Gerald Benham’s notes from diaries

31 August 1916. Aunt Louise died.

Dick-Cunyngham letter to wife dated 31 Aug 1914

My darling one,

I have had some rest at last & feel more lively – I was almost overcome one day with fatigue & loss of sleep. I had only 40 min on the floor in 48 hours, & started off without any breakfast or sleep on a long days work – result, I couldn’t ride because I fell forward in the saddle. I couldn’t walk except like a drunken man, so I got on hanging on to a stirrup leather – Times have been hard and sorrowful, I have not seen or heard any authentic news of the Regt: and am in great anxiety – The Weather is dreadfully hot & oppressing – we manage to find fairly comfy quarters, one night in a beautiful Chateau, all furnished and we had an excellent dinner, commandeering some champagne & old Brandy to revive us.

I have not seen any casualty list, fear many friends have gone, and it must take time before lists are full & complete. A good many are turning up – Darling one I fear this is a dreadful anxiety for you all at home, I honestly hope the worst is over, but with such a huge front for Armies to work over it will probably take time.

Our letters have not been very good – only about 2 posts so far, somehow we never seem to settle down into working the post.

Have seen Weir, Charlton, Kay, & many other S.C. officers – I wish I could see the Regt & find out all about them.

Send me some more cigarettes & a small box of Harrod’s No 1 club cigar when you can I am out I find & don’t care for a pipe in this heat – I slept out last night & found it quite warm. Straw makes an excellent bed – I have found this paper in a case handed to me today so am making use of it.

My precious one, don’t be anxious I am very fit & as happy as can be. I still picture you in the little cottage – where you will be surrounded with sympathetic friends – I am writing to Mother now as we are waiting for orders

All my love to you both
Your devoted
Jimmie

For Betty XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

With envelope addressed to Mrs Dick Cunyngham, Mount View, Crownhill S.O., S. Devon. England. Endorsed No stamps available. Signed Dick Cunyngham. Postmarked ARMY POST OFFICE 42 AU 31 14. Also London Paid 8 SP 14

SECRET. R.A., 38th Division No. G.S.81

O.C.
RIGHT GROUP
—————————–

Reference XIVth Corps R.A. No. 685/1/94 paras 4 and 5:-
2 Batteries of 76th Brigade will be withdrawn on night 30/31st August, and the remaining 2 on night 31st August/ 1st September.

1 Battery 122nd Brigade and “C”/121 will go into action on night 30/31st August, and the remaining 2 batteries of 122nd Brigade on night 31st August/ 1st September.

J.E. Marston
Captain R.A.
Brigade Major Right Artillery.
30 Aug 1917

Copies to:-
Left Group.
38th Division.
XIV Corps R.A.
XIV Corps H.A.
20th Div. Arty.
“Q” Group.

Gerald Benham’s notes from diaries

28 August 1916. Moved to Foxhall Heath Camp Ipswich.

SECRET. Copy No……
27th August 1916.

REVISED COPY – FOR REFERENCE ONLY.

20TH DIVISION OPERATION ORDER NO 90.

Reference –
Trench Map, LONGUEVAL Sheet 57c, S.W. – 1/10,000
GINCHY-GUILLEMONT Map 1/5,000

Attack 1. The Fourth Army in conjunction with the French is renewing the attack on September 3rd at an hour ZERO to be named later.

Corps objective. 2. The XIV Corps is to clear GUILLEMONT and establish itself on the line FALFEMONT Farm – WEDGE WOOD – GINCHY Road up to T.20.a.1.5.
This attack will be carried out by the 20th Division on the left and the 5th Division on the right.

5th Division Objective 3. The 5th Division will attack FALFEMONT FARM and the trenches to the South of it up to point 48 at 9.0 a.m.

Objective, 20th Division. 4. The 20th Division will capture GUILLEMONT, clear it and then establish itself on the WEDGEWOOD-GINCHY Road from T.26.a.1.7. on the right to T.20.a.1.5. on the left. Finally it will establish itself on a line – N.W. corner of LEUZE WOOD T.26.b.8.8½. (exclusive) – T.20.a.6.5. where touch will be established with the 5th and 7th Divisions respectively.

Boundaries between divisions. 5. The dividing line between the 20th and 5th Divisions will be:-
S.30.d.5.8 ½. – T.25.a.3½.2. – Strong Point T.25.b.1.5. (inclusive to 20th Division) T.26.a.1.7. – N.W. corner LEUZE WOOD T.26.b.8.8 ½.
The dividing line between the 20th and 7th Divisions will be:-
S.24.b.8½. – T.19.b.2.6. – T.20.a.1.5. – 6.5.

Boundaries between Brigades. 6. The 59th Infantry Brigade and 1 Battalion 60th Infantry Brigade will attack on the right and the 47th Infantry Brigade on the left.
The dividing line between the 59th and 47th Infantry Brigades will be:-
S.24.d.7.1 ½. – Road junction T.20.d.2 ½.5½. – GUILLEMONT – COMBLES Road to T.20.d.2½.5½. (latter point inclusive to right Brigade).

Brigades’ objectives. 7. The objectives allotted to the Brigades are as follows and shewn on the attached map marked ”A” –
(a) 59th Infantry Brigade.
1st Objective – German trenches in Sunken Road from T.25.a.3 ½.3. to T.25.a.2.7½. thence North to MOUNT STREET.

2nd objective. – Trench junction T.25.b.1.4½. (incl) thence SOUTH STREET as far as MOUNT STREET.

3rd objective. – WEDGE WOOD – GINCHY Road from T.26.a.1.7.to cross roads T.20.c.1½.4 ½. (incl) touch being established with 5th Division and the right and 47th Infantry Brigade on the left.

4th objective. – N.W. corner LEUZE WOOD (exclusive), T.26.b.8.8 ½. – GUILLEMONT – COMBLES Road – T.20.d.2½.5½. (incl).

(b) 47th Infantry Brigade.
1st objective – MOUNT STREET at T.19.c.2.2. – Eastern end of QUARRIES – thence German trench to T.19.c.2½.9. – thence BROMPTON Road to T.19.a.8.2. – T.19.a.9.1.

2nd objective – NORTH STREET – T.19.a.9.1. – GINCHY Road, including buildings South of road T.19.c.9.9., – to T.19.b.2.6. where touch will be established with the 7th Divn.

3rd objective – WEDGE WOOD – GINCHY ROAD from cross roads T.20.c.1½.4 ½. (excl) to T.20.a.1.5., where touch will be established with 7th Division.

4th objective – T.20.d.2½.5½. (excl) – T.20.a.6.5.

(c) The advance from the first to the second objective will commence at 0 plus 50.
The advance from the second to the third objective will commence at 0 plus 2 hours.
The advance from the third to the fourth objective will commence at 0 plus 2 hours 45 minutes.
Consolidation of gains.
(d) On gaining each objective they will be consolidated and strong points will be established at the following points:-
Right Brigade.
On 2nd objective – T.25.b.1.5.
T.25.b.1.9.
On 3rd objective – T.20.c.1 ½.4½. and CEMETERY, T.19.d.7.3.
On 4th objective – QUARRY T.20.d.2.1.
Road T.20.d.2.5.
Left Brigade
On 1st objective – QUARRIES.
T.19.a.5½.½.
T.19.a.9.1. to 8.2.
On 2nd objective – T.19.c.9.4.
On 3rd objective – T.20.a.1.2.
On 4th objective – Trench junction T.20.a.6.5.
Reserve at disposal of Brigades (e) Immediately the objectives are reached Bdes will push forward patrols to establish under cover of these patrols a line in touch with Divs on the Right and Left as near as possible to the German positions.

(f) For the capture of the 3rd objective 2 bns of the 61st Inf Bde in reserve will be available to be placed at the disposal of 59th and 47th Bdes if required (para 11) but these Bdes will make their preparations for capturing the 3rd objective without having to call on the reserve.

(g) It may be necessary to employ the two rear battalions of the Divisional Reserve for the final objective, but this will depend on whether the 59th and 47th Brigades have used the two Reserve Battalions from the Divisional Reserve to gain the 3rd objective.

Bombardment 8. (a) The attack will be preceded by a bombardment by heavy artillery, commencing at 8 a.m. on morning of September 2nd.
(b) During this bombardment certain trenches may have to be cleared from time to time and arrangements for this will be made between XIV Corps H. A. and 20th Division.
Barrages (c) Fifty per cent of the Field Artillery guns in the division will be employed for stationary barrages and 50 per cent for rolling barrages.
Details of the stationary barrages are shewn on the attached map marked “B”.
(d) At Zero an intense Field Artillery barrage will open on the first objective. This barrage will lift as shewn on the attached map marked ”B”. At the same hour a creeping barrage will be opened one hundred yards in front of the infantry and will advance at the rate of fifty yards per minute in front of the infantry until the objective is reached. When this barrage has passed 200 yards beyond the objective it will become stationary.
Whenever the creeping barrage reaches the stationary barrage, the stationary barrage will lift on to the next barrage line, i.e. the next colour in front of it on the map.
An intensive rate will be continued for fifteen minutes when fire will drop to two rounds a minute per gun.
The barrage on BROMPTON ROAD, objective of Left Battalion, Left Brigade, will lift at ZERO 4 in stead of ZERO 3. the remainder of the barrage will lift at ZERO 3 as ordered.

(e)At the hour of Zero, all heavy howitzers will lift from GUILLEMONT.

Six inch howitzers will continue on the objectives in GUILLEMONT, east of GREEN STREET, HILL STREET and the German trench line from T.25.a.8.7½. to WEDGE WOOD.
(f) At Zero plus 50 the Field Artillery barrage will again become intensive and the infantry will advance to their 2nd objective, and the same procedure as ordered in para. (d) will again be followed.
An intensive rate will be continued for fifteen minutes, when fire will drop to two rounds a minute per gun.

(g) The heavy howitzers and six inch howitzers will, after zero plus 50, not fire on any parts of the third objective except the CEMETERY, and WEDGE WOOD – GUILLEMONT Road, between T.26.a.1.1. and T.20.a.1.5.

(h) At zero plus two hours the Field Artillery barrage will again become intensive and the infantry will advance to the third objective.

(i) The barrage on WEDGE WOOD – GINCHY Road in front of 20th Division will lift at 2 hours 15 minutes and not at 2 hours 25 minutes as shewn on Map ”B”.

An intense rate of fire will be maintained for 25 minutes.

(j) To enable the 4th attack to be made the barrage will again become intensive at Zero plus 2 hours 45 minutes. The creeping barrage will advance at the rate of 50 yards per minute until it has passed 200 yards beyond its final objective.

(k) Detailed orders for the action of the Field Artillery will be issued by the C.R.A. 24th Division (attached to 20th Division).

The movements of the Infantry will conform to the rolling barrages, it being essential that they get up close under the barrage and move along under it.

Pusher mine etc. 9 A “pusher” mine under the strong point at S.30.b.7.1. will be exploded at 0 – 10 seconds and the Flammenwerfer will open fire at the same hour if in position. The front trench will be cleared for 20 yards on either side of SCOTTISH LANE.

R.E. and Pioneers 10. The 96th Field Coy. R.E. and one Coy. Pioneers are placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. 59th Infantry Brigade and 83rd Field Coy. and 1 Coy. of Pioneers at the disposal of G.O.C. 47th Infantry Brigade.
These troops will be used mainly for the construction of strong points and for connecting back the various objectives with communication trenches.

Machine Guns 11. Brigadiers will select positions for their machine guns to cover the advance with either direct or indirect fire.
The 61st Machine Gun Company will also co-operate in the attack by bringing direct and indirect machine gun fire on to the enemy’s approaches to the objectives.

Divl Reserve. 12. The Divl. Reserve will consist of:-
61st Inf. Bde. – Headquarters S.28.b.6.7.
60th Bde. (less one Battn) – H.Qrs. The Craters.
11th Durham L.I. (Pioneers) less 2 Coys.) Trenches W. edge of
84th Field Coy R.E. )BERNAFAY WOOD
)S.28.b.4.0.

At Zero the G.O.C. 61st Inf. Brigade will send 2 Bns. forward to occupy trenches vacated by 59th and 47th Infantry Brigades near the front line. The two Bns. will be prepared to carry out the attack on the 3rd objective from the 2nd objective at 0 2 hours, for which purpose one bn would be placed at disposal of G.O.C. 59th and G.O.C. 47th Inf. Bdes. Respectively.

The G.O.C. 61st Inf. Brigade will keep in close touch with the 59th and 47th Infantry Brigades and will be prepared to act on his own initiative failing communication with Divisional Headquarters.

Note. ADD. Within the boundaries of GUILLEMONT Village creeping barrages will advance at the rate of 100 yards per 4 minutes.

(a) The 60th Inf. Bde. will not move forward from the CRATERS until ordered to do so by Divisional Headquarters.

(b) This Brigade will keep the closest touch with the 61st Inf. Bde. and will be prepared to occupy the trenches vacated by the 61st Inf. Bde. as the latter moves forward from its first battle position.

(c) The 60th Inf. Bde. will not be used except to resist a counter attack on the final objective or to meet any sudden emergency.

(d) The Brigadier, O.Cs. Battns. and Signalling Officers must reconnoitre all the approaches to GUILLEMONT and the several objectives.

(e) G.Os.C. 60th and 61st Inf. Bdes. will detail liaison officers who will move with Brigade H.Qrs.

(f) Visual signalling must be established between the two Brigades.

Aeroplane Co-operation. 13. The 9th Squadron R.F.C. will have two contact aeroplanes in the air from ZERO until three and a half hours after ZERO; after that one contact aeroplane until dark on September 3rd.
On the 4th September they will detail one contact aeroplane from 5.30 a.m. to 8 a.m.

Flares will be lit as follows:-
(a) On attaining each objective.
(b) At 7 p.m. September 3rd.
(c) At 6 a.m. September 4th.

The contact aeroplanes may be recognised by their markings of two long blue streamers, one attached to the end of each plane, and two transverse black bands on the plane, one near each end of the coloured circles.

YELLOW flares will be used, as it is believed the Germans may use RED to mislead us.

Tools for assaulting parties. 14. At least 40 per cent of the attacking Coys. will carry picks and shovels in the proportion of one pick to one shovel.
Men assaulting will not carry more than 120 rounds of ammunition.

Prisoners. 15. All prisoners will be sent to the Divisional Collecting Station at CRATER POST (A.8.a.8.3.) where they will be searched under arrangements of the A.P.M. 20th Divn.
From where they will be marched to the Advanced Corps Cage (F.23.d.0.4.) for preliminary examination.

Medical. 16. Separate detailed instructions have been issued with regard to medical arrangements.
Bearer Posts.
Left Brigade – BERNAFAY WOOD – S.22.d.9.1.
Right Brigade – BRIQUETERIE, A.4.b.5.3.

Adv. Dressing Station – CARNOY A.13.d.3.8.
Walking Cases. Through MONTAUBAN or BRIQUETERIE to A.D.S.

Reports. 17. Reports as to position and progress will be sent every ½ hour after ZERO unless runners and pigeons are the only means of communication, in which case information will be sent as often as possible. In any case important information will be sent at once.
Negative reports are required.

Distinguishing Badges. 18. Runners will wear distinguishing badges on their shoulder straps as follows:-
20th Division – BLUE.
47th Inf. Bde. – GREEN.
Orders will be issued to all control sentries to pass through priority all men wearing these badges.

Time. 19. Watches will be synchronised at 6.0 p.m., on 2nd September and 6.0 a.m. and 9.0 a.m. on September 3rd.
D.H.Qrs. 20. On the capture of the final objective, 20th Divl, H.Qrs will move forward to the BRIQUETERIE.
21. Acknowledge.

(sd) C.A. MILWARD, Major, for Lieut.Colonel,
General Staff, 20th Division.

Issued at

Copies to
1 XIV Corps (G),
2 XIV Corps (Q),
3 5th Division,
4 7th Division
5 16th Division,
6 C.R.A. 24th Division,
7 C.R.A. 6th Division,
8 C.R.E.
9 59th Inf. Brigade,
10 60th Inf. Brigade,
11 61st Inf Bde.
12 11th Durham L.I.,
13 A.D.M.S.
14 A.A. & Q.M.G.
15 A.P.M.
16 XIV Corps H.A.
17 20th Signal Coy.
18 9th Squadron R.F.C.
19/22 Retained.
47th Infantry Brigade.

53 Infantry Brigade lessons learnt from Recent Operations 27 August 1917

Appendix “A”
LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE RECENT OPERATIONS.

1. Inadvisability of “long” objectives owing to the confusion and exhaustion of the troops which render them specially vulnerable to enemy counter-attacks.

2. Necessity for the greatest attention being paid to the training of Coy and Platoon Commanders in leadership. Battles are now more than ever “battles of the Coy and Platoon Commanders”. The counter-attack of “B” and “C” Coys 8th Bn. Norfolk Regt. on J.14.a.3.3. on the 11th August, is a good example of the results of good leadership by subordinate Commanders.

3. Necessity for Reserves to be well forward, otherwise they cannot be got up in time.

4. Necessity for immediate re-organization when an attack has failed. Troops who have crowded into trenches must be thinned out at once and re-formed.

5. More initiative required in gaining ground by means of pushing forward small parties covered by the fire of M.Gs, L.Gs riflemen and rifle bombers. Greater activity in sniping required. The 6th R. Berks R. were very active in sniping and inflicted considerable losses on the enemy in GLENCOURSE WOOD.

6. The rapid exhaustion of troops is a factor which must be reckoned with. This is caused by:-
(a) The long distances troops have to march from rest areas.
(b) The lack of accommodation near and in the front line, and also in back areas, such as RAILWAY DUGOUTS, RITZ ST. etc.
(c) The heavy shelling of back areas which prevent troops getting any rest.
(d) The condition of the country which is much torn up, and is very marshy in places.
This physical exhaustion affects the moral of the troops when they are counter-attacked. It also renders their efforts at consolidation of any ground won somewhat feeble.
On this account I advocate the sending up of special consolidating parties of infantry if necessary, as well as R.E. and Pioneers. These should construct S.Ps and trenches to form a Main Line of Defence, a short distance in rear of the line held by the most advanced troops provided that the tactical siting of these is suitable.
7. If an attack has once failed, it is no good launching another without adequate preparation. Fresh troops will probably have to be used.

8. Necessity of good communications: roads and duck-board tracks.

9. Owing to the heavy shelling, it was found impossible to maintain communications by telephone forward of Brigade H.Q.
Power Buzzers were not a success owing to the fact that no suitable dugout existed in the forward area.
Visual signalling was fairly successful, but owing to the shell bursts, dust and smoke, it was unreliable. The Forward Stations were at times heavily shelled, and this interrupted communication by this method.
In future operations it will be necessary to rely largely on runners, signal rockets and pigeons.
The German method of showing the positions of advanced troops by means of white strips might be tried.

10. An increase of heavy guns for counter-battery work is recommended.

11. Special Lewis guns should be provided to deal with enemy aircraft flying low over our front lines: these cannot be dealt with by anti-aircraft guns. They might however be fired on by field hows., in the same manner as the enemy does when our planes are flying low.

12. The effect of the enemy gas shells is most trying to troops. Even if few casualties are caused, the troops are prevented from getting rest, working and ration parties are delayed, reliefs are rendered more difficult etc. The effect of our gas appliances on the enemy must be similar. A greatly increased use of gas on our part in recommended.

13. The bombing raids carried out at night by the enemy aircraft on areas just in rear of the forward area are very disturbing to troops, and prevent them getting a good rest. The work carried out by our air service in this respect is beyond all praise. When however, we are in a position to send over nightly large numbers of aircraft to bomb the enemy’s back areas continuously and harass his marching columns and camps with M.G. fire, it will have a very great effect on the moral and efficiency of his troops, and the results should be far reaching.

14. The provision of dugouts for troops in the forward area is a matter of urgency.
Brigadier General
Commanding 53rd Infantry Brigade.
Aug. 27th 1917.

53 Infantry Brigade Narrative of Operations 26 August 1917

Ref. Map. HOOGE. 1/10.000.
53rd Inf Bde No. C 703

53RD INFANTRY BRIGADE NARRATIVE
OF OPERATIONS 9TH TO 18TH AUG. 17

Situation.
9th August. 1. At 12 noon 9th August, the 53rd Infantry Bde was disposed as follows:-

Bde. H.Q. )
8th Norf. R. ) CANAL RESERVE CAMP.
53rd T.M.B. )

8th Suff. R. NEW DICKEBUSCH CAMP.

10th Essex R. ) DICKEBUSCH HUTS.
53rd M.G. Coy. )

6th R. Berks. R. CHATEAU SEGARD.

Aug 10th 2. At 3.39 p.m. the 53rd Inf. Bde received orders to relieve the 54th Inf. Bde. And the 55th Inf. Bde. (less 2 Cos. 7th R.W. Kent R. in CRAB CRAWL) in the line on the night 10/11th August.
Orders were immediately issued for :-the 10th Essex R. to take over the line from J.19.b.9.9. to J.13.d.9.9. (YPRES-MENIN Rd. inclusive) from 7th Queens R.
The 8th Norf R. to take over the line from J.13.d.9.9. (YPRES-MENIN Rd. inclusive) to J.14.a.5.6. from 11th R. Fus. and 7th Bedford R.
The 6th R. Berks R. to take over the line from J.14.a.5.6. – J.14.a.8.4. – J.14.b.4.5. – J.8.c.7.3. from 7th Bedford R.
8th Suff. R. and 53rd T.M.B. to move to CHATEAU SEGARD Area.
53rd M.G.C. 3 Secs. employed on barrage fire on the 10th., to move back to DICKEBUSCH HUTS to refit. 1 Sec to move up early on morning of 11th to take over from 54th M.G.C. in left Sector of the line.
C.Os., Coy. Commanders and Advanced Parties of 8th Norf. R. and 6th R. Berks. R. moved forward at once, and reported at H.Q. 54th Inf. Bde. In RIDGE ST.
Similar details of 10th Essex R. reported at H.Q. 55th Inf. Bde. At DORMY HOUSE.
At 7 p.m. H.Q. 53rd Inf. Bde arrived at H.Q. 54th Inf. Bde. At this moment the S.O.S. Signal was sent up in front and the enemy were reported to be counter-attacking GLENCOURSE WOOD which was held by the 7th Bedford R.
G.O.C. 53rd Inf. Bde. At once placed 8th Norf. R. and 6th R. Berks. R. who had arrived in the RITZ ST Area, under the orders of G.O.C. 54th Inf. Bde. Who ordered 1 Coy of each Bn to move forward to re-inforce 7th Bedford R. and 11th R. Fus.: these 2 Coys were shortly afterwards re-inforced by 2 more (1 from 8th Norf. R. and 1 from 6th R. Berks. R.)
Information regarding the situation on the 54th Inf. Bde. Front was not very definite.
H.Q. 53rd Inf. Bde. Then proceeded to H.Q. 55th Inf. Bde. At DORMY HOUSE.

Aug 11th. 3. At 12.11, 11th Aug a message was received from 6th R. Berks. R. timed at 9.40 p.m. 10th Aug stating that the situation was somewhat obscure on their front but that our troops were still holding JARGON TR. and S.P. J.14.a.8.8.
At 4.20 a.m. a message from 8th Suff. R. timed at 3.15 a.m. was received stating that the Bn had arrived in RITZ ST Area.
At 8.31 a.m. a report timed at 2.15 a.m. was received from 6th R. Berks R. stating they had relieved relief 7th Bedford R. on the line of JARGON TR (J.14.a.5.5. to J.8.c.4.2.).
At 8.54 a.m. a message received timed 8.20 a.m. from 8th Norf. R. stating relief was complete: a further message timed at 3.15 a.m. was received at 7.1 a.m. stating relief was complete at 2.30 a.m.
At 6.34 a.m. a message by runner from the 8th Norf. R. timed at 5.50 a.m., reported S.P. J.14.a.3.3. had been re-captured by the enemy.
Orders were immediately issued by Bde for a counter-attack on this S.P.
At 7.35 a.m. message timed at 6.55 a.m. was received from 10th Essex R. reporting relief complete 6 a.m.
At about 9 a.m. the Brigade Major returned from the front with the news that the S.P. at J.14.a.3.3. had been retaken by the 8th Norf. R., and the line re-established.

The following is a brief account of the loss of the S.P at J.14.a.3.3. and its re-capture by the 8th Norf. R.

At about 4.15 a.m. the enemy opener a light barrage on the front line which had just been taken over by this Battalion. At 4.30 a.m. the barrage became intense and the enemy delivered a strong counter-attack. Shortly after this attack developed, the O.C. 11th R. Fus who had remained at Bn H.Q., received a report that the enemy had penetrated our line just S. of the S.P. J.14.a.3.3. which was held by elements of his battalion and the 7th Bedford R., who had not been relieved owing to the darkness. The S.O.S. signal had been sent up at 4.55 a.m. and Lieut. Col. FERGUSON D.S.O. O/C 8th Norf. R., had thereforeupon ordered 1 Company to be prepared to counter-attack immediately. A message was just then received from the Sergeant Commanding the Right Platoon of the Company holding the line W. of J.14.a.3.3. stating that his right flank had been pushed back, but that the left of the Coy was still holding on. The O.C. 8th Norf. R. having reconnoitred the position, found that the enemy were in possession of the S.P. and had brought 4 M.Gs into action and were in considerable strength. He therefore issued orders for 1 Coy to attack from the direction of SURBITON VILLAS, and 1 Coy to move up towards CLAPHAM JUNCTION and strike the enemy on his left flank. The attack to be carried out under cover of fire from Lewis Guns and snipers. The 6th R. Berks R. also were to assist in the attack by covering fire from the North.
This counter-attack was launched at 5.25 a.m,. and the position was again in our hands at 6 a.m. together with 9 prisoners, 2 of our M.Gs, and some of our troops who had been captured by the enemy were retaken.
This attack was carried out over a distance of some 600 yards of very rough and shell torn ground, the whole of which is dominated by this S.P. at J.14.a.3.3.
Captain J.D. CROSTHWAITE, Brigade Major, was an eye witness of the attack which he describes as having been carried out in a most daring and gallant manner. It was carried out without any artillery preparation and entirely on the initiative of the Commanders on the spot. The assaulting troops advanced by rushes under the cover of fire from Lewis Guns and rifles. The enemy losses were heavy: I myself saw a considerable number of dead Huns when I visited the S.P. afterwards.
I desire to record my appreciation of the able manner in which Lieut. Col. H.. de L. FERGUSON, D.S.O. O.C. 8th Norf R. handled the situation, and the splendid manner in which the assault was carried out. The leadership of the Officers and N.C.Os and the gallantry of all ranks in the assaulting Coys was worthy of the highest praise.
Unfortunately both Company Commanders of these Coys were hit, Captain W. BUNTING, M.C. being killed and Captain F.J. MORGAN, D.S.O. being severely wounded.

At 9.30 a.m. the Brigade Commander went forward to see C.Os, returning at 12.30 p.m.
At 10.15 a.m. orders were issued for the 10th Essex R., 8th Norf. R. and 6th R. Berks R. to attack at 4.25 a.m. on the 12th and capture the line:- J.14.c.10.05. – J.14,c.45. – J.14.c.67. – J.14.c.86. –J.14.b.0.1. – J.14.b.2.3.- J.14.b.28. – J.8.c.62.
At 1.25 p.m. message timed 12.15 p.m. from 8th Norf. R., stated S.P. J.14.a.3.3. re-captured at 6 a.m. Bn has 3 Coys in line from J.13.d.8.9. to J.14.a.45.55. 1 Coy about SURBITON VILLAS.
Divisional Commander visited Brigade H.Q. about 1.30 p.m. and left about 3.30 p.m.
1.30 p.m. 8th Suff. R. ordered to attack to-morrow morning instead of 8th Norf. R. who had lost heavily especially in Officers.
At 8.15 p.m. report timed 7.30 p.m. received from 8th Norf. R. stated that enemy counter-attack failed but that our artillery were slow in responding to S.O.S. Signals.
DORMY HOUSE and RITZ ST. Area heavily shelled from about 4 p.m. till about 7 p.m.
At 11.30 p.m. Gas Cylinders were discharged by us into the CHATEAU HERENTHAGE Area.
Heavy thundershowers during the early part of the night.

Aug 12th. 4. At 4.25 a.m. our barrage opened. It was a perfect morning and the light just right.
About 4.45 a.m. Lieut. Col. CLARKE Artillery Liaison Officer, reported he had just received a message from his F.O.O. stating “CIVIC Order No 93 cancelled”. Nothing was known about this at Brigade H.Q. and no such order had been issued by Brigade.
At 5.45 a.m. a message from 8th Suff R. timed 4.45 a.m. was received stating that assaulting Coys had lost their way and had failed to form up, and attack had therefore been cancelled. A Visual message to this effect had been despatched at 3.25 a.m. but had not reached Brigade.
The following is briefly the narrative of the movements of the two assaulting Coys of the 8th Suff R. who failed to reach the position of assembly.
Early in the afternoon of the 11th Aug Coy Commanders and guides from these Coys proceeded forward to reconnoitre.
The Coys were to have moved up at 5 p.m.
As the enemy shelled the RITZ ST Area heavily all the afternoon, Col HILL decided to move the Coys up later in order to avoid casualties. About 7 p.m. as these Coys were starting off, an enemy aeroplane came over flying low over SANCTUARY WOOD, and seeing some artillery horses in the Wood, dropped lights whereupon the enemy opened a heavy barrage on the Valley. In order to avoid this, the Coys moved towards HOOGE instead of going through the Wood. It was dark by the time they reached the YPRES- MENIN Road and they lost their way and failed to meet the guides who were waiting to take them up to the position of assembly.
The road is unrecognisable as a road at the point where they struck it, and they got into CHATEAU WOOD. It was not until daylight that they were able to find out their position.

5. At 6.50 a.m. Division asked whether it would be possible to carry out the attack in the afternoon. Brigade Commander replied “No” as it would not be possible to form up unobserved, but that Brigade were prepared to carry it out on the morning of the 13th , although the troops would be very tired by them.
At 11 a.m. Brigade ordered 8th Suff R. to relieve 8th Norf R. in the line on the night 12/13th .
At 12 noon Division ordered 7th Bedford R. to be placed under orders of 53rd Inf Bde and 7th R.W. Kents to be withdrawn.
At 1.5 p.m. Division ordered the attack proposed for morning of 13th to be cancelled.
At 1.15 p.m. orders received that 169th Inf Bde were to take over 53rd Inf Bde front between SURBITON VILLAS – BLACK WATCH CORNER Road (inclusive) and the Road running from HOOGE CHATEAU, along the Northern edge of GLENCOURSE WOOD (exclusive), held by 8th Norf R. and 6th R. Berks R. on night 12/13th.
During the night 12/13th , 2 Coys 7th Bedford R. relieved 2 Coys 7th R.W. Kent R. in CRAB CRAWL. H.Q. and 2 Coys 7th Bedford R. moved up to RAILWAY DUGOUTS.

Aug 13th. About 7 p.m. 12th , Major NOSWORTHY, 11nd Corps, came into Brigade H.Q. and informed the Brigade Commander that the Brigade would be required to attack on the 16th: the latter pointed out that the Brigade was not fresh enough to carry out an attack of this nature and make a really good job of it without some rest.
9th and 16th Bns London R. relieved 8th Norf R. and 6th R. Berks R. in the line during the night: relief completed by 6 a.m. 13th Aug.
Aug 13th. The Brigade Commander went up to reconnoitre the line.
S.P. J.14.a.3.3. was wired by the 79th Field Coy R.E. during the night.
Information from Division stated that Brigade would probably not be required to attack but only to hold the line.
At 10 a.m. the Brigade came under orders of 56th Division.
At 12 noon the Divisional Commander 56th Division, held a Conference at HALFWAY HOUSE, at which the operations ordered for the 16th were discussed. The Brigade Commander pointed out that 53rd Inf Bde were not fresh and that Battalions were not fit to carry out the attack except on a small scale. It was decided that the 7th Bedford R. should carry out the attack on the enemy S.P. at the N.W. corner of INVERNESS COPSE, and that the 8th Norf R. should attack S. of GLENCOURSE WOOD, and form a line of S.Ps from the N.W. corner of INVERNESS COPSE to J.15.a.1.2.
Brigade Commander saw O.C. 8th Norf. R. in the afternoon, and the latter informed him that owing to the heavy losses sustained by the Bn in Officers and N.C.Os he did not feel that his Bn would be fit to carry out the operation.

Aug 14th 7. During the night 13th/14th DORMY HOUSE and vicinity was heavily shelled: gas shells were also sent over and between 1.30 a.m. and 5 a.m. it was impossible to do any work in the Brigade H.Q. dug-out. 8th Norf. R. had 7 casualties amongst Officers during the night, a gas shell having penetrated and burst in a dugout occupied by these Officers.
B.G.G.S. IInd Corps visited Brigade Commander and the latter gave his opinion that the Bns of the 53rd Inf Bde were not fresh enough to carry out an attack.
The Brigade Commander attended a Conference held by Divisional Commander 56th Division at 10 a.m. at HALFWAY HOUSE.
Brigade Commander reported state of 8th Norf. R. and that he did not know how fit the 12th Middlesex R. (54th Inf Bde) was, but that this latter Battalion was very tired when it went out of the line.
It was then decided to place the 1/4th London R. under orders of the 53rd Inf Bde as well as the 12th Middlesex R.
The O.C. 1/4th London R. (Lt. Col. Campbell) was wounded on his way up in the afternoon to see Brigade Commander.
7th Bedford R. relieved 10th Essex R. in the Right Subsector, and 6th R. Berks R. relieved 8th Suff R. in the Left Subsector.
4.5” Hows bombarded N.W. corner of INVERNESS COPSE. About 15 Huns bolted from the concrete emplacement, but the emplacement itself was not destroyed.

Disposition of 53rd Inf Bde 12 mn 14th /15th Aug.

Right subsector ) 7th Bedford R.
J.19.d.9.9. to J.14.a.3.2. )

Left Subsector. ) 6th R. Berks R.
J.14.a.3.2. to J.13.d.9.8. )

8th Suff R. RAILWAY DUGOUTS.

10th Essex R. CRAB CRAWL.
8th Norf. R. CRAB CRAWL.
12th Middlesex R. RAILWAY DUGOUTS.
1/4th London R. CHATEAU SEGARD.

Aug 15th. 8. At 3 a.m. gas was discharged from projectors into INVERNESS COPSE.
Orders for the attack to-morrow were issued at 4.30 a.m.
At 6 a.m. 56th Division was asked to arrange for the destruction of the concrete emplacement in INVERNESS COPSE by H.A. Shoot arranged from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. This shoot did not take place.
Brigade Commander saw Officers Commanding 12th Middlesex R. and 1/4th London R., and explained the plan of operations.
1/4th London R. moved from RAILWAY DUGOUTS to Assembly Position.

Aug 16th. 9. Position of Bde at Zero Hour is as shown in para: 3 53rd Inf Bde Warning Order dated 14.8.17 (B.O. 223).

There was intense artillery activity N. of YPRES at 4.15 a.m. Our guns in the DORMY HOUSE Area were also active.
At 4.45 a.m. our barrage opened: the conditions and light were favourable.
At 6.2 a.m. 7th Bedford R. report (timed 5.40 a.m.) that their attack on the N.W. corner of INVERNESS COPSE had failed.
The assaulting Coy formed up N. and S. of JASPER LANE with its centre about J.14.c.25.55. Our shrapnel barrage is reported to have been good, but that immediately the Coy commenced to advance to close up to the shrapnel barrage, our 4.5” Hows opened short and inflicted so many casualties that the attack was broken up. The Officers of the Coy who were not casualties are positive that the shells which did the damage were not 18-pdr shells, and they state that the shells came from directly in rear of them. As the target allotted to the 4.5” Hows was at its most Western point at least 200 yards from the objective of this Coy, it seems almost impossible that it was caught in our barrage. I am inclined to think the shells were enemy 4.2” How fired from the ZANDVOORDE Group. The result however was the failure of the attack.
At 6.7 a.m. report from 1/4th London R. timed 5.30 a.m. stated that no reports from assaulting Coys had been received, but that wounded report S.P. 4 (J.14.c.65.85) was in our possession. Enemy barrage not heavy. A later message timed 5.35 a.m. (received 6.16 a.m.) stated that S.P. 4 was occupied by us and that the Bn had sustained rather heavy casualties leaving assembly area.
At 6.20 a.m. 7th Bedford R. were ordered to organise a fresh attack on the N.W. corner of INVERNESS COPSE.
The O.C. 7th Bedford R. had done so before he received the Bde Order, and reported at 6 a.m. (Received 8.3 a.m.) that the 2nd attack had failed and that he was too weak to carry out a further attempt.
At 7.50 a.m. a message timed 6.30 a.m. from 1/4th London R. stated that the Bn had gained the Brigade 2nd Objective (from J.14.d.9.2. to J.14.a.95.35.) and were in touch with 1/9th London R.
At 6.40 a.m. the Reserve Coy 12th Middlesex R. was moved forward from CRAB CRAWL to JACKDAW RESERVE.
At 7.50 a.m. 56th Division reported attack of 1/4th London R. appears to have failed. A message was therefore sent at 7.55 a.m. to 1/4th London R. ordering it to reorganise and send 1 Coy (or 2 if Companies were weak) round through GLENCOURSE WOOD to about S.P.s 10 and 11, and to attack S.P.s 5 and 6 by moving South from the Wood.
12th Middlesex were ordered to move 1 Coy to TUNNEL at CLAPHAM JUNCTION and 1 Coy to JACKDAW RESERVE.
At 8.35 a.m. 6th R. Berks R. were ordered to be prepared to support 7th Bedford R. with 2 Coys if required, as the latter Battalion was very weak.
At 9 a.m., a message from 1/4th London R. timed 8 a.m. stated “1 Officer and about 35 O.R. holding first Objective. Post 4 held by 15 men. 2nd Objective is roughly held and Post 5.”
At 9.5 a.m. however, Captain J.D. CROSTHWAITE, Brigade Major, reported from personal reconnaissance that the 1/4th London R. did not hold either the 1st or 2nd Objectives as reported by them, but that the assault had failed and they were crowded in JAP AVENUE and about J.14.a.3.2. That he had ordered them to reorganise and to push patrols out through GLENCOURSE WOOD to ascertain whether any of our troops were still on the line of JARGON TR. (J.14.d.2.9. to J.14.a.9.4.)
At 9 a.m. the situation on the Brigade front was as follows:-
7th Bedford R. and 6th R. Berks R. holding our original front line.
1/4th London R. in JAP AVENUE and about J.14.a.3.2.
12th Middlesex R:-1 Coy attached to 1/4th London R. 1 Coy CLAPHAM JUNCTION TUNNEL. 1 Coy about JACKDAW RESERVE. 1 Coy about JAM SUPPORT.
8th Norf. R. 2 Coys CRAB CRAWL. 2 Coys RAILWAY DUGOUTS.

At 9.25 a.m. 1/4th London R. was ordered to consolidate and hold the line gained, and to endeavour to gain S.P. 6 (J.14.d.3.9.) and to re-inforce S.P.s 4 and 5 if they were held by us.

At 9.45 a.m. Brigade Major again reported definitely that S.P.s 4 and 5 were not held by the 1/4th London R.
It was then evident that no further attack would have any chance of success unless carried out by a fresh Battalion. Orders were therefore issued at 10.15 a.m. for the 1/4th London R. to re-organise and reform about CLAPHAM JUNCTION, and for the 12th Middlesex R. to cover the re-organisation and relieve the 1/4th London R.
Reconnaissances made during the morning, ascertained that the N.W. corner of INVERNESS COPSE and S.P. 4 (J.14.c.6.8.) were strongly held by enemy with machine guns.
At 4.25 p.m. the following order was issued:-
1. “53rd Inf Bde will make no further attack to-day.
2. The ground gained will be consolidated, and 1/4th London R. before handing over the line, will endeavour to push down JARGON DRIVE and make good point J.14.a.6.1.
They will get touch with 169th Inf Bde who are establishing a Post at J.14.a.6.2.
They will then by means of small shell hole posts, join up JAP AVENUE with JASPER LANE to the South at J.14.c.2.6. and JARGON DRIVE at J.14.a.5.1. to the North.
3. 79th Field Coy. R.E. will construct “T” heads to the Saps in JAP AVENUE and JARGON DRIVE and wire them to-night, 12th Middlesex R. will provide covering party”.
During the day the 1/4th London R. was re-organised and partly relieved by the 12th Middlesex R. The relief of the advanced troops could not be carried till after dark: it was however, completed by 10.50 p.m., and the 1/4th London R. withdrew to CRAB CRAWL.
12th Middlesex R. also relieved 6th R. Berks. R. at 11.5 p.m.
At 8.55 p.m. 169th Inf Bde on the Left, reported they had lost Posts at J.14.a.9.3. and J.14.b.1.4. and were back in their original line.
The Brigade Major went forward again at 9 p.m. and remained in the advanced trenches all night assisting in the task of re-organising the line.
The Brigade Commander went forward as soon as it was light on the 17th. He ordered O.C. 12th Middlesex R. to thin out the troops in JAP AVENUE, to push a Post down JARGON DRIVE, and establish a line across between JAP AVENUE and JARGON DRIVE by means of posts in shell holes.

The enemy were fairly quiet during the 17th: there was the usual artillery activity on our back areas.

On the night 17th/18th Aug the Bde was relieved by the 41st Inf Bde and at 7.30 a.m. 18th Aug G.O.C. 41st Inf Bde assumed command of the line.

Brigadier General
Commanding 53rd Infantry Brigade.
Aug 26th 1917.

Part of a document of which pages 1 & 2 are missing page 3 commences:-

“is recovering from the first effects of the attack.
(iv) Owing to the lack of training which junior members of the Staff now have, it is necessary that all reconnoitring officers should be given a list of questions which the Brigadier wishes answered, in order that important points may not be overlooked through ignorance.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS. 7. The following points were noticed with regard to Signal Communications. More technical details have been sent by my Signal Officer direct to your A.D.A.S.
(i) More use might have been made of wires laid back to Brigade Forward Station by Battalions; whenever this was done, the result was satisfactory.
(ii) All concerned should be warned that if a pigeoneer becomes a casualty, his birds should be immediately released by his comrades if the basket in which they are found has evidently been abandoned and no facilities for transport are available. Although the expenditure of birds is justified, even when a very small proportion deliver their messages, it must be remembered that casualties amongst the birds entail the curtailment of a further supply until new birds have been trained.
(iii) Wireless and power buzzers are best used for supplementing other means of communication, when these have broken down; no attempt should be made to rely on these two methods.
(iv) The amplifiers are useless unless moderately good accommodation is obtainable; i.e., they should not be taken in advance of Brigade Forward Station. If any part of their equipment miscarries, they are out of action.
(v) (a). Arrangements for visual signalling had been made between the leading infantry and selected points in rear, whence information could be carried back to Brigade and Divisional Headquarters.
(b). During the actual battle, the smoke caused by our own and the enemy’s bombardment, prevented visual signalling being extensively used. During the afternoon of the 16th, however, it should have been possible to use this form of signalling to a considerable extent, and thus save the lives of runners, and also time. It was not, however, sufficiently made use of, except by one or two F.O.O’s., R.A.
(c). It has been suggested that visual signallers be separated from the rest of the signalling personnel. If they have other work to do, and only attempt visual when the normal means have failed, the results are not likely to be good.

ANTI-GAS MEASURES. 8.
(i). A considerable increase of gas shelling by the enemy was noticed, both of the ordinary poisonous variety, and of the mustard oil type. A feature of the latter is its persistency.
(ii). The necessity for continual practice in adjusting Box Respirators with the greatest possible speed has been still further emphasised.

STOKES MORTARS. 9. No valuable lessons as regards the employment of trench
mortars were learnt during operations, beyond the fact that it is better to have few guns and a large amount of ammunition, than many guns and a limited supply of ammunition.

RIFLE GRENADES. 10. A small proportion of No. 24, (Improved) Hales, failed to
explode. It has been suggested that the material used in the construction of the tubes through which the brass striker drops is at fault, and that it becomes soft and sticky, this holding up the striker.

Major General,
Commanding 20th Division.
25th August, 1917.