Account of 56 Division Operations September & October 1916.

Account of 56 Division Operations September & October 1916.

School
Stamp of
General Staff
56th Division
No OG 58
SECRET
ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY 56th DIVISION
DURING SEPTEMBER and OCTOBER, 1916.
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1. On the 23rd August the 56th Division arrived in the St. RIQUIER Training area and remained there until September 3rd, when the Division moved partly by road and partly by rail to CORBIE.
During the stay of the Division at S. RIQUIER information was received that the Division would take part in offensive operations in co-operation with the Heavy Section Machine Gun Corps, and each Brigade had an opportunity of practicing with the Tanks during its stay at S. RIQUIER.
On the arrival of the Division at CORBIE orders were received for the Division to proceed at once to the forward area with a view to going into the line to relieve the 5th Division on the extreme right of the British front.
On the afternoon of the 5th September the 168th Infantry Brigade proceeded to MARICOURT SIDING and came under the orders of the 5th Division, the remainder of the Division moving up to the CITADEL and HAPPY VALLEY.
Divisional Headquarters opened at the FORKED TREE (L.2.b.0.9.) at 10 a.m. on 6th September.
On the night 6th/7th the 56th Division relieved the 5th Division in the line in accordance with 56th Divisional Order No. 31. Divisional Headquarters was established at BILLON FARM on the morning of the 7th September.

2. On the 6th September a Warning Order was received from the XIVth Corps that it was intended to renew the offensive with the 16th and 56th Divisions on the line T.27.b.3½.4 ½. – 141.7 East of GINCHY. This operation was to be carried in co-operation with the XVth Corps, and was originally intended to take place on the 8th but was postponed to the 9th September.

3. In view of the offensive operations mentioned in the preceding paragraph, 56th Divisional Order No 33 was issued ordering the attack to be carried out by the 169th Infantry Brigade on the right and the 168th Infantry Brigade on the left with the 167th Infantry Brigade in Divisional Reserve.

The 169th Infantry Brigade assembled in LEUZE WOOD and the 168th Infantry Brigade in assembly trenches that were dug just South of LEUZE WOOD – GINCHY ROAD. The hour for the assault was fixed for 4.45 p.m. By 6.0 p.m. the 168th Infantry Brigade were reported to have reached all their objectives also the left battalion (Q.V.R.) of the 169th Infantry Brigade.
The situation as regards the 5th Londons (L.R.B.) on the extreme right was obscure. Information was also received that the left Brigade of the 16th Division had reached its final objective East of GINCHY, but that the right brigade had not made progress and was approximately on the line of the road from T.29.a.1.4. T.20.c.1.5. to T.20.d.3.2. where they connected up with our own troops. It was also reported that there was a fair number of Germans still about T.20 central.
The 169th Infantry Brigade was instructed to clear up the situation on its right flank by putting in its reserve battalion if necessary, and the 168th Infantry Brigade was ordered to put in its reserve battalions from about the Northern corner of LEUZE WOOD on a North Westerly direction so as to surround the Germans in T.20 central by joining up with the left brigade of the 16th Division along the GINCHY – 141.7 road.
In order to carry this out the 168th Brigade ordered the Kensingtons to reinforce the Rangers and the London Scottish to move forward on their left to the line of the GINCHY – 141.7 road.

4. 10th SEPTEMBER. Reports were received during the morning that the left brigade had occupied all its final objectives and that consolidation was proceeding; also that the London Scottish had succeeded in reaching GINCHY – 141.7 and were extending Westward so as to obtain touch with the Guards who had relieved the 16th Division and were supposed to be in position in trenches due East of GINCHY.
The day was misty and no confirmation of our situation could be obtained from the air. The London Scottish reported that they had failed to obtain touch with the Guards about T.14.c. On the right of the divisional front from the Q.W.R’s carried out an attack at 7.0 a.m. with the object of gaining the QUADRILATERAL due East of LEUZE WOOD but this attack failed.

5. On the evening of the 10/11th, arrangements were made for the 167th Infantry Brigade to take over the line held by the 168th Infantry Brigade, and a composite brigade of the 5th Division relieved the 169th Infantry Brigade on the Southern half of the 56th Divisional front. During the morning of the 11th, , reports were received that our troops holding the QUADRILATERAL had been driven out previous to the relief taking place, and that the Northern extremity of our line now rested at T.21.a.4.8.. It also transpired that the London Scottish were not holding the line of the GINCHY-141.7 road but that they had on the previous day apparently lost direction in the mist and were occupying the trench facing North East in T.21.a. This situation was definitely confirmed by air reconnaissance during the afternoon which showed that the QUADRILATERAL in T.15.c. was in German hands. The 167th Bde made several attempts to gain a footing in the QUADRILATERAL but met with no success, chiefly owing to machine gun fire from T.20.b.
As the efforts to surround the Germans in T.20 had not proved successful, Corps decided that an attack against the enemy in this neighbourhood would be carried out as a separate operation by the 6th Division on the 13th instant, and the front held by the Division was consequently altered in accordance with 56th Divnl Order No 35. This operation however, did not meet with success. On the night of the 13/14th the Composite Brigade of the 5th Division was relieved by the 169th Infantry Brigade.

6. Orders were now received from the Corps that the main offensive would be renewed on the 15th instant, and that the main task of the 56th Division on the right would be the clearing of BOULEAUX WOOD and the formation of a protective flank covering all the lines of advance from COMBLES and the valleys running N.E. from COMBLES. The capture of MORVAL and LESBOEUFS was to be undertaken by the 6th and Guards Divisions.

7. Orders and instructions for the attack on the 15th instant were contained in 56th Divisional Orders No 37 and 38 which included instructions for the use of tanks, three of which were allotted to this Division. The 169th Infantry Brigade were again formed up on the right with the 167th Brigade on the left and the 168th Brigade in the rear, with orders to pass through 167th Brigade and to secure the right flank of the 6th Division in its attack on MORVAL. The attack was fixed for 5.50 am. and was carried out according to time-table. As regards the three tanks allotted to the Division, the male tank broke down on its way to the point of assembly owing to engine trouble, and this tank never came into action. One female tank rendezvoused at the S.W. corner of LEUZE WOOD and got as far as T.27.b.4.7., but was unable to proceed any further. The third tank cruised about the Northern side of BOULEAUX WOOD, but finally stuck at T.21.b.2.2.

The attack of the 169th Infantry Brigade failed to make much progress, and the bombing attacks of the 167th Infantry Brigade on the same objective were also held up. The attack of the 167th Infantry Brigade was successful as regards its first objective, but the 7th Middlesex, who were ordered to advance to the second objective were held up in BOULEAUX WOOD by hostile machine gun fire.
All efforts to make further ground were without avail. About 8.30 am. reports from out patrols indicated that the attack of the Division on our left was not progressing favourably. Consequently, orders were sent to the 168th Infantry Brigade that they would not keep to the time-table issued with Divisional Orders, but would await instructions from Divisional H.Q. before attempting to pass through 167th Brigade.
The situation on the evening of the 15th September was, therefore, that the 169th Brigade had only obtained a portion of their objective. They had progressed up the LOOP TRENCH as far as T.27.b.8.8., and they were in possession of the COMBLES TRENCH from LEUZE WOOD down as far as the track at T.27.b.4.4.
The 168th Infantry Brigade were holding the main German line running through BOULEAUX WOOD from T.21.b.2.2. to T.21.d.2.7., and had joined up with the 6th Division on our left on the LEUZE WOOD –MORVAL track at T.21.d.8.8.
The 167th Brigade had pushed forward posts into MIDDLE COPSE at T.21.b.2.8.

8. 16th SEPTEMBER. Was spent in consolidating our present position, and beyond a few isolated bombing attacks, no attack on any large scale was carried out to gain further ground.
Owing to the considerable success attained by the Fourth and Reserve Armies on the 15th instant, further attacks were carried out by the Guards Division and by the XVth Corps against LES BOEUFS and GUEUDECOURT. Attacks were timed to start at 9.25 am.

9. 17th SEPTEMBER. Instructions were received from the Corps that minor operations were to be carried out on the following day with a view to obtaining a satisfactory line for a further advance in the near future. The 56th Division were to capture the line T.21.b.7.3. – MIDDLE COPSE, where touch was to be obtained with the 6th Division. This attack was to be carried out at 5.50 am. on the 18th instant. The objectives of the 56th Division were allotted as follows. 169th Infantry Brigade to complete the capture of the QUADRILATERAL East of LEUZE WOOD. General direction of attack, S.W. to N.E. the 167th Infantry Brigade were to make good the S.E. face of BOULEAUX WOOD up to T.21.b.7.3., and secure a line thence to MIDDLE COPSE inclusive. The general direction of attack was to be from W. to E. the 4th Londons and the 14th London Scottish were attached to the 167th Infantry Brigade for this operation.
Rain started to fall on the evening of the 17th instant, so that the whole country very soon became a mass of mud, and progress over the ground near LEUZE WOOD, which was badly pitted with “crump” holes, became a matter of extreme difficulty.
The result was, that by 5.50 am., the time arranged for the attack, the troops of the left (167th ) Brigade attack had failed to reach their rendezvous. This attack, accordingly never materialised. The right (169th Brigade) attack was carried out under an artillery barrage but it again failed to make good its objectives. The attack was not renewed. The attack of the 6th Division on the QUADRILATERAL was completely successful.
On the evening of the 18th, the 167th Brigade was relieved by the 168th Brigade, while the 169th Brigade continued to hold its present front with orders to consolidate the ground gained and to push down the COMBLES Trench.
A Warning Order had now been received from the XIVth Corps that the general offensive would again be resumed on the 21st September, and that the task of the 56th Division was again to form a protective flank on the line from the N.E. Corner of BOULEAUX WOOD to the Southern end of MORVAL. With this object in view the ground in the vicinity of MIDDLE COPSE was reconnoitred, and instructions were issued for a trench to be dug on the night 19/20th running from the tramline at T.15.d.8.7. through MIDDLE COPSE on to BEEF TRENCH in the vicinity of the Tank at T.21.b.2.2. This trench was successfully dug by the 1/5th Cheshire Regiment and was occupied by troops of the 168th Infantry Brigade on the 20th instant, and on the night of the 20/21st strong points at T.16.c.1.8., T.15.d.9.4., and T.15.d.8.2 were connected up, and this system of trenches was used as assembly trenches for the next offensive.
Information was now received from the Corps that the attack arranged for the 21st inst. had been put off until the 22nd; it was again postponed until the 23rd, and finally postponed until the 25th September.
During this time the Division was busily employed in consolidating the line. On the 23rd instant, a change in the weather occurred and the ground rapidly dried in the fine weather that ensued.
Orders for the attack on the 25th September were issued in 56th Divisional Order No 43, which also contained instructions for the employment of two tanks, and instructions to the Special Brigade R.E., who had orders to create a smoke barrage across the Northern end of BOULEAUX WOOD.
On the 25th September, the task allotted to the 56th Division was the capture of the trench running from the Northern corner of BOULEAUX WOOD up to the tram line at T.16.c.4.6., and the construction of a strong post at the Northern extremity of BOULEAUX WOOD. This was carried out successfully by two battalions of the 168th Infantry Brigade – London Scottish on the left, 4th Londons on the right, who were assembled in RANGER and GROPI Trenches.
The assault of the 168th Brigade was timed seven minutes after zero to allow the troops on our left to come up into line, as we occupied trenches well in advance of the Division on our left. The Royal Fusiliers on the right and the London Scottish on the left advanced to their objectives close under a most efficient enfilade artillery barrage. The Royal Fusiliers reached their objective and cleared the Northern end of BOULEAUX WOOD without great opposition, but they killed a number of Germans who were occupying shell craters on the Western side of the Wood. This battalion suffered from snipers in the Southern part of the Wood, while they were establishing and consolidating the two strong points allotted to them. The London Scottish captured their objective the first German trench running N.E. from the end Corner of BOULEAUX WOOD without much opposition. The Germans were very strongly posted in the railway embankment N. of this trench, and for some time a hot bombing fight took place here. The left assaulting company put out of action and captured four hostile machine guns, but in spite of this suffered losses from the enemy posted in the embankments. This was finally cleared by 1.30 pm. and 80 prisoners were taken and sent back. Meanwhile, the leading company of London Scottish found the trench objective to have a poor field of fire, and also observed Germans driven out of BOULEAUX WOOD by the Royal Fusiliers withdrawing to a second trench running N.E. from the Eastern corner of BOULEAUX WOOD. This was captured, being cleared with the bayonet.
At a low estimate 150 Germans were killed in these operations a certain number escaped in the direction of COMBLES.
Eight prisoners were taken with four machine guns and five medium Minnenwerfer.
The strong points ordered to be made were sited further S.E. to conform with the greater extent of ground captured.
At 5.50 pm. the 2/1st Field Company R.E. and “C” Company 5th Cheshire Regiment were ordered forward to consolidate the ground won. Each section R.E. and each platoon of the pioneers had a definite job allotted to it, and the details of stores required had been worked out, and forward dumps had been formed at BILLON COPSE and at North GROPI Trench.
Touch was obtained with the 5th Division on our left after the embankment was cleared at 1.30 p.m., the 5th Division having exactly obtained the objectives allotted to them. The forward trench captured by the London Scottish was of great value in that it commanded a good view of the valley between MORVAL and COMBLES. Patrols were ordered to move Eastwards but could not at first be pushed far forward owing to our barrage in this valley, but in spite of the barrage our patrols moved several hundred yards East and cleared some dug-outs and captured a few more prisoners.
The Lewis Guns were invaluable in these operations as the dugouts and caves in the embankment were cleared by bombs, the Lewis Guns obtained many good targets as the Germans strived to escape eastwards.
At 10.40 p.m. orders were issued for the blocking of the COMBLES – MORVAL Road to prevent the exit of the garrison of COMBLES. One Officer, 40 O.R. and two Lewis Guns of the London Scottish were moved South along the tram line and established themselves at T.22. Central before dawn. Other posts were established to support them. At dawn our patrols moved down to COMBLES and met French patrols in T.22.d. coming from the Town. From this time on touch was maintained with the French North of COMBLES, and with the 5th Division in the MORVAL – LESBOEUFS Trench line.

10. 26th SEPTEMBER.
During the night of the 25/26th information was received from the French that the enemy proposed to evacuate COMBLES during the night. Brigades were directed to keep constant pressure on the enemy wherever they were in touch, and to patrol actively towards COMBLES from the S.W. N.W. and N. 168th Brigade was directed to block the roads leading from COMBLES towards MORVAL. A heavy barrage was placed across the valley N.E. of COMBLES and the French were asked to continue the barrage to the South, in their own barrage area.
The events of the night can be traced from the following:-
at 12.30 a.m. the enemy was working his end of LOOP TRENCH.
at 3.0 a.m. his bombing blocks opposite our right Bde were still active.
at 2.55 a.m. the enemy evacuated his post behind the derelict tank at T.21.b.2.1. and the 1st Londons had established a post there.
at 3.0 am. patrols from our centre brigade entered the ORCHARDS West of COMBLES.
at 5.30 am. The London Rifle Brigade who had worked down COMBLES TRENCH, obtained touch with the French on the railway.
at 7.0 am. the French occupied the portion of COMBLES south of the railway.
at 7.20 am. reports were received that BOULEAUX WOOD was clear of the enemy.
at 8.0 am. reports were received at 167th Brigade H.Q. that our patrols were in touch with the French along the railway through COMBLES.

It is thought that the bulk of the garrison of COMBLES escaped by the trench running through T.29.a. and b. and N. of FREGICOURT which was not in French hands until early on the 26th. A few small parties who tried to break away north were shot and dispersed by the posts of the London Scottish about T.22. central.
The trophies found in COMBLES were very few –
3 small Minnenwerfer
7small Flammenwerfer
1 large do.
Large quantities of rifles, grenades and ammunition were abandoned there by the enemy.
Progress was made throughout the 26th by all Brigades and the situation on the evening of the 26th was that the 168th and 169th Brigades kept touch with the 5th Division at about T.16.d.9.9. and were holding the line of the road from that point through T.22.d.9.2. Two Companies of the Rangers were situated in SUNKEN ROAD between T.22.b.9.0. and T.22.d.9.0. ready to seize MUTTON TRENCH which runs through T.17.c. and d. as soon as that trench had been dealt with by Tanks. The situation in this trench was that the French were reported at T.23.c.8.6. and that the 5th Division were as far down as T.17.c.8.6. This trench in between, which was strongly wired on its Western side, was strongly held by the Germans.
Instructions were issued for two Tanks to proceed to MORVAL on the afternoon of the 26th with orders to work down in front of MUTTON TRENCH and destroy the wire, and the Rangers who were in SUNKEN ROAD were to occupy the trench, as soon as the Tanks were seen to have accomplished their object. One tank, however, stuck at the southern corner of MORVAL and the second tank stuck near the tram line in T.16.c. so the attack of the Rangers from the SUNKEN ROAD never materialised.

On the 27th inst., another three tanks were allotted to the 20th Division for the purpose of clearing up the situation as regards MUTTON TRENCH. This task was, therefore, handed over to the 20th Division and the 56th Division took no further part.

On the evening of the 27/28th the whole of the front was taken over by troops of the 1st and 2nd French Divisions and the 56th Division withdrew to the MEAULTE – SAND PITS and TREUX area.

11. On the morning of the 29th September, Brigades were disposed as follows:-
167th Inf. Bde In the area of SAND PITS & MORLANCOURT.
168th “ “ “ “ “ VILLE-sur-ANCRE & MORLANCOURT.
169th “ “ “ “ “ MEAULTE.
Divnl. Hdqrs BILLON COPSE

There was a conference of Brigadiers and Commanding Officers at H.Q. 169th Inf. Bde. MEAULTE during the morning.

In the afternoon, the preliminary moves as detailed in 56th Divisional Order No. 48 were carried out, the 167th and 169th Brigades moving up into the forward area.

A warning order had been received from the XIVth Corps stating that the Fourth Army would renew the attack on the line LE TRANSLOY – THILLOY – WARLENCOURT – FAUCOURT on or about October 10th, and to enable this to be carried out successfully it was necessary to gain by the 5th October, certain tactical points from which observation of the enemy’s main positions could be obtained.

During the afternoon Divisional Order No. 48 was issued for the relief on the night of the 30/1st October of the 6th and Guards Divisions in the Sector E. of LESBOEUFS.

12. On the 30th September moves detailed in Divisional Order No. 49 were carried out, and at 6.0 pm. Divnl Hdqrs closed at BILLON COPSE and opened at A.10.b.3.8. on the MARICOURT – BRIQUETERIE Road.
On the night of the 30/1st relief was carried out as ordered without incident, and on the morning of the 1st October Brigades were disposed as follows:-
169th Inf. Bde. holding the right subsector, with H.Q. at GUILLEMONT QUARRY.
167th “ “ holding the left subsector, with H.Q. GUILLEMONT STATION.
168th “ “ in reserve in the area TRONES WOOD – BERNAFAY
WOOD, with two battalions at the CITADEL and the Brigade H.Q. at the BRIQUETERIE.

At 7.0 am., with a view to co-operating with operations further N., a heavy bombardment of the LE TRANSLOY line and other selected points commenced and lasted until 3.15 pm. when the XIVth Corps opened an intense barrage on the enemy’s defences on its front. Under cover of this barrage patrols were pushed out with a view to establishing themselves on a line running approximately parallel to the Divisional front at a distance varying from 500 to 300 yards from it.

The patrols left our trenches and advanced apparently without difficulty. It was not until the evening that the left battalion of the left brigade reported all objectives gained and parties digging in. The right battalion of the left brigade reported RAINY TRENCH occupied by one platoon with posts pushed forward to the Crest – The report about the posts was not correct. The position of the patrols of the right brigade was obscure because although the patrols got forward, it was definitely reported by airmen that the trenches in T.5.c. central were strongly held by the enemy. A further air report showed our occupation of RAINY TRENCH doubtful, but subsequent events proved that it was undoubtedly in our possession.

13. During the night 1/2nd the 169th Infantry Brigade dug a trench parallel to and E. of FOGGY TRENCH, but it was some days before its position could be accurately determined owing to lack of aeroplane photographs.

14. On the morning of the 2nd October, 167th Brigade reported that they were uncertain as to whether RAINY TRENCH was held by them, but they had joined up a line of posts from N.34.b.0.9. to N.34.d.3.3.

During the night 2nd/3rd the right brigade took over 500 yards of the front line from the left brigade so that on the morning of the 3rd the Divisional front was held by 2 Battalions of the right brigade and 1 Battalion of the left brigade. This move was preparatory to relieving the 169th Brigade by the 168th during the night of the 3rd/4th the intention being to reduce the left brigade to a one battalion front in order to avoid the necessity for relief.

15. 3rd October. By this time it had been ascertained definitely that we were in occupation of RAINY TRENCH, and that DEWDROP immediately East of it was strongly held by the enemy.

During the night 3rd/4th the relief of the 169th Brigade by the 168th Brigade was carried out. Before the relief took place, the London Rifle Brigade seized and occupied at 8.30 pm. the length of isolated trench T.5.c. afterwards known as GERMAN TRENCH. This was connected up the same night by a communication trench to the trench immediately West of it (MUGGY TRENCH), and thence to our front line at FOGGY TRENCH.

16. 4th October. GINCHY and the area immediately North of it were frequently shelled throughout the day. A flight of 5 Hostile Aeroplanes over our lines preceded the commencement of the shelling.

On account of the extremely wet weather the renewal of the attack which had been arranged to take place on the 5th was definitely postponed for 48 hours.

17. 5th October. – was uneventful except for the usual shelling of our trench system and valleys to the West of LESBOEUFS.

18. 6th October. – intermittent shelling of our front line trenches by the enemy with occasional heavy bursts of 77 mm. fire. No enemy movement was observed but his snipers were active throughout the day. During the evening, a flight of four enemy aeroplanes reconnoitred over LE TRANSLLOY LESBOEUFS and MORVAL, and were fired on by our anti-aircraft guns and infantry.

From the 1st up to this date a considerable amount of digging had been done by our troops, so as to make a connected trench system which was necessary for launching the attack due to take place on the 7th. This work was greatly impeded by the wet weather which also prevented the taking of aeroplane photographs. Consequently it was exceedingly difficult to obtain correct information as to the position of our own troops and those of the enemy. It was known that the latter was occupying a number of short lengths of trench and gun pits between his main line in front of LE TRANSLOY and our own front system. Reports received from patrols indicated that the whole of RAINBOW and SPECTRUM TRENCHES were wired through; this was contradicted by a special aeroplane reconnaissance. The only definite positions known to be held by the enemy were RAINBOW, SPECTRUM, DEWDROP, Gun Pits in T.5.a. and HAZY TRENCH. It was suspected that DEWDROP and SPECTRUM had been connected by a trench.
The wet weather made living conditions extremely bad, this added to the length of time the troops had been engaged in offensive operations, and the hostile shelling had considerably lowered the fighting efficiency of the Division.

During the night 6th/7th the Divisional front had been readjusted to allow of two battalions of 167th Brigade and three battalions of 168th Brigade being in the front line.

19. 7th October. – shewed improved weather conditions. The task of the 56th Division in the attack which was to take place at 1.45 pm. was divided into two portions, the first objective was the capture of the Southern portion of RAINBOW TRENCH, SPECTRUM, DEWDROP, and HAZY TRENCHES; the second was to push forward a further 500 yards and establish a line within assaulting distance of the enemy’s main TRANSLOY line. This second position was to be strengthened by numerous strong points, communication was to be obtained with the 20th Division on the left, and our right flank slightly advanced to gain and keep touch with the 56th French Division on the right.
A heavy bombardment of the enemy’s position was maintained throughout the morning; this was not to be increased before zero hour for fear of disclosing our intention to attack. The assault under cover of a standing and creeping barrage was so arranged that troops which were farthest away from their objectives started at Zero hour and the remainder at varying times according to the distances to be covered so that all assaulting waves should reach their first objectives simultaneously along the Divisional front. This expedient was necessary owing to the fact that it had been impossible to construct a continuous line parallel to that held by the enemy, and a barrage conforming exactly to our irregular line of departure trenches would have been dangerous.

The first reports received showed that the infantry went forward well, and it was shortly afterwards reported that they had gained their first objective. However, this later proved to be incorrect. The left battalion of the left brigade (7th Middlesex Regt.) having reached its first objective and occupied it after some minutes of hand to hand fighting in which they succeeded in capturing a number of prisoners (70 odd). The right battalion (1st London Regt.) of the left brigade was not so successful although it was repeatedly reported that it had taken SPECTRUM trench. Actually the left company of the 1st London Regt reached its objective in SPECTRUM, bombed up to the left, where it obtained touch with the 7th Middlesex Regiment. Several Germans were killed and a machine gun captured. The right brigade were reported as having captured all their first objectives and at 2.15 pm. observers reported seeing troops move forward to their final objective. The first definite information received was from an aeroplane report at 4.3 pm. which stated that the situation at HAZY TRENCH was doubtful but it was thought that this trench was in our hands. The enemy could be seen in occupation of the gun pits at T.5.a.4.7. The attack on DEWDROP and SPECTRUM TRENCHES had failed, but we had gained and were holding RAINBOW TRENCH. The observer stated that owing to the strong wind that was blowing he was unable to vouch for the accuracy of his report. Shortly afterwards the right brigade reported that the advance of their left battalion was being held up by two machine guns in the gun pits T.5.a.4.7. Reserve companies were pushed forward with a view to assisting the advance, but they in their turn failed to dislodge the enemy from this point. Up to nightfall, no further definite information was received. At 6.45 pm. the following orders were issued: – Right Brigade (i) to push out a company from RAINBOW TRENCH and establish a strong point at N.35.a.3.9. and round up the enemy occupying SPECTRUM and connect up with a post which was reported to have reached N.35.a. central. (ii) to dig a trench 200 yards W. of SPECTRUM from which a further attack could be launched if necessary. One battalion from the reserve brigade (169th Infantry Brigade) was placed at the disposal of the 167th Brigade. 168th Brigade was to ascertain whether or not DEWDROP was held by the enemy. (I) If found empty it was to be occupied and posts established to connect between N.35.a. central and HAZY TRENCH. The battalion from the reserve brigade which had been sent up earlier could be used for this purpose. (II) If DEWDROP was held by the enemy a new trench was to be dug 200 yards to the West to admit of bombardment should a new attack be launched. The organisation of a fresh attack was to depend on the reports received from the 168th Brigade as to whether DEWDROP was held by the Germans.
On receipt of information as to the position of the right flank of the 20th Division our left brigade was ordered to obtain touch with it about the Southern end of MISTY TRENCH.

About 7.30 pm. a report was received that we had a footing in the Northern end of SPECTRUM TRENCH where a machine gun had been captured and further progress was being made by bombing.

At 9.10 pm. a message was received stating that the French on our right had fallen back to their line of departure, that the right battalion of the right brigade had been counter-attacked and forced to withdraw from HAZY TRENCH, and the gun pits in T.5.a. central to the trenches from which they had delivered their assault in the morning. By this hour it was definitely ascertained that the Germans were in occupation of DEWDROP.

20. On receipt of instructions from Corps Headquarters orders were issued for the attack to be renewed on HAZY, DEWDROP and that portion of SPECTRUM not in our hands on the morning of the 8th . The night which was comparatively quiet was spent in digging the necessary trenches and re-organising troops for the attack on the forthcoming day.

Owing to our proximity to the objective it was necessary to withdraw from the Northern end of SPECTRUM TRENCH and from RAINY TRENCH so as to allow of the bombardment of SPECTRUM and DEWDROP Trenches.

21. To enable the attack to be carried out, two battalions of the reserve brigade were placed at the disposal of 168th Brigade and one battalion at the disposal of 167th Brigade. These were to be employed either for carrying out the attack or for assisting in the digging of the necessary trenches. As it was unavoidable that the order should be issued very late at night, great difficulty was experienced in getting the troops into position and it was not until daylight that the last battalion reached its assembly trenches. Arrangements for the bombardment and the artillery support were similar to those of the previous day except as regards the barrage. On the 7th RAINY TRENCH was occupied by our troops, and the barrage on DEWDROP was provided by Stokes Mortars. On the 8th in order to allow the artillery barrage to reach DEWDROP, RAINY TRENCH had to be evacuated. Several adjustments of the barrage had to be made, as many batteries owing to the short range were unable to clear LESBOEUFS and hit DEWDROP TRENCH. This readjustment of lines of fire may have been responsible for the thinness of the barrage on the 8th. The assaulting troops, however, left their assembly trenches at Zero hour irrespective of the distances from their objectives. The bombardment by the heavy artillery was not successful, chiefly owing to the difficulty of observation caused by the weather conditions, and many shells were reported to be falling very short. Shortly after Zero a report from an F.O.O. stated that our infantry were advancing along our whole front and that the enemy could be seen leaving their trenches and running back over the rise. This, however, was not the case and at 3.55 pm. a message was received from the left brigade which stated that their attack had been held up by heavy German barrage and machine gun fire and had definitely failed. On the other hand, the left battalion of the right brigade were reported to be progressing favourably. No definite reports were received as to progress of the right and centre battalions of the right brigade until later in the afternoon when a report was received from a wounded officer of the battalion on the extreme right that he had seen his company go through the gun pits in T.5.a. central and enter HAZY TRENCH. At this time reports from wounded tended to show that the extreme right had got to its final objective. No definite news, however, was to hand as regards DEWDROP TRENCH until a message was received that the situation of the right battalion as discovered by the personal reconnaissance of the Commanding Officer was as follows:- His battalion were digging in just West of HAZY TRENCH which was held by the Germans. His left was in touch with the centre battalion about T.5.a.5.9. and his right at T.5.a.7.3. The centre battalion appeared to be East of DEWDROP. The position of the French on the right was unknown.

22. 9th October. At 12.10 am. the O.C. of the centre battalion returned from personal reconnaissance and reported that DEWDROP and RAINY TRENCHES were held by the enemy and that his battalion was back at its departure line having been heavily counter-attacked at dusk from the direction of DEWDROP. It was also ascertained that the same counter-attack succeeded in dislodging the right battalion which appeared to have been digging in in prolongation of RAINY TRENCH, in a Southerly direction, bringing back with them 17 prisoners and a machine gun.

On the morning of the 9th the situation was that with the exception of our gains in SPECTRUM trench, we were back in our departure line, RAINY TRENCH apparently having been occupied by the enemy during our bombardment of the 8th.

During the early hours of the morning 167th Brigade had succeeded in digging a continuation of WINDY TRENCH for several hundred yards in a S.E. direction thus forming a more or less continuous line along the Divisional front.

23. During the night of the 9th/10th the Division was relieved in the line by the 4th Division and withdrawn to the back area.
C Hull
Major-General,
Commanding 56th Division.
Head Qrs. 56th Divn.
29th October, 1916.

56 Division casualties June 14 to October 1916.

56 Division casualties June 14 to October 1916.

CASUALTIES.

PERIOD DIED OF WOUNDS KILLED WOUNDED MISSING TOTALS
Off O.Rs. Off O.Rs. Off O.Rs. Off O.Rs. Off O.Rs.
JUNE 14th to JUNE 30th 1916
JULY 1st to JULY 4th 1916
JULY 5th to AUGUST 20th 1916
SEPTEMBER 6th to OCTOBER11th ’16 1
1

8 –
3
1

2 3
30
3

81 66
347
83

1148 23
87
20

258 405
2277
412

4943 –
40
1

30 26
1497
22

1680 27
158
24

377 497
4124
518

7773
TOTALS 10 6 117 1644 388 8037 71 3225 586 12912

53 Infantry Brigade scheme of attack Poelcappelle 16 October 1917

53 Infantry Brigade scheme of attack Poelcappelle 16 October 1917

SECRET.
Scheme of attack on HELLES HO, – THE BREWERY, – NOBLES FM. –MEUNIER HO. –TRACAS FM.
———————————————————————————-
Phase I (Zero) attack on HELLES HO & THE BREWERY.
8th Norfolk R. 2 Cos & 2 Pns will form up on the approximate line V.19.b.35.90. – V.13.d.9.6. and will capture that portion of POELCAPPELLE still in the enemy’s hands including the BREWERY and S.Ps V.20a.4.5. & 7.7.
1 Co will form up on the approximate line V.14.c.0.4. – V.14.c.0.9. 1 Pn of this Co will capture the enemy trench from V.14.c.3.5. to 2.8.
2 Pns less 1 L.G. Sec will move N. of REQUETE round the swamp and attack the HELLES HO Group from the North.
2 Pns will be in Bn. Reserve.
Phase II (Zero +4) attack on MEUNIER HO & NOBLES FM.
10th Essex R. 1 Co. plus 2 Pns will form up on the approximate line V.20.a.0.3. – 5.8.
1 Co will capture MEUNIER HO & Ridge.
2 Pns will capture S.Ps V.20.a.1.1. & 20.c.35.99.
1 Co will form up on the approximate line V.20.a.8.8. – V.14.c.65.15.and capture the NOBLES FM area. Smoke barrage to be put on to cover our forming up.
Phase III (Zero +5) attack on TRACAS FM & BEEK HOUSES.
1 Co & 2 Pns 10th Essex R. will form up on the approximate line V.20.c.2.9. – 20.c.7.4. and will attack BEEK HOUSES and TRACAS FM from the N.W.
2. During Phase I standing barrages will be required as follows –
NOBLES FM Pt V.20.b.3.8. – MEUNIER HO – PAPA FM – CAMERON HO (in case of M.G. barrage).
During Phase II standing barrages will be required as follows –
PAPA FM.
CAMERON HO
TRACAS FM
BEEK HOUSES

During Phase III standing barrages will be required as follows –
CAMERON HO
PAPA FM & HINTON FM.
MORAY HO
3. the present front line will be held very lightly by troops of the 8th Suffolk R. or 6th R. Berks. R.
As soon as all objectives have been gained these troops will be re-organized & formed into a Reserve.

H.W. Higginson,
Brig Gen.
Comg 53rd Inf. Bde.
16.10.17.

41st Divisional Artillery Operation Order No. 18. 26 September 1916

SECRET
Ref. FLERS – GUEUDECOURT
Sheet 1/10,000
41st Divisional Artillery Operation Order No. 18.
I. INTENTION. G.O.C., 55th Division intends to take the GIRD TRENCH and SUPPORT from N.26.a.5.9. to N.19.b.3.2.

II. ZERO HOUR and date will be notified later (probably noon September 27th.)

III. BARRAGES.
(a) There will be a Stationary and creeping barrage in the present Left, Left Centre, and Right Centre Zone.
(b) There will be a stationary barrage only in the Right Zone.

IV. CREEPING BARRAGE will be carried out by the 189th , 190th., 187th. Brigades R.F.A., each in its own zone.
The whole STATIONARY BARRAGE by the 21st Divisional Artillery each Brigade in its own zone with the exception that 95th Brigade extends up to a line NORTH and SOUTH through N.19 central.

V. The 183rd Brigade, R.F.A., will be allotted special tasks vide para. VIII.

VI. CREEPING BARRAGE will be placed
(a) At zero hour 150 yards NORTH of our present line which runs as follows:- N.20.d.1.0. – N.19.c.9.2.
(N.B. this line must be carefully verified by liaison Officers with the Infantry)
(b) At 0.3 Creeper advances at 50 yards per minute to line :- N.20.c.75.30. – N.20.c.7.51/2. – N.20.c.5 ½ .8. – N.20.a.2 ½ .0. – N.19.b.4.4 ½ .
And remain on this line till further orders.

VII. STATIONARY BARRAGE.:-
(a) At 0.0 hour on line:-
N.20.d.9½.2. – N.20.d.2.3½. – N.20.d.1½.8. – N.20.c.8½.8½ . and remain in this line till further orders.
(b) (1). At 0/.0 hour on line:-
GIRD TRENCH from N.20.c.2½.2. to N.19.d.0.9.
(2). At 0.3 hours:-
Stationary barrage from N.19.d.9½.4½. – N.19.d.0.9. lifts direct on to GIRD SUPPORT from N.20.c.½ .7½. to N.19.b.0.2½.
(3). At 0.3 hours stationary barrage from:-
N.19.d.9½.4½. to N.20.c.2½.2.
searched back 50 yards per minute to a line N.20.c.8 ½.8 ½. – N.20.a.2.3.,
and remain till further orders.
(4). At 0.7 minutes stationary barrage in b (2) Advances from line N.20.c. ½ .7½. – N.19.b.0.2½. – N.19.b.0.9. and remains till further orders.
N.B. Right flank of Stationary barrage follows a line:-
N.20.a.2½.2. – N.20.c.4.4½. – N.20.c.8½.8½.

VIII. 183rd Brigade R.F.A. will carry out the following tasks:-
(a). Search LIGNY-TILLOY-FACTORY CONNER ROAD from N.19.b.5.8.
as far north as possible.
(b). Search tracks from N.20 Central and N.20.b.7.0., Northwards towards LIGNY TILLOY.
(c). Search track from N.20.b.7.0. towards N.15.a.5.0.
Above will be dealt with with sharp bursts of fire at frequent intervals from zero onwards.
(d). Will sweep to cover all dead ground between above mentioned tracks and roads.
(e). Officer Commanding, 183rd Brigade, will detail a special Battery to engage any fleeting targets.

IX. RATES OF FIRE for all Barrages.
(a). From 0.0 to 0.3 hours 2 rounds per gun per minute.
(b) “ 0.3 to 0.8 hours 3 “ “ “ “
(c). “ 0.8 to 0.38 hours 2 “ “ “ “
(d). “ 0.38 to 1.38 hours 1 round per gun per two minutes
(e). “ 1.38 onwards bursts of fire equivalent to 1 round per gun per four
minutes.
X. (a). 4.5” HOWS of all Brigades will carry out a slow and methodical bombardment of GIRD TRENCH and GIRD SUPPORT from N.30.c.2½.1½. – N.19.b.3.2. from 5 hours before zero to zero hour.
D/187 assisting D/189 in Left zone.
D/183 “ D/190 in Left Centre Zone
Hows of 94th and 95th Brigades on Left and Left Centre zones.
Special attention being paid to strong points at:-
N.19.d.3.9½.
N.19.b.3.2.
N.19.b.4½.8. and
N.13.b.8.3.
(b). From Zero hour onwards 4.5” Hows will deal with all strong points, sunken roads, and road junctions, in their original Brigade zones North of the final line of creeping barrage.
RATES of FIRE for HOWS.
(a). during bombardment
1 round per gun per 4 minutes.
(b). after zero hour, as in (a) except for special targets of fleeting opportunities.

XI. Forward guns of 183rd Brigade and 95th Brigade will assist close support to our Infantry and deal with favourable targets as offered.

XII. There is no limit to Ammunition (18 pdr or 4.5” How).
Every endeavour should be made to have a dump of:-
450 rounds per 18 pdr. Gun
300 “ “ 4.5” How.
At or near the guns at zero hour.

XIII. During the bombardment by 4.5” Hows., i.e. from -5 hours to 0.0 hours 18 pdrs will carry out normal day firing, searching all dead ground in their own zones at a slow rate of fire.

XIV. Diagrams of barrage will, if possible, be issued.

XV. Watches will be synchronised at a convenient hour before zero hour.

XVI. Arrangements as to Liaison Officers:-
Divisional Artillery O.P. and M.T.Ms will be the same as for attack on September 25th. (vide 41st Divisional Artillery Order No. 17 and Appendices).

XVII. ACKNOWLEDGE by Wire.
C.M. Ling***
BRIGADE MAJOR,
41st Divisional Artillery.
26.9.16.
HHP

20th Division report 15 September 1916

G.S. 555/60
20th Division

XIV Corps

With reference to my G.S. 555/60 dated 5th inst.
I submit herewith a complete narrative of the operations undertaken by the troops under my command on the 3rd, 4th and 5th September. I would particularly call the Corps Commander’s attention to my recommendations made in para 14. This was compiled by Lieut. Colonel James who was acting as G.S.O. I during the operation.

(sd) W. Douglas Smith, Major General,
15th Sept. 1916.
Commanding 20th Division

NARRATIVE OF THE OPERATIONS

Carried out by the 20TH (LIGHT) DIVISION

On 3rd, 4th and 5th SEPTEMBER, 1916

CONTENTS.

1. Movements previous to the attack.
2. Strength of the Infantry Brigades employed.
3. Dispositions and Orders for the attack. Push pipes and Flammenwerfers.
4. Attack on the first objective.
5. Attack on the second objective.
6. Attack on the third objective.
7. Attempt to capture fourth objective.
8. Events on 4th September.
9. Events on 5th September.
10. Casualties.
11. Work of the R.E. and Pioneers.
12. Work of the Signal Company.
13. Lessons to be learnt from the Operation.
14. Recommendations.

LIST OF APPENDICES.

APPENDIX 1. Revised Operation Orders of 27th August and covering minute.
2. Orders for the defence of GUILLEMONT.
3. Operation Order No. 95.
4. Operation Order No. 96.
5. Operation Order No. 97.
6. Operation Order No. 98.
7. Report on the communications of the 20th Division during the operation.

LIST OF MAPS

MAP A. Showing objectives.
B. Showing the Artillery Barrages.
C. Showing positions of Assembly.
D. Showing Dispositions at 12.30 p.m. on 3rd September.
E. Showing Dispositions at 1.30 p.m. on 3rd September.
F. Showing Dispositions at 3.45 p.m. on 3rd September.
G. Showing Dispositions at 2. a.m. on 4th September.

OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE 20TH (LIGHT) DIVISION
On 3rd, 4th, and 5th September.

1. Movements previous to the attack.

The Operations carried out by my Division on the 3rd September had, as you are aware, originally been planned to commence on August 24th, but, owing to various causes, including inclement weather, they were postponed from time to time and the attack was not actually launched until noon on 3rd instant.
These unavoidable delays, owing to the inclement weather, gave rise to a considerable amount of sickness, chiefly due to trench feet and diarrhoea which, together with considerable casualties, reduced the fighting strength of the Infantry to a serious extent.
This reduction of strength, combined with persistent bombardment with gas shells, rendered it necessary to with-draw the 60th Inf. Bde. from the left sector of the Divisional front and to replace it by the 47th Infantry Brigade which you placed at my disposal for that purpose. The 60th Infantry Brigade was relieved successfully on 31st August and was placed in Divisional Reserve at Carnoy.
On the night 2nd/3rd September the 59th Infantry Brigade reinforced by 6th Battn Ox & Bucks L.I. (from 60th Brigade) relieved the 61st Infantry Brigade in the Right sector of the line, and the 47th Infantry Brigade took up its battle position in the Left Sector. When relieved the 61st Infantry Brigade fell back into Divisional Support. This Brigade had orders to place one battalion at the disposal of each of the two assaulting Brigades to assist in capturing the fourth objective should it be found that by that time they were unable to do so with the troops of their own Brigades. The remaining two battalions were ordered to move forward and occupy positions as they were vacated by other units in their front; in this way a reserve of fresh troops was always at hand to meet any emergency. The two battalions placed at the disposal of the assaulting Brigades viz: 7th Somerset L.I. and 12th King’s Liverpools moved to their battle positions, the Somersets in the trenches between TRONES AND BERNAFAY WOODS, the Liverpools in the trenches in BERNAFAY WOOD itself. The remaining two battalions of this Brigade and the Brigade H.Qrs concentrated at the CRATERS.

2. Strength of Brigades.
The available strength (Actual number of rifles) of the Infantry Brigades at the commencement of the operation was approximately as follows:-
47th Infantry Brigade ….. 2400
59th Inf Bde plus Ox & Bucks. 2300
60th Inf Bde less Ox & Bucks 1000
61st Inf Bde 2253
Total 7953

3. Dispositions and orders for the attack.

Owing to the several occasions on which the attack had been postponed, various slight alterations had to be made to the Operation Orders originally issued. Revised Operation Orders embodying these alterations were therefore issued on the 2nd Sept. and a copy of these orders is attached hereto as Appendix 1. the objectives allotted to the Division are shewn on attached Map “A”.
In accordance with my orders troops under my command occupied the following positions during the night of 2nd/3rd inst., it being impossible to move them into position by daylight.

Right Attack. 59th Inf. Brigade H.Qrs at the BRIQUETERIE.
(a). Front line, from right to left – 11th R.B., 10th R.B., 10th K.R.R., plus one Coy 11th K.R.R.
In Support. – Ox & Bucks L.I. in SHERWOOD TRENCH.
In Reserve. – 11th K.R.R. less one Coy in LIDDEL TRENCH S. of BERNAFAY WOOD.
(b) The 96th Field Coy R.E. and one Coy 11th Durham L.I. Pioneers, attached to 59th Inf. Bde. were divided, one section R.E. being in SHERWOOD TRENCH about S.30.a.9.8., one section R.E. in JACKSON TRENCH about S.30.d.1.7. and the remaining half Coy R.E. and Pioneers in LIVERPOOL TRENCH S.29.d.7.9.

Left Attack. 47th Inf Bde. H.Qrs DUMMY TRENCH.
(a). Front line, from right to left – 6th Connaught Rangers in trenches facing E. and opposite to the QUARRIES, 7th Leinsters in the GRIDIRON TRENCH facing S.E. and practically parallel to BROMPTON ROAD.
In Support – 8th Munster Fusiliers in KNOTT, MIKE, EDWARDS and NEW trenches.
In Reserve – 6th Royal Irish in TRONES and SHERWOOD trenches.
(b) The 83rd Field Coy R.E. and one Coy 11th Durham L.I. Pioneers, attached to the 47th Brigade, were in DUMMY TRENCH behind BERNAFAY WOOD.

Supports to Right and Left attacks – Two battalions detailed from 61st Inf. Brigade viz 7th Somerset L.I. (detailed to support 59th Inf. Bde.) in trenches between TRONES and BERNAFAY WOODS. 12th King’s Liverpools (detailed to support 47th Inf. Bde.) in trenches in BERNAFAY WOOD.

Divisional Reserve. – 61st Inf. Bde. H.Qrs. at BERNAFAY WOOD S.28.b.6.7. The remaining two battalions of this Brigade viz 7th D.C.L.I. and 7th K.O.Y.L.I. moving forwards from the CRATERS with a view to occupying the trenches vacated by the 7th Somersets and 12th King’s Liverpools as soon as the latter battns advanced.
60th Inf. Bde. (less Ox & Bucks L.I.) H.Qrs. THE CRATERS.
11th Durham L.I. Pioneers (less 2 Coys). Trenches W. edge of BERNAFAY 84th Field Coy R.E. ) WOOD.

Artillery. – The attack of the Division was covered by the fire of the Artillery of the 6th and 24th Divisions, and the Corps Heavy Artillery allotted for that purpose. The two Divisional Artilleries were placed under the command of the G.O.C. R.A. 24th Division, Brigadier General L.M. PHILPOTTS. The principles upon which the Divisional Artilleries directed their fire are given in para. 9 of Appendix 1 and the lines upon which stationary barrages were established from time to time are shewn on attached Map ”B”

4. Sept 3rd Attack on the first objective.

During the night of the 2nd/3rd September there was very little shelling and no bombardment with gas shells as there had been on the two previous nights. This was most fortunate for had the troops been forced to move into their battle positions with their gas helmets on, their movements would have been so hampered that in all probability it would not have been possible to complete the assembly before dawn. This would have been serious as the enemy would no doubt have realised the situation, shelled the assembly and communication trenches, and inflicted great loss upon the troops.

As it was, the enemy apparently remained ignorant of the concentration being carried out against them and the early morning passed quietly.

6.0 a.m. At 6.0 a.m. the Corps Heavy Artillery commenced a slow and deliberate bombardment of selected places in the divisional objectives. The Field Artillery co-operated during this bombardment by directing bursts of fire at irregular intervals over the area to be attacked.

8.15 a.m. At 8.15 a.m. a “Chinese Attack” took place and all batteries delivered a rapid burst of fire on the enemy’s front, support and communication trenches.

8.33 a.m. At 8.33 a.m. in accordance with previous arrangements, a special concentration of fire took place upon an area on the North Eastern side of GUILLEMONT which purposely had not been shelled during the preliminary bombardment. The whole of the Divisional Artillery of both the 6th and 24th Divisions concentrated an intense fire on this area known as the TRAP AREA for five minutes. At the same hour four of the field howitzer batteries opened fire with ”Lethal” shell and continued with this nature of projectile until 9.3 a.m.

9 a.m. At 9 a.m. the 5th Division on my right commenced their attack on FALFEMONT FARM supported by an intense bombardment. The enemy did not retaliate heavily on the trenches held by my Division, but contented themselves with shelling the assembly and communication trenches intermittently. This shelling did not inflict any serious losses on the troops and in no way affected their keenness to advance. The attack on FALFEMONT FARM at first resulted only in a partial success, but indirectly it was of great benefit to the subsequent attack of my division as it appeared to convince the enemy that no attack against GUILLEMONT was being prepared.

Noon. The morning passed comparatively quietly and both the 47th and 59th Infantry Brigades reported shortly before ZERO that the situation was as favourable as possible casualties having been very few. 10 seconds before ZERO i.e. Noon – the “Push Pipe” mine driven from the trench at T.30.b.5 ½ 1 ½. towards the hostile strong point at T.30.b.7.2. was exploded and the Flammenwerfer turned on to the same objective. The apparent results of the explosion was somewhat disappointing, as the trench formed was very shallow and only some 120 feet long. The actual results obtained from the combined effects of the explosion and the Flammenwerfer appear, however, to have been satisfactory, for the strong point against which they were directed gave no trouble to the troops during the advance.

The bombardment of GUILLEMONT was not increased in intensity before ZERO, and consequently the enemy had no indication of the infantry assault. At Zero the artillery fire became intense and the rolling barrages commenced.
Whether owing to some mistake in the time, or the keenness of the troops, the leading Companies of the Left Battalion of 59th Brigade, i.e. 10th K.R.R.C. (Note. Owing to the death of the Coy Comdr. It has been impossible to ascertain the reason for the departure from the orders laid down) quitted their trenches slightly before the appointed time and suffered some losses from our own barrage in consequence.

12 noon. The 6th Connaught Rangers on the Right of the 47th Brigade, determined not to be left behind followed suit, and punctually at 12 noon the whole front line of the 59th Brigade and the right battalion of the 47th Brigade pressed on to the assault, close, in fact in some cases too close, under our own barrage.

The enemy was completely taken by surprise, The QUARRIES were taken in the first rush, and there was comparatively little fighting. The enemy surrendered freely.

So impetuous had been the attack of the Connaught Rangers that they passed the QUARRIES without completely clearing them of the enemy. This placed the left flank of the 10th K.R.R.C. in a difficult position for a few moments, but Lieut. Colonel Blacklock, the O.C. of this Battalion detached 5 platoons to clean up behind the right of the Connaught Rangers, and the danger was soon obviated. Great credit is due to this officer for so quickly grasping the situation.

At noon also the left battalion of the 47th Brigade left their trenches and attacked their first objective, the North Western edge of GUILLEMONT. They reached the German line just as the enemy was manning the parapet and mounting a machine gun. Here also the garrison appeared to be taken completely by surprise, and most of the survivors surrendered at once.

12.15 p.m. At 12.15 p.m. the enemy placed a heavy barrage on the TRONES WOOD and the G.O.C. 59th Infantry Brigade asked for as much counter battery work as possible. This was arranged for accordingly.

12.30 p.m. From the aeroplane reports received it appeared that both attacking Brigades had succeeded in occupying their first objective by 12.30 p.m. These reports were confirmed shortly afterwards by the Artillery F.O.O. with the right battalion of the 59th Infantry Brigade.
Whilst the advance was being carried out the two battalions of the 61st Infantry Brigade detailed to support the attacking Brigades, moved forward. The leading battalion, the 7th Somerset L.I. at first occupied the trenches vacated by the 59th Brigade.

Moving on from there its two leading Companies reached the first SUNKEN ROAD from GUILLEMONT S.30. (b) by 12.30 p.m., the Bn Headquarters and two rear companies established themselves in LAMB TRENCH and the trenches about ARROW HEAD COPSE. The enemy had established a heavy barrage on the latter point, and the battalion in consequence suffered a considerable number of casualties.

The second battalion, the 12th King’s Liverpools, following some 20 minutes after ZERO, were advancing in assembly formation through TRONES WOOD to occupy KNOTT, MINE, NEW and EDWARDS trenches.

These two battalions were supported by the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. and 7th D.C.L.I. which were marching up from their billets. The former battalion reached the trenches between BERNAFAY and TRONES WOOD, where they halted.
The disposition of the troops under my Command at this juncture are shown on Map D.

5. Attack on the second objective.

12.50 p.m. The attack on the second divisional objective was timed to take place at 50 minutes after Zero, i.e. 12.50 p.m. At 12.52 p.m. I received a report from my Liaison Officer with the 59th Brigade stating that wounded passing the Brigade Headquarters at ARROW HEAD COPSE were asserting that the second objective has already been taken.

At 1.20 p.m. confirmation of this rumour reached me in the shape of an aeroplane message saying that British troops were holding the GUILLEMONT ROAD running through T.25.b. to 25.c.6.9. A further aeroplane message, received at 1.35 p.m., stated definitely that the whole of the second objective had been taken, that our troops held the Eastern edge of GUILLEMONT and that a Yellow flare had been shown in the SUNKEN ROAD at T.25.b.1.5.

1.30 p.m. This message added that the enemy still held the trench from FALFEMONT FARM to WEDGE WOOD.

It would appear therefore that the capture of the second objective was completed by about 1.30 p.m.

From reports from the Brigades and battalions concerned it seem that when the barrage lifted the whole of the troops in the front line followed close under it and reached the second objective without much difficulty. Some casualties were caused by machine gun and shell fire.

The advance of the right brigade front was carried out by the 11th R.B., 10th R.B., and one Company 10th K.R.R.C. supported by the Oxfords and Bucks on the Right and the 10th K.R.R.C. on the left, with the 11th K.R.R.C. in reserve.
On the left Brigade front the Leinsters and the Connaughts were detailed to consolidate the positions already won, the former dealing with GREEN STREET, the latter with the Western Edge of HILL STREET to its junction with MOUNT STREET. The actual attack on the second objective was therefore executed by the 6th Royal Munster Fusiliers, who passed through the Connaught Rangers, pressed on and captured the Eastern part of the village up to and including NORTH STREET, taking 6 machine guns and a new pattern trench mortar designed to throw darts. The troops at once consolidated the position won, but avoided the actual edge of the village, the line dug in running about 100 yards in advance of the road on the right to about 30 yards in rear of the road on the left. The comparatively few casualties suffered by the troops whilst consolidating their position was due to the judicious line selected, and the importance of not consolidating on a line well-known to the enemy’s artillery such as the edge of a Wood or village, was once more proved.

Whilst the second objective was thus attacked the supporting troops moved forward and the methodical progression of re-inforcements from front to rear was maintained.

The disposition of the troops under my command at the time when the second objective had been taken is shewn on attached map E.

6. 1.30 p.m. Attack on the Third Objective.

As our troops approached the second objective the enemy’s barrage round ARROW HEAD COPSE and TRONES WOOD BECAME HEAVY and the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. moved off to their right front to avoid it. When this barrage became less severe the Officer Commanding the 7th D.C.L.I. ordered his battalion to advance and occupy the trenches between the BERNAFAY and TRONES WOOD which he had seen the K.O.Y.L.I. vacate. The Western edge of GUILLEMONT was also heavily shelled at this time and F.O.O. reported that there was a considerable movement of enemy troops near the cemetery T.19.a. The reports were not very clear as to the direction in which these troops were moving, but in all probability they were the survivors of the GUILLEMONT Garrison retreating. In accordance with my instructions, however, the G.O.C. R.A. 24th Divisional Artillery directed the fire of all the guns he could spare upon this vicinity, and, if the troops seen were men massing for a counter attack, the artillery fire prevented them from delivering it.

2.15-2.25 p.m. At this time the situation as regards the advance of the 5th Division on my right flank was not at all clear. The G.O.C. 59th Infantry Brigade had reported that his right flank was exposed owing to the left brigade of the 5th Division failing to affect its advance. On the other hand I had received aeroplane reports stating that whilst British obviously those of 5th Division, held the German trench T.25.b.1.4. to T.26.c.0.6. German troops were still in the GINCHY GUILLEMONT Road from T.20.c.2.6. to T.26.c.1 ½.5. I also knew that the enemy still occupied the line FALFEMONT FARM to WEDGEWOOD. At 2.20 p.m. I learnt from your Headquarters that the 7th Division had occupied GINCHY and received your orders to co-operate closely with the 5th Division in clearing the trench running from the S.E. point of GUILLEMONT to FALFEMONT FARM by working down from the North. I therefore placed an additional battalion of the 61st Brigade at the disposal of G.O.C. 59th Brigade, but instructed him not to use it unless in case of absolute necessity.

2.40-2.45 p.m. At 2.40 p.m. the G.O.C. 61st Brigade reported that he was moving the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. and 7th D.C.L.I. forward to occupy SHERWOOD and TRONES TRENCHES. At 2.45 p.m. the G.O.C. 59th Brigade reported that the enemy were placing a very heavy barrage on TRONES WOOD and ridge to the South of it, and asked for further re-inforcements in view of the probability of a counter attack on his right flank.

I did not consider that the information I had pointed to there being any serious risk of counter-attack. I therefore contented myself with ordering the G.O.C. 59th Infantry Brigade to form a defensive flank and waited for further information.
3 p.m. This was not long in forthcoming as at 3 p.m. I received a message from the 5th Division stating that their left brigade had captured their 3rd objective, i.e. the trench running from WEDGE WOOD to T.25.b.1.5. and that their right brigade were just about to attack the line FALFEMONT FARM – WEDGE WOOD. Any anxiety that I had felt for my right flank was thus set at rest, but I had not received any very clear information as to the situation on my left. I therefore ordered the 47th Brigade to use every endeavour to link up with the 7th Division and in case of failure to form a defensive flank watching the approaches from GINCHY.

The delays caused by the hand-to-hand fighting in GUILLEMONT itself and the inevitable confusion which arose from the simultaneous assault of that village in front and flank had rendered it impossible for the troops to progress in accordance with the programme laid down in my orders. The G.O.C. R.A. 24th Division, however, maintained a clear grasp of the situation and modified his artillery barrages accordingly and with excellent effect.

3.35 p,m. The G.O.C. 59th Brigade reported that his front line had reached the third objective, the GINCHY – WEDGWOOD road without heavy casualties and that the position gained was being consolidated. The right of his Brigade had not, however, succeeded in gaining touch with the 5th Division. He therefore prolonged his right to the Southward towards T.26.a.0.3. and from that point formed a defensive flank to the S.E. towards T.26.d.5.9., this flank he strengthened with 7 machine guns posted on the line T.25. central to T.26?0.6. The four remaining machine guns he concentrated in the cemetery. The front line defensive flank of the right attack was being held by the following troops from right to left – 7th D.C.L.I. which the G.O.C. 59th Bde. had ordered to move up to his support when I had placed it at his disposal, 6th Ox. & Bucks L.I., 11th R.B., 1 Coy 10th K.R.R.C., 10th R.B., portions of the 96th Field Coy. R.E. The enemy had offered but little opposition to this advance.

Whilst the 59th Brigade was carrying out their advance the 47th Brigade had also moved forward. The Royal Irish advanced from our old front trenches near the station through and to the North East of GUILLEMONT. They experienced great difficulty in keeping their direction owing to the way in which the ground was cut up by shell craters.
MOUNT STREET upon which their right flank was supposed to rest was completely blotted out and only a piece of railing showed where the cemetery had been. They were followed by some of the Munsters whilst the remains of the Leinsters and the Connaughts remained in GUILLEMONT as a reserve. G.O.C. 47th Brigade had not intended the Munsters to advance at this junction, but their ardour could not be restrained and a great many pushed on and joined the Royal Irish. The Royal Irish thus reinforced approached to within 70 yards of the GINCHY – WEDGEWOOD road under hot fire, when the trenches were rushed and the enemy threw down their arms. Over 100 prisoners were taken on this portion of the front and a machine gun was captured. The Lewis guns were properly posted on the flank and a strong point constructed at the junction of MOUNT STREET and the GINCHY – WEDGEWOOD road. The rest of the Munsters came up and advancing some 40 yards beyond the road took up a position with their left running W. of the railway so as to form a defensive flank towards GINCHY.

The fighting in and around the ruins of GUILLEMONT village had in the meantime created some confusion. The G.O.C. 59th Inf. Bde. therefore detached one company of the 6th K.S.L.I. to reinforce the right of the 47th Inf. Bde. Companies of the 10th and 11th K.R.R.C. were also engaged in consolidating the village south of MOUNT STREET, whilst the remainder of the K.S.L.I. had continued their advance through the southern portion of the village. The last remaining company of the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. had also moved forward out of the heavy barrage on TRONES WOOD and had occupied SHERWOOD TRENCH as far south as SCOTTISH TRENCH.
On the left the 12th King’s Liverpools, the battalion of the 61st Brigade specially detailed to support the 47th Brigade, had under instructions from the latter Brigade, occupied our old trenches near GUILLEMONT STATION. Shortly after it reached its new position, this battalion in accordance with instructions received from 47th Bde sent forward two companies to support the Connaught Rangers. Two companies advanced accordingly, and at about 3.45 p.m. when the front line troops were in position in the third objective, had reached the point T.19.c.6.8. without, however, having gained touch with the Connaught Rangers.

During the fighting the 96th Field Coy and attached Coy of Pioneers had reached the road in front of ARROW HEAD COPSE where they halted. The half Coy of the 83rd Field Coy R.E. and the half Coy of Pioneers which had been ordered up from DUMMY TRENCH had succeeded in reaching GUILLEMONT and were assisting the Connaught Rangers to consolidate North Street. The position of the troops under my command at this time are shewn on Map ”F”.

7. The attempt to capture the Fourth Objective.

The actual course of events immediately subsequent to the capture of the third objective did not at first become known to me with accuracy. I was aware that the 47th Brigade were not in touch with the 7th Division, but I was still under the impression that GINCHY had fallen into the latter’s hands.

3.50 p.m. I had heard from G.O.C. 47th Bde that the Munsters had been ordered to advance & take the Fourth Objective, that GUILLEMONT was being heavily shelled, and that the village itself was being consolidated by the Connaughts and the Leinsters assisted by two companies of the King’s Liverpools. I also knew that the other two companies of the latter battn had reached our old front line. I had therefore no immediate anxiety for my left flank.

4.30 p.m. At 4.30 p.m. I learnt from G.O.C. 59th Inf. Bde that latterly casualties amongst his troops had been heavy, that the Ox & Bucks L.I. were pushing on slowly to the 4th objective in touch with the 5th Division but not without losses, and that the GINCHY-WEDGE Road was being consolidated.
I had therefore every hope that the combined efforts of the right and left attacks would give me possession of the 4th objective.

5 p.m. At 5 p.m. the G.O.C. 59th Bde reported that his advance was held up by machine guns on the SPUR N.W. of LEUZE WOOD T.20 central and that the 6th Ox & Bucks L.I. supported by the Somerset L.I. were about to attack the final objective.

5.15 p.m. At 5.15 p.m. I received a report from the 47th Bde stating that the 22nd Bde of the 7th Division had evacuated GINCHY. I therefore requested G.O.C. R.A. 24th Division to barrage my left flank and his quick response did much to prevent counter attacks on that flank before a proper defence could be organised. I also ordered the 60th Bde to move up immediately into NEW GUARD TRENCH W. of TRONES WOOD, and not knowing that the G.O.C. 59th Bde had already called upon the 7th D.C.L.I. I placed that battn at the disposal of the G.O.C. 47th Bde.

5.30 p.m. At 5.30 p.m. I ascertained that the 47th Bde had suffered heavily in attacking GUILLEMONT, that the 7th Division had been definitely forced to give up GINCHY and that the 5th Division on my right had not succeeded in advancing up to their objective – the edge of LEUZE WOOD. The G.O.C. 59th Bde also reported that the enemy had been seen moving on the high ground to his right, about T.26 central. The position of my front line with both its flanks in the air appeared therefore to me to be too precarious to admit of a further advance to the 4th objective until the situation was cleared up. I therefore ordered the G.O.C. 59th Bde to consolidate his position on the GUILLEMONT-WEDGE WOOD road and confine his efforts against the 4th objective to pushing out strong patrols as close up to it as possible.

I also requested the Corps Heavy Artillery to open fire on the GINCHY – LEUZE WOOD road in case the enemy might mass for a counter attack and reported the situation to you.

I then learned for the first time that the D.C.L.I. had actually been drawn into support the 59th Bde, and at once placed the last remaining battalion of the 61st Bde, the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. at the G.O.C. 47th Bde.

The situation on my left flank in reality was far more precarious than I knew, and but for the prompt action of Capt. C.D.R. CLEMINSON, 12th King’s Liverpools, might have jeopardised the whole of the success already won.
This officer had been sent up in command of the two coys 12th King’s Liverpools detailed to reinforce the Connaught Rangers. As already related he had advanced to T.19.c.6.8. without gaining touch with the battalion he had been sent to assist, and whilst moving forward he had noticed parties of the 7th Division returning from GINCHY.

Shortly after arriving at T.19.c.6.8. he was joined by a party of about 60 men of the Manchester Regt. 7th Divn, without officers. These men stated that the 7th Division had definitely been driven out of GINCHY. Realising the danger to our left flank, Capt. CLEMINSON on his own initiative advanced towards GINCHY and occupied a line running from T.13.c.8.4. via T.13.c.9.3. to T.13.d.0.1. where he dug in. he had not been long in this position when he received a message purporting to come from an officer of the Royal Irish and asking for help. Capt. CLEMINSON at once sent forward a platoon and a Lewis Gun to the edge of GINCHY WOOD T.13.d.8.3. the place to which he was asked to send assistance. In advancing this platoon came under fire, the Platoon Commander and many of the Platoon being killed. The platoon Sergt, Sergt. JONES, took command, and after getting the Platoon and Lewis Gun into position returned to Capt. CLEMINSON to report that no trace of the Royal Irish could be found. Capt. CLEMINSON ordered him to return to his platoon and hold out in the position already gained. (Sgt. JONES & his party held their position until they were relieved on the morning of 5th ) Capt. CLEMINSON then reported the situation to his Commanding Officer who at once sent up an additional Coy. As soon as this reinforcement came under his command, Capt. CLEMENSON proceeded to organise a strong defensive flank towards GINCHY. Throwing out advanced posts to T.13.c.9.4 ½. T.13.c.9 ½.3. and T.13.d.1.1 ½. He strengthened his line by collecting parties of stragglers from the 7th Division, amongst which were two Lewis Gun detachments with their guns.

The additional Coy of the 12th King’s Liverpools he posted to protect his left flank as follows:-
One platoon at about T.13.c.7 ½.4. – 8.4.
One platoon at about T.13.c.6 ½.3. – 7 ½.3.
Two platoons at T.13.c.5.4. – 7.3 ½.
Capt. CLEMINSON gained touch with the parties of the 7th Division on his right flank fairly soon, but it was not until 9 p.m. that he gained touch with a party of about 50 rifles of the Royal Irish Rifles under Lieut HEAD. This party placed themselves under Capt. CLEMINSON and remained with him until the morning of the 5th when all were relieved.

5.30 p.m. At 5.30 p.m. a number of Germans estimated as 200 strong by one account and 400 by another were seen advancing along the road running through T.15.c., T.14.d. & c. to GINCHY. They were fired at by the Lewis and Machine Guns on my left and dispersed with considerable losses.

5.46 p.m. At 5.46 p.m. I received information from your H.Qrs that the 48th Bde of 16th Division at BILLON FARM was placed at my disposal and that the 49th Bde was being moved to that place.

6.30 p.m. At 6.30 p.m. the enemy again attempted to counter attack my left. No less than three attacks were delivered but all broke down under the fire of the defensive flank already alluded to.

6.40 p.m. At 6.40 p.m. I learned that the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. were approaching GUILLEMONT. The G.O.C. 59th Bde reported that he was consolidating his position on the GINCHY-WEDGE Road by every means in his power and that he was in touch with 95th Bde on his right, but believed that their right was in the air. He stated that some of the 47th Bde were mixed up with his men and that he feared he might lose what he had gained unless some stiffening was put into the troops on his left. He added that he was not attempting any further advance that evening. I told him that so far as the information at my disposal showed there were no serious hostile concentrations being carried out against his right. Throughout the whole period of consolidation after the capture of the third objective, messages were received stating that the enemy were moving W of LEUZE WOOD, and also in the valley to the N. of BOULEUX WOOD. None of these messages, however, reported the enemy in force, and the G.O.C. 24th Divisional Artillery at my request arranged with the 3rd Divisional Artillery to cover the whole of the area likely to be used by the enemy to concentrate for counter attack. The 3rd Divisional Arty arranged to keep the high ground swept with fire while the 24th Divl Arty dealt with the valley.

7.15 p.m. At 7.15 p.m. the Germans opened a very heavy barrage on the MONTAUBAN-GUILLEMONT Road and continued it for one hour.

7.30 p.m. At 7.30 p.m. the situation was as follows:-
The 59th and 47th Bdes were holding the GINCHY-WEDGE WOOD road from about T.26.a.2.8. toT.20.a.1.2. Some patrols had been thrown forward on the right but they had not gained touch with any similar patrols sent out by the 5th Divn. The 59th Bde reported that Germans were still massing N. of LEUZE WOOD, but that our guns were dealing with them.
The 47th Bde had two battns in the front line along the GINCHY-WEDGE WOOD Road, and the defensive flank on its left was held by some 250 men of the Connaught Rangers and 7th Leinsters, some 60 men of the Manchesters without officers and 3 coys of the 12th King’s. Casualties had been very heavy in this Brigade and S.A.A. was running short. I therefore ordered the 48th Bde to move to CARNOY as Divl Reserve.

8.10 p.m. At 8.10 p.m. I received information from your H.Qrs to the effect that the troops of the 7th Division were back in their original trenches. I therefore determined to use the 60th Bde to relieve the 47th Bde and issued orders accordingly.

8.30 p.m. During the evening the enemy made repeated attacks upon my left flank, but their efforts gradually became less vigorous, and they were finally driven off at about 8.30 p.m.
During these counter attacks, the officer commanding the front line troops of the 47th Bde called upon the 59th Bde for assistance, and the G.O.C. of that Bde at once detailed two Coys of the K.S.L.I. to strengthen the defensive flank. The arrival of these troops added very materially to the defensive powers of that flank and made it practically secure.

11.25 p.m. At 11.25 p.m. I learnt that two battns of the 60th Bde, viz:- the 12th R.B. and 12th K.R.R. had started from TRONES WOOD at 9.15 p.m. to assist the 47th Bde in accordance with my instructions, and I therefore felt the situation on my left flank was more satisfactory.

8. OPERATIONS ON 4TH SEPTEMBER.

12.10 a.m. At 12.10 a.m. I issued the following orders for the defence and consolidation of GUILLEMONT. A copy of the orders issued will be attached to this report as Appendix 2.

1 a.m. At 1 a.m. the Royal Irish and Munsters had been relieved by the 12th R.B. and 12th K.R.R.C. and returned to their original positions in BERNAFAY WOOD and at CARNOY. In view of a possible counter attack in the morning I ordered the 48th Bde to reach the following position at 6 a.m. One battalion to the trench running through BERNAFAY WOOD, S.29.a.c. One battn to the trenches along the Western edge of BERNAFAY WOOD S.28.b and d. One battn to the BRIQUETERIE and one battn to the CRATERS.

2 a.m. At 2 a.m. the situation was as follows:-
(a) Right attack. The front line of the right attack was established in the GINCHY-WEDGEWOOD road from the cross roads at T.20.c.2.4. to T.26.a.1 ½.6. This line was composed of companies of the 6th Ox & Bucks L.I. and 7th Somerset L.I., 11th R.B., 10th K.R.R., and 10th R.B. This line was in touch with the 47th Bde on its left and the 5th Divn on its right. The 96th Field Coy R.E., one coy 11th D.L.I. Pioneers and the 7th D.C.L.I. were in GUILLEMONT south of MOUNT STREET, the area they had been detailed to consolidate and hold.
(b) Left attack. The front line running from T.20.c.2.4. where it joined up with the 59th Bde along the GINCHY-WEDGE WOOD Road to T.20.a.1.2. From there it bent west and N in front of the old German trench in T.13.c.9.4 ½. This front was held by the 12th R.B. 12th K.R.R.C. 2 coys Somerset L.I.
A composite battn formed from men of the Leinsters and Connaughts, 60 men of the Manchester Regt. without officers, 50 men of the Royal Irish Rifles, and 3 coys of the 12th King’s. The left of this line was in touch with parties of the 7th Division. The 83rd Field Coy R.E. and one Coy 11th D.L.I. Pioneers were employed in strengthening the left flank and consolidating GUILLEMONT VILLAGE N. of MOUNT STREET.

(c) DIVISIONAL RESERVE R.E.
The 84th Field Coy R.E. and the remaining two coys of 11th D.L.I. Pioneers, were engaged on wiring in the front line and improving communication trenches back to GUILLEMONT.
The situation at this juncture is shewn on Map “G”.

4a.m. At 4 a.m. you’re your orders were received that the 20th Div. must be prepared to participate in conjunction with the 5th and 7th Divisions in an attack on the 4th objective which was to be launched by 3.10 p.m. After consulting your H.Qrs I issued the necessary orders, a copy of which are attached hereto as Appendix 3.

8.30 a.m. At 8.30 a.m. G.O.C. 60th Bde reported that the S. and S.E. end of GINCHY requires constant attention from the Artillery, but that E. of the GINCHY-WEDGE WOOD Road the Germans were a long way off. I accordingly arranged with the G.O.C. 24th Divl. Artillery to keep a barrage on this area. Unfortunately owing to reports that some of the 7th Division troops were still in GINCHY, the G.O.C. R.A. could not bring this barrage as close to our front as either he or I would have wished.

9.30 a.m. At 9.30 a.m. the G.O.C. 59th Bde reported that his men were very exhausted, and he did not think they could last longer than another 8 hours. He also stated that an officer’s patrol had entered LEUZE WOOD but found no Germans. I concluded from this and other evidence that there was no immediate danger to my right, and I therefore told the G.O.C. 59th Bde that whilst I would do my utmost to relieve his men at the earliest possible moment, I trusted him to hold out in the position he then occupied until I could effect his relief.

9.45 a.m. At 9.45 a.m. I sent out messages to Bdes warning them that they must be prepared to send out strong patrols during the afternoon to secure the line of the fourth objective.

10.50 a.m. At 10.50 a.m. as it was evident that some considerable time must elapse before the 59th Bde could be relieved by fresh troops, I ordered the two coys of the 11th D.L.I. Pioneers which had been in Divisional Reserve to relieve exhausted units of the 59th Bde. The units thus relieved I ordered to assemble at CARNOY.

11 a.m. I learned from G.O.C. 47th Bde that troops of the 7th Division had again entered GINCHY, and that the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. had taken up their position in the old German trenches running through S.19.b. with one coy in support in the GRID IRON. All these trenches had been badly damaged and the troops were digging themselves in.

12.25 p.m. At 12.25 p.m. the G.O.C. 47th Bde reported that the 7th Division had again been driven out of GINCHY, and that the 12th King’s Liverpools had defeated an attempt to work round their left flank.

1.30 p.m. At 1.30 p.m. I issued orders for the relief of 47th Bde and 60th Bde, less Ox & Bucks L.I. by the 48th Bde during the night of the 4th/5th September. A copy of these orders is attached hereto as Appendix 4.

3 p.m. At 3 p.m. I issued orders confirming the verbal instructions for the attack on the 4th objective which I had given in the morning. A copy of these orders is attached hereto as Appendix 5.

4 p.m. At 4 p.m. I issued further orders for the relief of the 59th Inf. Bde during the night 4th/5th by the H.Qrs and two battns of the 49th Inf. Bde. (16th Division) which you had placed at my disposal.
A copy of these orders is attached hereto as Appendix 6.

4.35 p.m. At 4.35 p.m. the G.O.C. 60th Inf. Bde reported that Germans had been seen moving about in the South end of GINCHY and that our men were retiring from that village. He also stated that all movement on his left flank was very hazardous as sniping from GINCHY was continuous. As this information again pointed to the danger of my left being driven in, I again arranged for the artillery barrage to be placed as close to the defensive flank as possible.

7.30 p.m. Owing to the state of the trenches and casualties amongst the runners, the orders given in my operation order No 97 did not reach battalions until some while after 6.30 p.m. the time at which the strong patrols were instructed to push forward. At 7.30 p.m. however, these patrols under cover of an intense creeping barrage had succeeded in establishing themselves on the line S.W. of LEUZE WOOD to T.26.a.6.5. Simultaneously the 5th Division captured FALFEMONT FARM and pushed out strong patrols to LEUZE WOOD. As I now had a line of strong posts with Lewis Guns formed across the whole of my front and was in touch with the 5th Division on my right, I felt confident that any danger of my being driven back from GUILLEMONT by an attack from my right front had ceased.

9. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 5TH.

2 a.m. At 2 a.m. the G.O.C. 60th Bde reported that owing to messengers being killed and guides losing their way, the relief of the 60th Bde troops in the front line could not be completed before dawn. The relief of the remainder of the 47th Bde was complete and the relief of the 59th by the 49th Brigade was proceeding slowly.
Information regarding the progress of this relief was not at all easy to obtain and in view of the new line of advanced posts established during the night, I did not think it advisable to hand over command of the Divisional front until I was certain that the situation was satisfactory. The G.O.C. of the 16th Division concurred, and I did not therefore hand over to him until the G.O.C. 49th Bde reported that the
relief had been carried out successfully.
9.20 a.m. This report was received at 9.20 a.m. when I moved my H.Qrs in accordance with your instructions to the FORKED TREE CAMP. On handing over I left at the disposal of G.O.C. 16th Division, the following troops –
60th Inf Bde
7th Somerset L.I.
11th Durham L.I.
These troops rejoined my Division on 7th instant.

10. The casualties suffered by the troops of my Division were as follows (excluding 47th Bde) –
Officers. Other Ranks.
K. W. M. K. W. M.
59th Inf Bde 5. 20. 5. 117. 404. 416.
60th Inf Bde 2. 16. 2. 70. 231. 101.
61st Inf Bde 4. 12. 0. 64. 308. 46.
R.E. 2. 6. 42. 2.
Pioneers 4. 3. 78. 6.
R.A.M.C. 1. 1. 7. 0.
11. 55. 7. 263. 798. 371.

GRAND TOTAL. 73 Officers 1632 other ranks.

The medical arrangements made for the evacuation of the wounded worked admirably in spite of the very great difficulties which existed owing to the mud and to the way in which the whole ground was cut up by shell fire.
How great these difficulties were may be realised from the fact that at one time wounded had to be carried some 5,000 yards before they could be placed in ambulances.
Moreover so bad was the condition of the roads that heavy motor ambulances could not get within reasonable distances of our front trenches. It became necessary therefore to transport stretched[r] cases firstly by horsed ambulances and then by light motor ambulances before they could be finally evacuated in the large motor ambulances.

11 WORK OF THE R.E. AND PIONEERS.

The successful consolidation of the positions won and the construction of various strong points was very largely due to the assistance rendered by the R.E’s and 11th D.L.I. (Pioneers). These troops worked gallantly and strenuously without rest for some 48 hours, and during part of that time two companies of the 11th D.L.I. took over and held part of the front line of the 59th Brigade.

12 WORK OF THE SIGNAL COMPANY.

The arrangements for transmitting orders and information throughout the division were devised by the Officer Commanding the Signal Coy, Major F.J.M. STRATTON, R.E. and worked admirably. I was in telephonic communication with the various Brigade H.Qrs practically continuously throughout the action and communication between Bdes and their component units was also maintained with unexpected success. This I attribute to the carefully thought out methods adopted by Major STRATTON who I consider deserves great credit for the manner in which he planned and carried them out.
A short report describing the methods adopted is attached hereto as Appendix 10.

13 LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM THE OPERATIONS.

The operations did not reveal any unusual features, nor did they teach any new lessons. The value of well directed artillery fire was again emphasised, the infantry were loud in their praises in the way in which the barrages were controlled and the methodical searching of all areas from which the enemy might attempt to counter-attack, no doubt largely prevented any really serious effort to wrest the position again from us.
The value of Lewis and Machine Gun fire was most apparent.
The Lewis guns dug in with the advanced patrols were invaluable, and the fire of the Machine Guns which were brought up into or close up to the front line, served to disperse several counter-attacks attempted by comparatively small bodies of the enemy.
The consumption of small arm ammunition was unexpectedly great. Men went into action with 120 rounds a man each, and in spite of this, calls for more ammunition commenced early on the 3rd September, and continued throughout the 4th. I have gone very carefully into the reasons for this expenditure and have come to the conclusion that it was due to the fact that the fighting after the capture of GUILLEMONT was rather more of the nature of open than trench warfare. Small bodies of the enemy were frequently seen moving and numerous minor counter attacks were delivered especially on the left flank.
Men consequently had good targets for rifle fire with far greater frequency than is usual in trench warfare, and took advantage of it accordingly. I do not consider that 120 rounds is enough it there is any intention or possibility of driving the enemy into the open, and consider that the number should be raised to 220 immediately before an attack is launched.
In conclusion I would add that it appears almost certain that the Germans were not expecting an attack in the Northern end of GUILLEMONT and it shows the importance of the GRID IRON trenches which were dug before the operations. These were very heavily shelled on the days previous to the attack, but every night were reclaimed. It says a great deal for the discipline of the 7th Leinsters that they were able to keep themselves concealed in these trenches for the 6 hours before ZERO. Had they moved about or even shown their bayonets over the parapet, the Germans would have shelled them heavily.

14 RECCOMMENDATIONS.

Brigadier-General PEREIRA, Commanding 47th Infantry Brigade carried out the task which was given to him in a most masterly manner and although he was able to work on the Operation Orders prepared by Brigadier-General BUTLER, whom he relieved two days before the attack he had very little time at his disposal to make careful reconnaissances of the position and to explain the details to his commanding officers. That he made the most of his time is obvious by the great success gained by his troops.
The 59th Inf. Bde captured the successive objectives with courage and dash which is inherent in the Brigade, and great credit is due to Brigadier-General SHUTE, his Staff, and the regimental officers, for the careful forethought they gave to all details without which success cannot be assured. I again wish to bring to notice Brigadier-General SHUTE’s powers of organisation and command which eminently fit him for the command of a Division.
The names of other officers will be brought forward for special recognition when called for.

Letter of Occupation PJ Lister 14 September 1916

On headed notepaper of
Government Controlled Establishment.
The Parsons Motor Co., Ltd.
Oil & Petrol Engine Builders
Town Quay Works SOUTHAMPTON
Sept. 14th 1916
Our Ref PES/GES.

This is to certify that Soldier L/Cpl. P.J. Lister, Regt. No. 28407. 12th Field Coy. R.E. Release Ref No. D.A. 25421. Occupation No. 04430, has been temporarily released to the Parsons Motor Co., Ltd., Town Quay Works, Southampton, by the Ministry of Munitions for the execution of important War Work
THE PARSONS MOTOR CO: LTD:
P.E. Sharp
Cachet of ASSISTANT PROVOST MARSHAL SOUTHAMPTON 1/6/18

Report on operations 7 September 1916

COPY

Report on operations taken part in by 6th Bttln
Ox & Bucks Light Infantry Sept 3/6. 1916.

The Battalion was attached to the 59th Brigade for the above operations, in accordance with 59th Brigade operation orders left the Craters at 11 p.m. Sept. 2nd and moved into position of assembly in ARROW and SHERWOOD trenches.

The Battalion advanced from these trenches at noon Sept. 3rd.

”B” Coy from ARROW trench was in the centre and from the position of the starting points was somewhat in advance of “A” and “C” companies which were on the left and right of “B” company respectively. “D” Company followed in rear of “B”. The Battalion was ordered to follow the 10th and 11th R.B. to the first sunken road (see map attached) open through them to the 2nd sunken road, then to halt to consolidate till 1 p.m.

“A”, “B” and “C” Coys. lost all their officers except one and three of their Company Sgt. Majors before reaching the 2nd Sunken Rd. “D” Coy. also lost its Captain at the 1st Sunken Rd.

”B” Coy. in the centre found the Rifle Bde. clearing dug-outs and appeared to have stopped at the first to help and then pushed on to the 2nd Sunken Rd. “A”, “C” and “D” Coys. passed right on. “A” Coy. appeared to have overrun the 2nd Sunken Rd. and got on to the near objective at the edge of the Orchard about 150 yards, probably due to the fact that their Officers had gone and the Sunken Rd is difficult to locate in places owing to damage by shells.

At 1 p.m. the advance was continued. As a matter of fact men were going forward about 4 minutes too early, but the barrage ruled the pace. I do not think many casualties were incurred by our barrage. There was but little resistance after this. By the time that the Eastern side of the village was reached Units were much mixed, 10th & 11th R.B. some of K.R.R.C., Somerset L.I. and my own Battalion. Units were reorganised here as far as possible. The 7th Somerset L.I. at my request kept back a portion in the position, when the advance was continued up to the WEDGE WOOD – GINCHY Rd. to look after the right flank, as the number of Germans were visible working down the open street of LEUZE WOOD and our contact with the 5th Division did not appear complete. At 2 p.m. the whole line went forward up to the WEDGEWOOD – GINCHY Rd. and reached it with very little opposition, but a number of prisoners were taken from dug-outs on the road.

The consolidation of the position at once began, but there was a shortage of tools.

I had previously sent a message to that effect by aeroplane, it would be interesting to hear if it ever arrived. The message was sent to the aeroplane by a lamp and the aeroplane acknowledged. It was evident that the 5th Division had not been able to advance up to the Spur S.W. of LEUZE WOOD, and that the spur and the wood were still in the hands of the Germans. I therefore decided not to move forward from the road to the final objective ordered that was with the right on the S.W. corner of the wood.

1st D.C.L.I. of 5th Division were now in touch with my right, and the 8th Royal Munster Fusiliers on the left near the Cross Roads.

There were then on the WEDGE WOOD – GINCHY Rd. portions of the following battalions – 10th and 11th R.B., 11th K.R.R.C., 6th Ox & Bks.

The 7th Somerset L.I. were digging trenches in support close behind.

An officer patrol went through the Quarry and up to the S.W. edge of LEUZE WOOD and found no one there.

During the night 3rd and 4th Sept., patrols were working in the valley below us but could not work up the ridge owing to our artillery fire. The enemy made no attacks during the night on our front. Nearly all the losses incurred were from shell and M.G. fire before reaching the 2nd Sunken Rd, and more especially before reaching 1st Sunken Road. During the clearing of dug-outs at the final position, one case occurred of a “P” bomb being thrown in at one door of a dug-out smoke came out at the other without dislodging the Germans who however came out when the Mills’ bombs were thrown in. 8 Company Officers out of 11 and 72 N.C.O.s were casualties, mostly early in the advance so that I think much credit is due to the men and the few Company leaders left for obtaining the right objective.

During September 4th, consolidation was continued and was not interfered with except by a few shrapnel shells.

During the afternoon the 5th Division were up the Spur East of us to LEUZE WOOD. About 7 p.m. Battle patrols were established by 7th Som. L.I. from S.W. corner of LEUZE WOOD – GUILLEMONT – COMBLES RD.

The night was very wet, about 5 a.m.5th Sept. the line was relieved by 49th Brigade and the Battalion withdrew to SHERWOOD TRENCH where it remained until the afternoon of the 6th September. When relieved by the 6th K.S.L.I. the Battalion returned to the Craters.

I attach a list of those I recommend for Reward in connection with the operations.

(Sd) E.D. WHITE. Lt.-Col.
Commanding 6th Ox & Bucks L.I.
9-9-16.

Report on Communications of 20TH Division 7 September 1916

REPORT ON COMMUNICATIONS OF 20TH DIVISION DURING THE OPERATIONS.
September 3rd and 4th 1916.

1 Division to Brigades.

Two telephone wires ran to each Brigade in the line. In each case the forward part of the line lay in an open narrow cable trench. The lines were not all completed until the day before the operations so that they could not become too weak for speaking owing to numerous breaks and joints. The lines held throughout the operations save for a line to the Reserve Brigade which was put out of action for nearly an hour by the blowing up of a bomb store close to the line. Lateral communication was provided by wire and held throughout.

In addition both Brigades had wireless stations by them and the Corps wireless station was at Divisional H.Qrs. These stations were used for occasional messages such as requests for motor ambulances to be sent forward. Visual signalling was also arranged. A main visual post on the high ground between MINDEN POST and MARICOURT received direct from the Right Brigade and Reserve Brigade and through two transmitting stations from the Left Brigade. The Visual transmitting stations were placed at test stations along the wires and runner posts were established there also. In the case of one section of the main line being broken two alternative ways of securing communication in that section still held. The runner posts were provided by mounted men from the Corps Cavalry Regiment for the forward portion and motor cyclists for the backward portion. Roads forward of the West end of MONTAUBAN were impassable for motor cycles.

2. Forward of Brigades.

Each Brigade relied mainly on one forward line laid just before the operations in trenches along the route of the runner posts, the Left Brigade to WATERLOT FARM and the Right Brigade to ARROW HEAD COPSE. The lines were divided into sectors at the runner posts and linesmen were stationed at these posts with cable to replace whole sections of the line with fresh cable when necessary. The line to the Left was only broken once, the line on the right was broken several times in the neighbourhood of the SUNKEN ROAD E. of TRONES WOOD but it was never out of action for more than about 10 minutes at a time. Lines were prepared beforehand and taken forward with the attacking troops but these lines did not last long being very soon cut by the enemy’s fire. Information came back to WATERLOT FARM and ARROW HEAD COPSE almost entirely by runners.

Further information from the firemost troops did however come back by pigeons – several valuable messages about dispositions being sent back from the troops in the GINCHY – WEDGE WOOD road – and by aeroplane observations. Not many actual messages were signalled from the ground to the aeroplanes but a few were sent and received including a request for ammunition and a statement that troops at a certain point were being held up by machine gun fire. Flares were used successfully.

To sum up the methods successfully employed, they were:-
(a) Forward of the original front line, pigeons and signals to aeroplanes.
(b) In rear of the old front line accessible telephone wires with relay posts for runners and linesmen along the route of the wires.

7th Sept. 1916

(sd) F.J.M. STRATTON, Major R.E.
O.C. 20th Divisional Signal Coy.