53 Infantry Brigade Order 105 19 October 1917

B.M.
SECRET. Copy No.:- 2.
19th October, 1917.
53rd Inf. Bde. Order No. 105.
1. 7th Queens will come under the orders of G.O.C. 53rd Inf. Bde. from noon 20th instant.

2. The Divisional front is being extended on night 19/20th as far N. as V.14.c.15.15.
3. 7th Queens will take over from 7th Bedford R. on the right, and 6th Northants on the left, with 2 Coys, each, with H.Q. at BULOW FARM.

4. Coys. for right subsector should move up by HURST PARK – NEW HOUSES track, and for Left subsector by GOURNIER FARM – PHEASANT FARM track.

Coys will move by platoons at 200 yards distances. Leading platoons should leave HURST PARK about 3.45 p.m.

5. Os. C. 7th Bedford R. and 6th Northants. R. will arrange for guides on the scale of 1 per platoon and 1 per Coy. H.Q. to meet incoming troops at U.30.d.5.8. and PHEASANT FARM at 5 p.m.

6. All other details of relief to be arranged direct between C.Os. concerned.

7. Completion of relief will be reported to Brigade H.Q. by code word RATIONS.

ACKNOWLEDGE.
John D. Crosthwaite
Captain,
Brigade Major, 53rd Inf. Bde.
Issued at: – 4 pm
Copies to:-
Copy No:-
1. G.O.G. 15. 79th Fd. Coy R.E.
2. B.M. 16. 151st Coy. A.S.C.
3. S.C. 17. 54th Inf. Bde.
4. S.O. 18. 55th Inf. Bde.
5. Supply O. 19. Right Bde. 34th Div.
6. T.O. 20. Left Bde. 9th Div.
7. Norf. R. 21. 18th Div “G”.
8. Suff. R. 22. 18th Div “Q”.
9. Essex R. 23. A.P.M. 18th Div.
10. R. Berks. R. 24. War Diary.
11. 53rd M.G.C. 25. War Diary.
12. 53rd T.M.B. 26. File.
13. 7th Queens R. 27. 7th Bedford R.
14. 56th Fd. Amb. 28. 6th Northants. R.

53 Infantry Brigade message 19 October 1917

“A” Form
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

To All Concerned.

Senders Number Day of Month In reply to Number AAA
c. 762 19

ref Bde Order No 104. Train will now leave RAILHOEK at 10/30 am AAA All times will be advanced ½ an hour. AAA There will be no halt at clock house. AAA Ack
53 Inf Bde
7/30 pm
John D. Crosthwaite
Captain.
Bde. Major.
PTO
Issued to:-
18 Div G
“ Q
157 ASC
Supply O
53 M.G.C.
Essex
Norf
T.M.B.
Bde Sig O
A.P.M. 18 Div.

53 Infantry Brigade Order 104 amendments 19 October 1917

G.O.C.
SECRET.
53rd Inf. Bde. No. C. 756.
19th October 1917.
Amendment to 53rd Infantry Bde. Order No 104.
Para: 5.
On completion of relief Battalion of 10th Essex R. will be disposed In CANE TRENCH Area.

John D. Crosthwaite.
Captain,
Brigade Major, 53rd Infantry Brigade.
To Recipients of
Bde. Order No. 104.
Issued at p.m.

53 Infantry Brigade Order 106 19 October 1917

SECRET. Copy No. 2
Ref. map “C”. 19th October,1917.
53rd Inf. Bde. Order No. 106.
************************************
1. Information. On a day which has been notified to all concerned, the XVIII Corps in conjunction with Corps on its left, will attack the enemy in front of it.
2. Intention. The attack will be carried out by the 18th Div.
The 102nd Brigade, 34th Div., of the XIV Corps will be on the left of the 18th Div.
The attack on the 18th Div front will be carried out by the 53rd Infantry.. Brigade, less 8th Suff. R. and 6th R. Berks. R.
3. Dividing Lines & Objectives. Dividing Lines between units and their Objectives are shown on Map “C”
4. General Plan. The 8th Norf. R. will attack at Zero and make good the dotted BLUE Line shown on Map “C”.
At Zero plus 2 hours, 3 Coys 10th Essex R. will attack and make good the BLUE Line shown on Map “C” as far South as V.20.d.2.8.
At Zero plus 3 hours, 1 Coy 10th Essex R. will attack and make good the remainder of the BLUE Line.
5. Tasks of Units. Tasks of units are detailed in para: 5 of 53rd Inf. Bde. Preliminary Instructions No.1 for POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS II., and amendments thereto.
6. Artillery. (i). Barrage Maps have been issued to all concerned. The left flank of the barrage covering the attack on BEEK HOUSES, will run along the line V.20.c.45.55. – V.20.d.70.75.
(ii). It must be impressed upon all ranks that the barrage will be an enfilade one, and that they will therefore not be able to move up close under the shell bursts as in a frontal barrage. They are quite safe 70 yards from the shell burst. An enfilade barrage is safer than a frontal one as shorts can do no harm, and the lateral error of a gun is very small.
(iii). A camouflage attack will be carried out from the British front line trenches in V.27.c. to V.20.c.
The front of the attack on the 53rd Bde. front will be behind the line V.26.a.8.9. to V.20.c.2.8.
An artillery barrage will be put down at Zero and last till Zero plus 40.
Initial barrage line will be V.20.c.95.00. – V.20.c.45.90.
Camouflage figures will be put up at irregular intervals during that period.
7. Forming Up. 8th Norf. R. and 10th Essex R. will each send up special parties on X/Y night to mark out their forming up lines with wire and stakes.
O.C. 79th Fd. Coy. R.E. will detail an Officer to assist in this.
Special parties will be sent up be each Bn. at dusk, on Y/Z night to tape out these lines and to put up platoon discs.
8. Communications. As detailed in Appendix “D” to 53rd Inf. Bde. Preliminary Instructions No 1 for POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS II.
Aeroplanes.
(a) A contact machine will fly over objectives at –
Zero plus 1 hour.
Zero plus 5 hours.
and when ordered by Corps Headquarters.
Infantry will be ready to light RED FLARES, or wave WATSON FANS if no flares are available, at these hours but will NOT do so unless called for by Klaxon horn or by the dropping of WHITE lights.
THE IMPORTANCE OF INFANTRY MAKING THEIR POSITION KNOWN TO THE CONTACT MACHINES MUST BE IMPRESSED ON ALL RANKS.
Each contact aeroplane will be marked with two BLACK rectangular flags (2 ft. by 1 ft. 3 ins) attached to and projecting from the lower plane on each side of the fuselage.
(b) Counter-attack Machine.
An aeroplane will be continuously up during daylight from Zero onwards, whose mission will be to detect the approach of enemy counter-attacks.
Whenever this patrol observes hostile parties of 100 or over moving to counter-attack, it will drop a smoke bomb over that portion of the front to which the enemy is moving.
The smoke bomb will burst about 100 feet below the machine into a white parachute flare which descends slowly, leaving a long trail of brown smoke about 1 foot broad behind it.
(c) Situation Reports.
In addition to all other messages and reports, a situation report will be forwarded every two hours after Zero.
9. Liaison. As detailed in para: 9 of 53rd Inf. Bde. Preliminary Instructions No 1 for POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS I.

10. Dress. As detailed in 53rd Inf. Bde. No 1. B.M. 818 of 8th October, 18917..
11. Administration. As detailed in 53rd Inf. Bde. No S.C./Y/8 of the 19th October 1917.
12. Synchronization of Watches. A watch will be sent to Battns at 4 p.m. on “X” day, and at 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. on “Y” day.

ACKNOWLEDGE.
John D. Crosthwaite
Captain,
Brigade Major, 53rd Inf. Bde.
Issued at:- 6 am 20th
Copy No:-
1. G.O.G. 11. 53rd M.G.C. 21. Right Bde. 34th Div.
2. B.M. 12. 53rd T.M.B. 22. Left Bde. 9th Div.
3. S.C. 13. 79th Fd. Coy R.E. 23. 18th Div “G”.
4. S.O. 14. 56th Fd. Amb. 24. 18th Div “Q”.
5. T.O. 15. 151st Coy. A.S.C. 25. XVIII Corps Cyclists.
6. Supply O. 16. 7th Queens R. 26. War Diary.
7. Norf. R. 17. 54th T.M.B. 27. War Diary.
8. Suff. R. 18. 55th T.M.B. 28. File.
9. Essex R. 19. 54th Inf. Bde.
10. R. Berks. R. 20. 55th Inf. Bde.

53 Infantry Brigade Preliminary Instructions Poelcappelle 18 October 1917

SECRET. B.M.
Ref. Map “A”
53rd Inf. Bde. No. C. 754.
October 18th 1917.
53rd Inf. Bde. Preliminary Instructions No. 1.
For POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS II.
1. Information. On “Z” day the 18th Div. will continue the attack in conjunction with the XIVth Corps on its left.
The attack of the 18th Div. will be carried out by the 53rd Inf. Bde. less 8th Suff. R. and 6th R. Berks. R.
4 Mortars each of 54th and 55th T.M. Bs will be attached to 53rd Inf. Bde.
The 7th Queens R. will hold the line now held by the 18th Div. and that part of the line now held by the 34th Div. as far North as V.14.c.15.15., from the night 20/21st October until “Z” day. This Bn. will be withdrawn as soon as the 53rd Inf. Bde. has established itself on its objectives.
I Bn 54th Bde will be attached to 53rd Bde from Zero hour as counter-attack Bn.
The 79th Fd. Coy. R.E. will be attached to the 53rd Inf. Bde during the operations.

2. Disposition of Units. The disposition of units on X/Y night and at Zero hour on “Z” day is shown in Appendix “A”.

3. Dividing Lines & Objectives. The dividing lines between units and the Objectives of units of the 53rd Inf. Bde. are shown on Map “A”. Map C showing new objectives of units is issued herewith & cancels Map A.

4. General Plan. The attack will be carried out in 3 Phases.

(a) Phase I. The 8th Norf. R. will attack with 3 Coys and capture that part of POELCAPPELLE still in the enemy’s hands including the BREWERY, and the S.Ps. at V.20.a.4.5. and 7.7., and make good the BLUE Dotted Line.
1 Coy will attack and capture the enemy trench about V.14.c.2.6. – HELLES HO., and the enemy S.Ps. just N.E. of it.

The attack on HELLES HO area will advance between REQUETE FARM and the track N. of this farm and will assault the enemy positions from the North.

The attack on POELCAPPELLE will be assisted by 4 Mortars 53rd T.M.B. and 4 Mortars 54th T.M.B.
As soon as the objective has been gained, the 8th Norf. R. will reorganize not less than 2 Platoons and hold them in readiness to exploit success, and move forward to occupy NOBLES FARM and the S.Ps S.E. of it when the protective barrage ceases. These platoons will move as close as possible up to the protective barrage as soon as they have been reorganized.

(b) Phase II. 23 Coys. 10th Essex R. will form up in rear of the 8th Norf. R., and will move forward so as to be close up to the protective barrage ready to advance to the attack on the 2nd Objective (BLUE Line), as soon as the barrage lifts back at Zero plus 2 hours.

(c) Phase III. 1 Coy 10th Essex R. will be formed up on the approximate line V.20.c.4.0. – V.20.c.3.5. by Zero hour, and will advance and capture the 3rd Objective at Zero plus 3 hours.
In the event of the assault on the 2nd Objective failing, the attack on the 3rd will not be carried out.

(d) 1 Coy will be in Bn. Reserve. In the event of the attack on POELCAPPELLE failing the attack of the 10th Essex R. will not be carried out.

(e) Instructions for 53rd M.G.C. will be issued later.

(f) 4 Guns 53rd T.M.B. and 4 Guns 54th T.M.B. will fire on POELCAPPELLE during the attack from positions in V.13.d. and V.19.b.
4 guns 55th T.M.B. will fire on BEEK HOUSES, Pts. V.20.c.8.1. – 84 and 96 during Phase III from positions in rear of GLOSTER HO.

5. Tasks of Units.
(a) 8th Norf. R. will be formed up by 1 a.m. on “Z” day on the line shown on Map “A”.

3 Coys. will fight their way through POELCAPPELLE and make good the 1st Objective. The Left Coy. Of this group will gain touch with the Coy. Attacking HELLES at about V.14.c.85.30.

The O.C. 8th Norf. R. will arrange that the area N. of POELCAPPELLE between that village and HELLES HO is cleared as far as the 1st Objective. 1 Coy. will capture the enemy trench about V.14.c.2.6., and will also capture the enemy S.Ps. in the HELLES HO area by moving N. of REQUETE FARM and attacking these S.Ps. from about V.14. central. Lewis guns will be posted about V.14.c.4.6. and REQUETE FARM to fire towards HELLES HO and cover the advance of the attackers.

A post will be established about V.14.b.3.0. in touch with the 34th Division.

As soon as the 1st Objective has been gained and the 10th Essex R. have moved forward to the attack of the 2nd Objective, the O.C. 8th Norf. R. will re-organize his Coys for defence. As the village will be heavily shelled, it will be lightly held. Sufficient shelters for the troops necessary for the actual defence of the village will probably be available.

One Coy will be retained for the defence of the line from V.19.b.9.2. to V.20.a.9.8., until the 2nd Objective has been made good by the 10th Essex R. When this has been done, this Coy will be held ready to exploit success and advance on NOBLES FARM when the protective barrage lifts. ready to take over the front from V.14.d.2.7. to V.20.b.7.9. from 10th Essex R. at dusk.

(b) 10th Essex R. 23 Coys will be formed up in rear of the 8th Norf. R. by 2 a.m. on “Z” day, and will advance not later than Zero plus 1 hour to the approximate line of the 1st Objective, where they will form up close under the barrage ready to assault at Zero plus 2 hours. These 2 Coys will make good the 2nd Objective.

The defence of the MEUNIER HO ridge is of the utmost importance.

As soon as the 2nd Objective has been made good, mentioned in last bit of para 5a this relief has taken place, the dividing line between the 10th Essex R. and 8th Norf. R. will be the SPRIET Road (inclusive to 8th Norf. R.) to the road junction at V.20.a.05.75. and thence to POELCAPPELLE – ST. JULIEN Rd.

1 Coy will be formed up on the approximate line V.20.c.4.0. – 3.5.by Zero, and will advance at Zero plus 3 hours, and make good the 3rd Objective.

1 Coy will be in Bn Reserve and may be retained on the ROSE TRENCH line until required.

(c) The 7th Queens R. will hold the present front line with 2 Coys during the attack. Only the actual posts will be held. The 2 Support Coys will be withdrawn at 1 a.m. on “Z” day to CANE TRENCH.

The troops holding the Divnl front line N. of a point which will be notified later, will withdraw at Zero minus 30 mins to a line which will be notified, in order that our barrage may be put down on our front line.

(d) 53rd M.G.C. will detail 8 guns to take up the positions shown in Appendix “B”.

1 section will be detailed for barrage work under the D.M.G.O.

1 section will be in reserve about FERDINAND FARM.

(e) 53rd T.M.B. will detail 4 Mortars to fire from positions S.E. of STRING HOUSES on the area shown red on attached Map from Zero plus 12 mins to plus 16 mins.

(f) 54th T.M.B. will detail 4 Mortars to fire from positions S.E. of STRING HOUSES on the area shown Green on attached Map from Zero to plus 5 mins.

(g) 55th T.M.B. will detail 4 Mortars to fire from positions W. of GLOSTER HO. on BEEK HOUSES and the enemy S.Ps. about V.20.c.8.1. – 8.4. and 9.6. from Zero plus 2 hours 55 mins to plus 3 hours 2 mins.

(h) 79th Fd. Coy. R.E. will detail 3 sections to construct S.Ps. about V.20.a.9.1. – V.20.a.7.5.75. and REQUETE FARM (1 sec. to each).

The S.P. at V.20.a.9.1. especially will be strongly wired.

These sections with their attached platoons will garrison and hold these S.Ps until relieved, or ordered to withdraw by Bde. H.Q.
They will carry rations and water for 48 hours with them.

(i) A definite unit will be detailed for the capture of every known centre held by the enemy.

6. Organization for Defence of Captured line. As soon as each objective has been captured, the defence will be organized in depth.

The main line of defence will where possible, be on the reverse side of the slope with posts pushed out on to the crest line for observation.

The Strong Points to be constructed, and the garrisons of these are shown in Appendix “C”.

7. Artillery Arrangements. Barrage Map and artillery programme will be issued later.

The barrage for Phase I will open at Zero, and remain on the initial line till Zero plus 8 mins.: it will then move forward at the rate of 50 yards in 4 minutes and halt on the Protective Barrage line for the 1st Objective.

At Zero plus 1 hour 56 mins. this barrage will intensify and move forward at Zero plus 2 hours at the rate of 50 yards in 4 mins to the 2nd Objective.

8. Signal Communications. Signal Communications will be as shown in Appendix “D”.

S.O.S. Relay Stations will be formed at V.19.a.6.1. and PHEASANT FARM.

Every possible use must be made of pigeons.

A Bde O.P. will be formed at V.19.b.4.0.

The personnel of this O.P. will consist of:-
The Bde Intelligence Officer, 1 Observer each from 8th Norf. R. and 10th Essex R., 2 runners each from 8th Norf. R. and 10th Essex R.

These Observers and runners will report to the Bde Intelligence Officer at VARNA FARM at 2 p.m. on “Y” day, and will bring rations for “Z” day with them. This party will remain on duty at the O.P. from Zero hour on “Z” day until ordered to withdraw by the Bde Intelligence Officer. Observers will carry field glasses and maps.

9. Liaison. The 8th Norf. R. will detail 1 Officer from Echelon “B” and 2 runners to report to the Right Bde. 34th Div. by Zero hour on “Z” day.

The 8th Norf. R. and 10th Essex R. will each detail 1 N.C.O. and 2 runners to report to 53rd Bde. H.Q. at VARNA FARM by Zero hour on “Z” day.

The 8th Norf. R. will detail 1 N.C.O. and 2 runners to carry out liaison with the Bn. on their left.

The usual cross liaison between Companies will be maintained.

10. Administrative Orders. Administrative Orders will be issued separately.

11. Report Centres. Bde. R.C. VARNA FARM

Bde. Advd. R.C. PHEASANT FARM
8th Norf. R. R.C.) V.19.a.6.1.
10th Essex R. R.C. )
Bn. on Right (9th Div) HUBNER FARM
Bn. on Left (34th Div) FERDAN HO.
53rd M.G.C. PHEASANT FARM

ACKNOWLEDGE
John D. Crosthwaite
Captain,
Brigade Major, 53rd Infantry Brigade.
Issued at 6.30 a.m. 19/10/17
Copies to:-
Copy No:-
1. G.O.C. 13. 56th Fd. Amb.
2. B.M. 14. 79th Fd. Coy. R.E.
3. S.C. 15. 151st Coy. A.S.C.
4. S.O. 16. 54th Inf. Bde.
5. Supply O. 17. 55th Inf. Bde.
6. B.T.O. 18. Right Bde. 34th Div.
7. Norf. R. 19. Left Bde. 9th Div.
8. Suff. R. 20. 18th Div “G”
9. Essex R. 21. 18th Div “Q”
10. R. Berks. R. 22. War Diary
11. 53rd M.G.C. 23. War Diary.
12. 53rd T.M.B. 24. File.
NOTE:- Appendices will be issued later.
SECRET. 53rd Inf. Bde. No. C. 755.
19th October,1917.
Amendments to 53rd Inf. Bde. Preliminary Instructions No. 1.
For POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS 11.
Para: 1. Sub-para: 4. line 3.
For “V.14.c.15.15.” read “V.14.a.15.15.”
Para: 4 Sub-Para 4 of (a).
After “protective barrage” read “moves forward” and delete “ceases”.
Para: 5. (a) Sub-para 7.
Erase “held ready to exploit success and advance on NOBLES FARM when the protective barrage lifts” and substitute “withdran into Reserve”.
Para: 5 (h).
For “V.20.a.7.5.75.” read “V.20.a.75.75.”
Para: 9 last line but one.
For “Companies” read “Units”.
John D. Crosthwaite
Captain,
Brigade Major, 53rd Infantry Brigade.
Issued to Recipients of
53rd Inf. Bde. Preliminary Instructions
No. 1 for POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS II.

B.M.
SECRET. 53rd Inf. Bde. No. C. 757.
19th October,1917.
Amendments No 2 to 53rd Inf. Bde. Preliminary Instructions No. 1.
For POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS 11.
Para 1. Add “1 Bn. 54th Inf. Bde. will be attached to 53rd Inf. Bde. from Zero hour as counter-attack Bn.
Para 3. Map “C” showing new objectives of units is issued herewith, and cancels Map “A”.
Para 4. (a). Phase I. Delete last para:
(b). Phase II. For “2 Coys” read “3 Coys” 10th Essex R.
Add:- “In the event of the attack on POELCAPPELLE failing, the attack of the 10th Essex R. will not be carried out.
Delete para (d).
Para 5. (a). Last two lines will now read:- “ready to take over the front from
.14.d.2.7. to V.20.b.7.9. from 10th Essex R. at dusk”.

(b). 10th Essex R. For “2 Coys” read “3 Coys”.
For “As soon as the 2nd Objective has been taken made good” read “as soon as the relief mentioned in last line of para: 5 (a) has taken place”
Delete last para:.
Add “1 Bn. 54th Bde will be accommodated in CANE TRENCH on Y/Z night. They will not enter the area before 9 p.m.
This B. will move up and be in position as follows
As Counter-attack Bn by Zero.
2 Coys on line of ROSE TRENCH.
2 Coys in PHEASANT TRENCH.
H.Q. PHEASANT FARM.
This Bn will only be used for the purpose of counter-attacking the enemy if he has gained a footing in our positions. They will on no account be used to reinforce the troops holding the line.
Hostile counter-attacks will be countered on the initiative of the O.C. Bn., who will immediately inform Bde H.Q. of any action taken.
Detailed instructions for counter-attack will be issued separately.
App. “C”. No 1. Delete:- Col.3 “1 M.G. team”, Col 4 “1 M.G.”, Col 5 “M.G. to fire
towards CAMERON HOUSES”
ACKNOWLEDGE.
John D. Crosthwaite
Captain,
Brigade Major, 53rd Infantry Brigade.
Issued at p.m.
to Recipients of
53rd Inf. Bde. Preliminary
Instructions No. 1 for
POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS II.

SECRET. 53rd Inf. Bde. No. C. 763.
19th October,1917.
Amendments No 3 To 53rd Inf. Bde. Preliminary Instructions No. 1.
For POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS 11.
1. During operations the boundary between the 18th and 34th Divisions, will be the line:- V.14.b.2.2. – V.14.a.0.2. – LANDING FARM – V.13.c.8.3. – FERDAN HOUSE.

Immediately after the capture and consolidation of objectives, the permanent inter-corps boundary which runs from:-
V.19.a.2.2. to V.14.b.2.2. will come into force.

2. The objective of the 34th Division is the line from:-
V.14.b.3.3. to V.14.c.1.4.

3. Reference para: 4 (e).
The whole of the 53rd M.G. Coy is now placed at the disposal of the Brigade Commander.
They will be employed as follows:-
8 guns consolidation.
2 guns with counter-attack Bn.
2 guns FERDINAND HOUSE.
4 guns CANAL BANK.

4. Reference para: 5 (a), sub-para 5.
The post in liaison with 34th Division will be established at junction of hedge and road at V.14.b.40.15., and not V.14.b.3.0. as stated.
John D. Crosthwaite
Captain,
Brigade Major, 53rd Infantry Brigade.
Issued at 6 a.m. Oct 20th.
To Recipients of 53rd Inf. Bde.
Preliminary Instructions No. 1
for POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS II.
B.M.
SECRET. 53rd Inf. Bde. No. C. 760.
APPENDIX “A”
Dispositions of Units.
Unit X/Y Night Zero Hour
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8. 8th Norf R.
10th Essex R.
53rd M.G.C.

53rd T.M.B.
54th T.M.B.
55th T.M.B.
7th Queens R.

1 Bn 54th Bde. CANE Trench
CANE Trench
CANAL BANK

CANAL BANK
Present Billets
Present Billets
Line.

CANAL BANK Assembly Position.
Assembly Position.
2 secs Assembly Position
1 sec FERDINAND FARM
1sec under orders of D.M.G.O.
Battery position.
Battery position.
Battery position.
H.Q. and 2 Coys Line
2 Coys. CANE TRENCH
H.Q. PHEASANT FARM.
2 Coys. ROSE Trench.
2 Coys. PHEASANT Trench.

19th Oct 17.
Issued at p.m. to
Recipients of 53rd Inf. Bde.
Preliminary Instructions No. 1
for POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS II.

B.M.
SECRET. 53rd Inf. Bde. No. C. 758.
APPENDIX “B”
The 8 consolidating guns 53rd M.G.C. will occupy the following approximate positions:-
No Position Line of fire.
3 guns.

2 guns

1 gun.
2 guns. OXFORD HOUSES

MEUNIER HOUSE

V.14.c.3.5.
V.14.d.0.8. 2 guns towards TRACAS FARM.
1 gun towards GLOSTER FARM.
1 gun towards TRACAS FARM
1 gun towards V.15.c.0.0
1 gun towards V.20.b. central.
Towards V.15.c.0.0.

Issued at p.m. to
Recipients of 53rd Inf. Bde.
Preliminary Instructions No. 1
for POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS II.

Appendix “C”
LIST OF SPECIAL S.PS.
No Approximate Position By whom constructed Garrison Remarks
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

8.

9.

10. BEEK HOUSES

V.20.c.7.7.

MEUNIER HO.

V.20.a.7.7.

V.14.c.75.35
V.14.b.2.0.

REQUETE
FM.

V.14.c.30.55.

V.14.c.5.2.

V.20.a.3.3. 10th Essex R.
1 M.G. Team.

do

10th Essex R.
1 Sec 79th Fd C.R.E. & attchd Inf Pn 1 M.G. team.

As for 3.

8th Norf R.
do

8th Norf. R.
1 Sec 79th Fd Coy R.E. & attchd Pn.

8th Norf. R.
1 M.G. team

8th Norf. R.

10th Essex R. 1 Pn Essex R.
1 M.G.

1 Pn Essex R. (1 L.G.)
1 Pn Essex R.
1 Sec 79th Fd Coy R.E. & attchd Pn
I M.G.
I additional L.G. Sec.
1 Pn Essex R.
1 additional L.G. section.
1 Sec 79th Fd Coy R.E and attchd Pn.
1 Pn.
1 Pn
1 additional L.G. Sect.
1 Pn 8th Norf. R.
1 Sec 79th Fd Coy R.E. & attchd Pn.
2 Secs 8th Norf.
1 M.G.
2 Secs 8th Norf. (including
1 L.G. Sec).
1 Pn M.G. to fire towards CAMERON HOUSES.
L.G.to fire across LEKKERBOTERBEEK Valley.
L.G. to fire across front of BEEK HOUSES.
M.G. to fire S.E. towards TRACAS FARM.
L.Gs. to fire N. & E.

L.Gs. to fire N.E. and S.E.

L.G. to fire N.E.

L.Gs to fire N.E. and S.E.

L.G. to fire N.E.

M.G. to fire S.E.

L.G. to fire S.E.

L.G. to fire E. by North.

The garrisons of the above S.Ps. will be specially detailed beforehand.
The names of the Officers in command of the Platoons detailed by Battalions and of the R.E. Sections, will be reported to Brigade H.Q./ by the C.Os. concerned (showing date of present rank) by 6 p.m. on the 20th inst.
O.C. 79th Fd. Coy R.E. should arrange for his Officers to see Infantry Officers concerned and discuss matters at CANE TRENCH on the morning of the 21st October.
*********************************************************

SECRET. 53rd Inf. Bde. No. C. 758.
APPENDIX “D”
1. Telephone and Telegraph Communications.
Telephone lines have been buried from VARNA FARM to SNIPE HO., and from there lines have been run out to PHEASANT FARM and V.19.a.6.1.
2. Visual.
A Visual Receiving Station will be established at PHEASANT FARM.
3. Pigeons.
30 birds have been allotted to the Bde. 6 pairs of birds will be allotted to each Bn, and 2 pairs will be kept at Brigade Report Centre at PHEASANT FARM, and 1 pair at Brigade H.Q.
Bn Signal Officers will make themselves responsible that these pigeons are used whenever possible.

4. Runners.
Runner Posts will be established at VARNA FARM, PARTRIDGE FARM, SNIPE HOUSE and PHEASANT FARM.

5. Wireless and Power Buzzer.
A Power Buzzer Set will be erected at V.19.a.6.1. working to PHEASANT FARM if sufficient accommodation is found for the former station.
A Wireless trench set will work direct from PHEASANT FARM to VARNA FARM.

6. Message Rockets.
A Message Rocket Station will be established at V.19.a.6.1. working direct to SNIPE FARM – the Rockets now having a range of over 2000 yards. Any message sent by rocket will also be sent by runner as soon as possible.

7. Message Dog.
One dog will be available for message carrying and will be used by the Brigade Intelligence Officer to take messages back from the Brigade Forward O.P. at V.19.b.4.0. to Brigade H.Q. at VARNA FARM.

8. The main line of communication will be:-
VARNA FARM
PARTRIDGE FARM
SNIPE HOUSE
PHEASANT FARM
V.19.a.6.1.

Battalions will arrange to send back messages to the nearest station on this line which is in some form of communication with Brigade H.Q.

Messages so sent by runner should have the word “WIRE” written on the outside of the message so that the message can be opened by a signaller and wired on at any station which is still in wire communication with Brigade H.Q.

19th Oct. 1917.
Issued at 10 p.m. to
Recipients of 53rd Inf. Bde.
Preliminary Instructions No. 1
for POELCAPPELLE OPERATIONS II.

March Table to accompany 53rd Infantry Brigade Order No 104
————————————————————————————-
Serial No Unit From To Starting Point Time Remarks
1.
2.
3.
4.
5. Brigade H.Q.
53rd T.M. Bty.
8th Norfolk R.
10th Essex R.
53rd M.G. Coy. TUNNELLING CAMP.
do
do
do
do RAILHOEK Sidings
do
do
do
do F.28.a.0.4.
do
do
do
do 9.20 a.m.
9.25 a.m.
9.30 a.m.
9.45 a.m.
10.0 a.m. To march by
Companies at
200 yards
distance.

53 Infantry Brigade Order 104 18 October 1917

B.M.
SECRET.
Copy No 2
18th October 1917
53rd Inf. Bde Order No 104.
1. 53rd Bde. (plus 7th Queens R.W. Surrey R. attached) will relieve 54th Bde in the line on the night 20/21st October.
2. 8th Norf. R., 10th Essex R., 53rd M.G.C., 53rd T.M.B. and 53rd Bde. H.Q. will move by train leaving POPERINGHE at 11 a.m. to the Forward Area.
7th Queens R. will be picked up by this train at DIRTY BUCKET CAMP.
Staff Captain will arrange entrainment on the spot.
3. Units will march to entraining Station RAILHOEK, L.5.d. on 20th inst., in accordance with attached March Table.
4. 8thv Suff. R. and 6th R. Berks R. will not move.
5. On completion of relief units will be disposed as follows:-
7th Queens… … In the line.
10th Essex R.
1 Coy … … PHEASANT TRENCH.
1 Coy … … ROSE TRENCH.
H.Q. & 2 Coys … CANE TRENCH.
8th Norf. R. … … CANE TRENCH.
53rd M.G.C. … … CANAL BANK.
53rd T.M.B. … … CANAL BANK.
6. Transport of units moving forward will move by march route to CHATEAU des TROIS TOURS, head of column passing F.28.a.0.4. at 9 a.m.
Column will march under orders of Bde. T.O., by unit groups at 200 yards distances.
ACKNOWLEDGE
John D. Crosthwaite
Captain
Brigade Major, 53rd Infantry Brigade.
Issued at:- 6.30 am 19th
Copies to:-
Copy No:-
1.G.O.C. 13. 56th Fd. Amb. 25. War Diary
2. B.M. 14. 79th Fd. Coy. R.E. 26. War Diary.
3. S.C. 15. 151st Coy. A.S.C. 27. File.
4.S.O. 16. 54th Inf. Bde. 28. 54th T.M.B.
5. T.O. 17. 55th Inf. Bde. 29 55th T.M.B.
6. Supply O. 18. 34th Div.
7. Norf. R. 19. 9th Div.
8. Suff. R. 20. 18th Div “G”.
9. Essex R. 21. 18th Div “Q”.
10. R. Berks R. 22. A.P.M. 18th Div.
11. 53rd M.G,C. 23. 7th Queens.
12. 53rd T.M.B. 24. Area Cdt. Canal Bank.

Appendix IV – H.Q. 29th Divisional Artillery – September 1917.

29th Divisional Artillery.
—————————————

Strength on 1st & 30th September 1917.

1st September 30th September.
Officers O.R. Officers O.R.
H.Q. 4 16 4 16
15th Bde. R.H.A. 32 745 38 755
17th Bde R.F.A. 36 774 37 723
29th D.A.C. 20 685 21 654
Trench Mortars 10 127 9 115

Reinforcements received:-
2 Officers – 266 Other Ranks.

Casualties.

Officers.
Killed:- Nil.
Wounded:- 2/Lt. R.WALKER 92nd Bty. 19-9-17.
2/Lt. C.R. BRADSHAW “B” R.H.A. 20-9-17.
2/Lt. F.W.L. PARKINSON 460 Bty. 20-9-17
Capt. A.E. HAYNES M.C. D/17Bty. 27-9-17
(Gas) 2/Lt. R.J. CAZEAUX 13th Bty. 29-9-17
“ Lt. Col. A.W. MURRAY DSO 17 Bde 30-9-17

Other Ranks. Killed Wounded
15th Bde R.H.A. 3 14
17th Bde R.F.A. 12 44
29th D.A.C. 5 22
Trench Mortars. – 2
————————————————–
Total 20 82
———————————————————–
———————————————————–

H.Q. 29th Div Arty
September 1917
WAR DIARY Of H.Q. 29th DIV ARTY.

September 1917

VOLUME 30

Place Date Hour Summary of Events and Information

On 1st September Brigadier General G.H.A. WHITE C.M.G., D.S.O., handed over command of the 29th D.A. to Brigadier General E.H. STEVENSON D.S.O., General WHITE going as C.R.A. to 30th Division on exchange with General STEVENSON.
On September 1st, 15th Brigade R.H.A. and 17th Brigade R.F.A. moved from their Wagon Lines to the PROVEN Area, marching on September 2nd to rest billets at POLINCOVE near AUDRICQ, where they were joined by H.Q. 29th D.A. on September 5th. 29th D.A.C. remained in the line assisting Left Artillery (XIVth Corps) in the supply of ammunition and material in the construction of forward positions in the Valley of the STEENBEEK. In addition to parties from the D.A.C., each Battery left behind an Officer with a party of men to push on the work on these forward positions as their early occupation for the support of a further advance was anticipated. On 10th September 13th Battery (17th Bde. R.F.A.) marched from rest to HERZEELE and on 11th September to the neighbourhood of ELVERDINGHE where it came under the orders of RIGHT ARTILLERY (XIVth Corps). On September 14th and 15th the remaining units of 15th Brigade R.H.A. and 17th Brigade R.F.A. marched back to their old Wagon Lines near ELVERDINGHE billeting at HERZEELE on the night 14th/15th September.
On the night 16th/17th September batteries went into action under the orders of LEFT ARTILLERY (XIVth Corps). H.Q., 29th D.A. returned to “J” Camp on September 16th.
At 6 p.m. on 21st September C.R.A. 29th Division took over command of LEFT ARTILLERY (XIVth Corps) from C.R.A. Guards Division, the relief of the Infantry of Guards Division by the Infantry of 29th Division being completed on the morning of September 22nd.
LEFT ARTILLERY at this time consisted of:-
Left Group Right Group
74th Brigade R.F.A.) 11th Army Bde. R.F.A.
75th Brigade R.F.A.) Guards D.A. 17th Brigade R.F.A.)
(13th Bty. Rejoined 17th Bde. on Sept. 22nd ) 15th Brigade R.H.A.) 29th D.A.
On September 22nd/23rd 74th and 75th Brigades R.F.A. withdrew from the line to rest in the back areas, LEFT ARTILLERY (XIVth Corps) then consisted of 11th Army Bde. R.F.A., 15th Bde. R.H.A. & 17th Bde. R.F.A. each of which dealt direct with 29th D.A.H.Q.
On September 26th artillery action was taken in support of an attack by troops on our right, the Infantry on our front taking no part.

Appendices as under are attached:-

Appendix I – Orders for the march of 15th Brigade R.H.A. and 17th Brigade R.F.A. to and from rest area at POLINCOVE.
Appendix II – Orders for artillery action on September 26th.
Appendix III – Various Orders and Instructions issued by 29th D.A. during September.
Appendix IV – Strength at beginning and end of month, giving casualties and drafts received.
Appendix V – Honours and Awards received.
Appendix VI – Location statements for September.

NOTE: – Special maps of this area were appended to War Diary for August.

Signature unreadable.
Captain R.A.
Brigade Major, 29th Divisional Artillery

SECRET. 20th Division No. G.338.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
CARRIED OUT BY THE 20TH (LIGHT) DIVISION
Between 11th and 29th September, 1917.

1. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS. Between the 11th and 26th September, the Sector opposite the Divl. front was held by the 25th I.R. and 185th I.R. (208th Div.). The 25th I.R. held the line from LANGEMARCK – STADEN Railway to the CEMETERY in U.23.b., and the 185th I.R. from about the CEMETERY to PHEASANT FARM. Each Regiment had three battalions disposed in depth. The average company strength in the 25th I.R. was 70, and in the 185th I.R. 60.
It was known at the time, that the counter-attacking Div. for this sector was the
234th Div. located in the ROULERS Area. In the light of subsequent events, it appears that the 234th Div. was unable to carry out any counter-attacks against us owing to the fact that it had to relieve the 36th Div., which was opposite the 51st (Highland) Div. on our right. The 10th Ersatz Div. was brought in to take the place of the 234th Div., but was also unable to carry out any counter-attacks, as it had to relieve the 234th Div. which suffered an unusual number of casualties during the short period it was in the line.

2. TAKING OVER THE LINE.
(a). on the 11th September the 20th Div. took over the Right Div. Sector of the XIVth Corps Front from the 38th Div. the 51st (Highland) Div. (XVIIIth Corps) was on the right and the Guards Div. on the left.
One Brigade was placed in the line, the 61st, with two battalions in the line E. of LANGEMARCK, one in the AU BON GITE Area, and one in the IRON CROSS Area.
(b). The strength of the Div. had been much reduced since the capture of LANGEMARCK, and the average fighting strength of units was about 350.

3. OBJECTIVES.
(a). The task of the Div. was the capture of the GREEN Line which corresponded approximately with the Line of KANGAROO and BEAR Trenches, but included in addition ‘t GOED TER VESTEN FARM. An intermediate objective was selected upon which a pause was to be made in order to allow the 51st (Highland) Div. on our right (who had further to go) to come up into alignment before a further advance. This line was known as the RED dotted Line.
(b). On the left flank the RED dotted Line and the GREEN Line co-inclined between the SCHREIBOOM – KORTEBEEK Road and the LANGEMARCK – STADEN Railway.

4. PLAN OF ATTACK.
The plan of attack can be summarised as follows:-
(a) The attack was to be made in two bounds. The first bound was to be to the RED dotted Line, from which the infantry were to advance to the GREEN Line at Zero plus one hour twenty-five minutes.
The reasons for including the RED dotted Line and the GREEN Line in one objective on the left flank lay in the fact that a network of trenches existed between the jumping off line and the final objective (GREEN Line), which it was thought might be strongly held and would escape the barrage on the resumption of the advance had a pause been made midway between the jumping off line and the GREEN Line.
(b) The attack was carried out by the 60th Inf. Bde. on the right and 59th Inf. Bde on the left; these had taken up their battle positions in the front line during the nights of 18th/19th and 19th/20th September. Each Bde. attacked on a two battalion front, one battalion of each Bde. being in support and one in Reserve. The supporting battalions were both E. of LANGEMARCK, and the battalions in Bde. Reserve were placed in the STEENBEEK valley, but E. of the Stream. Special provision was made by the 60th Inf. Bde. to protect its right flank against counter-attack from the direction of POELCAPPELLE.
The 61st Inf. Bde. was in Divl. Reserve on the CANAL.

5. CONCENTRATION AND ASSEMBLY.
(a) A taped jumping-off line was laid out square with the objective, and in front of the area upon which it had been reckoned that the enemy’s barrage would fall.
The jumping-off line was not identical with the most advanced line held at the time, but was withdrawn slightly on account of the enemy being in close proximity to our front line and in such positions that had this not been done, our initial creeping barrage would not have fallen on the hostile trenches and organised shell holes just in front of them.
(b) The 59th and 60th Inf. Bdes. relieved the 61st Inf. Bde in the line on the night of the 18th/19th and 19th/20th. On the night of the 19th/20th, the assaulting battalions took up their positions for the attack under cover of patrols left out on the original front line, which withdrew one hour before Zero.
The deployment was effected without incident.

6. ARTILLERY PLAN.
The main features of the artillery plan consisted in:-
(a) A 24 hours hurricane bombardment which started off about 4.0 a.m. on the 19th September. Subsequent interrogation of prisoners pointed to the fact that the enemy was taken by surprise when the attack commenced, owing to the fact that he considered the hurricane bombardment represented the first day of a prolonged bombardment such as had usually been carried out.
(b) The usual creeping, standing and searching, distant, and smoke barrages, were carried out.
(c) The pace of the creeping barrage was altered on this occasion, and commenced at 50 yards in two minutes for the first 200 yards of the advance, thence to the first objective (RED dotted Line) at 50 yards in three minutes.
The first barrage lift was ordered at Zero plus three minutes.
(d) The combined barrages covered a depth of approximately 2,500 yards, and the smoke barrages were placed on the high ground about KORTEBEEK, about U.18. central, and about V.19.a to screen the attack from the enemy’s view.

7. MACHINE GUN BARRAGE.
The machine-guns of the Division were divided into:-
(a) Consolidating guns.
(b) Barrage guns.
(c) Reserve guns.
The Machine Gun Coys. of the assaulting Bdes. (each less two sections) were under the direct orders of their B.Gs.C.
The barrage guns, consisting of the Divl. Machine Gun Coy. and the Machine Gun Coy. of the Bde. in Divl. Reserve were under the orders of the D.M.G.O., while the reserve guns, being the remaining two sections of each of the two forward Machine Gun Coys., were kept back to replace casualties and to form a reserve in case the operations should be unduly prolonged or should unforeseen developments have occurred. These reserve sections of the 59th and 60th M.G. Coys. were placed at the disposal of B.Gs.C. as soon as the GREEN Line had been captured.

8. DISCHARGE OF OIL DRUMS.
As it was anticipated that the advance against EAGLE TRENCH, which was known to be strongly held, would be stoutly opposed it was arranged to discharge oil drums from projectors on to the portion of EAGLE TRENCH immediately W. of the CEMETERY. This discharge was to take place at Zero plus 2 minutes.
290 projectors were ready in position at Zero hour, and these were successfully fired at the given moment. Eye witnesses, however, state that the oil drums, owing to the range having been miscalculated fell on the area immediately E. of EAGLE TRENCH, and that the flaming oil therefore did not affect the garrison, but on the other hand lit up the surroundings and showed the enemy our advancing lines. There is no evidence at present to refute this statement which is believed to be correct.

9. THE ATTACK.
(a) The attack commenced at 5.40 a.m. on the 20th September. The first reports showed that the advance had not been uniformly successful. This was confirmed by the first contact aeroplane patrol sent out at 8.0 a.m. which showed that whilst the left of the 59th Inf. Bde. had reached its final objective (GOED TER VESTEN FM. (exclusive) and Westwards) the right of the 59th Inf. Bde. and left of the 60th Inf. Bde. had been held up by the enemy in EAGLE TRENCH about the SCHREIBOOM – RED HOUSE Road and SCHREIBOOM – KORTEBEEK Road. The right had advanced slightly, but was apparently held up by the enemy who were still holding EAGLE HOUSE and LOUIS FARM.
(b) Owing to the above delay the infantry ceased to gain any immediate value from pre-arranged Artillery programme, which, after the pause on the RED dotted Line continued to sweep forward. Owing to conflicting reports received regarding the exact situation of the infantry it was considered inadvisable to bring the barrage back to EAGLE TRENCH. Three contract aeroplanes were sent out at intervals (at 8.30 a.m., 9.30 a.m. and 12.45 p.m.). flares were called for at 9.30 a.m. and showed that our infantry had advanced still further on the left, and had reached their final objective, i.e. BEAR TRENCH. On the right a slight advance had been made, but the centre was still shown as being held up.
(c) Orders were issued at 1.30 p.m. for the attack to re-commence at an hour to be notified later when the situation had been definitely cleared. Owing to the difficulty of passing orders up to the front line it was decided that a properly organised attack could not take place for several hours following the clearing up of the situation.
(d) The Artillery programme was to be in the main a repetition of the morning programme, with the exception that there would be no pause on the RED dotted Line, and that the pace of the creeping barrage would be 50 yards in three minutes, and that it would remain on its first line for 15 minutes, in order to allow the infantry to get close up to it. It was arranged that some smoke shells should be fired into EAGLE TRENCH just W. of the CEMETERY in order to mask the enemy’s machine-guns while the infantry were getting into position. In the light of after events, this precaution proved to be a very necessary one, as EAGLE TRENCH was found to be a breast-work with an average command of 8 feet, and all movement between LANGEMARCK and EAGLE TRENCH, unless screened by smoke, would have been absolutely out of the question. Smoke barrages were also arranged on the flanks, as had been done in the morning attack. The machine-gun barrage was the same as in the first attack. The final objective for this new attack was to be the GREEN Line, and the attack was to be carried out by the Supporting battalions of the assaulting Bdes., their place being taken by the Battalions in Bde. Reserve.
(e) Before the situation had been cleared as regards this new attack, the 51st (Highland ) Div. On our right were heavily counter-attacked, and it was reported that they had been driven out of ROSE HOUSE and DELTA HOUSE, and had withdrawn to the PHEASANT FARM Line, and that they were about to counter-attack with a new battalion to restore the situation.
(f) Zero hour was ultimately fixed for 6.30 p.m. From 5.30 p.m. onwards a series of S.O.S. alarms occurred, and at Zero some batteries were actually firing on their S.O.S. Lines, and were a few minutes late in getting on to their barrage lines for the attack. As, however, fifteen minutes had been allowed for the initial barrage line all guns were firing on their barrage lines before the advance of the infantry commenced.
At 8.7 p.m. the 6Oth Inf. Bde. reported that they had every reason to believe they had gained the trenches round EAGLE HOUSE and LOUIS FARM, and that prisoners had been captured. An observer, flying at a low altitude believed that our men were in the portion of EAGLE TRENCH S. of the SCHREIBOOM – RED HOUSE Road.
At 9.15 p.m. the 60th Inf. Bde. reported that from 60 to 70 prisoners from 185 I.R. had been captured.
A contact patrol which was to have reported upon the result of the attack was unfortunately brought down, but by 10.0 p.m. it appeared clear that our whole line had been advanced, and that a portion of EAGLE TRENCH had fallen into our hands. The situation as regards the Northern portion of EAGLE trench lying between the SCHREIBOOM – RED HOUSE and SCHREIBOOM – KORTEBEEK FARM Roads was still obscure.
On the left the 59th Inf. Bde. were in their objective with their right flank refused, forming a defensive flank to the East, this flank being joined up to their right battalion front line which had taken up a position opposite EAGLE TRENCH, astride the LANGEMARCK – SCHREIBOOM Road. This concludes the operations on the 20th September, 1917.
10. (a) At 6.30 a.m. on the 21st September a contact aeroplane calling for flares
showed our line to run from KANGAROO TRENCH on our right Divl.,
Boundary in a straight line to the neighbourhood of BLUE HOUSE. The
Southern portion of EAGLE TRENCH appeared to be held by us, and
also BEAR TRENCH on the left. This reconnaissance confirmed the
situation of the evening of the 20th. A special aeroplane sent out to
accurately locate the enemy reported that a party of the enemy still held
the Northern portion of EAGLE TRENCH, but that not more than about 40
could be seen.
(b) At 5.20 p.m. on the 21st September a new attack was ordered to take
place at 5.30 a.m. on 22nd September, in conjunction with two tanks, for
the capture of the remaining portion of EAGLE TRENCH. By the special
request of the O.C., 1st Bde. Tanks the role of the infantry detailed for this
attack was to be secondary to that of the tanks who would advance down
the SCHREIBOOM – LANGEMARCK Road and branch off N.E. and E.
towards CHINESE HOUSE and BLUE HOUSE, and endeavour to enfilade
that portion of EAGLE TRENCH still held by the enemy. The infantry
detailed for the attack were to be lined up facing N.E., opposite EAGLE
TRENCH, and at a given signal from the tanks denoting that the enemy
wished to surrender or were retiring, the infantry detachment (which was
to consist of a total of 50) would rush the trench.
This attack did not materialise owing to the fact that the tanks became derelict in LANGEMARCK.

11.
(a) The situation throughout the 22nd remained the same. Endeavours had
been made to extricate the tanks, and it was hoped that these would be
able to take part in the attack on EAGLE TRENCH on the morning of the
23rd. as, however, the arrival of the tanks was problematic an alternative
plan was made, and orders were issued at 4.50 p.m. on the 22nd for a
similar attack with tanks to be carried out as had been ordered on the 21st,
but in the event of the tanks not being available at Zero hour (5.30 a.m.) a
combined attack from the W. and S. was to be made against the portion
of EAGLE TRENCH still holding out, preceded by a hurricane
bombardment by Stokes guns. The attach from the S. to be a bombing
attack covered by a barrage of No. 23 Mills rifle bombs, while the attack
from the W. would be above ground.
The hour fixed for the Stokes bombardment was 7.0 a.m. A smoke
barrage was also arranged; it was placed on a line just S. of KANGAROO
TRENCH opposite the point of attack.
(b) As had been expected the tanks could not extricate themselves from
LANGEMARCK to move forward to their rendezvous on the
LANGEMARCK – SCHREIBOOM Road just E. of LANGEMARCK by the
hour arranged.
(c) At 6.25 a.m. on the 23rd the enemy attacked our posts S.E. of LOUIS
FARM, LOUIS FARM itself, and the CEMETERY. These attacks were
driven back by machine-gun and fire and 22 unwounded and one
wounded prisoner were taken. These prisoners formed part of the 208th
Divl. Sturm Abteilung. Following this attack by the enemy we carried out
the pre-arranged attack at 7.0 a.m., the troops taking part being
detachments of the 12th K.R.R.C. and 10th R.B., totalling about 80 all
ranks. The preliminary three minutes Stokes bombardment was very
effective, and covered by the rifle grenade barrage our assaulting infantry
advanced to the attack, the detachment from the South being the first to
move.
While the enemy in EAGLE TRENCH were engaged with this
detachment, the detachment of the 10th R.B. assaulted EAGLE TRENCH
from the West and carried it, and after a short and sharp fight, in which
our casualties were not heavy 86 unwounded and 8 wounded prisoners
were captured, and in addition 10 M.Gs. Had it not been decided to
attack that portion of EAGLE TRENCH held by the enemy on the morning
of the 23rd a local success might conceivably have been gained by the
enemy and a fresh attack by us on EAGLE TRENCH might have been
necessary; as it was our attack completely upset the enemy’s calculations
and we gained an important success.
(d) The majority of the prisoners belonged to the 208th Div. Sturm Abteilung
who stated that a concerted attack against the Divl. front had been
arranged, the attack to be carried out by a portion of the 185th I.R.
assisted by the Sturm Abteilung. This fact accounted for the large
number of prisoners taken, which, by the evening of the 23rd reached the
satisfactory figure of one Officer and 102 O.R.
An aeroplane reported at 9.25 a.m. that 16 Germans still remained in
EAGLE TRENCH in the fork of the road between SCHREIBOOM – RED
HOUSE and SCHREIBOOM – KORTEBEEK FARM Roads.
Subsequently it became known that the 16 Huns seen by the aeroplane
were dead Germans.
From the night of the 18th/19th September to the 23rd September there
was little or no cover for the troops, except existing shell holes and a few
concrete dugouts; during the whole of this time they were exposed to
heavy shelling day and night and yet these were the troops which carried
out the attack on the 23rd September. It had been decided not to relieve
the 59th and 60th Inf. Bdes. until the night of the 23rd/24th September, by
which time it was expected that the situation in EAGLE TRENCH would
have been cleared up.
12.
(a) The information elicited from the prisoners is of interest:-
The 208th Div Sturm Abteilung, consisting of about 200 men, were used against us for local attacks. This detachment attacked our right near WHITE HOUSE on the 16th September, but were so heavily engaged by our Artillery that it never reached out lines and retired with about 60 casualties.
On the evening of the 20th it carried out an unsuccessful patrol, losing 24 men, 8 of whom were taken prisoners. Practically all the Sturm Abteilung were either captured or killed after their attack on LOUIS FARM, the CEMETERY, and EAGLE TRENCH on the morning of the 23rd.
The 185th I.R. had suffered very heavily during our attacks and its third battalion was practically wiped out. It was no longer able to hold its sector, and the 25th I.R. which had suffered less was placed in support of the 185th I.R.
During the period under review the effectives of the regiments opposed to us had been reduced by over 30%; their fighting qualities and morale were much shaken, and they were unable to carry out any decided counter-attack.

13. By the evening 23rd the 59th and 60th Inf. Bdes. were well established on the line LOUIS FARM, the CEMETERY, CHINESE HOUSE and BEAR TRENCH, and the 61st Inf. Bde. took over the line on the 23rd/24th; the 59th and 60th Inf. Bdes. being withdrawn to the MALAKOFF AREA and CANAL AREA respectively.
The task of the 61st Inf. Bde. during the next few days was to straighten the line in order that the relieving Divisions (4th and 29th ) might have a good jumping off line for the further operations which were contemplated. This was effected by the evening of the 27th/28th.
Patrols which had gone out nightly had not discovered the enemy in any strength in KANGAROO TRENCH. The enemy made no attempt to drive us out of our newly captured positions, but contented himself with heavily shelling the whole area and especially the region between our front line and the STEENBEEK STREAM.

14. Between the 12th and 26th September a total of two Officers and 156 O.R. were taken prisoner by the Division. They belonged chiefly to the 185th I. R. and the Sturm Abteilung of the 208th Div.

15. The 61st Inf. Bde. was relieved in the line by the 12th Inf. Bde. (4th Div.) on the night of the 28th/29th September, and at 10.0 a.m. on the 29th the G.O.C. 20th Div. handed over commands of the Right Sector, XIVth Corps Front to the G.O.C. 4th Div. while the 20th Div. was withdrawn to the PROVEN Area into Corps Reserve.

(Sd) W. Douglas Smith
Major General,
Commanding 20th Division.
1st October, 1917.