NOTE III ON ARTILLERY WORK. 11 July 1918

NOTE III ON ARTILLERY WORK.

1. Wireless Stations. It is most important that all wireless stations held by artillery units should be used to their fullest extent. It should be realised by all concerned that the wireless station must be erected at the very first opportunity and not left to be erected until after arrangements for every other means of communication have been made.
Close co-operation with aircraft is of vital importance during a moving battle, as few batteries have wire oft time available to ensure good communication with ground O.P’s and aircraft are the first and frequently the only means of discovering concentrations of the enemy just prior to an attack. If all units have wireless sets working, such concentrations can be successfully dealt with by means of LL and GF calls. During the last withdrawal some such concentrations were successfully fired on and dispersed in this manner but in a great many cases wireless was not working at the critical moment and opportunities of inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy were missed. In many cases for lack of any other means of attack such concentrations have been dealt with by means of bombs and M.G. fire from the air.
It is of course impossible during hurried changes of position to avoid the loss of a certain amount of material but – once the vital importance of a serviceable wireless set is realised by all – it should always be possible to bring away the essential parts of a wireless set i.e. tuner, aerial and earth mat. Masts, if lost, can always be improvised by using trees, buildings or even short R.E. signal poles. A sheet of corrugated iron can be used to replace a missing earth mat or at a pinch any metallic earth such as a jack knife or earth pin can be utilised.
Efforts are being made to reduce the weight and bulk of a wireless station so as to render it more easily portable by Field Artillery units; even at present the essential portions, referred to above, can and should always be carried in the firing battery. They will then be immediately available and the station can normally be ready to take in messages within a few minutes of guns getting into action.

2. Field Artillery. Field Artillery during a moving battle will form a large proportion of the available artillery for engaging surprise targets. As Brigade Commanders may be out of communication with a proportion of their batteries, it is essential that as many Field batteries as possible should be equipped with wireless stations. This can only now be done by withdrawing stations from Siege batteries when no longer required. Squadron Commanders should make early arrangements with their Corps H.A. to withdraw the stations from those Siege batteries which are least likely to require them and reissue them to R.F.A. brigades for allotment to batteries. This must be done under Corps arrangements as R.A.F. transport is inadequate to deal with the situation.

3. Map references and calls from the air. The importance of having squared maps of the back areas ready marked up with zones has been touched on above: without security on this point Artillery will hesitate to fire and golden opportunities will be lost. Another cause of trouble is here dealt with. Owing to the small amount of wireless sending going on calls have in past moving battles been picked up from two map sheets away: the danger of this will be readily seen as the correct zone will not preclude the possibility of the call being taken in and acted on by batteries who should not have been affected: it is essential therefore in moving warfare for the Squadron call to precede any signal sent from the air including SOS, LL, GF, and NF, calls. The Squadron call and battery calls will remain unchanged during the whole period of movement.

4. Message Dropping. Pilots must not hesitate to use message bags to indicate favourable targets to our guns if the wireless produces no response: this practice has a great future before it. Pilots must not forget that if by any means concentrated artillery fire can be brought on to living targets far greater effect will be produced than by a few small bombs.

J.A. C****
Lieut Colonel,
Commanding 15th Wing,
Royal Air Force.
In the Field.
11/7/18
JAC/JWC

Note II on LIAISON WORK,CALLSIGNS etc. 11 July 1918

Note II on LIAISON WORK,CALLSIGNS etc.

X = Corps Headquarters Station, i.e. Main Report Centre.

X = Divisional Dropping Station sign, as authorised.
Divisional calls might be
DW)
DX) (Note D is formed by strips)
DY)
DZ)
So that in event of loss of some strips the letters above would indicate a Division.

= Brigade Headquarters as authorised, and calls might be
WW)
WX) for W Division’s Brigades.
WY)
WZ)

XW)
XX) for X Division’s Brigades.
XY)
XZ)
Etc., so that in the event of loss of the special signal the letter alone would indicate a Brigade.

D = Battalion Headquarters and call signs might be any starting with earlier
letters of the Alphabet, so that in the event of the special sign being lost they would still be recognised as Battalion Headquarters though the Division would not be known to the Airman.

All Artillery formations to which calls are allotted will use the prefix N if not in action as regards aerial observation, L if they are ready to fire with a plane.

All Infantry formations will display their signals as usual on the call by aeroplane of a series of A’s on KLAXON and a white Very Light.
All Artillery formations will display their signals as usual on the call by aeroplane of a series of B’s from KLAXON and a green Very light.
——————–

Strips of formations at some distance from the battle line will be more visible if a flare is burnt near them or a smoke fire lit.
———————–

A special unit may be demanded by its call letters on KLAXON
———————–
The aeroplane will acknowledge having seen strips by repeating the call letters with R.D. or by diving on the strip.

—————————————-
Popham panel work will be carried out as usual with the accepted code.
—————————————————

Any formation which is about to move should put out its strips and add an arrow to its strips giving the direction in which it will proceed.

N.B. the French System of Ground Panels has much to recommend it. It is reproduced below:-

FRENCH SYSTEM OF GROUND SIGNALS.

CORPS. –

DIVISION. –

BRIGADE. –

REGIMENT. –

BATTALION. –

(Each sign is 3 metres over its maximum diameter Squares or bands 4 centimetres wide)

J.A. C****
Lieut Colonel,
Commanding 15th Wing,
Royal Air Force.
In the Field.
11/7/18
JAC/JWC

CORPS SQUADRON COMMANDERS ACTION. 11 July 1918

NOTE 1.

CORPS SQUADRON COMMANDERS ACTION.

All possible arrangements as detailed below must be worked out beforehand, so that as soon as orders are received by S.C. “Moving warfare action” he can take the following measures, (Orders for move of Squadron to rear aerodrome will be issued by the Wing). –

1. Turn 1 Artillery Flight into a Liaison Flight.

2. Issue to Flight Commanders for distribution (if not already done) squared maps of the rear areas. These must have been previously marked up with the zones e.g. QA, QB, QC, QD or KW, KX, KY, KZ, etc. If this is not done, Pilots may get careless once they get off their C.B. Map, and will send Zone calls with the wrong Zone with disastrous results. All Pilots and Observers must be cautioned to be careful in this respect.

3. Despatch 1 Light Tender to C.W.S. with 3 Artillery, and 3 Reconnaissance Observers for attachment to Divisional Artillery, and Divisional H.Qrs.
All personnel will have two days rations, tin helmets, gas masks, and a minimum of kit (not exceeding 30 lbs).
All ranks must know what their duties are, to which unit they are attached, and where it is situated. Any spares required to complete the C.W.S. to the standard A attached (establishment of M.R.C., or A.R.C.) will be taken on this tender.
At least 20 gallons M.T. petrol, and 2 gallon M.T. oil, will be carried. A rifle and 100 rounds S.A.A. will be taken. Any spare space will be filled with aero petrol and oil.

4. Despatch 1 Light Tender and 1 motor bicycle with S.C. to Corps H.Qrs., with B.I.O., and limited staff, (2 men), and 2 Liaison Observers. This is to form the M.R.C.
Other details as above.

5. Arrangements for all aeroplanes to operate from Main Report Centre as soon as established – Pilots travelling solo to load up with petrol and oil in cans, and ammunition in drums and belts. – a fitter and a rigger with a few tools and patching material to be sent over with the first planes of each flight daily, returning at night – tail weights to be provided for solo work.

6. The administration of the Squadron must be largely left in the hands of the R.O., and E.O. – the Squadron Commanders place by day is mostly at the M.R.C., in close touch with his Corps and his aeroplanes.
J.A. C****
Lieut Colonel,
Commanding 15th Wing,
Royal Air Force.
In the Field.
11/7/18
JAC/JWC
LIST A.
Main or Advanced Report Centre.

COMPLETE RECEIVING STATION FOR RECEIVING AEROPLANE
SIGNALS CONSISITS OF:-
—————————————————————————————————————-

Mast 30 Ft. complete.
Tuner, short wave Mk. III.
Canvas carrying bag.
8 Ground Strips.
125 ft. Aerial Wire.
2 Insulators.

Weight of above approx 120 lbs.

Could be packed in a space 4’ 6” x 16” x 16”
——————————————–

C.W. Transmitting and Receiving.

Mast 30 ft. complete.
150 ft. Aerial Wire.
2 Insulators.
Transmitter.
Receiver.
3 Sets of accumulators.
Wavemeter. Hetrodyne.
H.T. Unit or H.T. Batteries.
Weight of above with H.T. unit – 163 lbs.
Weight of above using H.T. Batteries instead of H.T. unit 197 lbs.

—————————————————-

One pair of Earth Nets would do for both stations.

1 Officer, and 4 Operators – a few spares – Time token to erect – ½ hour.
dismantle ½ hour.

1 B.I.O. and 2 Clerks for M.R.C.

——————————————

Transport.

1 Motor Cycle and Side car.
1 Light Tender.

GQG instruction 10 July 1918

GRAND QUATIER GENERAL
—————————————– 10 Juillet 1918.
Aéronautique & D.C.A.
——————————-
No 12.927.
L’AIDE-MAJOR GENERAL
Chef du Service Aéronautique
au Commandant de l’Aéronautique du G.A.C.
au Commandant du C.I.A.C.B., FERME de PERTHE.

Le Commandant de l’Aéronautique du G.A.C. assurera l’organisation d’un réseau de signalisation dans la zone du G.A.C.

Cette organisation, destiné à faciliter et à intensifier le travail de nos avions de bombardement et de reconnaissance de nuit comprendra :
– 1o) le repérage des Itinéris,
– 2o) la signalisation des terrains d’atterrissage de nuit,
– 3o) le balisage des chenaux de sécurité.

Elle sera établio :
– 1o) Suivant les besoins des Commandants d’Escadres de Bombardement de nuit et
des Commandants d’Aéronautique d’Armée ayant des Unités faisant vol de nuit, qui fourniront toutes les indications utiles.

– 2o) D’accord avec les Commandants de la D.A.C. des Armees intéressées, en ce qui concerne la décence contre les avions ennemis.

Pour réaliser cette organisation, le Commandant de l’Aéronautique du G.A.C. disposera, comme moyens matériels :

– 1o) de la Section de Phares No 1, attache a l’Escadre 11, et qui pourra être
éventuellement renforcée.
– 2o) de projecteurs qui seront demandes au G.Q.G. si la nécessite de leur
emploi est reconnue.
– 3o) de moyens de signalisation spéciaux employés a titre exceptionnel
(Voitures Photographiques), mis provisoirement a sa disposition par les
Unites de Bombardement ou par le G.Q.G. dans la mesure des
disponibilités.

D’autre part, le Lieutenant de Vaisseau BABIN, du C.I.A.C.B. est mis a la disposition du Commandant de l’Aéronautique du G.A.C., pour la réalisation du réseau de signalisation demande.

P.O. Signe : PUJO.
GROUPE D’ARMEES DU CENTRE.
————————————————
Etat-Major Q.G., le 18 Juillet 1918.
——
Aéronautique.
————–
LE CHEF DE BATTAILLON ORTHIEB
charge de l’Aéronautique au G.A.C.

aux Commandantes de l’Aéronautique des 4o – 5o – 6o –
9o Armees, aux Commandants des Escadres, Groupes et
Escadrilles de Bombardement du nuit.

En exécution des prescriptions de la Lettre No 12.927 de l’Aide-Major General Chef du Service Aéronautique au G.Q.G., en date du 10 Juillet 1918 :

Le Lieutenant de vaisseau BABIN, mis a la disposition du Commandant de l’Aéronautique du G.A.C. par le G.Q.G. sera charge, a dater d’aujourd’hui, de tout qui concerne la signalisation lumineuse de nuit dans la zone du G.A.C.
La S.P.G.P.1. (Section de Phares a grand puissance No 1), personnel et matériel, actuellement stationnée au Parc Aéronautique de NUISEMENT sera placée sous ses ordres, ainsi que la S.P.G.P. No 2 des que celle-ci sera constitue.
Les Commandants d’Escadres ou de Groupes de Bombardement de Nuit lui adresseront directement leurs desiderata en ce qui concerne les améliorations à apporter au Réseau de Signalisation de Nuit. Il aura seul qualité pour faire allumer, éteindre ou changer de place les feux.
De son cote, le Lieutenant de Vaisseau BABIN tiendra les Groupes de Bombardement de Nuit et les D.C.A. d’Armée au courant de toutes modifications survenues dans la signalisation de nuit.

Signe : ORTHLIEB

Vo Armée Au Q.G.A. le 20 Juillet 1918.
———-
Commandement
de
L’Aéronautique
———–
No 5386

Copie confirme notifiée a :
Aéronautique de C.A.
Toutes Escadrilles et
Compagnies d’Aérostiers.
G.C. 11, G.C. 12
Le Chef de Bataillon Commandant l’Aéronautique.
GUILLEMENEY

15th WING OPERATION ORDERS No 101. 4 July 1918

SECRET. Copy No 8
15th WING OPERATION ORDERS No 101.
In the Field
2/7/18.

1. Intentions. The 4th Australian Division is to attack HAMEL, and the ridge to E. and S.E. on Z day. Zero hour will be promulgated at noon on Y day.
O.C. 3 Sqd., A.F.C. will send an Officer to Anzac Corps Headquarters at 1 p.m., and 7 p.m. on Y day, to synchronize his watch.
Other Squadrons will work to signal time.

2. Army Squadrons. The 3rd Brigade R.A.F. is extending their Army Patrol area for the purpose of this operation to the River SOMME – and the 9th Brigade, and 22nd Wing will have strong Patrols at varying heights from MORLANCOURT to MOREUIL throughout operations.

3. Contact Patrols. No. 3 Sqd. A.F.C. O.C. No. 3 Sqd A.F.C., will arrange Contact Patrols from zero till dusk – flares will be called for at zero + 90 minutes at which time 2 machines should be on the line to avoid failures.

4. Counter Attack Patrols No. 3 Sqd A.F.C. O.C. No 3 Sqd A.F.C. will arrange Counter Attack Patrols from zero + 90, til dark. Counter Attacks are less likely on the Northern side as the Valley of the SOMME is marshy, and open to our observation.
The WARFUSEE – CERISY valley should be specially observed as a likely assembly position.
The responsibility for observation of Counter Attacks up to the line MARCELCAVE – BAYONVILLERS – CHIPILLY – MORLANCOURT rests with O.C. 3 Sqd A.F.C. This will be partly the duty of Artillery Patrols & Counter Attack Patrols. Beyond the line stated the Army Squadrons will take up the work of observation.

5. Artillery Patrols. No. 3 Sqd A.F.C. O.C. 3 Sqd .A.F.C., will arrange to keep Artillery Patrols on the Corps front throughout the day from zero till dark.
Certain Batteries have been detailed for M.Q.N.F. work, but until after zero + 2 hours, smoke is likely to interfere with serious shooting, and Pilots will be best employed on NF, GF, and LL calls.
Normal conditions will be resumed under instruction from C.B.S.O. Australian Corps.
O.C. 35 Squadron R.A.F. will arrange to extend his Artillery Patrol area on Z day, as far S. as MORLANCOURT.

6. Ammunition Dropping No 9 Sqd R.A.F. O.C. No 9 Squadron will detail 12 machines for ammunition dropping work to start dropping at zero plus 3 hours, in accordance with orders already issued.

7. Bombing etc No 3 Sqd A.F.C. All machines crossing the line except ammunition carrying machines will carry 25 lb bombs, and will drop them on favourable living targets – and will engage such targets with M.G. fire from a low height.
In default of favourable living targets, bombs will be dropped on any of the targets shown in Bombing Map attached.
No. 6 Sqd D.F. No. 6 Sqd D.F.)
No. 9 Sqd. No. 9 Remaining Flight) will work as one formation by arrangements to
be mutually fixed, and will cross the line at approximately 5-30 a.m., and 2 p.m. to bomb.
They will descend at intervals to 3,000 feet to look for living targets – if found they will bomb and machine gun them from a low height. If no favourable targets seen, bombs will be dropped on one of the bombing targets shown on map North of the SOMME.
No. 82 Sqdn R.A.F. Working as 2 formations will cross the line to bomb at approximately 8-30 am, 10-30 am, 5 pm and 8 pm.
Their orders are as for No. 6 Detached Flight above, except that bombing targets (other than living targets) will be selected from those South of the SOMME.
NOTE
I. All bombs will be 25 lbs.
II. Formations must be kept.
III. Great care must be taken if targets are seen nearer that 500 yards East of the final objective owing to the danger of attacking our own troops.

8. Orders for the day or days succeding Z day, will be issued later, O.C. 3rd Squadron, A.F.C. will in any case ensure that Michelon Flare reconnaissances and patrols keep the line without further instructions.

9. Acknowledge.

J.A.C***
Lieut. Colonel,
Commanding 15th Wing,
Royal Air Force.
Copies 1 to 3 5th Brigade, R.A.F. Time issued…..
No 4 3rd Squadron, A.F.C.)
No 5 No 6 Sqdn Det Flt )
No 6 No 9 Squadron ) Time issued…………
No 7 No 35 Squadron )
No 8 No 82 Squadron )
No 9 & 10 Filed
Time issued

Zero day 4/7/18
“ Hour 3.10 AM

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 8. 28 April 1918

K.J. Bunting Capt.
Issued down to Brigades.
T.9.
NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 8.
(Issued by the General Staff)
Signal communication.
1. Trench warfare has unduly emphasised the use of telephonic communication, which cannot be extensively maintained in warfare of movement. It will very rarely be possible to provide any communication by wire in front of Infantry Brigade H.Q., and it is impossible to count upon the telephone forward of Divisional H.Q. Commanders of Infantry Brigades and units must accustom themselves to rely entirely upon other methods of communications. Greater attention must therefore be paid to the organization of such means of communication, especially visual and wireless.
2. In each divisional area, efforts should, if possible, be concentrated on one main artery of communication from front to rear, which should consist of cable, wireless, visual signalling and despatch riders, as circumstances permit. H.Q. of Divisions, and of Infantry and Artillery Brigades, should be placed in as close proximity as is practicable to this artery, on which signal offices should be established to serve several H.Q. It is for Corps to select the location of these arteries and to assist in their formation, so that Divisions may be enabled, if necessary, to move to points at which they will find both forward and rearward communication already provided.
3. It is essential that the move of H.Q. of a formation or unit should be notified as early as possible to higher, lower and adjacent formations or units. The difficulty of maintaining communication has sometimes been much increased by failure to indicate the position at which new H.Q. were to be opened, or to inform all concerned of alterations of plans in regard to movements arranged.
4. It would seem that there has sometimes been a lack of discretion in regard to the use of the signal cable wagon. Cases are reported in which all available cable was laid out while the situation was still obscure, so that the cable could not be recovered on withdrawal; and in other cases it seems that no use was made of the cable wagons, which were sent back when they might usefully have been retained.
5. In a withdrawal it is inadvisable to trust entirely to permanent overhead routes; when cut they take a long time to repair, and a cable line can be restored much more quickly.
April 28th 1918.
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NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 7. 24 April 1918

Issued down to Divisions
(for distribution down to Battalions)
T.9.
NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 7.
GERMAN ATTACK NEAR GIVENCHY, APRIL 9th, 1918.
From captured German orders and the attached map which shows the dispositions and plans of the 4th Ersatz Division, it appears that the following method of attack was adopted by the enemy:-
1. A very careful study was made of our defences in this locality. It is noteworthy that three days before the attack the enemy issued to platoon commanders detailed information gathered from air reconnaissance carried out at low elevation on that day, together with a note indicating not only the force expected to oppose the attack but also the estimated quality of the opposition anticipated. As a result of his reconnaissance, the enemy seems to have based his plan on avoiding the strong locality at Givenchy itself, penetrating our line on either flank, and turning inwards so as to take Givenchy from the right rear (south-west and south). The attacking force was divided into two portions, a northern and a southern. The northern attack was undertaken by four battalions, of which two were in front line, one in support and one in reserve. The southern attack consisted of two battalions, one being in the front line and one in support. In these attacks, the leading battalions were ordered to push straight forward, while the supporting battalion of the southern attack was to turn north and to take Givenchy in flank and rear from the south-west and south, and the supporting battalion of the northern attack was to deal similarly with Festubert from the south. This method of dealing from the flank and rear with strong points which are not attacked frontally has been conspicuous in the German operations since the 21st of March 1918.
2. Our defences consisted of defended localities each of which was held by a complete unit of not less than a platoon; other platoons especially detailed for counter-attack were kept in support. The garrisons of the defended localities had received orders to hold on at all costs – orders which were carried out in every case – and the platoons in support had been instructed to counter-attack as soon as the occasion arose without waiting for further orders. Each defended locality was prepared and wired for all round defence. Many of the communication trenches were wired, and lines of wire running perpendicularly and obliquely to the front had been erected to check any lateral advance in the event of local penetration. These obstacles proved of great assistance in preventing the enemy from extending his flanks after he has forced his way into portions of our front defences.
3. The attack was launched in a heavy mist, which greatly assisted the enemy. The parties of Germans, however, which succeeded in penetrating our positions were held up by the garrisons of the defended localities. As soon as the enemy’s advance was thus checked, the platoons in support counter-attacked and worked round the flanks of the parties which had pressed forward into our line. The enemy was engaged, therefore, by fire and bayonet from all sides. Several hundred prisoners and a large number of machine guns were captured, and our line was maintained intact. There was very little bombing.
4. The failure of the enemy’s attack upon these defences was due to the stubbornness of the defence maintained by the garrisons of the defended localities, and to the promptitude and skill with which the supporting platoons made their counter-attacks. We employed the same tactics against the enemy as he was endeavouring to employ against us. No frontal counter-attack was delivered, but the enemy was defeated by a succession of immediate counter-attacks delivered from the flanks.

Full advantage was taken of counter-attacking platoons of their knowledge of the ground, with the result that the enemy was outmanoeuvred as well as outfought.

From a study of this engagement the fact emerges clearly that an enemy penetrating into gaps in our positions is very much at a disadvantage until he can widen the flanks of the gaps; if the defending troops strengthen the flanks of these gaps and hold on to their positions tenaciously, he is bound to be caught between two fires, and forced to surrender what he has gained.

April 24th 1918.

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