Category Archives: World War I

XV Corps Instructions 12 June 1916

XV Corps Instructions 12 June 1916
15/CA 10/23

SECRET
Copy No 7

INSTRUCTIONS FOR A PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT BY THE XVth CORPS.
———————————————-

1. The preliminary bombardment will be carried out on “U”, “V”, “W” “X” & “Y” days. Wire will be cut during all 5 days.
On “V”, “W”, “X” & “Y” days and during the nights “U”/”V” to “Y”/”Z” inclusive a continuous bombardment will be carried out.
On “V” & “W” days there will be one, and on “X” & “Y” days two concentrated bombardments.
Gas will be discharged on the first night that the wind is favourable, and smoke on the morning of “X” day if the direction of the wind permits.
240 mm Trench Mortars may be used as required from “V” day onwards.
2” Trench Mortars for wire-cutting on “U” day and as required afterwards.
3” Stokes Mortars as required on “V” day and onwards.
Amended

2. A. The principal tasks to be carried out are:-
Heavy and Siege Artillery.
1. Destruction of enemy’s front systems of defences.
2. Destruction of trenches and strong points further back.
3. Distant wire cutting.
4. Bombardment of villages, woods, railways and stations.
5. Interrupting communications which are beyond the reach of Field Artillery by night.
6. Bombarding distant billets by day and night.
7. Counter-battery work. This to include the destruction of distant O.P’s.
8. Preventing enemy repairing damage.
9. Dealing with balloons.
10. Destruction of water pipe lines.

B. Divisional Artilleries.
(i)18 pr Batteries
1. Wire-cutting.
2. Searching trenches, villages, woods, O.P’s and hollows by day and night.
3. Destruction of machine gun emplacements, O.P’s and dugouts within the power of the gun.
4. Interruption of communications especially by night.
5. Preventing enemy repairing damage.
(ii) 4.5” Howitzer Batteries:-
1. Assisting in destruction of fire trenches.
2. Destruction of all communication trenches.
3. Assisting in bombardment of villages and woods.
4. Complete destruction of machine gun emplacements, O.P’s and dug-outs not entirely destroyed by the Siege and Heavy Artillery.
5. Interruption of communications especially by night.
6. Preventing enemy repairing damage.

C. Trench Mortars (under Divisional G.O’s C. R.A.)
(i) Heavy and Medium:-
1. Destruction of enemy’s defences and bombardment of villages within range.
(ii) Medium:-
1. Wire cutting
2. Preventing enemy repairing work by night.
3. Night firing on front system.

3. A list of important points will be issued later, (Appendix 1), and each Battery Commander is to be given a list of those which are in the areas he is to bombard. In bombarding villages and woods particular attention should be paid to the defences on the outskirts but strong points road junctions communications and likely billets inside the area should also be dealt with. Woods and hollows where there are no known defences should have a few rounds fired into them at intervals during the day.

4. The two Divisions in the line and the Heavy Artillery will have the following extra batteries allotted to them for the bombardment:-
7th Division – 2 Brigades ) 24 guns – 18 prs.
) 4 howitzers – 4.5”
2” T.M. )
3 batteries) 12 guns.
240 mm Mortars)
1 battery ) 4 guns.
21st Division – 2 Brigades less ) 24 guns – 18 prs.
1 Howitzer Battery ) 4 howitzers – 4.5”
2”T.M. – 2 Batteries – 8 guns.
Heavy Artillery – 1 Battery – 4 Howitzers – 4.5”

5. G.O’s C.R.A. of Divisions will allot the tasks for their own batteries. In addition they will arrange (a), for the necessary guns to join in the concentrated bombardments ordered (b) to carry out the special tasks allotted to the 4.5” howitzers on tracings A B C and D, (c) for the gas and smoke discharges to be accompanied by a heavy shrapnel barrage on the front line trenches, searching communication trenches, and heavy bombardment of reserve billets and communications.

6. The tasks for Heavy Artillery are shewn on attached tracings.
They consist of:-
Bombardment “V” & “X” days – Tracing A.
“ “W” & “Y” days – “ B.
Concentrated bombardment “V” & “W” days)
“ “ mornings of ) Tracing C
“X” &”Y” days)
Concentrated bombardment afternoons )
“X” &”Y” days) Tracing D.
Cancelled
The whole of the fire trenches are to be thoroughly bombarded and special attention paid to places from which flanking fire can be brought to bear, machine gun emplacements, O.P’s and trench junctions.
Heavy howitzers must cease firing for a certain period on W.X and Y days to permit of photography, verification of fire and examination of equipment.
The times will be fixed later but they will not be prior to the morning concentrated bombardments.
In addition to the above tasks the G.O.C., H.A. will arrange:-
(a) to bring a heavy fire from all available guns and howitzers twice by day and once by night, and to fire a few rounds at irregular intervals on LONGUEVAL and BAZENTIN-LE-GRAND. He will also arrange to fire a few rounds on FLEURS.
(b) to bombard the railways between –
(i) TRONES WOOD and GUILLEMONT STATION;
(ii) FRICOURT and MARTINPUICH.
(c) to carry on Counter-battery work very actively beginning on “U” day.
Special batteries will be told off for this work, and if necessary heavy howitzers.
(d) to bombard heavily distant billets, villages and communications during the discharge of gas and smoke.

7. Night Firing.
For night firing areas will be allotted as follows:-
Right Division.

BLACK HEDGE(inclusive)
Valley S.25.b.59
X.29.b.04.96.
X.29. central
X.29.c.52
WILLOW AVENUE (exclusive) to Front Line.

Left Division.
WILLOW AVENUE (inclusive) from Front Line to X.29.c.52
N.E. corner of BOTTOM WOOD
Road junction X.22.a.04.
Thence to Front Line.
Heavy Artillery.
Beyond the Divisional areas.
G.O’s C.R.A. of Divisions and G.O.C. Heavy Artillery will allot the tasks for night firing.
They must endeavour –
1. to interrupt all communications by road, rail or trench.
2. to prevent any movement in enemy’s trenches or repair of defences.
3. to give the enemy no rest in trenches or billets. For this purpose the villages must be fired on at intervals with howitzers as well as field guns.

Medium Trench Mortars can be used for the above purposes, but Heavy Trench Mortars only if well concealed.
Care should be taken to allot the tasks so that the detachments get as much rest as possible.

8. Ammunition.
G.O’s C.R.A. of Divisions and G.O.C. Heavy Artillery will allot the amount of ammunition they consider necessary for each task.

9. Times.
The hours for carrying out the different tasks are shewn in Appendix II.

10. G.O’s C.R.A. of Divisions and G.O.C. Heavy Artillery will send in their schemes to Corps Artillery for approval by 10 a.m. 17th Instant noon 15th Instant.

E.W. Alexander
Brigadier General R.A., XV Corps.
Copy No 1 to XV Corps
“ “ 2 to XV Corps Heavy Artillery
“ “ 3 & 4 to 7th Divn.
“ “ 5 & 6 to 17th Divn.
“ “ 7 & 8 to 21st Divn.
“ “ 9 to 4th Army Artillery.
“ “ 10 to file.
“ “ 11 & 12 spare.

June 12th 1916

XV Corps Instruction 11 June 1916

XV Corps Instruction 11 June 1916

PLEASE INITIAL AND PASS QUICKLY.
For information.

Divl. Comdr.
G.S.O. (1)
G.S.O. (2)
G.S.O. (3)
Div. Art.
Div. Eng.
Sigs.
A.A. & Q.M.G.
D.A.A. & Q.M.G.
D.A.Q.M.G.
A.D.C.
C. Comdt.
A.D.M.S.
D.A.D.M.S.
A.D.V.S.
A.P.M.
D.A.D.O.S.
G.S.O.
[No. 4284
[Hour 9 am
[Date 12/6/16
[Initials N.F.
Connected papers.
File

SECRET

133 G.
21st Division

Reference your G.76 dated 9/6/16.
A wireless station of the R.F.C., which is at present in use with one of your Artillery Groups, will be withdrawn when registration is finished and allotted to your Divisional Artillery.
This set will be erected at your Advanced H.Q. and will receive all wireless messages addressed to your Headquarters.
It will also be able to intercept all other wireless messages addressed to Corps H.Q., provided there is no “jamming” at the time.

J.R. Wethered Maj
G.S.
for Brigadier General,
General Staff.
H.Q. XV Corps,
11/6/16

56 Division Narrative of Operations 22 May 1917

56 Division Narrative of Operations 22 May 1917

SECRET.
56th Divn. G.3/355.
56th DIVISION
Narrative of operations from 28th April
to 21st May 1917.
————————————————
MOVES.
27th April. On 27th April 167th Infantry Brigade relieved the Reserve Brigade of 15th Division,
On the night 28th/29th it relieved the two leading Brigades of the 15th Division, 169th Infantry Brigade taking its place in Support, while 168th Infantry Brigade had moved into ARRAS in Reserve during the day.
29th April. The command of the line was taken over by 56th Division at 10 a.m. on 29th and on the same night, 169th Infantry Brigade took over from 167th Infantry Brigade the right section of the line, the dividing line being the ARRAS – CAMBRAI Road.
30th April. 56th Division Order No. 88 was issued on the 30th for the attack on 3rd May.
2nd May. On the evening of the 2nd May 168th Infantry Brigade was moved up out of ARRAS, two battalions being in or about THE HARP and two in the old German line East of ARRAS. The 169th and 167th Infantry Brigades also concentrated that night for the attack on the next morning, their final dispositions being:-
On the right – – 169th Infantry Brigade.
Right front Battalion – 5th London Regiment.
Left “ “ – 2nd “ “
Support “ – 9th “ “
Reserve “ – 16th “ “

On the left – – 167th Infantry Brigade.
Right front Battalion – 1st London Regiment.
Left “ “ – 7th Middlesex Regt.
Support “ – 3rd London Regiment.
Reserve “ – 8th Middlesex Regt.
A sketch map is attached showing the assembly areas, dividing lines between Brigades and the objectives. [Map not attached]

OPERATIONS OF 3rd MAY.
3rd May. Zero hour was 3.45 a.m., it being then dark, and no reports were received for a considerable time.
169th Infantry Brigade.
At 6.15 a.m. a F.O.O. reported that our men could be seen digging in front of ST. ROHART FACTORY and that 14th Division on the right appeared to have reached its objective.
At 7 a.m. the Brigade reported that the 2nd London Regiment had two platoons and four Machine Guns in the trench S.E. of CAVALRY FARM, but that the enemy appeared to be holding TOOL Trench.
The 2nd London Regiment was also holding a portion of LANYARD Trench, and more of the same Battalion, together with 5th London Regiment were in Trench N.15.a.0.5. to the CAMBRAI Road. The 5th London Regiment was also holding a Trench close to the PIT near ST. ROHART FACTORY.
No further news was received until 10.45 a.m. when 169th Infantry Brigade reported that bombers of the 9th London Regiment had rushed CAVALRY FARM after a bombardment by Stokes Mortars – they had bombed the dug-outs and taken 22 prisoners, and were proceeding to bomb up TOOL Trench, to aid in which 4.5” Howitzers were turned on to the trench in front of them.
At 10.50 a.m. 3rd Division asked for our guns to lift off TOOL Trench as they had troops in it who were going to bomb Southwards and at 11.35 a.m. they reported that they held that trench at the Northern end to East of the COPSE in 0.8 Central.
At 3.50 p.m., however, it was confirmed that the enemy was holding the whole of TOOL Trench, and that the 3rd Division was in touch with 7th Middlesex Regiment in our original line. Meanwhile at 11.50 a.m. the 14th Division on our right reported that both their attacking Brigades were being heavily counter-attacked and had been driven back, and at 12.30 p.m. it reported that it was in its original line. About the same time 169th Infantry Brigade reported that it had no troops North of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road, but that it still held the trench immediately West of the PIT in 0.15.c.
The situation, therefore, was that while the troops on the right and left were back on their original line, 169th Brigade held a narrow wedge of ground at the bottom of a valley and projecting about 1,000 yards forward, and very open to attack from the high ground on either flank. This wedge, however, was occupied until after dark when the enemy bombarded the whole front very heavily, and at 11.15 p.m. it was reported that the 2nd and 5th London Regiments had been driven in.
The General Officer Commanding 169th Infantry Brigade was, therefore, ordered to hold our original front line and to re-organise, and he issued the necessary orders to carry this out. Before these orders reached the 2nd and 5th London Regiments, however, they had organised a fresh advance and pushed out and re-occupied all the ground they had won during the day except CAVALRY FARM, where the Germans appeared to be holding the line of the CAMBRAI Road as a T-head to the South end of TOOL Trench.
This prevented all communication with the troops who were forward, except along the bottom of the valley, and the troops were therefore withdrawn an hour before sunrise, in accordance with the previous orders. During this period an officer and 15 Germans came out and surrendered in the neighbourhood of CAVALRY FARM.
167th Infantry Brigade.
At 5.54 a.m. it was reported that the 7th Middlesex Regiment had met with heavy Machine Gun and Rifle fire and failed to reach TOOL Trench.
At 6.40 a.m. a wounded officer of the 1st London Regiment reported that his Battalion had made two attacks but was each time driven back by Machine Gun fire, and that it was back in its original trenches.
The 168th Infantry Brigade was ordered at 7.10 a.m. to move two Battalions up to the WANCOURT LINE and two Battalions to THE HARP in view of the uncertainty as to the situation on the front of the 167th Infantry Brigade and the fact that the casualties were reported to be heavy.
At 8.55 a.m. it was reported that the Reserve Bn. (8th Middlesex Regiment) was prevented from moving up by a heavy hostile barrage.
During the morning it was reported that numbers of Germans could be seen reinforcing TOOL Trench along STIRRUP LANE, and these were dealt with by field and heavy artillery.
At one time (10.25 a.m.) it was thought that the enemy was retiring from the BOIS DU VERT as a large number were seen moving S.E. from there, and with a view to taking advantage of any opportunity, the Reserve Battalion was kept in readiness; but there was no sign of any weakening of the enemy on our immediate front. There was no further incident of note on the front of this Brigade – it was pinned to its original ground by M.G. and Artillery fire and had many of its troops lying out in shell holes about 80 yards from TOOL TRENCH.
Some small parties did undoubtedly pass over TOOL Trench and reached LANYARD Trench, but they were completely cut off and were never able to gain touch with the 169th Infantry Brigade on the right.
General Notes.
(a) There is an unanimous opinion that Zero hour was too early.

In the dark, signals to advance cannot be seen, nor can whistle signals be heard owing to the bombardment. Consequently Officers could only pass the order to advance down the extended line, and, as each man advanced as he received the order, the waves became zig-zag in shape with the officers at the forward points.

(b) In one instance a tape was laid out in front of our front line. This was found a great help in correcting the alignment and in assisting the direction, there being no landmarks visible.

(c) The barrage was very good, but the pace (100 yards in 3 minutes) too slow considering the dry state of the ground.

There is a natural inclination among assaulting troops to reach their objective as quickly as possible, and so the rear waves push on while the leading wave is kept back by the barrage. This tends to dangerous thickening of the line and to premature mixing of units.

For the first part of the advance, at any rate, a pace of 100 yards in 2 minutes would be better on dry soil: the barrage could lessen its rate of advance later as the Infantry get less fresh.

(d) Mopping up is still of great importance. CAVALRY FARM was not properly mopped up, two separate parties of prisoners being captured in the vicinity long after the leading wave had passed beyond it.

It is thought that TOOL Trench also had Machine Guns in it which came up after the leading wave passed, but there is little doubt that the bombardment had made the trench unrecognisable as such, and the darkness was against proper “Mopping Up”.
(e) A good many Germans were found killed by the bombardment and many more were disposed off by the bayonet and rifle fire by 169th Infantry Brigade, of which all ranks were satisfied that they had inflicted heavier losses than that had themselves sustained.

(f) The PIT contained several M.G.s and at least one Light Trench Mortar. Two M.G.s were found blown up by 4.5” Howitzers which had made excellent practice here.

(g) No hostile M.G.s or Infantry were met with along the COJEUL RIVER, along which a flanking platoon had been sent especially to deal with such a situation.

(h) S.E. of CAVALRY FARM the CAMBRAI Road is embanked 7 ft or 8 ft, but it is swept by fire from the direction of ST. ROHART FACTORY, and troops who formed a defensive flank along it suffered severely from enfilade fire.
(i) The enemy was found to be occupying shell-holes in front of his trenches as well as the trenches themselves.
4th – 10th May.
During this period 168th Infantry Brigade took over the line from 167th and 169th Infantry Brigades, the relief being complete on the morning of 5th May.
One Battalion of 167th Infantry Brigade and one from 169th Infantry Brigade remained attached to 168th Infantry Brigade.
The Divisional front was re-adjusted in accordance with orders from VI Corps, the 168th Infantry Brigade taking over from 3rd Division additional frontage as far North as 0.8.a.8.8.; this was completed by 5 a.m. 7th May.
Our patrols endeavoured on several occasions to enter TOOL Trench, but on each occasion found it held by the enemy in some strength.
Much work was done in deepening trenches, improving and constructing communication trenches and wiring.
On 9th May, 56th Division Order No. 92 was issued for an attack to be made on TOOL Trench on the evening of 11th inst.
During the whole of this period the German Artillery was active.
11th May. Operations of 11th May.
The attack by 168th Infantry Brigade on TOOL Trench was carried out at 8.30 p.m.
For two days previously, the trench was systematically kept under steady enfilade fire from 4.5” howitzers in N.23 which had been specially placed there for that purpose.
A steady destructive fire was kept up and great precautions were taken to prevent the enemy suspecting that an attack was intended.
A practice barrage of 18 prs on TOOL Trench on the evening of the 10th drew a heavy hostile barrage rather quickly, and it was, therefore, decided that the steady bombardment of the objective should continue up to the last possible moment, and that there should be nothing in the nature of a barrage opening at Zero hour.
The attack was carried out by the 4th London Regt on the right, and by the 14th London Regt (London Scottish) on the left, the dividing line being an E. and W. line between Squares 0.8 and 0.14.
The exact objectives were:-
(1). Trench S.E. of CAVALRY FARM, O.14.a.7.1. to O.14.a.9.3.
(2) CAVALRY FARM.
(3) TOOL Trench from the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road O.14.a.6.5. to about O.8.b.2.2.
Except for CAVALRY FARM, the objectives were practically out of sight behind a spur which ran between the two lines.
The assault was a complete surprise to the enemy.
On the right the 4th London Regt had very little opposition and it appeared that this part of the objective was not held in any strength.
On the left there were some casualties in the Left Company of the London Scottish from machine gun fire from a N.E. direction, but the actual occupants of the trench made little resistance.
Six machine guns were captured (one of these by a gun team of 168th M G. Coy, which at once turned the gun on the enemy).
A party of about 50 Germans broke and fled, but were caught by Lewis gun, machine gun and rifle fire in the open, and practically annihilated.
A considerable number of German dead were found in the trench, and 11 unwounded prisoners taken.
As soon as the trench was captured a block was formed at the North end by filling it in for about 40 yards, and the position was consolidated, while the portion of the trench north of the objective was kept under steady fire by artillery and Stokes Mortars, and a slow sweeping barrage placed in front to prevent counter-attack, either by bombing from the north or over the open ground from the east.
The trench was also thinned out by withdrawing to our original line after dark troops in excess of the numbers required for the garrison.
The principal lessons of this small operation appear to be:-
(a) The efficacy and demoralising effect of a steady observed enfilade bombardment by howitzers.
(b) The advantage to be gained by frequently altering the hour of an attack, the enemy having become accustomed to attacks at dawn.
(c) The advisability of occasionally doing without an 18 pr creeping barrage opening at Zero. In this case the enemy barrage came down on our front line some 3 or 4 minutes after our assaulting troops had left it. Although 6 m.g.s were captured in the trench, some were taken unmounted and none were used effectively.
(d) The limiting of one’s objective when the enemy is plentifully supplied with artillery.
12th -17th May.
During the nights 11th-12th May, three communication trenches were dug connecting our old front line with TOOL Trench and the latter was strengthened.
167th Inf. Brigade (with 1 Bn. 169th Inf Bde attached) relieved 168th Inf. Brigade (with 1 Bn each of 167th and 169th Inf Brigades attached) between the nights 12th-13th and 14th-15th May.
Considerable work was carried out repairing and deepening trenches, and active patrolling was carried out.

18th May
At 9.20 p.m. 18th May, 167th Inf Brigade carried out a bombing attack on the northern portion of TOOL Trench with a view to capturing it as far north as O.8.b.55.50.
This attack was carried out by 8th Middlesex Rgt., who attempted a surprise attack. They started by successfully passing the block (where the trench had been filled in for 40 yards at the northernmost point previously captured), and made good another 30 yards; but they came up against very strong opposition and were unable to progress, and having fought for an hour and suffered some 10 to 15 casualties, they withdrew, bombers covering the party while the wounded were removed.
As the element of surprise had gone, no further attempt was made.
As a reconnaissance on the night 17th/18th showed that the trench appeared to be only held by about 6 posts of 4 men each, and as this attack came up at once against strong resistance and enemy were seen both in front of and behind TOOL Trench, it appears likely that the Germans were also contemplating a surprise attack, which was frustrated by ours.
The Officer in command of the party is satisfied that the enemy had many casualties as the trench was full of Germans and cries were heard when our rifle grenades fell among them
19th May
At 9 p.m. 19th May, an attack was carried out by 167th Infantry Brigade on:-
(1) TOOL Trench from our block about O.8.b.2.2. to its junction with HOOK Trench and LONG Trench about O.8.b.55.45.
(2) HOOK trench from junction with TOOL Trench to about O.8.b.50.95.
(3) LONG Trench from junction with TOOL Trench to O.8.b.99.95.

The 29th Division on our left was to capture the continuation of (2) and (3) on INFANTRY HILL, the BOIS DES AUBEPINES and DEVILS TRENCH. The attack was made under an 18-pdr barrage which, opening at Zero and remaining on TOOL and HOOK Trenches till Zero plus 5 minutes crept forward at the rate of 100 yards in 2 minutes till it reached a line just West of the BOIS DU VERT.

Behind the 18-pdr barrage other batteries swept ground from which Machine Gun fire was likely. The B.G.C. entrusted the carrying out of the attack to the 8th Middlesex Regiment and placed at the disposal of the Officer Commanding that Battalion two Companies of 1st London Regiment for the purpose of holding our original line in the event of the attack being successful.

Owing to the late hour and the dust from the barrage, observation of the attack was not obtained and for a long time no reports were received as there was a failure to establish visual signalling and all telephone lines in advance of Battalion H.Q. were cut.

At 1.25 a.m. Brigadier-General Commanding 167th Infantry Brigade reported that he had received a message timed 1 a.m. from O.C. 8th Middlesex Regiment that the attack had failed and that our troops were back in their own trenches. He also believed from reports received that the attack of 29th Division on our left had also failed.

From reports subsequently received our troops reached the first objective in the centre, but not on the flanks and were subjected to heavy bombing attacks. All the Officers became casualties and our men were finally forced to withdraw after sustaining casualties of about 40% of the attacking force.

At 5.30 a.m. the 29th Division confirmed this and reported that their line was then the same as before the attack.

19th – 20th May
On the 19th May, 112th and 111th Brigades of 37th Divn. Relieved 169th and 168th Infantry Brigades respectively.

On the early morning of 20th and on the night 20th/21st May 112th Brigade relieved 167th Brigade in the line, the 111th moving up to the Support Area.

The command of the line was handed over at 10 a.m. on 21st inst.

General.
During the time the Division was in the line the following casualties were sustained. –
Period Killed Wounded Missing Total
O. O.R. O. O.R. O. O.R. O. O.R.
29th April – 2nd May
3rd May
4th May -10th May
11th May – 12th May
13th May – 18th May
19th May
20th May
21st May –

9
7

5

3
1
–
– 35

115
85

41

54
3
2
6 5

18
11

4

1
1
1
– 130

683
285

136

141
36
11
6 –

10
2

–

–
1
–
– 6

192
16

14

10
15
–
– 5

37
20

9

4
3
1
– 171

990
386

191

205
54
13
12
TOTALS 25 341 41 1428 13 253 79 2022

C. Hull
Major-General,
Commanding 56th Division.
22nd May 1917

Distribution
167)
168) Bdes
169)
C.R.A.
C.R.E.
‘Q’
1 per Battalion
1/5 Cheshires

Dick-Cunyngham letter to wife dated 29 Apr 1915

Dick-Cunyngham letter to wife dated 29 Apr 1915
Thursday 29th
My own darling one,

Two dear long letters from you yesterday dated 25th, yes one has been busy but although the actual fighting has not been near us, we have come in for a good measure of bombardment of the Salient. No the little farm house has not been hit yet, nearest within about 6 yards, but bits often come back and hit the roof.

One is getting a little tired of incessant banging all day long and it seems such a sin, on such perfect days, to be sitting in trenches ‘potting’ at one another & shelling every corner where anyone may be all day and night.

At last I was able to get out last night & went with Th on a tour of inspection and I am glad to say since our last visit there has been some very good work done so now I hope we shall carry on at a greater pace, things have been slow, for we have all our reserves out digging on other lines.

One longs to be in a peaceful clime these lovely days – a nice country walk with my darlings & Fritz (how is he) just perfect peace and happiness.

Darling One I think it would be quite a good idea for you all 3 to join hands in a house. Somehow Wimbledon reminds me of the Clark family and I can never imagine you there. I think I shall have to come home and help you chose. I am glad you are going to remain with Edie & I really think Gertie would love to join you both – What a nice establishment it would be. I should appoint you financial advisor, and treasurer.

Well, day’s work must be arranged. So no more will try & write to Charlie but tell him I think it is perfectly sweet of him to have given us those things from the Old House.

My eyes are practically all right again only a little bit red – Darling only want a tin of Colegate’s Violet Talc powder, so nice after a bath in a greasy wooden tub!

Much quieter today scarcely a gun firing at the present moment.

All my love my precious one,
Ever yr devoted Hubby
Jimmie

With black edged envelope addressed to Mrs J. Dick Cunyngham, Heslington, Croft Road. Crowborough, England. Signed Dick Cunyngham. Passed by Censor No 73 cachet. Postmarked FIELD POST OFFICE 15 dated 29 AP 15. Marked On Active Service.

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 8. 28 April 1918

K.J. Bunting Capt.
Issued down to Brigades.
T.9.
NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 8.
(Issued by the General Staff)
Signal communication.
1. Trench warfare has unduly emphasised the use of telephonic communication, which cannot be extensively maintained in warfare of movement. It will very rarely be possible to provide any communication by wire in front of Infantry Brigade H.Q., and it is impossible to count upon the telephone forward of Divisional H.Q. Commanders of Infantry Brigades and units must accustom themselves to rely entirely upon other methods of communications. Greater attention must therefore be paid to the organization of such means of communication, especially visual and wireless.
2. In each divisional area, efforts should, if possible, be concentrated on one main artery of communication from front to rear, which should consist of cable, wireless, visual signalling and despatch riders, as circumstances permit. H.Q. of Divisions, and of Infantry and Artillery Brigades, should be placed in as close proximity as is practicable to this artery, on which signal offices should be established to serve several H.Q. It is for Corps to select the location of these arteries and to assist in their formation, so that Divisions may be enabled, if necessary, to move to points at which they will find both forward and rearward communication already provided.
3. It is essential that the move of H.Q. of a formation or unit should be notified as early as possible to higher, lower and adjacent formations or units. The difficulty of maintaining communication has sometimes been much increased by failure to indicate the position at which new H.Q. were to be opened, or to inform all concerned of alterations of plans in regard to movements arranged.
4. It would seem that there has sometimes been a lack of discretion in regard to the use of the signal cable wagon. Cases are reported in which all available cable was laid out while the situation was still obscure, so that the cable could not be recovered on withdrawal; and in other cases it seems that no use was made of the cable wagons, which were sent back when they might usefully have been retained.
5. In a withdrawal it is inadvisable to trust entirely to permanent overhead routes; when cut they take a long time to repair, and a cable line can be restored much more quickly.
April 28th 1918.
Printed in France by Army Printing and Stationary Services. PRESS A-4/18-6194S-3,500.

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 7. 24 April 1918

Issued down to Divisions
(for distribution down to Battalions)
T.9.
NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 7.
GERMAN ATTACK NEAR GIVENCHY, APRIL 9th, 1918.
From captured German orders and the attached map which shows the dispositions and plans of the 4th Ersatz Division, it appears that the following method of attack was adopted by the enemy:-
1. A very careful study was made of our defences in this locality. It is noteworthy that three days before the attack the enemy issued to platoon commanders detailed information gathered from air reconnaissance carried out at low elevation on that day, together with a note indicating not only the force expected to oppose the attack but also the estimated quality of the opposition anticipated. As a result of his reconnaissance, the enemy seems to have based his plan on avoiding the strong locality at Givenchy itself, penetrating our line on either flank, and turning inwards so as to take Givenchy from the right rear (south-west and south). The attacking force was divided into two portions, a northern and a southern. The northern attack was undertaken by four battalions, of which two were in front line, one in support and one in reserve. The southern attack consisted of two battalions, one being in the front line and one in support. In these attacks, the leading battalions were ordered to push straight forward, while the supporting battalion of the southern attack was to turn north and to take Givenchy in flank and rear from the south-west and south, and the supporting battalion of the northern attack was to deal similarly with Festubert from the south. This method of dealing from the flank and rear with strong points which are not attacked frontally has been conspicuous in the German operations since the 21st of March 1918.
2. Our defences consisted of defended localities each of which was held by a complete unit of not less than a platoon; other platoons especially detailed for counter-attack were kept in support. The garrisons of the defended localities had received orders to hold on at all costs – orders which were carried out in every case – and the platoons in support had been instructed to counter-attack as soon as the occasion arose without waiting for further orders. Each defended locality was prepared and wired for all round defence. Many of the communication trenches were wired, and lines of wire running perpendicularly and obliquely to the front had been erected to check any lateral advance in the event of local penetration. These obstacles proved of great assistance in preventing the enemy from extending his flanks after he has forced his way into portions of our front defences.
3. The attack was launched in a heavy mist, which greatly assisted the enemy. The parties of Germans, however, which succeeded in penetrating our positions were held up by the garrisons of the defended localities. As soon as the enemy’s advance was thus checked, the platoons in support counter-attacked and worked round the flanks of the parties which had pressed forward into our line. The enemy was engaged, therefore, by fire and bayonet from all sides. Several hundred prisoners and a large number of machine guns were captured, and our line was maintained intact. There was very little bombing.
4. The failure of the enemy’s attack upon these defences was due to the stubbornness of the defence maintained by the garrisons of the defended localities, and to the promptitude and skill with which the supporting platoons made their counter-attacks. We employed the same tactics against the enemy as he was endeavouring to employ against us. No frontal counter-attack was delivered, but the enemy was defeated by a succession of immediate counter-attacks delivered from the flanks.

Full advantage was taken of counter-attacking platoons of their knowledge of the ground, with the result that the enemy was outmanoeuvred as well as outfought.

From a study of this engagement the fact emerges clearly that an enemy penetrating into gaps in our positions is very much at a disadvantage until he can widen the flanks of the gaps; if the defending troops strengthen the flanks of these gaps and hold on to their positions tenaciously, he is bound to be caught between two fires, and forced to surrender what he has gained.

April 24th 1918.

Printed in France by Army Printing and Stationary Services. PRESS A-4/18.-6188S-3,500.