Category Archives: 1915

H.M.S. Albion Reoprt 4 May 15

H.M.S. “ALBION”

4th May 1915

 

2nd May; At 4.30 a.m. 7 miles off entrance course East, 14 knots observed heavy firing on shore.  At 5 a.m. Action.  5.15 arrived off Totts Battery; observed VENGANCE firing and under accurate fire, and came under fire on closing her.  Observed French retiring everywhere, but whether a retreat or retirement uncertain.  Told by VENGANCE to keep out of the way.  Dropped back off Morto Bay, and asked R.F. station for situation.  Received optimistic reply.  6.10 VENGANCE signalled us relieve.  Closed.  6.20 came under fire.  6.27 VENGANCE communicated situation as follows; from position about 163.F:- ”At present our troops have advanced to the ridge beyond yellow hollow on cliff joining west side Kereves Dere.  This position is best for close work like this, but it is exposed to Suandere River Guns at range of 12,000 yards from 7.B. battery.  Best post for general work and view is 163.0.  Three Asiatic disappearing Howitzer Batteries, a little Field Gun, and big howitzer hunt you everywhere”.  Asked for position of big  Howitzer and yellow hollow, but did not get them.  6.25, opened fire on relieving VENGANCE.  Remained under fire until about 8 a.m. firing at Turks on ridge.  7.40 hit Port side abreast B.2. Gun.  7.53 firing at small bodies of Turks advancing.  All forenoon firing occasionally at trenches as required.  Did not succeed in establishing signal communication for spotting, working ship as requisite.  At 12.30 concentrated fire on trenches.  Saw Turks running.  12.50 under fire, from whence not ascertained, about 1.5 hit twice, one in same place as at 7.40 the other Starboard side of boat deck.  Fired on Suandere on chance.  Went astern to change range.  AGAMEMNON signalled thought battery in 178.L but not certain.  Under fairly accurate intermittent fire until 5.36.  Hit Port side at 2.25, abreast of Y.I casemate.  Curiously enough this Shot, the first that has killed a man on board “ALBION” at the same time cut the Ensign Halliards and half-masted the colours.

 

Noticed some British and Indian troops on Hill 236.  1.50 fired on battery in position given by Totts, that was firing at them, and on supposed positions of guns that were firing at “ALBION” , occasionally.   2.50 noticed Ship had listed slightly; reported fact, stating relief not necessary at present.  Wells dry.  4.43 observed LATOUCHE TREVILLE under fire and firing.  5.33 Relieved by GOLIATH.  Turned over orders, and messages recently received from Military and proceeded to anchor in Billet 162 P off Seddul Bahr.  Ammunition expended 12” 6, 6” 151, 12 pr 272.  Enemy’s shot or Salvoes 76, including some heavy projectiles four hits.  Their fire as on 28th, apparently regulated according to the movements of their infantry, and our fire on the latter.

 

Casualties Ply/12797 Sergeant Edwin Kershaw R.M.L.I. killed.

 

Damage as far as then ascertained Wing Compartment 48 to 60 flooded, 30 ft Cutter smashed, 24ft Gig holed, Main Derrick Purchase and topping lift wires badly stranded, and engine damaged.  Main derrick slightly holed; Shelter and upper deck holed, other minor damage.  Reported same.  Received two cutters by order of R.A.I., ordered by R.A.3, to proceed to Mudros and make good defects.  Discharged Major A.F. Thomson, R.A. to Shore.  This Officer was not on board on 25th from no fault of his own, but has been of much assistance to me on the succeeding days, stationing himself in the Control position and exposed on 28th April and 2nd May to considerable danger.  9.30 proceeded at 7 ¼ knots, a cutter in tow, as boats falls shot through.  4.45 stopped.  Committed body of Sergeant Edwin Kershaw, R.M.L.I. to the deep.  6 a.m. anchored in Mudros.  Sent down diver; diver report armour plate (240 lbs) cracked and adjacent seams opened.  Some water found in wing bunker abaft 60.  Divers caulked seams.  Shored sluice valves; commenced pumping.  Later commenced cleaning bunker abaft protective deck.  6.15 p.m. examined compartment.  Damage as ascertained; outside superficial cracks on armour plate, plate pushed in about ½ inch.  Inside **** protective deck, side plating bulged but not fractured, many rivets gone; “B” Seacock and tranches off forward to C.O. 2 Rooms and Magazines, extensively damaged.

 

By 3 p.m. 4th May, bunker was sufficiently clear to examine above protective deck, when further damage as follows was found.

48 to 60 Armour driven in about 2”.  Below protective deck: – Lightened plate frames 3 in Number under protective deck much buckled, many connecting rivets sheared.

 

Side plating buckled for two frame stations, indented to about 6” from original line, and butt straps damaged, many rivets loose and fractured.  (B) Seacock, Downton Discharge, and Master Flood of C.O. 2 valves extensively damaged.

 

Above Protective Deck:- I Bulkhead much buckled, Z frames (3 in No) behind armour buckled, gusset plates torn from seating and distorted; armour bolts 6 in No appear to have had severe strain.

 

Compartments flooded Wing 48 to 60 stations

Reserve Coal Bunker, 60 to 68.

 

  1. Watts Jones

CAPTAIN (Act)

 

The Vice Admiral Commanding,

and the Rear Admiral Commanding

Divisions.

Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,

MAY 1915

The 2nd May 1915 saw the commencement of the Gorlice in the Carpathian Mountains and Artois, France offensive by the Central powers of Germany and Austria/Hungary. Included in the summer offensive was the sinking of the American Tanker “Gulflight” by a German U-Boat in the Mediterranean Sea near Sicily on the 1st May 1915.

 

2nd/4th May 1915, on the Eastern Front a combined German and Austro-Hungarian offensive began against the Russian Army at Gorlice and Tarnow in Galicia. The defences of the weakened Russian Army were broken down by a massive 700,000-shell bombardment. With the Russians suffering from a shortage of artillery shells and rifles, German and Austro-Hungarian forces broke through the Russian lines on the 4th May 1915. The Russian Army began a disorganised retreat.

 

The German submarine U-20 was patrolling the southern entrance to the Irish coast off Kinslade Old Head. On the 7th May 1915, the submarine Commander Schweigher sighted the Cunard Liner “Lusitania” on her final leg of her passage to Liverpool from New York.

Three months prior to the sighting of “Lusitania”, Germany had declared all waters around the British Isles a “war zone”.

Approximately 2.10pm the submarine fired two torpedoes at the “Lusitania”. The first torpedo struck the “Lusitania” causing a massive explosion. Within 20 minutes, the liner had keeled over and sunk. Aboard the “Lusitania” were approximately 2,000 passengers. Of the 1,198 that perished were 291 women and 94 children. Neutral America protested strongly at the death of 128 American citizens. An inquest was carried out after the victims bodies had drifted into Kinslade. The coroner’s court of Ireland (then part of the United Kingdom) gave a verdict of wilful murder against the German Kaiser.

Both combatant and neutral states were now aware of the deadly and ugly nature of modern warfare. The sinking of the “Lusitania” was the first of a number of reasons, which started to sway the American resolve toward the Allied cause.

 

On the 9th May 1915, the first divisions of the British Expeditionary Force New Army departed for France. When war was declared on the 4th August 1914 Field Marshall Earl Horatio Herbert Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, was almost alone in believing the conflict would last longer than the general response that the “war would be over by Christmas”. Anticipating a longer campaign Kitchener was in a position to do something about it. He received authorisation from Parliament to raise a new army of 100,000 men and on the 7th August 1914, he appealed to the nation for volunteers to boost the 150,000 regular troops of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF).  Within 3 weeks, Kitchener received his 100,000 volunteers. By early October 1914 over 760,000 young men had volunteered and before the end of the year the one millionth volunteer had been achieved.

In 1914, the army was short of officers and NCOs to train the New Army. They were also short of arms, equipment, accommodation, uniforms, food and supplies. These difficulties were slowly overcome and the first divisions of the British New Army began arriving in France in early May 1915.

 

Chief of French General Staff Joseph Joffre was one of the most experienced soldiers of France. On the 9th May 1915 Joffre launched an offensive in the Artois region. The offensive was centred on Vimy Ridge, which began with an artillery bombardment of 1,200 guns. The French were able to advance 4km (2.1 miles) to overlook the Douai Plain.

With French reinforcements 11.2 km (7 miles) away, the Germans were able to stabilize their line, the French having lost the opportunity to capitalise on their advance. The battle ended in mid June 1915 with little success on both sides. The overall losses were horrendous with the French sustaining 100,000 casualties and the Germans 75,000 casualties.

After the Vimy Ridge encounter the French realised they needed to reappraise their offensive tactics, the same way the British had modified their tactics after the Battle of Aubers Ridge.

 

On the 9th May 1915, in an effort to take Aubers Ridge, the BEF attacked over the same Neuve Chappelle battlefield of March 1915. Since the battle of Neuve Chappelle the Germans had improved and strengthened their front lines. Dug-outs were added to shelter the troops and trenches had been re-inforced. German barbed wire had been increased in depth, and their heavy guns were adequately positioned to repel any Allied attack. Because the German’s were aware of an imminent attack, reserves of ammunition were increased.

On the 9th May 1915 at 5.00am, the British guns began their bombardment and at 5.40am, the infantry advanced. The bombardment had been insufficient to destroy German machine guns and consequently the BEF sustained huge losses. The BEF consisted of British and Indian troops. By the evening of 9th May 1915, the BEF had gained some positions in the German front line trenches. The BEF did not have sufficient troops to exploit the successes. This was due to the heavy casualties taken together with the lack of artillery fire owing to the shortage of ammunition.

 

The battle of Aubers Ridge was abandoned at 20.00 hours on the 10th May 1915.

 

On the 15th May 1915, the Battle of Festubert began with the fifth, sixth and Garhwal (Indian) brigades attacking 1,700 yards of German trenches. Longer and systematic artillery bombardment began on the 13th May 1915 and continued for 36 hours. The Battle of Aubers Ridge, a few days before, had taught the BEF a valuable lesson. The attack was to be realistic and not too ambitious with orders to advance 1000 yards. The German front line trenches were 300 yards behind a 12-foot ditch away allowing the Allies to capture German held rear area. Although there was a shortage of heavy artillery, considerable success was obtained. The attack began at 11.30pm on the 15th May 1915 with the sixth brigade reaching the German front line and capturing ground behind the enemy trenches, without a shot having been fired.

North of the sixth brigade attack, the element of surprise was lost. When the fifth and Garhwal brigades advanced, the Germans lit up “No Mans Land” and bombarded the advancing troops with shells, machine gun and rifle fire. Only half of one battalion reached the German front line trench close to the left of the sixth brigade, leaving its flanks exposed.

Attacks and counter-attacks continued until the 25th May 1915 when the order given to abandon the offensive operation of the British First Army.

 

On the 22nd May 1915, Italian General Luigi Cadorna was officially appointed Commander in Chief of the Italian army, although from June 1914, he was Chief of the Italian General Staff. Italy declared war on Austro-Hungary on the 23rd May 1915 after having mobilised the Italian army the day before on 22nd May 1915. A new 600 km Front line opened up with the Italian declaration of war. The border between Italy and Austria is mostly mountainous. Although Italy was able to mobilise 1.2 million men they were only able to equip 732,000 men, because they were not a fully industrialised power.

After declaring war, the Italians advanced into the South Tyrol  region and onto the Isonzo River. Austria-Hungary resisted the Italian advance with their defensive tactics learnt from nearly twelve months of fighting against Russia. Treacherous and snow clad mountains made the region unsuited for offensive operations. Despite several quick Italian successes, the whole operation settled into a stalemate, similar to that on the Western Front.

 

On the 25th May 1915, Liberal Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith formed a coalition government with the Conservative opposition party. A political crisis was developing in the British Government. The major reasons for the coalition were the “shell scandal” together with the lack of success in the Dardanelles and Gallipoli peninsular. Kitchener had been tasked to raise and equip a new army of one million men to bolster the “Old Contemptables” of the professional BEF, as well as being Minister for the supply of artillery shells.

Field Marshall Sir John French – Commander of the BEF complained bitterly at the lack of artillery shells, which impeded his forces on the Western Front. The lack of progress at Gallipoli helped the government to become impatient with Kitchener. Liberal David Lloyd George was appointed Minister of Munitions under the new coalition government. This appointment resulted in Kitchener having his ministerial powers reduced. As the new Minister of Munitions, Lloyd George was successful in persuading the unions to drop their restrictive practises for the duration of the war. Lloyd George also gave the militant Suffragettes the right to work. Many Suffragettes were brought into the shell factories and many more were enlisted to perform tasks that were previously male dominated employment.

 

Also on the 25th May 1915, Japan loyally entered the war as Great Britain’s ally, annexing Shantung. She was able to profit by turning the whole of China into a colony of her own.  This colony was the beginning of the creation of the Japanese Empire that ultimately encouraged Japan to attack America in Hawaii during the Second World War.

 

German Kaiser Wilhelm II, on the 12th February 1915, expressed a wish that war in the air should be carried out against England.The 31st May 1915 saw the first German airship raid on London. The German High Command responded by authorising raids on England but they were to be confined only to military bases and barracks. The London docks and fuel, ammunition, and military stores were also to be a target for the raids. Royal residences and residential areas were not to be included in the list of military targets.

The German fleet of airships was available owing to the vulnerability of the airships over the Western Front from anti-aircraft fire.

The initial raid on London saw residential areas being bombed instead of military or dockland areas. This was the result of a navigational error coupled with the airship flying too high. Twenty-eight people lost their lives and many were injured during the raid.

 

F Hammond letter 30 Apr 15

30th April

Bordon

Easter 1915

 

Dear M & P

Just a few more things I don’t think I shall need.  We expect to leave here for Winchester.  We are all mobilised and were inspected today.  Our Section are the Telegraphists for the 28th Brigade which consists of 10th Highland Light Inf, 11th HLI, 9th Scottish Rifles and 6th Kings Own Scottish Borderers.  Allcock and myself are at Headqrs with the General.  So we should be OK.

Do not know if we shall have any leave before going away.

Will drop you a line when we move.  Hope Gladys is better and did well in her exam.  What is George doing now?  Well I want to catch this post so bye bye for present

Burgy

H.M.S. Albion letter 30 Apr

 

H.M.S. “ALBION”

30th April 1915

 

At 4.45 a.m. on 28th April, weighed, and proceeded to take up position 170. W to support right flank as ordered.

 

At 6.10, came under fire, replied about 6.12; under occasional fire until about 7 a.m.  Observed white screen in Domuz Deresi valley probably an aiming mark.  At 8.50 observed French troops advance from Totts Battery; their line then wheeled to left and faced about W.N.W.  At 9.5 fired on enemy on ridge up Kereves valley.  For remainder of forenoon took station about 163.F, in order to see up Kereves valley.  At 9.45 Totts signalled that enemy were advancing in Square 176.T, the position recently shelled by “ALBION”.  About 9.40 observed and sank a mine.  At 9.50 noticed French troops facing to their right towards Achi Baba, then saw they were under gun fire.  Continued firing at intervals.  At 11.0 right gun, Fore Turret, valve box cracked.  At 11.20 shot struck near stem, went astern, apparently no damage.

 

At noon opened heavy fire on body of Turks seen in former position, and continued supporting French Flank.  Frequently under fire sometimes from heavy guns which we could not locate.

 

At 12.55, “LORD NELSON” coming up to relieve, 1.0 proceeded, at 1.3 hit aft port side.  Ammunition expended for day, 12” 7, 6” 165, 12 pr. 134 largely on Turks in the open.  Enemy fired 54 rounds at “ALBION” including many heavy shells.

 

On arrival at North Side of Rabbit Island, ordered TEES alongside, and DEMETIAN to proceed to Gaba Tepe; saw RIVERSDALE anchored south side.  Noticed that “ALBION” was holed before collision bulkhead; sent down divers to examine who reported that plating had parted 11 ft by 2” horizontally, 2 ft by 2” vertically; a split 2 ft by 2”, and several rivets out.  Ship side badly bulged.

 

Ceased taking in ammunition, but continued getting out empties and reported damage.  Directed by Rear Admiral to complete with ammunition and rejoin Flag, unless orders to the contrary were received from the Vice Admiral, and later by Vice Admiral to proceed to Mudros if necessary.  Considered it necessary, and proceeded at midnight arriving at Mudros at 5 a.m. 29th, and sent down divers to wedge and plug as necessary.  Obtained one diver from HUSSAR; RELIANCE carries none.  Obtained services of Engineer Captain.  Ammunitioned from BONDICAR, very little shrapnel obtainable.  Coaled from QUEENSLAND TRANSPORT, and received stores from CARDSWELL.  Sent defective 12” valve box to RELIANCE.

 

About 1 a.m. 30th, outside work sufficiently advanced to commence pumping, but could only get hand pumps to bear, and they would not reduce water.

 

About 7 a.m. 30th, sent diver down to Cofferdam between 7 and 8 to take off manhole in steel deck.

 

Drained water into bilges abaft.  Considerable vibration of bulkhead between Bosn’s store and Cofferdam owing to air; shored up as necessary.  Pumps got water under about 1 p.m. on 30th.  All compartments forward of 7 and part of cofferdam between 7 and 8 had been flooded, and the damage consisted of the following:- The 80 lb Protective Plating was found to have been split at the rivet holes on lower edge and forced inwards to about 4 ins.  The two thicknesses of 20 lb plating behind protective plating were found to be extensively damaged, one plate being turned inwards to approximately 9”, all rivets being sheared.  The protective deck was forced down 2” in frame space, many rivets sheared.  The collision bulkhead was buckled at boundary port side, many rivets sheared, length approximately 2 ft in depth.  The cofferdam bulkhead only slightly damaged at boundary angle; three rivets started.

 

In repairing the damage, divers placed wedges in fracture, and drove in oakum plugs where it was possible to do so effectively.  The water was then pumped out by Main Suction of Ship, taking about 6 hours.  The fracture was filled in with blankets, oakum, stiff red lead, and possible wedges.  Three cofferdams were constructed, consisting of cants 6” x 6” bolted to stiffeners of bulkheads, and planking of 3” deal boards bolted to them; the space was filled in with concrete up to deck, and whole securely caulked.  Shores were then placed from Starboard side to cofferdams.

 

Only small leakage of water discovered when compartments were closed down; quite within the pumping capacity of ship.

 

After various too sanguine estimates, defects were completed and compartments closed up, and ship sailed to rejoin Flag at 9.15 p.m. on 1st, but was later recalled to pick up lapping gear, and returned to outer anchorage.

 

Sailed after receiving gear about 12.30 a.m; arrived off Dardanelles and proceeded to relieve VENGANCE.

 

  1. Watts Jones

CAPTAIN (Act)

 

The Vice Admiral Commanding,

and Rear Admiral Commanding Divisions,

Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,

 

 

 

H.M.S. Albion Appendix to letter 29 Apr 15

APPENDIX I

H.M.S. “ALBION”

29th April 1915

 

LIST OF VOLUNTEERS IN LAUNCH AND SAILING PINNACE

 

P.O. 2Cl Fredk. Gibson, R.F.R. O.N. C/191025, Coxswain of launch, jumped overboard with a line, and got his boat beached.  He then took wounded to the RIVER CLYDE under heavy fire.  Witnessed by Lieut. Tysdale, R.N. Division and many of the Dublin Fusiliers.

 

H.T. Morrison. Smn. R.N.R., 1495. D. was of great assistance to P.O. Gibson, carrying out orders with coolness and alacrity.

 

Frank Dawe, A.B. D/231502, as Cox’n of the Sailing Pinnace showed courage in trying to beach his boat, until having to retire wounded.

 

Samuel Forsey, A.B., R.F.R., S.S.D/2059, took charge of sailing pinnace after Cox’n had been wounded; he succeeded in securing his boat to a lighter, eventually beaching her, and assisted to get pontoons in position for troops to land.

 

Jesse Lovelock, Ord. Sea. C/J 28798, assisted A.B. Forsey in securing boat to lighter and beaching her, then assisted in getting pontoons in position, also helped wounded on the beach and in boats to reach the “RIVER CLYDE”.

 

Samuel Quick. Sea. R.N.R. 3109.B.)

Jas. Rice. Smn. R.N.R. 1519D.        )             Volunteer Launch’s Crew.

Daniel Roach. Smn. R.N.R. 1685D.)

 

Wm. Thomas. Smn. R.N.R. 2208B.   )           Volunteer Sailing Pinnace’s Crew.

Wm. H. Kitchen. Smn. R.N.R4330A )

 

  1. Watts Jones

CAPTAIN (Act)

 

H.M.S. Albion letter 29 Apr 15

H.M.S. “ALBION”

29th April 1915

 

 

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following account of such of the operations an 25th and subsequent days as came under my notice.

 

In accordance with orders, “ALBION” anchored S.10.E true, 1300 yards from Cape Helles on the morning of 25th.  At 5a.m. there was a slight mist especially between Seddul Bahr and No. 1 Fort, and hardly light enough to distinguish objects.  ”ALBION” opened fire at 5.4, and from then onwards fired deliberately into all objects overlooking ”V” Beach that seemed to be of military importance.

At 5.25 as the smoke over Area “A” was very thick, and no boats were approaching, checked fire.  Expenditure of ammunition up to this time being 6” 121 rounds, 12 pr. 54 rounds, 12” 2 rounds, both latter having been fired into S.W. Tower of Seddul Bahr Castle.

 

At 5.33 opened fire again, and continued as before.  At 5.50 observed boats from EURYALUS passing SWIFTSURE.  RIVER CLYDE and Fleet Sweepers approaching; increased rate of fire whenever boats seemed to be coming, decreased again when they proved not to be for ”V” Beach.

 

At 6.5 RIVER CLYDE passed to Starboard, but later dropped back.  Observed boats on “W” beach were under heavy fire.

 

At 6.25 SAPPHIRE signalled that our shot was falling on her landing party, (“Y” Beach).  ”ALBION” had fired at a trench on crest of hill close to Fort No. 1.  Checked fire accordingly.

 

At 6.33 observed ”CORNWALLIS” approaching with boats, and opened heavy fire, but checked again at 6.35 on observing the boats were not loaded.

 

At 6.37 observed loaded boats approaching, re-opened heavy fire.  The boats passed astern, and about this time “ALBION” received signal from “EURYALUS” to support “RIVER CLYDE”, and “RIVER CLYDE” passed astern.

 

At 6.44 observed fire on boats off “V” Beach.  At 6.45 boats were close to beach, checked fire, and then observed they were under heavy fire on the beach, from whence unknown.  At the same time “RIVER CLYDE” beached under heavy rifle and machine gun fire.

 

At 6.49 “ALBION” opened a continuous deliberate fire over head of boats.  At 6.50 boats cast off tow, and at 6.53 troops were landed on “V” beach with heavy loss, only a few men succeeding in crossing the beach and reaching the shelter afforded by the foreshore.

 

Many boats were drifting about helplessly, some broadside on to the beach with men in the water sheltering behind them.  “V” beach, and especially a rocky spit off the starboard bow of “RIVER CLYDE” being strewn with dead and wounded.  The lighters were ahead of “RIVER CLYDE” mostly on her Port bow.

 

In spite of the heavy cross fire on “V” beach, a few boats of the first tow got back, and at 7.5 observed them approaching “CLACTON”.

From about 7.15 onwards, disabled boats some with dead and wounded continued to come alongside ”ALBION”.  Dealt with boats as necessary and despatched them when ready to “CORNWALLIS”, and continued passing signals or information received.

 

About 8.10 an Officer of the Naval Division, and later the Beach Master came on board, and from them learnt that the “RIVER CLYDE” and “ARGYLE” were 50 ft apart, and that troops could not disembark, and that our troops were nowhere more than 100 yards from shore.

 

At 8.15, “QUEEN ELIZABETH” arrived; and informed her of situation.

 

At 9.10 having obtained permission from “QUEEN ELIZABETH”, hoisted out launch and pinnace manned by volunteer crews and loaded them with casks lashed under thwarts to form bridge, and sent them in tow to “RIVER CLYDE”.  Boats reached “RIVER CLYDE” at 9.50, but were apparently unable to get into place owing to heavy fire.

 

Throughout the forenoon continued firing on enemy’s supposed positions, occasionally checked by signal or reports, some of them inaccurate, old, or ambiguous, receiving wounded, and dealing with boats as requisite.

 

At 11.30 a.m. “EURYALUS” ordered boats for “V” beach to be diverted to “W” beach.

 

In afternoon continued the same as in forenoon, “ALBION” firing as desired by RIVER CLYDE.  By 4.30 p.m. rifle fire had considerably diminished, and “RIVER CLYDE” signalled asking for barrel pier.

 

At 5.35 ordered by Rear Admiral to attack hill 141, and directed fire accordingly.  At 6.30 ordered to weigh and close shore.  At 7.2 anchored in 10 fathoms, C. Helles N.28.W. 800 yards.  Could now see N.W. Side of wall of Seddul Bahr castle and more into the gullies below, and to eastward of Fort No. 1.  At 7.10 ceased fire.

 

At 7.30 “NEWMARKET” came alongside; discharged 23 dead and 45 wounded to her; all being troops or beach parties, including Captain Johnson of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, wounded, and the body of Mr. Handiman, Midshipman, late of  “CORNWALLIS” who died of his wounds on board “ALBION”.  About 8 p.m. Major Thomson, R.A., joined.

 

At about 9 p.m., I learnt from some of our boat keepers who had returned, that they had got the launch into position so that the troops from “RIVER CLYDE” could land.  About this time, a boat was sent to Cliff under Fort No. 1 to search for wounded seen in boat there, but could not find them.

 

Situation at dark as seen from “ALBION”.  “W” beach troops on hill 138, and at C. Helles signal station.  “V” beach troops dug in along fore shore, or in RIVER CLYDE, and under Seddul Bahr Castle wall, and behind Fort No. 3 earthworks.

 

S.W. Borderers visible along wall of Totts Battery.  The situation apparently precarious.

 

The expenditure of ammunition for day. All into Area “A” :- 12” 12, 6” common 604, shrapnel 294.  12 pr. Common 903, shrapnel 327.

 

All ranks and ratings of  “ALBION” did their duty, but mostly lacked the opportunity of distinguishing themselves.  I give however in Appendix I the names of volunteers who manned the launch and pinnace, particularly that of Petty Officer 2nd Class Frederick Gibson, R.F.R., O.N. C/191025, who, as I understand from several sources, behaved most gallantly.

 

Able Seaman Frank Dawe, O.N. D/231502 was wounded while coxswain of the Sailing Pinnace.

 

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

  1. Watts Jones

CAPTAIN (Act)

 

The Vice Admiral Commanding

Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,

H.M.S. “QUEEN ELIZABETH”.

& Rear Admiral Commanding

Divisions.

H.M.S, Albion Report 17 Apr 15

H.M.S. “ALBION”

17th April 1915

FIRST PHASE OF OPERATIONS.

SWEEPING THE STRAITS

  1. The operation is to consist of a fast deliberate search for mines by destroyers, and their removal, if they are very heavily moored by French Sweepers.

ORDERS FOR SWEEPING.

  1. Six large buoys are to be laid by the SAPHIRE in positions ordered at a distance of 500 yards apart (literally).       They will carry numeral flags numbered from N.N.W. to S.S.E. Two more buoys are to be laid in the following positions, No.7 being 8 cables N.61 E from Kum Kale Lt., and No.8 being S.S.E. 500 yards from No.7, next day by Destroyers as soon as the enemy’s gun fire is under control.
  2. The course to be steered when sweeping is E.N.E., and after each sweep, destroyers will return to the line of buoys to start the next sweep.
  3. One division of 6 destroyers is to sweep in “U” formation. The outer destroyers will take their departure first from 1 and 3 buoys, secondly from 2 and 4 buoys, and so on up the line; thus if accurate courses are steered, the whole ground will be covered twice; at all events it will allow for divergences of course.

If not required for any other service, the second division of four destroyers will be signalled to commence sweeping, and they are then to take up “A” formation, and commence sweeping E.N.E from No.8 buoy, and gradually work back across the line being very careful to overlap their last sweep every time.  The buoys being 500 yards apart are not ideally spaced for this formation, but will give a good guide so as to cover all the ground.

  1. If under any fire that is likely to damage a destroyer seriously the leader of the Division when arriving at a position S.S.E. of Domuz Deresi is to order ”Slip Sweeps”. If however he finds no serious interference by the enemy, he is to go on as far as possible, but not more than a mile beyond that position.

Each time the sweeps are slipped the port destroyer of the division is to drop a white buoy to mark the distance of advance.

  1. In the event of a sweep being spoilt by any misadventure such as a parting sweep, the leader is to order ”Slip Sweeps”, and the Sweep is to be recommenced over again.
  2. AGAMEMNON will follow the destroyers in the first instance, and after that keep in the previously swept area to cover the operations.
  3. Captain ”S” will be on board “AGAMEMNON”, and with the concurrence of the Captain of that Ship, will give any necessary orders such as to suspend operations temporarily until the enemy’s fire is controlled, and to recommence again, or in case of one or more destroyers being temporarily disabled to replace casualties.
  4. Destroyers are at liberty to return the enemy’s fire whilst sweeping.
  5. Three French Sweepers will follow AGAMEMNON, and are to be prepared to go ahead at once and clear any obstruction that may have been found, and parted the destroyer’s sweeps.
  6. After this area is swept the destroyers are to be prepared to sweep the area to the southward of it. Both divisions acting as before, but sweeping from east to west, slipping their sweeps close to Henders Shoal.

A.W. Henage  CAPTAIN (S)

G G Hammond letter 9 Apr 15

P/e G.G. Hammond

No 3142 2nd 7th Mc/r Reg.

27 Scarisbrick St.

Southport

9-4-15

Dear F & M,

I have been rather a long time in answering your letter but under the circumstances it was impossible to write sooner.  How is it that you seem to be making such a fuss about me being ill?  Did I not write last week telling you I was much better?  I might say that I had another bad turn and that I have only commenced parade today but I am now quite fit except for pains over my eyes like I used to have at school.

I am afraid that Pa will have to postpone his visit on the coming Saturday as the officer has promised me a pass home.  When I get home I shall have a doctor & get a certificate so that I can stay about a week.  If the doctor won’t give me a certificate I shall stay in any case and pay the penalty.  There is no doubt that I have had the rottenest illness I ever had in my life.  We went for a 15 mile march today, I did it all but about 4 miles, and I could have done that only there is nothing like playing the old soldier.

I am sorry to hear that Ma has not been well.  She will have to dash about when I get back I hope she is not worrying about me because as I said before I am quite alright only I am going to play the old soldier when I get back.

You all seen to have been having colds.  I heard from Willie this morning he has lost his position as section commander to the KTL for the time being as the others say they have not had a fair chance.

We are all having rifles shortly.  50 of our company have got them already, they are the proper Home Service Lee Metford pattern & not Japanese as have been served out to a number of the men here.  The Japanese rifles only hold 3 cartridges in the magazine whilst ours hold 10.  I am sorry to hear that Mr. Smith has been down with the Influ, but of course he has been under better treatment than I.  you know I have had an awful cough & when I asked the doctor for something to cure it he said that they had nothing for coughs.

I thought that I was going to get a pass last week but it did not work, there is a lot of underhand work goes on & if the chap in the orderly room is not a pal of yours it is practically impossible to work the oracle.  I had to leave the parade yesterday (old soldier) & when I saw the OC I asked him if there was any chance of sick leave, he said I should have to see the doctor so I knew it was off.  However he said that he would give me my leave at weekend so I shall remind him tomorrow.

Well I shall have to finish now & for heavens sake stop worrying I have found a place where I can get a badge.  Love George

 

PS I will write a PC on Thurs or Friday letting you know if I have my leave for certain G

APRIL 1915

The 8th April 1915 brought to a head the long and bitter struggle between the Turkish citizens and the Armenian subjects living in Eastern Turkey. Early 1915 saw the Russians countering the potential threat of Turkish invasion of Southern Russia on the border with Eastern Turkey. Despite dreadful weather the Russians defeated the Turkish army. The Turkish Government sought revenge by rounding up hundreds of thousands of Armenian citizens, and shot approximately 50,000 men. The remaining Armenians either were force-marched into the mountains of Turkish Mesopotamia and the remainder of the population slaughtered. Approximately one million Armenians died 400,000 of the 500,000 during the forced march and another 500.000 massacred. 200.000 Armenian citizens had been forcibly converted to Islam.

Russia, France and Britain denounced the massacres as acts against “humanity and civilisation”. The charge was rejected by the Turkish Government on the grounds the allies had fermented Armenian unrest in the first place.

The Armenian massacre was to be the First Genocide of the 20th Century.

 

 

On the 16th April 1915, the price paid for the Secret Treaty of London was that Italy announced the end of her neutrality and joined forces with the British, French and Russian allies. Like the German Empire, Italy was a newly united European state. She had a growing population of 36 million citizens and was desperate to acquire additional territories. The country was facing wide rural poverty and mass illiteracy. The Government was economically backward and the Parliamentary system hardly functioned. Social reforms were either staggeringly inefficient or shelved.

In 1914, Italy remained neutral between the two opposing forces but over a period she conducted a diplomatic auction promising to join forces with the highest bidder. Germany and Austria-Hungary yielded too slowly to Italian demands for substantial additional territories. The Triple Alliance promised everything Italy requested.

 

 

The Second Battle of Ypres commenced on the 22nd April 1915. The Ypres Salient followed the Yser Canal and bulged East around the town of Ypres. The Belgian army held the line from the coast of the English Channel to the Yser Canal. The French army held the Northern section of the Salient. British and Canadian forces held the Eastern sector. The attack commenced with the German army releasing 5,370 gas cylinders, each weighing 90lb. (41kg) along a 4 mile (6.5km) sector of the front line. The gas cylinders were carried by hand to the front line position. At approximately 5.00pm the cylinders were opened releasing the contents of chlorine gas against the Northern section of the salient defended by the French troops. The prevailing wind drove the gas-laden air drifted towards the Allied lines. However, whilst carrying out this operation a large number of German soldiers were injured or killed. The French army, consisting of French Territorial and Colonial Moroccan and Algerian troops suffered more than 6,000 casualties when the gas-laden air reached the trenches. Within 10 minutes many had died, mainly from damage to the lungs or asphyxiation. The chlorine gas blinded many troops. When chlorine gas mixes with moisture, it destroys the soft tissue of eyes and lungs. The denser than air gas quickly filled the trenches. Many French troops abandoned their trenches straight into enemy fire. The front line sustained a 4-mile gap, upon which the Germans were not able to capitalise. Not having foreseen the effectiveness of the gas attack the German High Command did not have sufficient reserve forces to exploit this advantage. Most of the available German reserve forces had been transferred to Russia. Canadian troops were able to fill the gap created by the French Moroccan line collapsing. To counter the effects of the gas the Canadian troops used urine saturated cloths over their nose and mouth. The demands of securing the left flank and being enveloped on three sides by the Germans the 13th Battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force took very heavy casualties.

Two battalions of the Canadian army were ordered to counter-attack Kitchener’s Wood to close the gap created by the gas attack. Forming up and advancing in two waves the two battalions ran into small arms fire whilst they were still only halfway to the wood. This resulted into a bayonet charge, finally clearing the wood of the Germans but at a cost of 75% casualties.

Before the gas attack the village of St. Julien had been behind the lines in the British sector. After the gas attack St. Julien was the front line. Despite the stand by Lance Corporal Frederick Fisher employing a machine gun to halt the German advance, a further gas attack enabled the Germans to secure the village. For his gallant defensive action Fisher was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross. Between the 8th May 1915 and 27th May 1915 the German army forced the British to retreat and established a straightened but shortened front line salient to the East of Ypres.

All combatants took huge casualties:-

The German army almost 35,000

The French army almost 21,000

The British army almost 60,000

The Canadian army almost 6,000

During the 2nd Battle of Ypres, the Canadian Lieutenant Colonel John McRae MD wrote his memorable poem “In Flanders Fields” which established the poppy as the symbol of sacrifice.

 

 

Landings on Gallipoli began on the 25th April 1915. The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) consisting of British, French and Anzac troops. Awaiting them were 84,000 Turkish troops. The French mounted a diversionary attack at Kum Kale on the Southern, Asiatic side of the Dardanelles.  British forces landed at Cape Helles at the south end of the Gallipoli peninsular. Their orders were to destroy the forts defending the narrow entrance to the Dardanelles. In the meantime, the Anzacs attacked the Western coast to cross the peninsular and cut the lines of communication to prevent any Turkish re-enforcements reaching the defenders.

Despite the British landing on 5 points at Cape Helles Point and the Anzacs landing at Ari Burnu (known as Anzac Cove) the landings were not successes. Hamilton’s plans for invasion had caused some confusion to the Turkish defenders as regards the MEF strategy; however the British did not exploit any advantage offered. Well-defended Turkish defensive positions trapped the attackers on the beach but the Anzac landings met with limited resistance. Confusion occurred because the Anzacs had inferior maps of the area, which gave the Turkish troops time to re-organise their defences. Some Anzacs forces moved quickly inland and reached the high ground of Chunuk Bar but they were soon in retreat from a Turkish counter attack. By dusk, the Anzacs had retreated to the beach having taken very heavy casualties.

By the time darkness fell on the 25th April 1915, the allies had attained little more than establishment on the beaches. Stalemate transpired as the Turkish defenders took up positions on the high ground.

Hamilton did try to break the stalemate and get his forces inland but necessity forced both sides to dig in. Trench warfare had begun at Gallipoli, not dissimilar to that on the Western Front.

 

 

On the 26th April 1915, the Treaty of London commits Italy to take-up arms against Austria-Hungary on the side of the Entente Powers.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

March 1915

The 10th March 1915 saw the commencement of the Battle of Neuve Chappelle by British forces of the First Army under the command of General Douglas Haig. The task of the First Army Corps was to take Neuve Chappelle and finally Aubers Ridge less than one mile to the East. The First Army Corps consisted of British and Indian forces. The whole British Army was very inexperienced in trench warfare from Senior Leadership down to the soldiers in the line.

The battle commenced at 8.05am with a 35-minute artillery barrage along the German Trenches at Neuve Chappelle. The attack by the British and Indian Infantry on a frontage of 4000-yards began immediately on cessation of the artillery bombardment. The centre successfully captured the village of Neuve Chappelle by 9.00am. The left flank had lost approximately 1000 advancing troops owing to undamaged German trenches. The right flank was in danger of being isolated and were ordered to halt and await further orders.

 

Communications were poor between Allied Command and the front line troops. The slowness and accuracy of intelligence was mainly because the front line telephone cables had been cut or destroyed by enemy shellfire. The Corps Commander Lt-General Sir Henry Rawlinson was aware only of the initial capture of the village but unaware of the gap on the left hand flank. Rawlinson ordered a general advance even though his support troops were unprepared. With the confusion, some of the British Artillery opened fire on friendly infantry. With the light fading in the late afternoon, the forward units were attacking without sufficient artillery support against a hardening German defence.

 

The Battle of Neuve Chappelle lasted 3 days, and on the 13th March 1915, the British troops repelled a German attack and immediately the BEF counter attacked. Many of their units had suffered high casualties so the British called a halt less than two hours later.                The attack was called off after the British had captured a salient 2000 yards wide and 1200 yards deep.

 

Following the naval bombardment of the Turkish forts during the attack in February 1915 and after some initial success, the Turkish forces proved to be of stronger opposition than was expected. The waters of the Dardanelles were thought to be heavily mined. Turkish forces had been redeployed to defend against infantry attack in the Dardanelles. The British attack ground to a halt after British minesweeping trawlers had failed to clear the mined area. Admiral Carden, the Commander in Chief of the Allied fleet in the Dardanelles, collapsed through ill health and his replacement was Rear-Admiral Robeck.’ On the12th March 1915 the Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener appointed Sir Ian Hamilton to take command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF). Lieutenant-General Birdwood, who commanded the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) forces based at Cairo in Egypt, suggested the army had an input to support the naval attack. The MEF consisted of the ANZAC forces of the Australian and New Zealand armies together with British and French troops.

 

Hamilton left for the Dardanelles on the 12th March 1915 with the MEF and arrived on the 18th March 1915. He did not have sufficient information available, due to inadequate intelligence, regarding Turkish strength or the fighting capabilities of the Turkish forces. This lack of information led him to believe the qualities and tactics of the Turkish forces were not of any consequence. This belief was to prove disastrous.

 

In the Dardanelles three British battleships were sunk, a further three battleships crippled but not sunk. The British had lost 2/3 of their battle fleet in the Dardanelles because the mine clearing trawlers had failed to locate and clear the mined areas. On 22nd March 1915, Hamilton and Robeck decided that the remaining fleet would sail to Alexandria to enable repairs to be carried out. In the meantime, Hamilton arranged for his force to prepare for an infantry invasion of Gallipoli. Winston Churchill was adamant that the decision was taken without Government approval or knowledge. At the time these events were happening the British War Council did not meet, nor were they to meet again for another two months.

 

The 21st March 1915 saw the first German Zeppelin airships appear over the skies of Paris. The Germans sent aircraft to attack Paris between August-November 1914. The 30th August 1914 saw Germany dropping four 5lb bombs on Paris, the last “bomb” being a bag of sand. Attached to the bomb was a message saying, “The Germans Army is at your gates. You can do nothing but surrender.” This message had little effect because the citizens of Paris had become used to the daily aircraft flying over the city. With the arrival of the Zeppelin airships in March 1915, bombing raids against Paris had been established.

 

On the 24th March 1915 the Prussian born German General Otto Liman von Sanders was appointed to command the Otterman Fifth Army. Arriving at Gallipoli on the 26th March 1915 Liman von Sanders reorganised his defences to make the most of the advantage of the high ground. The Turkish army had the experience of fighting during the Balkan Wars the previous year. They had learnt from their campaign whereas their British and French enemies lacked experience in this type of warfare. This was to be the precursor to the Gallipoli campaign.

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