcappelle

12^th Oct First battle of Passchendaele

26^th Oct to 19^th Nov Second Battle of Passchendaele

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Western Front

21^st Oct The first American troops entered trenches at Nancy

23^rd Oct to 10^th Nov Battle of La Malmaison

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Other Theatres

15^th Oct Execution of Mata Hari

15^th to 18^th Oct Battle of Mahiwa

24^th Oct Battle of Caporetto

30^th Oct Italian PM Boselli succeeded by Orlando

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Middle East

23^rd Oct Battle of Wadi Musa

31^st Oct Third Battle of Gaza- Beersheba

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War Diary of AA Laporte Payne September 1917

Sep30

War Diary of AA Laporte Payne

EXTRACTED FROM.

Brigade Diary, Personal Diary, Operation Orders, Note Books, Memoranda

Correspondence

—————–

September 1917

September 1917.

Hove Sussex.

After a quick but slumbersome journey I arrived with the rain at Brighton, and found M. and F. here. I surprised them with the amount of luggage, but I was determined to enjoy mufti for a few days, though I had to travel down in uniform.

It was strange to be subject to the unwelcome attentions of the Boche as night visitors to London. On my way back home I fell in with Mr. Special Constable Jordan, who ran me in for riding without a light. It would have been amusing if he had reported me to the Superintendent, whose house I had just left. However the offer of a cigarette appeased the official anger at such wanton flouting of the laws of our country, and I gained my own bed in my own home and not the local lock-up.

Brighton bores me, but I am right glad to be with my people once again.

I leave here Monday morning, and arrive in town to entertain the Colonel to dinner, if possible graced by female society, if not, well! He must go without.

Then I desire to go to some sea-side place as unlike this London by the sea as possible. It is more populated by the nomadic Eastern tribe than ever.

September 9, 1917.

Tomorrow being Monday M. and F. go to Worthing, and I propose travelling to town by the 9.40 a.m. train, arriving at Victoria at 11.10. Then to dine in town in the evening.

I am better and more presentable than I was, and I hope you will not mind being seen with me.

R.P. September 12, 1917.

Hydro Hotel

Eastbourne.

R.P. September 27, 1917.

Same old place.

I have arrived safely and am in charge of the battery at the gunline as the Major is away sick at ****. I am now living on the memory of a delightful holiday at home.

September 27, 1917.

Same old place, and leave all over! It is the best leave I ever had.

At present I am up to my eyes in work. The Major is away, and I am in charge of the battery in the gun-line. There have been a lot of changes.

September 29, 1917.

My three weeks leave has faded into a happy memory of a glorious time with many fine days, and without the strain of responsibility. Returning was not pleasant. The fine weather we are now having makes me long to be back at Eastbourne, spending long days by the sea, or at Pevensey or Herstmontseaux with nothing to do and nothing to worry about. It was, perhaps by reason of contrast, the happiest time I have ever spent.

At the moment I am writing letters in my target book with the map board on my knees for a desk. I am sitting on a stretcher in the signalling dug-out, a shanty made of tin.

I left home on Monday evening with more luggage than was convenient. I arrived at Victoria and found the Grosvenor Hotel full. It was then after midnight. The Y.M.C.A. Hostel for officers was also crowded out, so I went to the Queen Mary’s Officers’ Club and secured a room. The accommodation afforded is quite good: single bedroom to oneself, bath with hot and cold water and shower, for breakfast, porridge, fish, bacon and eggs, toast and marmalade at any hour of the morning, and carriage of luggage to the station – all this for five shillings! I was up at 6 a.m. and caught the first train to Folkestone. There I met two fellows returning to our Brigade, so I had a journey with pleasant company.

It was a glorious day, and a perfect crossing, but it was hellish having to leave England on such a day. The country looked lovely in the morning sunlight.

We had two hours in Folkestone. John Amour, Roberts and I went to the Grand Hotel, but could get nothing to drink to drown our sorrows. We listened to the band for a short time, and I met one or two people I knew. We brought some pears and chocolate, and then went on board. I read the “Morning Post” and O Henry’s “Gentle Grafter”, which rather bored me.

We had lunch on board, and arrived at Boulogne without further incident. In the afternoon we went for a drive to W. and at night had dinner at the Louvre, oysters, soup, fish, poulet, sweets and cheese. We stayed the night at the Officers’ Club, a horrid place. Boulogne swarms with W.A.A.C.S.

The next day we did not go by train as we expected. I met a sapper, whom I knew, with a car. He was going to the same place as we and was good enough to give us a lift. We left about 5.30 p.m. and had a most exciting journey. We had on board with us a keg of gunpowder (100 lbs.) with the lid missing also cans of petrol, all in the back of the car. The driver drove furiously. On the way we had four punctures, once a rifle cartridge lying in the road, went right through the tyre. Three times we had to mend punctures. We arrived at our destination at about 11 p.m.

I found our battery in the same position. The Major was at the wagon-line and we stayed up talking until 2.30 a.m. The following morning I rode up to the gun-line and took charge. The guns had been moved to another place a short distance away for good and sufficient reason.

That night I was ordered to push a single gun further forward into a cemetery across the canal, so I was up all night. The next day I spent with the lone gun supervising the work of preparing a gun platform and laying telephone lines to the O.P.

Today I went to the O.P. and registered the gun from its new position. On my arrival back at the battery afterwards, or rather when I was some little way away. I found the officers and gun detachments sitting disconsolately in a ditch away in the fields, and gazing at the position, which was being heavily shelled. There we sat for the rest of the house of daylight, and now it is late but comparatively quite.

So my reception here like my departure was quite warm. An air raid in London, also in Boulogne, shelled at the wagon line on arrival, shelled at Headquarters, where I reported on my way up, shelled at the forward gun position, shelled at the Observation Position, and now shelled at the battery gun line. Delightful is it not? And the weather as it was at Eastbourne.

At Headquarters I found the Colonel in a very bad temper, and looking unwell. On the morning of the day I arrived he asked the adjutant whether I had turned up. When he heard that I had not he was angry and said, “I told you so, he will never come back.” But he was wrong. It was quite time I came back, for I feel that if I had delayed any longer I should never have come back at all. I should have funked it altogether. Such a delightful time as I have had on leave is not good for me. I was getting much too soft and lazy.

At present I have my bedroom in a deserted and broken down gun pit. It certainly has a concrete floor, but it is generally flooded with dirty water. One end is open, that towards the rear, the other is blocked to some extent with a few sodden and decaying sand-bags.

I found my kit safe and sound, much to my relief. But my wretched servant never got away as I had arranged, poor devil. Leave was suddenly stopped, so I only got away just in time.

The adjutant is leaving us, so the Colonel wants me to take the job on, and I do not want to. I really don’t know what to do about it. I should like to get a battery one day, and if I go to Headquarters I shall get stuck there. But I do not look like getting a battery at present.

I do not see any papers now except the Continental Daily Mail, so I should like to know when I am gazetted Captain. We are at present very short of subalterns.

R.P. September 30, 1917.

The moon is bright tonight, and I can almost see to write by its light alone.

As you can imagine it was not at all enjoyable to return after such a delightful leave. It has given me once more to realise more completely that home and all it means is worth fighting for. I did enjoy the few days with you, more especially because they came close upon a rather uncomfortable time out here.

Returning I arrived safely in town and went to the Queen Mary’s Officers’ Club in Eaton Square. It is an excellent place run by the Y.M.C.A. I got a clean bedroom, hot bath and cold shower, boots cleaned, breakfast of porridge, fish, eggs and bacon, rolls and marmalade, and my luggage carried to the station, all for the inclusive sum of five shillings.

I met two fellows returning to the Brigade, so we cheered one another up. It was a lovely day at Folkestone, much too good for leaving England. There we had two hours to spare, so I called on Offer, but he was away on holiday. The crossing was perfect. We had lunch on board and then eat chocolates and pears. We stopped the night at the Officers’ Club in Boulogne and left the next day in a car of a Sapper Officer, who was going to the same place as we. Leaving about 5 p.m. we arrived at 11 p.m. The man drove like mad, and we had on board a cask of gunpowder (100 lbs.) and full petrol tins. On the way we had four punctures, three of which we had to mend.

On arrival at the wagon line, same old place, I met the Major and we stayed up talking until about 2 a.m. After breakfast I went up to the gun line and took charge there, where I still am.

That night I was ordered to move a gun forward. This kept me up all night, and the following day I registered it from its new position. The next day was very busy. The Boche paid us unwelcome attentions, so we had a lot to do. And we are two subalterns short.

The Colonel apparently was getting rather anxious about me, and expressed his belief that I was going to get an extension of leave or never coming back at all. Evidently he does not trust me.

At present I am living in a broken down old gun pit, with only two sides, and it is half under water. But it is the best place I can find at present. It will harden me off for the winter after the luxury of leave.

The sunset this evening was beautiful. I do not think I have ever seen it so red. Of course we spoiled it with a straffe, and the guns are going like mad. Now the Boche are retaliating.

Leave has just been stopped again, so I was lucky to get mine in first.

We are still in summertime here, but it does not make much difference to us as we are always up at dawn. Tomorrow I have to go out with the Colonel at 5 a.m. I wish he would not choose these unearthly hours, but he thinks things are quieter then when the Boche has hardly rubbed his eyes.

I am sitting in the telephone dug-out. It is a tin shanty cupola shape, stuck on a wooden floor over a ditch at the side of a field. My desk is a map board on my knees as I sit on a stretcher supported by ammunition boxes. Someone is trying to mend the door with a sledge hammer, and combined with the noise of the guns firing, it is difficult to concentrate.

Report of Attack on Eagle Trench September 1917

Sep30

Eagle Trench

On the 6^th August the 20^th Division took over the right Divisional Sector of the 14^th Corps from the 38^th Division.

The task before the division was to capture LANGEMARCK village and a portion of the enemy’s GHELUVELT – LANGEMARCK line beyond the village. Before proceeding with the attack on Langemarck it was necessary to obtain the mastery of the STEENBEEK which was held by the enemy. This stream was liable to sudden floods and its steep banks presented a considerable obstacle. In addition to this there were many concrete blockhouses at intervals along the eastern bank of the river, the largest one constructed in the ruins of a house called AU BON GITE formed more or less the key of the position, and commanded all the approaches to the river from one side. The 59^th Bde. which was holding the line, with the 60^th and 61^st Brigades in support and reserve was to carry out this operation, but the two latter Brigades took no active part in the fighting. The first attempt was made on the 11^th August and was unsuccessful, the enemy having discovered the concentration and opened a heavy fire on our troops as they were assembling. The second attempt on the 14^th August, made be the 10^th and 11^th Rifle Brigades was more successful and a line was established 200 yards east of the stream, but the Au Bon Gite still held out. At one period, it was captured and a number of the enemy were killed, but our men were again driven out after heavy fighting by a counter attack from a N.E. direction. The crossings of the Steenbeek had however been made good and it was now possible to arrange for the main concentration to take place east of the stream. The two Battalions engaged in the above operation carried out the attack with great gallantry; The attack was made over boggy ground across a stream which was too wide to jump and bridges had to be carried and put into position; all this was done under fire and it is safe to say that had the crossings not been sieged the main attack in Langemarck would have been a far more dangerous undertaking and in all probability would have failed.

The 59^th Brigade had suffered heavily and on the night of the 14/15 it was relieved by the 60^th and 61^st Brigades in order from the right. On the night of the 15/16 these two Brigades were deployed into their battle positions east of the Steenbeek. It was a pitch dark night, the ground over which the troops had to move was very boggy and the concentration had to take place close under Au Bon Gite whose Garrison at any moment might give the alarm and so prevent the deployment taking place. So silently was this carried out and without a vestige of confusion that the enemy heard or saw nothing to arouse their suspicion, but they kept up Machine Gun fire from Au Bon Gite most of the night, making the assembly still more difficult. This was one of the most difficult operations the two Brigades had ever been asked to carry out and it reflects the greater credit on all ranks. The attack commenced at 4.45 a.m., Au Bon Gite being rushed by two companies of the 11^th Rifle Brigade, under Captain Slade who displayed great courage and coolness, which had been left in position the previous night. Covered by a heavy artillery barrage the attacking waves moved forward, the chief centres of resistance being REITRES FARM on the left of the 61^st Brigade and LANGEMARCK itself with the houses to the east of the village, all of which concealed many machine guns.

The Chateau grounds had been reduced to a swamp by the recent rains and the advance of the infantry on the left was greatly impeded. The whole country east of the Steenbeek for a great distance was a swampy crater field.

Banbury’s 61^st Brigade which had never been known to fail to take its objection [objective], captured the village and established a line beyond it. The 12^th King’s Liverpool & 7^th Somerset, D.C.L.I. and K.O.Y.L.I. were the heroes of this exploit and in spite of bog and bullets fought gloriously. On the right the attack of the 60^th Brigade went through without a hitch, in spite of considerable resistance, the 12/King’s Royal Rifles being on the left in touch with the King’s Liverpool while the 6^th Shropshire, L.I. were on their right, and the 6^th Oxford and Bucks cleared up numerous pill boxes near to Steenbeek.

The German Commanding Officer of the 3^rd Battn. 261 R.I.R. was captured in Langemarck; other prisoners captured during the day numbered about 20 Officers and 400 other ranks; captured trophies included a section of 4.2” Howitzers, one 7.7. M.M. gun and 20 or 30 machine guns; many more machine guns – trench mortars were buried in the debris. The number of enemy killed and wounded is difficult to estimate, but it was known that two Battalions were almost annihilated in addition to others which suffered heavily. From captured documents it would appear that during the 16^th August the enemy’s forces on the 20^th Division Front were greatly disorganised; prisoners were captured from no less than five divisions on the front where normally there would only have been two divisions. On the night of the 17/18^th the 38^th Division relieved the 20^th Division, and the latter was withdrawn to refit and reorganise.

…………………………………………………………………………………………..

CAPTURE OF EAGLE TRENCH.

On the 11^th September the 20^th Division took over the right Divisional Sector of the XIV Corps front from the 38^th Division. The 51^st Division (XVII Corps) was on the right and the Guards Division on the left. The next task of the 20^th Division was to capture EAGLE and KANGAROO and BEAR trenches and included ’T GOED TER VESTEN FARM; the guards Division had for their objective a line between the SCHEIRBOOM – KORTEBEER road and the LANGEMARCK – STADEN railway. The attack of the 20^th Division was carried out by the 60^th Brigade on the right and 59^th Brigade on the left. The 61^st Brigade was in Divisional reserve on the canal. Prepatory to the infantry attack the artillery kept up a hurricane bombardment of the enemy’s positions for 24 hours.

It was known that EAGLE trench was strongly held; it was full of concrete machine gun emplacements and dugouts and was well sited for field of fire. Although it had been shelled by heavy calibre guns some days before, many of the dugouts were not injured and it was felt that it would be a tough fight before it could be captured. Arrangements were made to discharge 300 oil drums from projectors on to the portion of Eagle trench near the cemetery shortly before the assault. The assaulting waves attacked at 5.40 a.m. on the 20^th September. Reports shewed that the advance had not been everywhere successful; the right of the 59^th Brigade and the left of the 60^th Brigade had been held up by the enemy in Eagle Trench; the right had been advanced a little, but the enemy in Eagle house and Louis farm were holding them up. On the left, Bear trench had been reached. An order was issued to renew the attack at 6.30 p.m. In the meantime the attackers in front of Eagle trench had to find what little cover they could and were being exposed to heavy fire from hostile artillery the whole day. The 60^th Brigade at 8.0 p.m. gained the trenches round Eagle House and captured about 70 prisoners. By 9.0 p.m. our whole line had been advanced and a portion of Eagle trench had been captured. By midnight the 59^th Brigade had got their objective with their right flank refused. Early on the 21^st September a contact aeroplane reported Germans holding the northern portion of Eagle trench. A third attack was ordered to take place at 5.30 a.m. on the 22^nd September. The men all this time had been under heavy artillery and machine gun fire and were unable to move out of the muddy holes in which they were trying to get shelter, but they were as eager as ever to come to close grips with the enemy.

Tanks were to co-operate with this attack, but owing to the terrible state of the roads they were unable to reach this rendezvous, and the attack had to be postponed. During the 22^nd the situation remained the same and a fresh attack was ordered for the 23^rd. It was felt that unless we could take Eagle Trench at once, the Germans would bring up fresh troops for counter attack which if successful would necessitate the whole operation being carried out again with great loss of life.

At 7.0 a.m. on the 23^rd September the attack was to be tried again and Eagle trench to be assaulted from the west and south; this was to be preceded by a heavy bombardment with Stokes mortars. At 6.25 a.m. on the 23^rd the enemy attacked our Posts near Louis farm and the cemetery; they were driven back by machine gun fire and 23 prisoners captured. Soon after this our attack began; it was carried out by detachments of the 12 K.R.R. and 10 R Bde. The Stokes bombardment was most effective and under a rifle grenade barrage our assaulting infantry rushed in from the south. While the enemy in Eagle trench were fighting the rifle men, the 10^th R. Bde. came in from the west and captured the rest of this trench; we captured about 100 prisoners and many machine guns. Most of the prisoners belonged to picked troops of the 208 Division, who said that they had been ordered to attack that morning, assisted by detachments of the 185 Infantry Regiment; our attack on the 23^rd September forestalled it and thanks to this success the German counter attack failed completely. Both the 185 Infantry Regiment and the Storm troops of the 208 Division had suffered heavily and the 3^rd Battalion of the latter was almost wiped out.

The 20^th Division was relieved on the 28^th September by the 4^th Division.

The capture of Eagle Trench was a splendid performance; the men were exposed to heavy firing for the best part of 4 days; the ground was wet and muddy and there was very little cover. In spite of this the 59^th Brigade (Hyslop) and 60^th Brigade (Butter [Butler]) managed to bring to a successful issue the task which was set them, in the face of determined resistance by picked enemy troops. The 20^th Division received the Congratulations of the Army and Corps Commanders.

Appendix Y to OO 142 30 September 1917.

Sep30

APPENDIX Y.

Reference O.O. 142.

(a). If the 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. fail to take the 1^st objective, the 15^th Durh L.I. will take 1^st objective and 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. will take 2^nd objective.

In this case, one company of 15^th Durh L.I. will follow 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. and be in support of them.

(b). The 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. will assist 15^th Durh L.I. and will dig in on objective allotted in Brigade O.O. to two companies of 10^th K.O.Y.L.I.

(c). The 1^st E. York R. will occupy our old front line with one company.

In the event of 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. being unable, owing to enemy action (e.g. severe counter-attacks on 110^th Inf. Bde. on 2^nd inst., or on 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. on 3^rd inst.)-

(a). The 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. will take 1^st objective, and will take over line and be formed up in front by 5 a.m. 4^th inst.

(b). The 15^th Durh. L.I. and one company 1^st E. York. R. will take 2^nd objective as arranged.

(c). The 1^st E. York. R. will perform role originally allotted to 10^th K.O.Y.L.I.

(d). The 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. will be Brigade Reserve and occupy position allotted to 1^st E. York. R.

In the event of dispositions having to take place as in para 2 – If 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. fail to take 1^st objective, the 15^th Durh L.I. will take it.

The 1^st E. York. R. will take 2^nd objective supported by one company 15^th Durh L.I.

The 10^th K.O.Y.L.I. will do task as allotted to 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. in para. 1 (b).

O.C. battalions will have plans ready for each eventuality and let their officers know them.