8.6.18

My dear dad,

How are you? I hope you are feeling stronger & better in yourself.  I wish the dickens I could get home for a bit & drag you away somewhere where we could potter round some links a few holes a day.  When I do come home you & Edie Win & I are going away to some quiet spot like Borth for a bit, or anywhere where you and I can play a round in the morning or cool of the evening, & the girls can bathe.

I return the warrants signed. The dividend on the Exchequer Bonds has been paid into Cox & Co.

I believe mother has the dividend warrant for the £150 I brought through Selfridges. She mentioned it in one of her letters to me while the rush was on in April & I hadn’t time to think about         it then.  I have since written about it to her but had no reply as yet.

I am glad you liked the chit from the Chief Engineer. I was rather pleased about it myself but it is a silly characteristic of the Englishman to assume indifference.  The original is in the office here & when I leave the school I shall ask them for it.

Thought it was so nice because it is very rarely one gets thanks nowadays & the little that comes one’s way is quite gratifying. I expect you find it the same when grateful coal kings write & tell you they are thankful to you that things are going well & smoothly: I am not getting leave just at present but could do with a bit.  I am looking forward to many a long talk with you.

By the way dad tell them at B’pool to keep a tight hand on that letter as there are various details on it that are confidential & I shouldn’t like them to get about.

The first week of the course is over. They are an extraordinarily good lot of fellows on it.  Their spirit is wonderful.  They are cheerful & confident & a good example to anyone who may be inclined to be a doubting Thomas.

Col. Murray is home.  He is downright ill.  He was given a month’s leave but has written since he was home & says the doctors say it will be 4 months before he is well.  I am awfully sorry as it looks as though we shall lose him, & a decent fellow & a man at the top makes all the difference to a show like this.  I am not very taken with the man who I believe is coming.

I must dry up. I do hope you are better dad.  Where are you thinking of going to?

What is this farm idea?

With very best love to you both

Your loving son

Geoff.

Headquarters 178^th Infantry Brigade stamp.

K.J. Bunting Capt.

Issued down to Divisions

(for distribution down to Battalions)

T/9

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 14.

(Issued by the General Staff)

GERMAN METHOD OF OVERCOMING MACHINE GUN DEFENCE IN DEPTH.

1. The German document, of which a translation is attached, proves that the enemy has had considerable difficulty in overcoming our machine gun defence, and emphasizes the importance he attaches to training his troops in the engagement of machine gun nests.
3. The chief points upon which insistence is laid in this document are the following :-

1. No uniform method of dealing with machine guns – arranged for mutual support in depth – can be laid down, but it is essential that all arms should cooperate for their destruction.
2. All located or suspected machine gun nests are to be engaged with aimed fire before and during the preparatory bombardment, but the neutralization of the majority of hostile machine guns will have to be carried out after the assault has begun. For this purpose, a light field howitzer and a field gun are to be attached to each battalion. Special efforts are to be made to get forward the light and medium minenwerfer and to ensure the covering fire of the heavy and light machine guns for the assaulting infantry. It is recommended that the field howitzers and guns should be employed firing direct from crests and at close ranges. Great emphasis is laid upon the necessity for good communication between the gunners and the infantry commander who selects the targets.
3. If the assaulting troops are held up by machine gun fire, they are to lie down and keep up a steady rifle fire, while troops in the rear and on the flanks try to work round the flanks and rear of the machine gun nests which are holding up the attack. Meanwhile, the commander of the battalion which is responsible for the attack is to arrange for artillery and minenwerfer support and should protect his flanks from machine gun fire by means of smoke.

1. The enemy’s tactics can be met by the methods already recommended (see “Notes on Recent Fighting No. 6 and No. 9”). In preparing a system of machine gun defence, special importance should be laid on :-

1. The necessity for having in front of the outpost line of resistance – or of the main battle position, if it happens to coincide with the outpost line of resistance (see “The Division in Defence.” S.S. 210, Section 11, paragraph (a)) – a lightly held zone from 1,500 to 2,000 yards in depth. Only the most essential tactical points in this zone should be held during the hostile bombardment, but troops must always be kept in readiness to regain by immediate counter-attack the remainder of the ground which has been vacated as soon as the bombardment has finished.
2. The concealment of machine gun positions from ground observation or from the air.
3. The advisability, wherever possible, of having strong all-round defence for any tactical locality.
4. The danger of having any dead ground near machine gun positions.
5. The necessity for fortified posts to be mutually supporting.
6. The importance of protecting the flanks of all tactical localities and fortified posts by defensive positions in rear as well as by positions on the flanks.

7^th of June, 1918.

[I.a/50379.

(Distributed through Divisions down to Companies and Batteries.)

TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT.

XIII CORPS, H.Q.                                                                                                  Corps H.Q.

Ia No. 576 op.                                                                                                              17-4-18.

Not to be taken into the front line.

METHODS OF SURMOUNTING THE MACHINE GUN ZONE.

Recent fighting has shown that special consideration and preparation is essential in order to overcome hostile machine guns. For further offensive operations, all troops (commanders as well as men) must possess a thorough knowledge of the methods of engaging machine gun nests and must be provided with the necessary means to meet all possible emergencies.

A uniform method of engaging machine gun nests does not exist. A successful issue must be sought by the co-operation of all arms and means of warfare, and by an intelligent use of ground.

1. The enemy’s means of defence opposite this front consists of a deep, defensive zone, provided with a large number of machine gun nests. The machine guns afford one another mutual flanking support. Heavy machine guns are situated farther in the rear and are supported by light machine guns. Alternative positions are employed. According to prisoners’ statements, an extensive use made of indirect fire in order to conceal the machine gun positions.
3. Our preparatory bombardment for the attack must be so arranged that it is suited to this scheme of defence. The artillery and Minenwerfer, which will be specially concentrated at the points of penetration, and must open an intense fire with H.E. shell upon a zone extending from the enemy’s foremost outpost line to a depth of about 300 yards, at the same time, the zone situated at about 660 to 1,100 yards in the rear of the line (according to the wind) will be bombarded with Blue Cross Gas Shell. The wave of H.E. and gas shell will then move slowly forward in front of the infantry. The object is to annihilate as many machine gun nests as possible prior to the assault by means of this preparatory bombardment.
5. Located and suspected machine guns will be engaged with aimed fire. In addition, every endeavour must be made to discover as many hostile machine gun nests as possible before the day of attack, by means of a continuous reconnaissance by ground and air observation and by patrols, and, by a careful study also of the country farther in rear, to determine points where machine guns would probably be encountered in the event of a further advance.
6. The neutralization of the majority of hostile machine guns will have to be carried out after the commencement of the assault. Infantry and artillery must be prepared for such tasks from the very outset.
8. The means by which this can be carried out are:-

1. Single light field howitzers in action or immediately in rear of the assault trenches; at least one per battalion.
2. Batteries accompanying the infantry (as far as possible only the field gun, 96). It is preferable to allot sections or single guns to battalions, rather than to employ the battery as a whole under the command of the infantry regimental commander.
3. Direct laying is the best method of fire for the guns under (a) and (b), being quicker and surer. It is desirable to take up positions on crests and to shoot at close ranges. The section commander should observe and fire as much as possible himself. Fire control requires specially careful consideration and preparation. The infantry commander selects the targets. The single light field howitzers and the sections of artillery accompanying the infantry must maintain constant communication with the foremost infantry line (observer) and with the infantry commander (battalion) to which they are attached. This communication must be short and must be ensured by various means (word of mouth, telephone, runner, mounted orderly), in order to prevent it failing.
4. Light and medium “Minenwerfer” – They will be employed in the first instance in the positions allotted to them for the preparatory bombardment, and they will be allotted, for the advance, to the battalions which are to deliver the main blow.
5. As regards their communications, the same principles apply as for the artillery, (see (a) and (b). Experience has shown that the light and medium Minenwerfer have often been unable to keep pace with the infantry. Thorough preparations must therefore be made to enable these weapons to push rapidly forward close behind the infantry.
6. Light and heavy machine guns. The emplacements of the heavy machine guns must be so sited that the guns can, in the first place, support the assaulting infantry by means of overhead fire, which should, as far as possible, be flanking fire. It is recommended that these guns be sited in groups, forming batteries. If the nature of the ground prevents the strike of the bullets being located, effective use can be made of tracer ammunition (the available supply is limited).

1. The penetration of the machine gun zone may develop roughly as follows:-

1. The infantry, which is held up by a machine gun nest, lies down and engages the enemy with heavy fire from machine guns and rifles. If the hostile machine gun has not been accurately located, patrols must work forward and reconnoitre the position. A commander should not shrink from this loss of time; it will always pay. While the enemy’s fire is kept down by a large number of heavy machine guns, assault detachments of formations in rear or of neighbouring troops, making skilful use of the ground, work their way up to the next approaching it from the flanks and, if possible, from the rear. Light machine guns, advancing in echelon, will also accompany and support this movement. The main point is to prevent the enemy, by means of frontal and flanking fire with a considerable expenditure of ammunition, from developing his fighting powers to the fullest extent. The moral effect of uninterrupted fire is of great importance.As soon as the assault detachments are ready to assault, they will cause the fire which endangers their further advance to cease, by a signal which has been definitely agreed upon beforehand. The assault will be carried out with hand grenades, fixed bayonets and cheering.
2. Meanwhile, the battalion commander provides for artillery and Minenwerfer support. Furthermore, he must be able to view the fighting of his battalion and to maintain complete command. Concentrated fire, directed against the “nest” which is to be attacked, is the quickest means of gaining the desired result. Flanking machine guns, which cannot be attacked simultaneously, will be neutralized by artillery (smoke shell). Minenwerfer or machine guns. The assault detachments can protect themselves from flanking machine guns by means of smoke (smoke bombs, smoke grenades).
3. Troops will gradually force way their through the network of machine guns by making use of every local success. The attack must proceed uninterruptedly. The battalion commander must arrange for the artillery batteries accompanying the infantry, the Minenwerfer and the heavy machine guns to follow up in good time. In doing so, he must insist very strictly on the fact that the transmission of information is not interrupted. The artillery observer must always be in the infantry front line, and there should be an additional representative of the battery with the battalion commander. They must both maintain communication with the officer controlling the fire. Individuals who have themselves located hostile machine guns will be sent back to notify the accompanying artillery or Minenwerfer direct.
4. Sufficient ammunition of the right kind – for artillery, the 1915 pattern H.E. shell with delay action fuze and shell with armour-piercing head for use against tanks – must be sent forward.
5. When a number of field artillery and heavy batteries have been brought up by the orders of the division, additional artillery will become available for the engagement of (machine gun) battery nests. It is recommended that these batteries should be allotted to (infantry) regimental commanders for employment at points where the attack is checked.
6. Machine gun nests which are exceptionally difficult to destroy will be engaged with tanks.

1. Divisions must train their troops in the engagement of machine gun nests. Resting troops will carry out extensive training in this respect. The training will be carried out from the beginning with the various arms co-operating and against a skeleton enemy. The destruction of several nests, situated one behind the other will always be practiced.(Sd.) von STAABS,GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE),30^th of May, 1918
2. Printed in France by Army Printing and Stationary Services.                                                                     PRESS A-6/18-6710S-4,000
4. GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
5. General der Infanterie.
6. The place and time of all such training will be telephoned at 8 p.m. to Corps Headquarters.

K.J. Bunting Capt.

Issued down to Divisions

(for distribution down to Battalions)

T/9

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 15.

THE GERMAN ATTACK ON THE BRITISH FRONT ON THE AISNE ON THE

27^th OF MAY.

1. Indications of the Attack.
2. The enemy was very successful in concealing his preparations for the attack. Hostile artillery was exceptionally quiet during the fortnight preceding the attack, and there was an almost entire absence of gas shelling. There was little aerial registration and very little aerial and wireless activity of any kind; aeroplane photographs, the latest of which were taken on the 23^rd of May, disclosed few new ammunition dumps and no new gun positions. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that the whole front was covered with old gun positions and that about three weeks previous to the attack some of these were reoccupied by the enemy. Except for the reoccupation of these positions, there were no indications of the attack until the 24^th and 25^th of May, when abnormal lorry and train movement was noticed in the back areas behind the enemy’s lines. In the late afternoon of the 26^th of May, whole battalions were seen on the march in the forward areas. The enemy made no attempt to conceal the movements of these troops and did not reply when they were shelled.
3. Hostile Artillery Preparation.
4. During the night of the 26^th-27^th of May, as it was evident that the enemy intended to attack, harassing fire was carried out by the heavy and field artillery on the enemy’s roads and approaches. The tracks, however, were numerous and the country very open, so that it is unlikely that the enemy experienced much interference in his approach. There was no artillery retaliation, and the enemy’s bombardment opened with a crash at 1 a.m. on the 27^th of May without any previous preparation. The bombardment is described as the heaviest there has been during the recent offensive. Our front line system of trenches was bombarded mainly, if not entirely, by trench mortars. Instantaneous fuzes were used and the wire, which is described as particularly strong, was destroyed. The shelling of our batteries was very accurate. The bombarded zone included practically the whole of our battery positions. Gas was not used in the front system, but was freely employed for counter-battery work and in every suitable locality in rear. The gas employed was chiefly, if not solely, “blue cross”. Its effects were felt as far back as the Valley of the Vesle.
5. The Attack.
6. The infantry attack is believed to have begun at about 4.30 a.m. It was preceded by a very heavy barrage, extending to a depth of about 400 yards, which appears not to have been a regular creeping barrage, but to have been moved from zone to zone at some distance in front of the assaulting troops. The enemy throughout the fighting adopted his usual tactics of working round the flanks. On the British front, at any rate, the enemy appears to have little made use of tanks. It is reported that a few tanks worked along the valley of the Miette and thence up to La-Ville-au-Bois, but their co-operation was no real factor in the success of the attack in this sector. From the beginning of the battle the enemy had a great superiority in the air, and he was exceedingly quick in getting forward his balloons. A balloon was working from Juvincourt before 11 a.m.   Another feature of the advance was the rapidity with which the enemy succeeded in bringing up his light trench mortars. They were drawn by horses and got into action more quickly, and were of greater use, than the field artillery which also accompanied the infantry in the advance.
7. Lessons.
8. There was nothing new in the enemy’s tactics, but the success which he again obtained emphasizes more strongly than ever the following points:-

1. The outpost system must be lightly held. It is useless to expose to the preliminary bombardment a single man more than is absolutely necessary.
2. It is none the less essential to organize some form of forward or outpost system, otherwise the enemy will simply destroy the main defensive battle line by his preliminary bombardment, and will then overwhelm such elements as remain by the strength of his infantry attack.
3. Reserves should not be sent up piecemeal as reinforcements to troops holding the line, but must be used as distinct units with definite tasks.
4. It is essential that a mobile reserve of guns should be retained.
5. Little registration was reported during the period immediately preceding the attack. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that registration can always be done unobtrusively when the light is unfavourable for ground or aerial observation, or when the wind makes sound ranging difficult. There is also a general tendency not to report a few apparently aimless rounds which do not cause any inconvenience. The importance of reporting all shelling, especially on quiet days, cannot, therefore, be too much emphasized.

6^th of June, 1918.

Printed in France by Army Printing and Stationary Services.                                                                                          PRESS A-6/18.

H.M. Government

Embossed notepaper

c/o British Embassy

Rome

6.6.18

My dearest Lillie & Anna,

I shall be up all night to-night, so this is a good opportunity to write to my dear folks at home. (Meine Lieben in der Heimat)

Well at present I am at Brindisi, right down near the heel of the boot.  It is a fascinating old place and takes one back to the early middle ages with all the primitiveness of those times. (it swarms with fleas, ants & mosquitoes.  The women walk about carrying huge jars of water, like Rachel & Rebecca used to take to the well.) It was a great *** leaving Rome, but I hope to return there any time to stay, and I shall appreciate more than ever then and never want to live any other place afterwards. Rome is at the same time primeval, medieval and modern, and sometimes one cannot help feeling it is more modern than anything else.  I loved every moment of the day there, and one of my greatest joys was to drive about in a Vettura and watch movements of the people.  The Sognoras are so graziose and the signores tanto cortesi.  I am already Italanissimo my self and cannot imagine I am a native of a more northern clime.  At Brindisi it is almost tropical, but I have not found the heat very intense yet.  For instance I only put on my drill uniform today for the first time.  I bathed in the blue blue Adriatic today and walked for miles along the shore admiring the flowers and plants.  There are enormous cactus trees everywhere and wild flowers of every kind and colour.  I wish you could see them.

There is a frightful shortage of water here, and one misses the facilities for washing, but that does not matter so long as one has the sea to bathe in.

Lord Monk-Breton has written to the Admiralty to ask them to have me promoted to Captain, so that’s that but it may be some time before it comes through.  I shall let you know at once as soon as I hear the result.  Until then I remain Lieutenant.

He is a splendid man to have as one’s C.O. and he would do anything to help one.  The question of pay &c has not been fixed yet.  It takes a long time to get a reply to one’s letters from here to England so we have just to wait patiently.

I had a great day in Paris on the way out, and the whole journey was simply wonderful.  I am thrilled with the joy of the whole thing.  My stay in Rome was of course simply enchanting, and it will be still better when I return.

I would not mind being here a month or two to collect my thoughts until every thing is made straight, but then I want to live in Rome for ere after.

Now I must stop as otherwise the letter would be too heavy.

Write soon please and tell me all about yourselves, your cars and everything that interests you.

Write c/o British Embassy Rome, always, and the letters will be forwarded to me no matter where I am.

Did you get my card from Turin and my letter from Rome?  There will be more to tell you in my next letter.  Write about once a week please just to tell me you are all right.

By the way you forgot to give me the Bystander you brought at the station.  If you care to send it I should be very glad to have it as we never see an English paper or journal here.

With best love to you two & Kathleen                      from  Willie

K.J. Bunting Capt.

Issued down to Divisions

(for distribution down to Battalions)

T/9

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 13.

GERMAN TACTICS IN THE ATTACK.

(Issued by the General Staff)

1. The method of concentration of the attacking troops and their movement to the position of assembly in the recent operations on the Western Front were very similar to those employed by the Germans in the attack on Riga in September 1917. Several of the attacking and second line divisions were brought forward by night marches and by easy stages. In certain cases these marches were so regulated as to bring the divisions into their assembly positions at the end of their last march. This method of attacking after long marches was a feature of the training and manoeuvres carried out by the German divisions in the back areas during the early part of this year. In some cases, the starting point of the attacking divisions was at a considerable distance behind the enemy’s line. Prisoners who have been captured from divisions which adopted this practice state that their losses during the advance were comparatively light.
2. The enemy has employed two or three different methods for deployment of his assaulting troops. There is evidence to shew that in some cases an assault division was brought up through a division already in the line. The 3^rd Naval Division, for instance, is stated to have marched through another division to attack Contalmaison, and in the attack north of the Scarpe on the 28^th of March the three attacking divisions passed through regiments of the two divisions which were holding the line. As a general rule, however, the enemy appears to have distributed his divisions in depth in groups of two or three, and the assaulting division attacked with two regiments in the front line and one regiment in reserve. Thus, the German IX Corps (St Quentin Group) for the attack on the 21^st of March was organized with three divisions in the front line and three divisions in reserve. The Corps frontage was about three miles, so that each division attacked on a frontage of about 1,760 yards, with two regiments in the front line and one regiment in divisional reserve. The heads of the central reserve division were ordered to arrive at positions about 4,500 yards behind the German front line at the moment of assault. The leading regiments of the assaulting division had two battalions in front and one battalion in reserve. The leading battalions had two companies in front and two in close support.
3. The general dispositions adopted by a company in the attack are shewn in the diagram below. This diagram is based upon a prisoner’s statement, and shews the formation adopted during training. It is probably typical of the formation generally employed by a company in the attack, but the strength of the various waves naturally depends upon the fighting strength of the company. It will be seen that a fourth platoon is temporarily formed, consisting of runners, signallers and carriers. The task of this platoon, in addition to maintaining communication, is to supply the forward infantry with ammunition and engineer material.| 50 yds.         |100 yds                     |100 yds.        |                                    | riflemen       |group                         |                       |                                    |                                                                                                                       |                       |                                   |                       |                                               |                                                                                                                       |                       |                                   |                       |L.M.G. Group            | group of       |“Granatwerfer”         |signallers      |                                    |                       |                                   |                       |
5.                                     | riflemen       |group                         |                       |
6.                                                Platoon Cmdr
7. Assault group           |                       |                                   |                       |
8. Platoon comdr.             L.M.G. Group |           Coy Comdr.      |                       |                                               |                        |           L.M.G Group     | Platoon Comdr                                                                                                           | Carriers         |
9. Assault group          |                       |                                   |                       |
10.                                                             |           Platoon Comdr.     |                       |
11. L.M.G Group           | group of       |“Granatwerfer”         |runners         |
13. The special assault detachments which form the first wave of an attack advance in extended order, but there is no definite information to shew the exact formation adopted by the succeeding waves of the leading battalions. It is probable that the usual method of advance is in line of groups in file until the battalions reach our trenches, when the men deploy into line. The reasons for this kind of formation are obvious. Casualties from artillery and machine gun fire are reduced to a minimum and the strength of the attack is liable to be underrated. The reserves follow the assaulting battalions in artillery formation, taking advantage of every form of natural cover.
14. The enemy’s maxim that the light machine gun is not an auxiliary weapon, but just as much the chief weapon of the infantry as the rifle, has been acted upon throughout the recent offensive. Light machine guns have always been well forward with the assaulting troops. On one portion of the front it was noticed that the system adopted was for one big man to carry the gun until the attacking troops came within our rifle fire. The No. 1 then took the gun from the carrier and crept forward as far as possible before opening a machine gun barrage, under the protection of which the infantry attacked.
15. The enemy’s light mortars have usually followed close behind the assaulting infantry. They have been used to support the attack if it appears to have been definitely checked and to reinforce machine guns in the defence of captured localities against our counter-attacks.
16. In some cases, as in the attack carried out by the enemy on the 24^th of April between the Somme and Hangard, attacks have been delivered by mixed groups of infantry and artillery, a minimum of one field gun battery accompanying an infantry regiment. Although this form of attack may not have been universally adopted by the enemy, it had been employed on all known occasions by various divisions during the recent operations on the Somme and Lys battle fronts. It should be noted that the constitution of mixed groups was laid down by the Germans for the engagement of intervening divisions during the fighting in Flanders in 1917.
17. In the majority of cases, the objectives of the attack appear to have been unlimited and the orders to the troops have been to push on until an organized resistance was encountered. In this connection, it is of interest to note that many of the prisoners who have been captured have been in possession of maps, complete in every detail, of the country into which they might penetrate.
18. In the development of his offensive operations the enemy has aimed at establishing continuous action. He has, therefore, allowed his unit commanders of all grades the fullest initiative, and has endeavoured immediately to exploit any success which he obtains. His tactical methods during the recent fighting constitute a complete return to the principles laid down in the training regulations of German infantry before the war.

4^th of June, 1918.

Printed in France by Army Printing and Stationary Services.                                                                     PRESS A-6/18-6661S-4000.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY of 9^th CANADIAN ARTILLERY BRIGADE

From May 1^st 1918 – To May 31^st 1918

A.27.c.90.45

LIEVIN

1.5.18           Visibility today has been poor.  Throughout the day the enemy artillery harassed our forward areas with all calibre of guns.  About noon today, an enemy “Whizz-bang” battery was engaged and silenced by one of our batteries.  Very little enemy movement was observed today on account of the low visibility.

2.5.18           Visibility today has been fair.  During the morning his artillery was very quiet.  Our forward areas received a light scattered shelling during the afternoon.  A certain amount of movement was observed today in enemy country all of which was fired on by our batteries.  Our planes were very active throughout the afternoon, frequently crossing the enemy lines.  Only one enemy plane was observed today.

3.5.18            Visibility continues fair.  With the exception of a light scattered shelling of our forward area, enemy’s artillery has been very quiet.  A considerable amount of movement was observed today, mostly individual.  Our batteries carried out their usual harassing fire during the night.  A large explosion was caused in SALLAUMINES by our Heavies at 5.15 P.M.

Operational Order No 145 was issued today detailing the relief of the 3^rd Canadian Division by the XVIII Corps (Imperial); relief to take place on the 3/4^th and 4/5^th.  The 9^th Brigade C.F.A. will be relieved by the 91^st Brigade R.F.A.  Relief is to be of personnel only, and all guns will be handed over to relieving batteries.

4.5.18           O.O.145-3 was issued today giving instructions regarding the move of the Brigade to AMETTES.  The brigade is to march at night, leaving the Wagon Lines about 7.30 P.M.

5.5.18            The Brigade arrived at AMETTES about 4.30 A.M. after an uneventful march.  The day was spent by the batteries in fixing up their horse lines and billets.

6.5.18 to 31.5.18       A considerable amount of open warfare manoeuvres in conjunction with the Infantry has taken place during the past three weeks, in the AUCHEL and BOMY Areas.  All Batteries made a very creditable performance, gaining valuable experience in the art of open warfare.  From the 10^th to the 17^th all the guns of the Brigade were calibrated on the Artillery Range at WESTREHEM.  A special shoot took place, during the calibration of the guns, in which the 33^rd and 36^th Batteries took part.  A demonstration of firing at short ranges took place which was witnessed by both Corps and Army Staffs.  On 21^st, instant all the guns in the brigade were taken by motor lorry to ALBAIN ST NAZAIRE where they were calibrated on the new electric ranges.  A number of trips were taken to the XI and XIII Corps Area and reconnaissance made of the Reserve Trenches and battery area.

On the 30^th and 31^st the Brigade preliminary Dumbell Contest took place, which was won by the 31^st Battery C.F.A.

Lieut-Colonel

Comd’g 9^th Canadian Artillery Brigade

WAR DIARY of 2/6^th Sherwood Foresters for May 1918

Place       Date    Hour                                                Summary of Events and Information

Fighting Strength  31 Offs 836 O.R.s

Sheet 27

HOUTKERQUE 1/5/18        Battalion training carried out.

E.20.b.25.75   2/5/18              Battalion moved by march route to Camp at K.17.a.3.3. (Nr. Watou).

K.17.a.3.3.   3/5/18  2.0 pm.   Battalion digging on Watou Caestre Front & Reserve Lines.

4/5/18

5/5/18  9.0 am.            Battalion embossed at E.28.d.6.6 and proceeded to Barracks at St. Omer.

1. OMER     6/5/18

7/5/18               16 Offs & 665 O.R.s despatched to ‘K’ Infantry Base Depot and Battalion formed into Battalion Training Cadre.   Establishment 10 Offs & 44 O.R.s.

HAZE 5a.95.40

BLESSY             9/5/18  8.0. am.       Training Cadre marched to Blessy.

SHEET 36B

BOURS           10/5/18  8.0 am.          Training Cadre marched to BOURS.

BOURS     11/5/18 to 31/5/18                        Training of Staff carried out.

F.S. Offs 10  O.R.s 43

WAR DIARY of 20 Siege Battery for May 1918

Place       Date    Hour                                                Summary of Events and Information

MAY

1^st 1918                                   Officers on strength of Battery

Capt (A/Major) L.G.R.F.H. BELL (Reg) (to Hospital, sick 29.4.18)

Lt. (A/Capt) JC THOMPSON (SR)

Lt. H.L. PAUL (TF)

Lt. E.B. LOACH (SR)

Lt. R.G. PERCIVAL (SR)

²/Lt. F.W. DAVIS (SR)

²/Lt.C.H. BATEMAN (SR)

²/Lt. W.H. CHAPMAN (SR)

²/Lt. A.E. COCKFIELD (SR)

²/Lt. E.O. DAVIES (SR) (Attd 125 SB till 18.5.18)

1^st                    3 guns at OBLINGHEM.  2 guns near ANNEZIN. 1 gun in workshops.

6^th                    2 guns for ANNEZIN moved to position near BETHUNE BEUVRY Road, E.18.b.3.0. (Sheet 36 B N.E.).  Also 1 gun for OBLINGHEM.  Guns not allowed to fire from this position owing to proximity of Inf Bde & Div H.Q.

8^th                    2 guns for position in OBLINGHEM moved into new position in BETHUNE E.11.c.5.3 (Sheet 36 B N.E.) 3^rd gun for workshops.

9^th                    3 guns for position on BETHUNE-BEUVRY Road to new position on BETHUNE-NOEUX-LES-MINES Road E.17.d.3.2 (Sheet 36 B N.E.)

10^th -31^st          Both sections almost entirely engaged in destructive counter battery shoots with aeroplane observation, 3450 rounds being fired on these targets & 7 OKs & 37 Ys obtained during **ing

No Battle Casualties during month of May.

 JUNE 1918

Spring Offensive – Operation Gneisenau

The fourth German offensive launched in 1918 was known by the German code-name of Operation Gneisenau. In May 1918, the fighting lines had reached the west of Château-Thierry at Vaux and Belleau Wood. The Battle of Belleau Wood was fought from the 1^st to 26^th June 1918, and was the first major battle the Americans were involved in fighting against the German army. At the end of the German Aisne Offensive, the American Second Division moved in to replace a French corps in the sector. The German advance was stopped on the 4^th June 1918. Two days later this American division made a successful counter-attack against four German Divisions, and recaptured Vaux and Belleau Wood which the Germans had previously over-run as part of Operation Blücher-Yorck. The Americans were operating under French Corps command during the earlier battles, but the American Expeditionary Force commander General John Pershing was working towards the deployment of an independent U.S. Field Army. The rest of the American forces followed at an accelerating pace during the spring and summer of 1918. By June American troops were arriving in Europe at the rate of 10,000 a day and most of them were trained by British, Canadian and Australian battle-experienced officers and senior non-commissioned ranks. The training took a minimum of six weeks due to the inexperience of the servicemen.

The Battle of Matz was fought from the 9^th to 12^th June 1918 and the German plan was to push the German Front Line westward in the sector between two salients. The northern salient had been formed from the fighting towards Amiens and the southern salient was to be from the previous German offensive in the Aisne sector. In attempting to straighten out the bulge between the two salients the Germans made progress on the first day, but the French organised a counter-attack on the 11^th June 1918. Three French and two American divisions were supported by tanks and two days later the Germans halted their offensive.

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Other Theatres

In the Middle East, British forces defended the Jordan Valley. The Action of Arsuf was the second Battle of Jordan, and was fought between the British and Turkish Empires, on the 8^th June 1918. The British Empire forces involved were the  21^st Brigade comprising the 2^nd Battalion the Black Watch, the 1^st Guides Infantry, the 29^th Punjabis and the 1/8^th Gurkha Rifles. The 21^st Brigade, was tasked with the capture of two hills, 1 mile (1.6 km) from the Mediterranean Sea known as the two sisters. The hills were defended by elements of the Turkish 7^th Division. The hills were being used as observation posts and the intention was to deprive the Turks of their use. The successful assault was carried out by the Black Watch and the Guides. The Turks responded with two counter-attacks of their own. The first succeeded in recapturing a section of their previous position before being driven back. The second counter-attack was defeated before they managed to reach the British position. The Turkish forces suffered considerable losses and had four officers and 101 other ranks taken prisoner. The capture of the two hills greatly improved the British position. Their loss deprived the Turks of an observation post that overlooked British lines and rear areas. They also gave the British their own observation post that could see the Turkish rear areas. The British forces occupied this high ground up to the Battle of Megiddo in mid-September.

In the Caucasus, with the Russians out of the war, following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, the growing German-Turkish rivalry for Caucasian influence and resources began. The resources were notably the oilfields near Baku, the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, and the associated rail and pipeline connection to Batum on the Black Sea. Early in June 1918 the Turkish 3^rd Army renewed its offensive on the main road to Tiflis and confronted a joint German-Georgian force. On the 10^th June 1918, the Turks attacked Vorontsovka and took many prisoners, leading to an official threat from Berlin to withdraw its support and troops from the Turkish Empire. The Turkish government had to concede to German pressure and halted its drive and further advance into Georgia for the Batum-Tiflis-Baku railway and associated pipeline. The Turks changed their strategic thrust towards Azerbaijan with a blocking action against British forces in north-west Persia.

On the Italian front, the Second Battle of the Piave River, fought between the 15^th and 23^rd June 1918, was a decisive victory for the Italian Army against the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Following the defeat at the Battle of Caporetto in the autumn of 1917, the Italians retreated to the Piave River and were reinforced by French and British infantry divisions. The Austro-Hungarian’s had ambitions of forcing the Italians into an armistice. Divided opinions within the Austro-Hungarian command resulted in a decision to attack the Italians at the Piave River. The Italian commander had learned the exact timing of the Austrian attack: 3.00 a.m. on the 15^th June 1918. At 2.30 a.m. the Italian artillery opened fire on the crowded enemy trenches, inflicting heavy casualties.  In some sectors the barrage had the effect of delaying or stopping the attack, and the Austrians began the retreat to their defensive positions, but in the greater part of the front the Austrians still attacked. The Austrians were able to cross the Piave and gained a bridgehead in the face of Italian heavy resistance, before the Austro-Hungarians were finally halted. One joint Austrian group commander, Svetozar Boroevié von Bojna was forced to order a retreat. On the following days the assaults were renewed, but the Italian artillery barrage had destroyed many of the river’s bridges. Subsequently the Austrians were unable to receive reinforcements and supplies. An estimated 20,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers drowned while trying to reach the east bank. On the 19^th June 1918 the Italians counter-attacked into Boroevié’s flank, inflicting heavy casualties. In the meantime, on 15^th June 1918, the other joint group commander, Conrad von Höttzedorf (the former Austrian Chief of Staff) attacked along the Italian lines west of Boroevié on the Asiago Plateau. His forces gained some ground, but came upon stiff resistance by Italians units, 40,000 casualties were added to the Austrian total. Lacking supplies and facing attacks the Austro-Hungarians were ordered to retreat by the Austrian Emperor Karl on the 20^th June 1918. By the 23^rd June 1918, the Italians recaptured all the territory on the southern bank of the Piave and the battle was over. The battle signalled the end of the Austro-Hungarian army as a fighting force and the beginning of the collapse of the Empire.

On the 15th June 1918, Captain Edward Brittain was shot in the head and killed during an early morning counter-attack against an Austrian offensive, on the Asiago Plateau, part of the Battle of the Piave River. Following his wounding at the Battle of the Somme in 1916, for which he was awarded the Military Cross (MC), he spent nearly a year recuperating in England. He returned to the western front in 1917 and was immediately sent into battle, before being sent to the Italian Front with the 11^th Sherwood Foresters in November 1917. Edward Brittain was close to his sister Vera and was one of the “Three Musketeers”. He, Roland Leighton and Victor Richardson formed a four-way friendship with Vera. Geoffrey Thurlow was to become part of that friendship. However, the Great War took the lives of the four male participants, who meant the most to Vera Brittain, and was one of the many reasons why she became a pacifist. Edward Brittain is buried in Granezza British Cemetery in Italy, and in September 1921 Vera visited the cemetery, but never fully got over the death of her brother, Edward. After her death in 1970 her will requested that her ashes be scattered on Edward’s grave on the Asiago Plateau in Italy: – “for nearly 50 years much of my heart has been in that Italian village cemetery” and her daughter Shirley Williams honoured her request in September 1970.

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 Timetable June 1918

German Spring Offensive – Operation Gneisenau

1^st to 26^th June          Battle of Belleau Wood

9^th to 12^th June          Battle of Matz

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Other Theatres

8^th June                     Action at Arsuf

8^th June-October       Germany interferes in the Caucasus

13^th to 23^rd June        Second Battle of the Piave River

15^th June                   Edward Brittain killed at the Battle of the Piave

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