Collins Diamond Diary

1944

Wednesday 23  August 1944

Moved from Quatre Puits to La Motte just 4 miles W LISIEUX – No mail either way came in or out.

V sick last night.

Kriegsgefangenenpost

Postkarte                  

                                                                                    Stamp GEPRUFT 95

Stamp. Postmark Little Lever Bolton Lancs. 19 AU 44.  Also Bolton 20 AUG 1944.

An                   Mrs. E. Wilkinson                            Stamp PASSED P.W. 5894

Gebuhrenfrei!

                                                1068 Bury Rd.

                        Empfangsort:  Little Lever Nr BOLTON Breightmet

                        Strasse:          84 Settle Street  Bolton

                        Land;              LANCASHIRE ENGLAND.

Absender:

Vor und Zuname:

Ernest Wilkinson Sgt.

Gefangennummer: 136.L.7

Kriegsgefangenenlager der Luftwaffe Nr.3.

Lager-Bezeichnung:

Deutschland (Allemagne)

Kriegsgefangenenlager.                                                                             Datum: 23.6.44

Sweetheart.  Just a few lines to say I am still fit and well.  But I would like some thick socks.  If you send me anything, send it through the “Red Cross”.  How are you darling?  I hope that you are keeping alright.  Write back soon, as I am longing to hear from you.  This is all for now Dear.  Give my regards to everybody.  All my love to you.  Yours always  Ernest.

Aug.                                                          INDEX 3.                                  10^th Long Course.

Issued in bulk to                                                                                                Green Paper.

DS for students

on 17 Aug.                               STAFF COLLEGE QUETTA

1944

INDOOR EXERCISE – JAPANESE IN BATTLE.

SUGGESTED SOLUTION.

OBJECT.

1. To examine certain aspects of the JAPANESE in battle.

CHARACTERISTICS AND PSYCHOLOGY.

• Before considering JAPANESE tactical methods it is essential to understand something of the characteristics and psychology of the men who comprise the JAPANESE army.

• Physique.

The JAPANESE army is drawn from people who live a simple, rough life and who are accustomed to physical hardship.  Men are still further hardened by severe army trg until they are capable of very considerable endurance.  They are able to move fast over long distances, across difficult country and carrying heavy loads.

• Courage.

The JAPANESE are a naturally brave race.  Courage has always been regarded as an essential virtue in a man and they are undoubtedly capable of suffering acute bodily pain.  But this does NOT mean that they are immune to fear.  There have been many instances in the face of our troops in which they have shown intense fear.

• Education.

The education of the JAPANESE offr and soldier makes them as well fitted for their duties in a modern army as their counterparts in the BRITISH or AMERICAN armies.  But, against this, the extreme uniformity of JAPANESE State controlled education has resulted in a marked lack of originality and initiative.

• Training.

The training of the JAPANESE army is thorough.  Lessons from past wars in all parts of the world have been studied, tactical doctrine is generally sound and ops are most carefully planned.  It is here, however, that lack of originality and initiative have been observed.  There is a strong tendency towards the employment of stereotyped methods and towards indecision, and even panic, when everything does not happen according to plan.  On the other hand, small parties are quick to react offensively to a surprise attack.

• Discipline.

Discipline is good.  The basis of it is the JAPANESE religion which is a mixture of ancestor-worship and State or Emperor worship.  On this foundation the army has built a code of discipline which is generally harsh.  But, though it is generally accepted, out of loyalty to the Emperor, there have been instances, incl entries in captured diaries, complaining of the inefficiency and brutality of offrs and comds, to show that this discipline is sometimes resented.  This is particularly so in the case of conscript soldiers now forming a large part of the army.

• Morale.

JAPAN has never been invaded.  The army, until very recently, has met with complete success. The JAPANESE have been made to believe they are a superior race with a divine mission to impose the will of their Emperor on the world.  Army trg and propaganda has emphasized these points and, in consequence, morale has been, and generally still is, very high.  But faith in JAPANESE invincibility cannot last indefinitely in the face of repeated defeats at the hands of the Allies.  They have suffered many defeats already and these have NOT been without effect.  JAPANESE comds on a number of occasions have found it necessary to issue special orders on the subject and there have been instances of a collapse of morale in more than one unit and fmn.  There has been evidence too of dissatisfaction and grousing about Allied material superiority.

• Attitude towards being captured.

The JAPANESE are taught to fight to the death.  By doing so, a soldier ensures that his soul reposes in the military shrine in TOKIO.  Added impetus is given by the knowledge that a soldier captured is officially notified as dead.  If he returned to JAPAN, he would find his civil rights gone and would bring shame on his family.  The result has been that we have taken few prisoners.

1. Recently, however, there have been indications that some JAPANESE are NOT made of stern enough stuff to live up to this standard.  Some diaries have revealed not quite a desire to surrender but an attitude of resignation to an inevitable death whose glory has grown slightly tarnished.  There have also been cases of JAPANESE making no great effort to avoid capture and cases of PW showing obvious happiness when refused permission to commit Hari-Kiri.

GENERAL TACTICAL CONCEPTION.

1. The whole conception of JAPANESE tactics is based on offensive action.  The other principles which he applies are maint of the objective, conc of force, mobility and surprise.  He makes full use of night ops, in which he is skilful, and employs every form of ruse and minor deception.  These, however, are now generally well known and he has NOT shown much ingenuity in inventing fresh ones lately.

ATTACK.

1. The forms of attack usually followed are :-
2. Enveloping or flank attack.
3. Frontal attack.

1. Enveloping or flank attack.

In the enveloping or flank attack the principles mainly applied are mobility and surprise.  Pressure is exerted frontally while the main effort is made round one or both flanks with the object either of making a direct attack from the flank or of securing a posn astride our L of C.

Attacks of this nature may involve a double envelopment, a small flanking attack being made with an objective 1 – 300 yds behind our FDLs whilst a further turning mov is made some miles behind them.  Such attacks cannot succeed if def posns are sited for all round def and provided adequate adm arrangements have been made to enable out tps to remain firmly in their posns.

1. Frontal Attack.

In the frontal attack the principles mainly applied are maint of the objective and conc of force.  Attacks are carefully prepared but often crudely executed.  Every effort is made to find a soft spot.  Fwd tps infiltrate, taking advantage of all available cover, and, when held up by fire, go to ground and bring LMG and mor fire to bear on any posns they have discovered.  The main attack is then launched with fresh tps in mass fmn who rely on weight of numbers, regardless of cas, to obtain success.  They adv in bunches, shoulder to shoulder, yelling, bayonets fixed, automatic weapons firing and rear ranks throwing hand grenades.

1. If the first attack fails, a diversion is made against another sector but the main attack always returns to the spot initially chosen.  Soft spots at widely separated pts are often selected but coordination in these attacks is seldom achieved.

1. Provided our tps are staunch, well dug in, have good fire discipline, adequate amn and a mob res, they have nothing to fear and have an opportunity of killing JAPANESE in large numbers.

1. Support.

Both types of attack are supported by mors, the fire of which may be directed on to targets by converging tracer fire from MGs.  In the past, there has been little arty sp but considerably more guns have been used recently. 

Long periods of slow fire are often employed rather than hy concs immediately before an attack.

1. Recce.

Both types of attack are always preceded by careful recce and by the employment of every form of ruse in an attempt to make us disclose our posns prematurely and shake our morale.

DEFENCE.

1. The JAPANESE conception of def does NOT differ basically from our own.  The principles of all round def is adhered to, posns are sited in depth and are mutually supporting.  His policy is to be offensive at every opportunity.  If part of a posn is overrun, an immediate counter-attack is launched or a hy conc of fire is brought down on the posn.  Outlying posts are often sited astride possible lines of approach and patrols are used offensively in rear of our fwd tps.

• Selection of positions.

A def posn is always based on a tk obstacle and, if possible, the flanks of the posn rest on natural obstacles.  High ground is always held, though the main posns are often on the reverse slope to avoid direct fire from tks or guns.  thick country is preferred and def posns frequently incl villages.

• Siting and Nature of Defences.

The siting, concealment and cam of defs is skilfully carried out, though their actual construction has NOT always been so good.  Fds of fire are sacrificed to concealment and fire is held until an assault has almost reached the posn.  Considerable use is made of alternative posns.  These factors make it extremely hard to pin point actual posns.

• Defs usually consist of a series of fox-holes (or weapon pits), holding one or two men each, or bunkers (dug-outs or pillboxes), holding many more.  The latter are strongly made so that hy mor fire can be brought down on them while our tps are trying to get in.

• Snipers.

Snipers are used extensively, firing from trees to which they are often roped.  They are difficult to locate and are of considerable nuisance value.

• Resistance to the last man.

Although there have been instances of withdrawal, both on orders and by individuals acting on their own, the JAPANESE teaching of resisting to the last man is frequently carried out, even hospital patients taking an active part.  A captured posn must, therefore, be carefully and systematically mopped up and steps taken to prevent enemy parties filtering back onto parts of the posn already captured.

• A Weakness.

Recent reports show that the JAPANESE are sometimes careless, giving us an opportunity of surprising him in his def posns.

PATROLLING.

• The JAPANESE make full use of both recce and fighting patrols.  The str of a recce patrol may be anything from one offr, with two local guides, all dressed in native clothing, to a sec.  The normal procedure is to adv about 100 yds and then halt for 5 mins to listen, but patrols are frequently careless about local security precautions, thus giving us good opportunities for successful ambushes.  Local porters are taken with patrols going out for three or four days and carrying everything except amn and weapons.  The str of a fighting patrol is usually about a pl but may be as many as 120 men.  This type of patrol usually works at night by infiltrating by twos and threes into our posns.

• Patrols are frequently used to engage us frontally while an encircling mov is taking place.  They make much use of cam and will often lie up for hrs in most uncomfortable posns.

CONCLUSION.

• While it is clear, therefore, that the JAPANESE is a good soldier who must NOT be underrated, it is equally clear that he is NOT a super-man and must NOT be overrated.

His savage beliefs have been exploited by trg and propaganda to produce a fanatical conception of service to the Emperor.  The high state of morale induced by this attitude of self sacrifice and loyalty has made the JAPANESE a formidable opponent.  But recent events have shown that his morale is NOT always strong enough to sustain him in the case of a local defeat.

• To look for a moment towards the future, it is difficult to say whether a series of major defeats will ultimately affect the morale of the whole army, but if it does the process will take a considerable time, since censorship and other security measures prevent the JAPANESE soldier from learning the true facts.  Local breaks in morale are more probable, but only as a result of really hard fighting.

J.F.W.

Jul 44.

(1)

INTRODUCTION

1. Before one can understand the potentialities of the Japanese as a soldier and his behaviour in battle it is essential to consider the environment in which he has spent his whole life.  Although this is true to a certain extent when assessing the fighting value of any nation it is of vital importance in the case

Good. of the JAPANESE since their tradition and upbringing is quite unlike that of any other nation.  In this paper, therefore, it is proposed to consider first the factors which produce the Japanese psychology and characteristics, then to summarise those characteristics and finally to consider the actual tactical methods they employ in attack, defence and patrolling. 

CHARACTERISTICS AND PSYCHOLOGY.

• The four factors which probably play the greatest part in moulding the character of any nation are:-
• The nation’s historical past
• The nation’s religious past.
• The nation’s educational system and
• The nation’s way of life.

We will therefore consider how each of these factors influences the Japanese youth from the cradle and see how, unlike the German who has little more than a decade to assimilate the Nazi doctrine, he has a similar doctrine inculcated into him through the tradition of centuries.

• The historical past. 

The Japanese consider that their Empire was founded in 660 B.C. when a grandson of the Sun Goddess came down to earth to rule over them.  From that day forward the Japanese have always been ruled by a direct descendant of this first God – Emperor.  Consequently it follows that this Emperor is a God and all his people sons of the Gods.

(2)       [From this belief springs a tremendous pride in their country – this “Land of [the Gods” – a pride that is enhanced by the fact that throughout the whole of [her history her soil has never been sullied by the foot of an invader.  Save [only once, in the thirteenth centaury, when the invader was crushingly [defeated and expelled forever from her shores.  A sure sign, if one were [needed, of the invincibility of these demi-gods.

In 1638 a law was enacted in Japan which has undoubtedly had great influence on the moulding of the Japanese character.  The effect of this law was to isolate Japan from the rest of the world for 215 years.  No Japanese was allowed to leave Japan nor even to build a ship capable of taking him to the mainland.  Every foreigner was expelled or exterminated.  It is interesting to note the irony of the fact that it was an American, Commander Perry, who ended this isolation in 1854.

One result of this isolation has been that the Japanese have a very acute sense of racial purity, a feeling of exclusiveness and superiority over all persons or things foreign.  Another that until ninety years ago Japan was a feudal state ruled by Shoguns each with his armed following of Samurai.  Since at that time the Emperor was little more than a monk, all the power being wielded by the Shoguns.  Civil war was endemic.  Consequently the Samurai, who were the only class of commoners allowed to carry arms, were regarded as a class far above any other walk of life.  As a result of this warrior tradition it is today regarded as a great honour to be allowed to serve the Emperor in his army.  The day that a recruit joins the army is probably the greatest of his life for on that day in his own eyes he becomes a Samurai, a member of a privileged class.

Since rule in Japan has always been exercised by the possession of the greatest powers it is natural to find that the Army and Navy have played a very important part in the government of modern Japan and influenced the whole nation.  A factor which has increased the prestige of the Army and confirmed their belief in their invincibility is the number of successful wars and lucrative conquests which Japan has made since the restoration.

In brief the lessons of Japan’s history may be said to be that she is a nation of demi-gods, ruled by a God, a chosen people of invincible warriors, socially pure whose destiny it is to rule the world; a world of inferior beings.

• The religious past. 

It has been said all religions are equally true to the people, equally false to the philosopher and equally useful to the Government, and of no religion is this more true than of Shintoism, the national religion of Japan.  It is the perfect religion for any fascist state and indeed the doctrine taught by Hitler bears many similarities to it.

The principal tenets are:-

• The divinity of the Emperor who is the only God.
• Worship of ancestors.
• Blind obedience to superiors.

While this suppresses individuality it produces docile and obedient soldiers for his superior officers are exercising power delegated by his God.

Another vitally important aspect of Shintoism is its teaching as regards death.  Loss of life is not regarded by the Japanese as a sacrifice; it is merely the last act which that life serves.  The criterion therefore is that one’s death should serve a useful purpose and be a fitting gesture to close one’s life.  How better then, than to die in battle for one’s Emperor?  Besides, one will then go straight to a warrior’s paradise.

• The educational system. 

The Japanese compulsory educational system is thorough.  There are only about five percent illiterates in Japan.

The system is run on good sound fascist lines designed to turn out a standard product drenched in the old warlike traditions and full of the knowledge of the invincibility of the Japanese and of their divine mission in life.  To this end retired Army and Navy officers are on the staffs of all Schools.  Dangerous ^? thoughts are not tolerated and every effort is made to stamp out individualism.  The competitive spirit is not encouraged for everyone is naturally doing his best for his Emperor.  The system succeeds and produces stereotyped products lacking in originality or initiative but convinced of their divine mission.

As with the fascists, patriotism is extolled as a virtue of the highest order and practically any crime is excusable so long as it is committed in the name of patriotism.

• The Way of Life. 

About eighty per cent of Japanese soldiers are recruited from peasants who normally lead a very frugal and penurious existence.  Campaigning is to them therefore little more rigorous than their normal life and living on short rations no uncommon hardship.  Generally the way of life is much as it was over two centuries ago.

• Summary of Characteristics. 

To summarise the characteristics and outlook which this environment has produced it can be said that the Japanese:-

• Regard themselves as:-
• Demi-gods fortunate in being the only people in the world ruled by a God.
• A chosen people whose mission it is to rule the world.  Thus any aggressive war is to them a jihad. ?
• Invincible in battle.
• Regard war as a natural and desirable state.
• Are greatly honoured to be allowed to die for the Emperor in battle.
• Are  frugal and hardy.

• Assessment of the Individual Soldier. 

The above characteristics suggest that the Japanese would make excellent, fanatical and brave soldiers.  To a great extent this is true.  There are however three factors of which sight should not be entirely lost:-

• Morale based on a false doctrine of invincibility is unlikely to stand up well to a succession of defeats.  Already there is evidence of individuals grousing at allied superiority of equipment and the morale of some units has been badly shaken by defeat.
• Some Japanese, though admittedly few, do kick against their upbringing and think perhaps there is more future in being a live coward than a dead hero.  Thus some are now less anxious to avoid capture or to commit hara-kiri when captured.

(3)      (c) Japanese education has produced a stereotyped mind which is not good at  

improvisation when things go wrong or of thinking up new ideas.  He is essentially a  copycat.

TACTICAL METHODS

• General Tactical Characteristics. 

In general principles Japanese tactics vary very little from those of any other civilized nation.  Greatest stress is probably laid on the following three principles:-

• Mobility. 

As an example of the importance which the Japanese have always attached to mobility in their military teaching an American observer was present at some manoeuvres in Japan some years before the war.  In the narrative a Japanese column and an enemy column were depicted as starting at the same time and equidistant from some vital high ground yet the Japanese column was allowed to arrive and take the ground before the enemy column arrived.  When the American suggested that this was an unfair and unreal picture he was curtly told that given equal conditions the Japanese would always arrive first.  The success which the Japanese achieved with mobility at the beginning of the war showed that the above confidence was justified and has given them no cause to modify their doctrine.

• Deception. 

The importance attached to deception has been more than amply illustrated during the war by the innumerable ruses employed by the Japanese to create a false impression.  Examples include excellent camouflage of all field works, employment of fifth column, shouting of false orders in English, movement through “impenetrable” jungle and the extensive use of noise to create a false impression of the number of troops employed.

• Offensive Action. 

The doctrine of offensive action is entirely in keeping with the Japanese character, and indeed it must be a basic doctrine of any successful army.  As an example of the offensive spirit may be quoted the action of the remnants of the garrison of a Japanese held island.  An American raiding party had attacked the island and having fulfilled their mission and practically annihilated the garrison were withdrawing from the island when

(4)             they were attacked by about a dozen of the garrison who could still carry arms.

1. Defensive Tactics.
2. Generally.

The idea of being on the defensive is extremely odious to the Japanese and consequently their defensive tactics are essentially offensive and mobile.  They may resign themselves to being held frontally but they will develop threats to the flanks of superior forces opposing them.

• Choice and Organization of Position.

A study of Japanese defensive positions has disclosed the following common features:-

• Where possible one or both flanks rest on a natural obstacle.
• Positions chosen whenever possible include a natural tank obstacle or a hole which can be made into one with little labour.
• High ground is invariably strongly held no matter how obvious and prominent it may be.
• Swampy ground is not an obstacle to the choice of a position.  If they cannot dig down they build up.
• If his forces permit a Japanese commander occupies a position in depth.  If they do not permit he will sacrifice depth rather than frontage.
• Similarly all round defence is adopted where possible but may be forgone.  Good.
• Alternative positions are dug.

• Conduct of the Defence.
• Surprise is achieved by silence and concealment.  It is almost impossible to draw fire from a Japanese position until the attack is actually launched.  When fire is finally opened machine guns may be firing on fixed lines as little as ten yards in front of Japanese FDLs.
• Overhead cover is provided wherever possible.  The Japanese will then bring down mortar fire onto his own positions when they are assaulted.
• The Japanese launch immediate counter attacks against troops who have captured part of a locality.  These attacks may be mounted within five or ten minutes.
• Defence is to the last man and last round.

(5)

1. Offensive Tactics. 

As is to be expected whenever possible the Japanese exploit their mobility to the full during the attack.  Particularly is this so when pursuing a withdrawing enemy, as in the first Burma campaign.  Wide enveloping movements were made bypassing our forward troops and seizing ground in the rear.  This left us with the alternatives of attacking him on ground of his choosing or withdrawing.

In other respects Japanese tactics in the attack are very similar to our own.  Attack is preceded by careful reconnaissance which tries to find the position of all enemy weapons.  It used to be preferred to develop the main attack round one or both flanks whilst holding the enemy frontally.  Now frontal attacks are becoming increasingly popular and repeated attacks may be launched against the same objective in massed formation.  He gains what success he achieves by the application of the principles of maintenance of objective and concentration of effort.

Whereas previously his artillery preparation used to be quite inadequate he is now using far more, usually in the form of long periods of slow fire rather than heavy concentrations immediately preceding an attack.

He uses tanks boldly in close cooperation with infantry, and makes excellent use of hull down positions.  He often moves his tanks into position by night and has them camouflaged before first light.

Since he is slow to follow a withdrawal it is usually simple to break contact though with his great mobility he may regain contact quicker than expected.

1. Patrolling. 

The Japanese have used patrols extensively during this war for a variety of tasks.  They are generally lightly equipped armed with light automatics and grenades and are usually not more than a few dozen men in strength.  They may carry enough food to operate for several days.

During an advance patrols are frequently used to infiltrate and then to open heavy fire and use fireworks to try to persuade forward troops that they are surrounded so that they withdraw prematurely.  They may be used in a similar role when the Japanese are on the defensive in order to lower the morale of opposing troops and make them jittery.  A patrol on such a task may consist of only two snipers.

Fighting patrols may be sent out with explosives to try to wreck guns in our artillery areas.

Reconnaissance patrols are employed in the normal way.

Patrols generally move quietly and are well trained but they are on occasion careless and may afford us an opportunity to surprise them.

1. Conclusion. 

Although the Japanese has absorbed a military outlook through centuries of tradition and is generally a brave, ruthless, fanatical soldier his fanaticism and morale are built on a foundation of sand.  Now that the weakness of this foundation are being exposed small cracks are appearing in the main structure.  His tactics are neither new nor unexpected.

We have in fact a soldier not unlike the Nazi bully but less well equipped.  We, in this Division have already proved our ability to defeat the Nazis:  We shall shortly prove our ability to defeat the Japanese.

(6)

XXXX

Signature

Aug.                                                          INDEX 2.                                  10^th Long Course.

To students 0900

hrs on 16 Aug.                             STAFF COLLEGE QUETTA

1944

INDOOR EXERCISE – JAPANESE IN BATTLE.

NARRATIVE.

1. You are G 3 (I) of an Ind div recently returned to INDIA from ITALY.  Your comd says to you:-

“I think that after fighting him for the last three years we know most of what there is to know about the GERMAN.  In a short time now we shall be fighting the JAP and our first task is to get to know all we can about him.  We’ve got to know the JAP just as well as we know the Hun.

Offrs have got the pamphlet “JAP Mil Forces” and the various supplements but we haven’t yet had a full issue of “JAPS in Battle”.  Nor have all offrs got individual access to WICs and other documents.  I know you have been studying these hard during the last week or two and I want you now to prepare a paper, for issue down to coys, summarising the main pts of JAPANESE characteristics and psychology, so far as they affect the soldier, and the main pts about certain of his tactical methods.

I was talking yesterday to the comd – Div which, as you know, has been fighting the JAP in the recent ops and I have made some notes on certain pts which he says he doesn’t think have yet appeared in any pamphlets.  Here they are.”  (At Appx A)

“In this paper I want you to begin with a summary of the JAP as a soldier generally and then go on to the main pts of his tactical methods in:-

Attack.  (excl any detailed account of night ops).

Defence.

Patrolling.

We will tackle other aspects of his tactics in subsequent papers.

I want this paper to serve as an introduction to a more detailed study, so don’t go into great detail.  About 1500 – 2000 words.  Let me have it by 1830 hrs this evening so that I can discuss it at the bde comds conference tomorrow morning.”

REQUIREMENT.

• The paper you submit to your div comd.  (Individual work)

Papers to be in DS boxes by 1830 hrs 16 Aug.

J.F.W.

Jul 44.

Appx A to INT/10/L.

INDEX 2.

Notes by div comd on pts about JAP characteristics and tactics.

Education.

As good as BRITISH or AMERICAN, but extreme uniformity results in lack of originality and initiative.

Discipline.

Still very good but evidence that it is sometimes resented, particularly by conscripts.  Entries in some captured diaries complaining of inefficiency and harshness of offrs and comds.

Morale.

Very high.  But evidence of some grousing about Allied material superiority particularly in tks and ac.  Morale of individual units and fmns has at times been badly shaken by defeat.  Evidence of special orders and pep talks by comds.

Attitude towards capture.

Generally remains as before but some instances of JAPS making no very determined effort to avoid capture, and of PW being extremely happy when refused permission to commit Hari-Kiri.

The tone of certain diaries indicates not so much the desire to surrender but a sort of resigned attitude to an inevitable death, whose glory has grown slightly tarnished.

General Weakness.

JAP has stereotyped mind.  Goes on doing things in the same way.  Has produced nothing new so far.  Takes a long time to make a new plan if one goes wrong.

Adv to Contact.

Previously, his first reaction has been to begin immediate enveloping or flank attack.  But on a number of occasions recently he has first tried a series of heavy frontal attacks and started enveloping only if these failed.

Attack.

Has been going in more for heavy frontal attacks.  Attacks carefully prepared but often crudely executed.  Gains success by application of two principles, maint of objective and conc of force.  Repeatedly attacks same objective – massed fmn regardless of cas.

Now uses more arty – usually goes in for long periods of slow fire as opposed to hy conc immediately before an attack.

Def.

JAP still very tenacious in the defence.  Sometimes careless, giving us a chance to surprise him.  Applies also to patrols, is frequently casual about local security precautions.

Siting and concealment of posns very good but actual digging not always so good.  Sticks to thick country if possible and likes villages as def areas.

Gen.

Uses tks boldly in close cooperation with inf.  Excellent use of hull down posns.  Moves into posn in darkness and cleverly cam before light.

Often slow to follow up a withdrawal.  Therefore generally simple to break contact if desired.

Daniell

1. Start with an object.  It will help to keep you “on the rails” and also put the reader “into the picture” from the start.

• Do NOT, in a military paper, get led astray into writing rhetorical passages with rather “flowery” language.  Keep it simple and short – rather dull but it saves TIME.

• You have led up to and brought out well, the results of background and training on the JAP soldier.  Your style is flowing but try and produce a paper rather than an essay.  Divide up your factors into shorter paras and make them stand out by underlining.

• Do NOT spend too long on these principles but get on to the JAP methods in the three ops of war that have been laid down for this paper.

• You might have included here, some details of his supporting arms and how he uses them.

• Quite a good effort and “easy” to read.  Do NOT forget that in military writing, that it is more a “paper” than an essay.  Without spoiling the “flow”, try and break it up into paras and headings so that your main facts are easily picked out and better “rammed home”.

EHS