1 B.

Reconnaissance No 759                                                                    20th November 1914.

Aeroplane B.E. 487.                                                                               Ref Map 1/100000

Squadron 4.                                                                                            

Pilot – Capt. Shephard.

Observer –

Hour commenced 8-15 a.m.

   “     concluded    10-0 a.m.

================================================================

Time                                       Place                          OBSERVATION

—————————————————————————————————————-

9-25 a.m.       GHELUWE                            18 6-horse teams exercising – SW.

                                                                        12 ammunition wagons – S.E.

20 vehicles horse transport.

MENIN                                   40      “      M.T. N of town.

15      “      H.T. on YPRES road halted on N. side.

24 small store tents E. of town.

                        HALLUIN.                              40 vehicles M.T.

                        BOUSBECQUE.                  30 vehicles M.T.

                        WERVICQ.                            40 vehicles M.T.

                        COMMINES.                         Rolling stock for 6 trains; 1 train going S.

9-35 a.m.       WARNETON.                        N. of town horses and 50 wagons parked.

All roads in area                   WARNETON, GHELUVELT,

ROULERS and MENIN       PASSCHENDAELE, were clear – No rolling

to LICHTERVELDE.            stock from ROULERS. 

                                                Country round FORET D’HOUTHULST

same as yesterday.

9-5 a.m.          ROULERS                            15 horse vehicles moving towards

OOSTNIEUKERKE.

9-0 a.m.          STADEN.                               12 6-horse teams drawn up in field.

                                                                        12 store tents.

                                                                        Rolling stock for 3 trains.

                        HOOGLEDE.                        About 90 wagons dotted about near farms

                                                                        between HOOGLEDE and STADEN.

3 store tents.

30 H.T. wagons.

Column of horse transport 1 kilo in length

entering HOUTHULST from N.

(Unsigned)               

Stamp of HEADQUARTERS HIGHLAND DIVISION T.F.

No. 3642 19 NOV 1914

FURTHER NOTES ON ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT WAR.

Speaking generally, it may be said that Field Artillery Training in the light of experiences up to date requires remarkably little alteration.  Both the general principles laid down and the detailed instructions given have been proved to be correct, with hardly any exceptions.

Some notes on various sections of the Training Manual follow:-

Chapter VII., Section 146. – Concealment assumes greater importance than ever.  It is not merely desirable but essential, and in modern war concealment means cover from view from the enemy’s observers, whether on the ground or in the air.  In addition to concealment when in position the approach to the position must also be hidden from air observers.  If hostile aeroplanes are observed guns must remain perfectly still along the edge of woods, &c., where they may escape observation; during movement there must be look-out men on the watch for the approach of the enemy’s aircraft.

Owing to the great height at which these fly, i.e., about 6,000 to 7,000 feet they cannot usually be detected unless first heard approaching.  The look-out man should therefore be placed where the approach of an aeroplane would be audible, e.g., away from roads.  It is possible to distinguish between the enemy’s and friendly machines by means of the coloured designs painted on the under plane.  The French have red, white and blue concentric rings, and the English a union jack in addition to the rings.  The German machines show a black cross almost similar to a Maltese cross.

It is usual when possible to stop firing when the enemy’s aeroplane is overhead until it disappears owing to the importance of keeping gun positions secret.  When they are located the enemy do not seem to find much difficulty in shelling them and inflicting casualties both on personnel and material.

Much may, however, be done to mislead the enemy’s air observers by the use of partially concealed emplacements and puffs to represent the flash and report of guns.  These must, however, be sparingly used, and, as a rule, be under the direction of the Divisional Artillery Headquarters.

It is quite as important to conceal completely wagon and gun teams as the guns themselves, and they are best placed, if possible, out of range altogether.  Where it is not possible to conceal them, their position must be changed directly it has been located by an observer, if casualties are to be avoided.

Even when positions are effectually hidden it must be remembered that if the locality can be described accurately by spies, just as effective fire can be brought to bear as if the position had been plainly visible.  The chief considerations, then – given concealment – should be

  • The selection of a position difficult to locate accurately on a map.
  • The occupation of the position in such a way as to increase the difficulty of hitting any gun or emplacement, viz., by placing guns at wide and irregular intervals, and even at varying ranges.

Section 147.  Economy of force. – The necessity for this has been well exemplified according to all reports and personal observation.   The enemy’s guns and observing stations are so well concealed and so constantly changed that it is nearly always advisable to reserve guns to deal with later contingencies.  That this is not sufficiently practiced is perhaps due to peace training, but it has assumed great importance in war, and great stress must be laid on it during training.  The labour of taking up a position and entrenching is great, whereas, often, it may have been completed only just before a change is shown to be desirable.

The bigger the calibre of the gun the more important this factor of economy.  If howitzers are required for a task, four may often be sufficient, or even two; while heavy guns should hardly ever be in larger units than sections.

            The bigger the calibre the greater also the difficulty of the ammunition supply.  It may therefore sometimes be advisable to attach an 18-pr. gun to heavier natures to assist in ranging and registering.  It is true this introduces complications, but nevertheless it may sometimes be worthwhile.

            In modern battle fronts the extent of ground is so great that the character of the country will vary in different parts of the position.  At the battle of the Aisne the British Corps were extended over a front of some 15 miles or even more.  In some portions only could howitzers be profitably utilized, while in others guns could do all that was required.

Section 148.  Protection, sub-paragraph 5. – The carrying of rifles on wagons in the artillery appears to have been justified by their having been made use of on more than one section.

Section 149.  Intercommunication. – Communications are perhaps the greatest difficulty that units have to contend with owing to the almost exclusive use of the telephone.  Flag signalling is rare, but has been used both by field and heavy artillery on suitable occasions when there was no chance of observation by the enemy.

Buzzing on the telephone is very much resorted to and is invaluable.

It was perhaps not sufficiently recognized in the Royal Artillery in peace how much training is required to keep telephone communication uninterrupted.  The difference in the working of the telephones by the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery is most marked.  The Royal Engineers succeed and the Royal Artillery to some extent fail.

The necessity for an efficient telephone service cannot be too strongly impressed on those now training.  Men require much training in speaking, which is an acquired art, as well as in keeping the instruments and line in good working order.  Casualties amongst these men, who do not hesitate to go out and repair lines under the hottest fire, are bound to occur, and there should therefore be plenty under training.  Every telephonist must know the Morse code and be able to use the buzzer.

When laid out the wire should be dug in if time permit, as such frequent interruptions occur from the wire being cut.  The digging in is best arranged by ploughing a furrow with an ordinary plough, if available, and there are many about in the fields.

The lamp is useful, but it also requires highly skilled signallers.

Megaphones are useful.  Section commanders sometimes use them to make themselves heard above the noise of bursting shell.

Section 163A.  Artillery in wood fighting. – Most guns in the recent battle have been inside or just on the edge of woods.  If woods did not accommodate the guns, young trees were cut down and planted around the batteries so as to screen them.  In the winter, except where firs are available, these methods will not, perhaps, be so effective.  Wagon teams were always concealed in woods if possible.

Artillery will do well to keep clear of all villages, if within range of hostile guns.  Villages aid the location of targets by description, and are apt to draw shell fire.

It may be well here to emphasise the necessity of much practice with maps, e.g., locating places in strange country, using the map for obtaining range, line and angle of sight.

Section 164.  Night operations. – The chief work to be carried out at night is the occupation of positions and entrenching.  Practice in peace training is all important.  Ammunition is constantly replenished at night, and changes of gun positions or the position of the teams are nearly always effected at night.  Suitable artificial light is a great help.  The showing of lights would generally be unobjectionable if positions are well concealed from the target direction.

Firing by night in more indulged in by the enemy than ourselves, but it has been attempted on certain occasions against targets to which the range had been ascertained by day.  The enemy make frequent endeavours to shell villages or buildings known to be occupied by our troops after dark, but the effect would not appear commensurate with the expenditure of ammunition; at least, we should not consider it so.

Chapter VIII., Section 181.  Reconnaissance. – From the information available on this subject, it would seem that the battery commanders have had more tactical control of their units than is contemplated by Field Artillery Training.  This is due mainly to the difficulty of communication in the field.  Battery commanders have certainly very often done the whole of their reconnaissance, making their choice of position on the information and instructions received from brigade headquarters.  Space appears for the most part not to be confined, but, since batteries are always concealed, observing stations are nearly always distant.  No account is taken of the danger angle.  The “position in observation” is much used, but the “position in readiness” finds no place in the modern battle.

Section 186.  Allotting objectives is effected either by the map or by personally pointing out localities visible from observing stations.

A howitzer brigade is seldom used as such, and howitzer batteries are further much split up into sections, or even single guns on occasions.

Chapter  IX., Section 192.  Reconnaissance of a position. – Complete concealment in the reconnaissance and in the approach to and occupation of the observing station is absolutely essential.  A background is necessary to the observing station, and there should be as few people present there as possible.  All required must be dug in to complete cover, and a view of the battery is likely to be impossible.  The use of observation wagons would seldom be desirable or possible, except sometimes in a flat country where it is necessary to raise the eye of the observer.  But it should then be remembered that the shield of the observatory is no protection against high explosive shell.  A battery commander would be as secure, on the whole, in a tree as raised up on a ladder provided with a shield, and at the same time better supported.

The first object of the reconnaissance is, contrary to paragraph 3 of this section, almost always a position for the guns that will defy discovery as long as possible.  The position of the observation station is subservient, being selected as occasion demands, and is normally in front of the guns.

It is hardly ever necessary to mark the line of fire with aiming posts.  The line is generally obtained roughly from the map and a trial shot fired from which to make a correction.

Section 193.  Methods of occupying a position. – In the above circumstances the “special method” is more often followed than the ordinary.

Occupations of position by night require special treatment, the method being adapted to circumstances.

Whatever the method or whatever the position, digging should commence at the earliest possible moment.

Section 195.  Advance for action. – This section requires slight modifications in accordance with the above.  The wagon line should be as far away from the battery as possible, convenient with ammunition supply, which will probably be by ammunition carriers by hand, or else take place after dark.

Section 196.  To come into action. – Batteries may require to have either both wagons in action at the same time or to have the wagon on one side of the gun and the limber on the other, if reliance is placed on the vehicles to afford cover.  Normally, however, cover is obtained by digging.

Section 198.  Laying out the line of fire. – Method of obtaining the line has been alluded to in the remarks on Section 192, the governing fact is, of course, that the battery is not likely to be visible from the observing station.  The compass is most useful.  Maps even more so.

The procedure adopted is somewhat as follows:-

Place the map on a plane table, or on some flat surface, in the battery.  Set the map accurately either by means of two known points located on the map or by the compass, taking into account the magnetic variation.

The battery commander measures with a protractor the angle between the target and some object shown on the map, such as a church, and telephones the object selected to the battery leader, who is thus enabled to fix a line on the map by means of two pins, viz.: – the line battery – church.

Suppose the battery commander orders the line of fire 10 degrees right of the fixed line, the battery leader will lay his director set at 10 degrees right on the line joining the two pins in his map.  The director is then swung round to zero, when it will be in the required line of fire.  Individual angles may then be given to guns or an aiming point selected in the ordinary way.

When working in conjunction with aircraft the line should be obtained by clamping the director on the aeroplane when immediately over the target.  A good method of signalling when the machine is over the target is that adopted by the enemy, whose observers fire a small smoke ball which shows very clearly, and could be laid easily on with a director.

Sections 203 – 205. Co-operation of aircraft. – Air observation is greatly used both by ourselves and the enemy.

Both the battery commander and observer are provided with a map, the larger scale the better, and the position of target on the map is given by the observer.  The battery then lays out the line by the aid of the map and observations are signalled back after each round fired.  Effective fire can be reached within some 10 minutes of the first round fired.

The first necessity of any system is speed, on account of the exposure of the airman to hostile fire throughout the operation.

This system is slow, and experiments have been undertaken with a view to devising other systems.  (See Appendix I.)

Wireless telegraphy has been found the quickest and most satisfactory system of communication.  The use of Very’s lights is resorted to on occasions when wireless telegraphy is not available, and some fair results are believed to have been obtained with them.

The German method of giving the line to the battery by firing a smoke ball over the target is most effective: it appears to be only a part of a somewhat elaborate system.  The resulting fire is generally most accurate.

Section 207.  Ranging. – Section ranging is the method that is employed as being the simplest, with percussion or long corrector, the former for choice, owing the there being less chance of error.  False crests do not abound in the north-east of France.  The general aspect of the country is not unlike Wiltshire, and often remarkably like Salisbury Plain.  There is a bigger sprinkling of woods, and they are larger.  The features are bolder and the valleys wider and deeper.  Time shrapnel ranging, which is so suitable for overcoming the difficulties met with where there are many small dips and depressions, is not apparently required by the conditions prevailing.

Fuzes have sometimes burst at irregular heights.  This is usually due to one of the following reasons –

  • Sights getting slightly out of adjustment.
  • Want of exact precision in the use of the gears when adjusting sights.
  • Development of increased play in equipment.
  • Bubble not being accurately centred before firing.

The importance of paying attention to these points must be impressed on all concerned with training.

The heights of burst given in the Manual must not be exceeded if fire is to be effective.

Section 215.  Searching. – Searching is much resorted to, in spite of the expenditure of ammunition entailed.  On the Aisne the lie of the land in the enemy’s position was soon fairly well known and constant reports sent in from aeroplanes increased the value and effect of searching.

Section 216.  Sweeping. – Sweeping has been employed on at least one occasion, and the effect appeared to be satisfactory.  The method adopted was an adaption of that laid down in this section, the object being to avoid regularity of fire against which the hostile detachments can easily protect themselves.

Section 219.  To register a zone. – Cases of registering a zone by single batteries, so far as is known, have been rare.  Either targets have been presented by bodies of troops moving in an area in such a way that they were capable of being dealt with by following them up as they moved, with shrapnel fire, or else the artillery have been employed in shelling certain held portions of a position which may or may not be visible from the observing station.

Registration would seem to have been more the task of the artillery of a division as a whole, that is to say, a division is made responsible for a certain zone and all the portions in that zone are ranged on, watched and shelled as required by the various batteries concerned, under divisional arrangements.

Sections 220 – 226.  Objectives. – The artillery duel appears to have returned, and one of the principal tasks of our artillery has been the silencing of the enemy’s guns.

The destruction or effectual shelling of an observing station requires all the skill of an experienced battery commander; similarly, infantry shelter trenches require most accurate fire to be brought against them, but for each case such as those mentioned there will probably be many where it is required to bring fire to bear on an area behind a ridge, a wood, a village, a ravine, or to keep quiet guns posted in an invisible locality.  In such cases accuracy in the service of the gun is as necessary as ever, but extreme accuracy of observation loses some of its importance.

A few batteries have made use of walls of fire, and at Caudry, in August, batteries built walls of fire which held up all movement for a considerable length of time.  Indeed, the wall was impenetrable so long as it lasted.

In dealing with situations similar to those at the Aisne, where the opposing infantry trenches were within a few hundred yards of each other and the guns of either side concealed in rear, often as far back as 2,000 or 3,000 yards, or even more, the advanced observation posts mentioned in section 153, paragraph 11, can be used with very great effect.  An artillery officer sent on to the infantry trenches may be able to see a target which is invisible from near battery, and, therefore, able to direct accurate fire.  Telephonic communication is usually essential.

The enemy’s trenches are not usually sited on the tops or forward edges of slopes but are apt to be thrown back behind the crest, in order that they may be difficult to reach with shell fire.  When so sited, if aircraft are not available, it is almost always necessary to employ a distant observing station and telephones necessitating long lengths of wire to control the fire.

Chapter XI.,  Section 238. – Entrenching and concealing guns. – A type of cover for guns which has been found useful is given in Appendix II.  Gun pits and epaulments both have their uses, according to the ground, the weather, &c.

The chief considerations to be borne in mind are:-

  • A good and sufficient platform for the gun.
  • Cover from view from in front and from overhead.
  • Protection for the detachments as far as possible when serving the guns.
  • Complete cover when not actually serving the guns.
  • Overhead protection against bad weather.

Chapter V., Laying. – A few notes on this subject may be useful.

Most of the time available should be devoted to learning thoroughly two methods –

  • Indirect without variations.
  • Direct.

Indirect is the most important and usual method employed.  Direct will be only rarely required, and either the open sight or the telescope may be used.

The exact method in indirect laying will depend on the sighting gear available.

The necessities are –

  • Simplicity.
  • Quickness.
  • Cover for the layer.

It is hardly ever feasible to place aiming posts to the front.

Discipline. – The following note on discipline, issued by the C.R.A. of one division, is worthy of attention:-

  • It is of the greatest importance that a high standard of discipline be maintained.  Strictness on the part of officers and non-commissioned officers is necessary on such points as cleanliness, falling out on the march and straggling.   In each unit every man must be detailed to a definite duty with non-commissioned officers properly in charge.  Roll call twice a day is essential.
  • States and returns must ,be carefully rendered.
  • Commanding officers must exercise the greatest care that equipment is not wasted.  Harness and saddlery and other stores whether bulky or small, if not required, must be returned to the Ordnance.

APPENDIX I.

Experiments were carried out on Salisbury Plain on 3rd November.  The following systems of obtaining line and range to the hidden targets were tried:-

  • The aeroplane flew from over the battery straight over the target.
  • When vertically above the target a signal was given.
  • By the aeroplane making a sudden dip.
  • By wireless.
  • By smoke ball.
  • By a coloured light or lights.
  • The position of the aeroplane when making the signal was obtained
  • By intersection with two theodolites from a measured base of 600 yards.
  • By intersection with two directors from a measured base.
  • By obtaining the line by means of a director and the range by means of a one man range-finder.
  • By obtaining the line by means of a director and the range by measuring the vertical angle, provided the aeroplane was flying at a known and prearranged height.

Of the methods in (2.) above –

  • was found by far the best, the dipping was very easy to see.
  • was very successful provided the message got through all right, but was only of use in connection with a theodolite or director alongside the receiving station, joined by telephone to the other end of the base.
  • and (d) were found unsatisfactory, the signal often being missed.

Of the methods in (3.) –

  • was accurate but theodolites are delicate instruments for use on service.
  • was accurate provided a good long base, 500 yards or more, was used.
  • was accurate provided the range-taker was an expert.
  • could not be satisfactorily tried because clouds prevented the aeroplane flying sufficiently high.

Generally, the results obtained were that the line could be ascertained with considerable accuracy, i.e., within one or even half a degree, while the error in the range varied from 50 to 300 yards.  It is necessary to estimate the angle of sight unless the latter can b e obtained from the map.  Given a good large scale map it would seem that intersections of the aeroplane when over the target by means of two directors from two points which can be located accurately on the map would fix the target as accurately as is possible.  If the battery or batteries can also be located on the map, the true range can then be measured off.

To obtain accurate fire subsequent observation from aeroplanes would appear to be necessary.  This was tried from an aeroplane fitted with wireless and worked well.  Practice in observation from above is essential.

Appendix 2.

ROUGH SKETCH OF GUN EMPLAULMENT.

Illustration on full page.

ORDERLY ROOM

B/5583

2nd Bn. THE BORDER REGT.

SOME NOTES ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL 7TH DIVISION.

Nov. 8th.         On November 8th the 22nd Infantry Brigade was finally relieved.

What the outside world thought of the doings of the 7th Division at this period

can be gathered from the following extract taken from one of the British papers at the time:- “There is no finer passage in the annals of the British Army that the world has known, than that which has been written concerning the deeds of the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division in Flanders.

30,000 strong, these two Divisions undertook the defence of YPRES, the key to CALAIS, until reinforcements should arrive.  Against them was arrayed the flower of the German Army, in the proportion of 8 to 1, and day after day this overwhelming force was hurled against our gallant band in vain.

When relief at last came, and the shattered remnants of the two Divisions were enabled to withdraw, there remained of 400 Officers of the 7th Division but 44, and of the 12,000 men but 2,336.  Those figures are more eloquent of the splendid courage of our men than any words.  Reduced to less than one fifth of their original numbers they still held out, YPRES remained, and still remains, uncaptured, and the losses of the enemy were vastly greater than our own.

Perhaps the most remarkable testimony to the vigour and accuracy of the British fire is conveyed in the words of a German Officer who tells us that the enemy believed that 4 British Army Corps were holding the positions actually maintained by less than one”.  

ORDERLY ROOM

B/5583

2nd Bn. THE BORDER REGT.

SOME NOTES ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL 7TH DIVISION.

Nov. 6th.         1st Corps, and on November 6th this Brigade made a very successful

counter-

attack at a critical period.  This Brigade was now so reduced in strength that one Battalion was formed out of the remnants of the Brigade, the 4 Battalions of the Brigade becoming Companies and the whole Battalion being known as No. 1 Battalion, 22nd Infantry Brigade.

ORDERLY ROOM

B/5583

2nd Bn. THE BORDER REGT.

SOME NOTES ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL 7TH DIVISION.

Nov. 5th.         On November 5th, the Division was relieved with the exception of the

22nd Infantry Brigade which remained as a reserve for the

HEADQUARTERS,

FIRST CANADIAN ARMY

To all soldiers serving in First Canadian Army

Our victories in the battle of the Schelde Estuary and opening of the port of ANTWERP mark a decisive step in the final defeat of Germany.  There should be no questioning of this fact.  It is testified by the following extracts from a captured order issued by the German Army Commander:-

“The defence of the approaches to ANTWERP represents a task which is decisive for the future conduct of the war…… After overrunning the Schelde fortifications, the English would finally be in a position to land great masses of material in a large and completely protected harbour with this material they might deliver a death blow at the north German plateau and at Berlin before the onset of winter………….And for this reason we must hold the Schelde fortification to the end.  The German people is watching us.  In this hour, the fortifications along the Schelde occupy a role which is decisive for the future of our people.”

The fighting has had to be conducted under the most appalling conditions of ground and weather.  Every soldier serving in this Army – whether he has fought along the banks of the Schelde or in driving the enemy from the north eastern approaches to ANTWERP – and every sailor and every airman who has supported us – can take a just and lasting pride in a great and decisive victory.

In the name of the Army Commander, I thank all commanders and troops for the loyal and able exertions which have contributed in such important successes.

G.G. Simonds

Lt Gen

4 Nov. 44

CFG-10

I MPS/11-2 (176)

15 F

Reconnaissance NO. 773                                                                21st. November. 1914.

Aeroplane: No. B.E. 242.                                                                      

Squadron No.  4.                                                                                                      

Pilot:  Capt Soames.

Observer.                                                              Ref Map:  N.W. Europe, Sheet 1

Hour commenced: 12. noon.                                                                     1/250,000

Hour concluded:    3-55. p.m.

================================================================

Time                                       Place                          OBSERVATION

—————————————————————————————————————-

2-30. p.m.      FORET D’HOUTHULST.                The snow in and about the villages

round the forest was very trodden in.  There were also a lot of exercise circles.

                        STADEN.                                           Rolling stock for three trains.  Anti

                                                                                    aircraft guns.

2-55. p.m.      CORTMARER.                                 Rolling stock for 7 trains.  One train

                                                                                    running through THOUROUT.  One

train near ZAREN running towards CORTEMARER.

3-10. p.m.      THOUROUT.                                     Rolling stock for about 10 trains.  No

movements seen.  Two trains in LICHTERVELDE with steam up, one on the up and the other on the down line.

The road to BRUGES & railway were clear as far as I could see.

Height. 5.000.

Observation.  Good

(Sd): A.W. Soames, Capt.

            Observer.

Capt Paterson (3)

HIGHLAND DIVISION T.F. No. 4387 (G).

CONFIDENTIAL.

            The following extract from a letter from an Artillery Officer, serving with the Allied Forces, is circulated.  All the information is confidential, and is not to be circulated outside the Highland Division:-

2.11.14.

…..”This battle has been going on for some time, and my battery has been under fire more or less continually for five days and nights now.

“To show you what sort of show it is, Number 4, at out No. 3 gun loaded by himself, in our first position yesterday, three and a half tons weight of 4.7” B.L. Q.F. shell.  Of course, this is the most in our battery in one position, so far; but it gives one an idea of the show.

“You cannot really imagine the roar that goes on continuously day and night here.

“My first advice to fellows coming out here is to teach your men to take every conceivable cover from aeroplanes, i.e. have straw, etc., tied to all the spokes of wheels, rims of wheels wrapped up in old grain sacks, and gun covered in straw mattresses with loose straw on top.  Cover the ground all round with straw for 20 yards.

“Never bring your battery into action in line, but always in a very eccentric way, with a field and hedges in between guns.  Have all communications by telephone.

“Directly you see a German aeroplane, stop firing; so that they cannot see the flashes of your guns.  If they see you they signal back to their “Black Marias” the square and position on it of your guns are on, and in half an hour you will be having hell on earth, and will have to abandon.

“Just called up to fire again.  All right, we are back again in our funk-holes.  These should be at the side of every gun, and dig them very narrow.  You can generally undercut this soft clay soil, and so get extra cover.

“The Black Marias generally arrive on end, in bunches of three; then a pause of three seconds, and three more.  The range generally varies about fifty to seventy-five yards.  Their shooting is very accurate, and if your position is found you must leave the guns and get under cover.

“Never stay for more than one day in the same position, as, otherwise, spies give information of where you are.

“I suppose one will get used to it in time, but some of the shell-fire here is bad for the nerves, especially at night.

“Another good way to dodge aeroplanes is to come into action behind a wood by night, and build, by planting trees in the battery, a wood round the battery.  It seems that these air fellows cannot notice the change in the slight increase in the wood.

“We always have a squad of men told off to fire on air-craft with rifles, as soon as identified as German.

ORDERLY ROOM

B/5583

2nd Bn. THE BORDER REGT.

SOME NOTES ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL 7TH DIVISION.

Nov. 2nd.        An intercepted wireless massage this day announced the arrival of the

Kaiser on this front and as was expected, at about noon on November 2nd another desperate effort to break through was made by the enemy from the direction of GHELUVELT against the 1st Division and against the right of the 20th Infantry Brigade.

The attack succeeded in driving back the 1st Division and all its available reserves were used up without result.  The last reserves of the 7th Division were then sent forward to try and preserve the flank of the 20th Infantry Brigade.  The fighting this day was particularly fierce – the finest troops of the German Army, under the eyes of the Kaiser, hurled themselves in vain against the battered line of the 7th Division.

This was really the last big attack the enemy made – for although he continued to bombard and attack our line, it was only in a half-hearted manner.

Some idea of the severity of the fighting the Division had taken part in may be formed by examining the fighting strength of Brigades at this time.  The 20th Infantry Brigade was reduced to 18 Officers 900 other ranks; the 21st Infantry Brigade 13 Officers 910 other ranks; the 22nd Infantry Brigade 13 Officers 586 other ranks.

                 

SECOND WORLD WAR

October 1944

(Liberation of Europe)

Beginning on the 12th September 1944, the Battle of Aachen was fought by U.S. and German soldiers. The battle ended on the 21st October 1944 when the Germans surrendered. The city, on German’s western border had been incorporated in the German Siegfried Line. Defended by 13,000 Soldiers the Germans were facing 100,000 U.S. First Army troops attacking the city from north and south. With the eventual German surrender on the 21st October 1944 both sides had suffered heavy casualties. The Allied plans for the advance into the industrialised Ruhr Basin had been significantly disrupted by the tenacious German defence. Aachen was the first German city to be occupied by the Allies, and was one of the largest and toughest urban battles of the war.

(Germany)

Following German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel’s wounding in Normandy on the 17th July 1944, he was taken to hospital suffering from face wounds and fractures to his skull. He made sufficient recovery whereby he was transferred to a rented house in Herrlingen, Germany on the 8th August 1944. His doctors objected to the move but did accompany him on his move. With the assistance of his caring wife he quickly recovered his health. However, he was implicated in the 20 July Plot to assassinate Fuhrer Adolf Hitler. He was under constant observation from the Nazi SS and Hitler decided on an extrajudicial execution. Rommel was given the choice to take poison or appear before the “Peoples Tribunal” and branded a traitor and face the public outcry that might cause. He chose poison knowing his family wold be looked after by the State and a pension provided. On the 11th October 1944 Rommel left the house in full dress and his Marshalls baton, climbed into a car followed by two Nazi generals. Having entered a forest Rommel bit into a cyanide capsule and died instantly. The same evening German radio stations broadcast that Rommel had died from the repercussions of the head wounds he received in Normandy. He was given the State Funeral befitting a national hero. On the 21st October 1944 Rommel’s body was cremated and the urn containing his ashes was buried in the rural cemetery in Herrlingen.

Announcing on the 16th October 1944 Hitler ordered the conscription of all males, aged 16 to 60 years, who were not already in some military unit. The German army did not have enough men to resist the Soviet Union onslaught. On the 18th October 1944 Volkssturm (“people’s storm”) was established. The figure of six million men required for Volkssturm was never attainable.

(Eastern Front)

In Poland, the occupying Nazi Germans forced the Warsaw Uprising participants to capitulate on the 2nd October 1944. All fighting stopped and finally the Warsaw Home Army surrendered on the 5th October 1944. Beginning on the 1st August 1944, the 63 day uprising was timed to coincide with the German retreat from Poland, due to the Soviet advance. 20,000 to 49,000 Polish resistance and Warsaw Home Army faced approximately 20,000 Germans. Both sides sustained heavy casualties.  One of the reasons why the Warsaw Uprising failed was the lack of assistance from the Allies. It is questionable whether the Soviet Union was prepared to assist in the uprising. Their aim was to replace German occupation with Russian occupation and embrace Poland into the Soviet Empire.              

On the 1st October 1944 Hungarian delegates arrived in Moscow to discuss an armistice with the Soviet Union.In consequence the Red Army entered Hungary on the 5th October 1944. On the 15th October 1944, an enraged Hitler received word that Hungary’s Regent, Admiral Miklos Horthy was secretly negotiating an armistice with the Soviet Union. He immediately ordered the introduction of Operation Panzerfaust. Hungary had been a German ally since November 1940, and Hitler was fearful that with the surrender it would expose his southern flank. During March 1944, German troops occupied Hungary as Rumania had recently joined forces with the S.U. On the 15th October 1944 Horthy was handed a statement announcing he was renouncing the armistice and abdicating. He signed the statement because he had been told his son’s life was at stake. Horthy and his son both survived the war. He later explained that he never resigned or abdicated, and stated – “A signature wrung from a man at machine gun point can have little legality”.

On the west coast of Estonia in the East Baltic Sea, the Red Army captured the Estonian Hiiumaa Island on the 3rd October 1944. The Germans had occupied Estonia since 1941.

In Poland, Auschwitz-Birkenau Concentration Camp was the largest Jewish extermination facility built by the Nazis. Construction of the camp was completed by March 1942. Immediately upon completion the Nazis began deporting Jews to the camp. By June 1943, four gas chambers and Crematorium had been added, allowing for the murder and burning of 4,000 people per day. The grizzly tasks were conducted by approximately 1,000 segregated Jews, who were called Sonderkammandos (Special Work Force). These workers received better living and food conditions but routinely were killed and new prisoners brought in. Several resistance groups formed in the camp’s early days. An overall resistance was formed in preparation for the general revolt. The Sonderkammandos planned to blow up the crematoria with explosives brought in by women delivering food. On the 7th October 1944 the revolt began when one crematorium was blown up. The revolt was suppressed and three German were killed as were 452 members of the Sonderkammandos. Following the revolt, Auschwitz did not return to its former operation.

From the 9th to the 19th October 1944 the forth Moscow Conference was conducted. Present were the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and delegates from the London based Polish government-in-exile and the communist Polish Committee of National Liberation. American delegates were in attendance as observers. There is unconfirmed evidence that Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan. There is also no evidence the British agreed to return all former Soviet liberated citizens to the Soviet Union.

On the 10th October 1944 Soviet troops had reached the German border of East Prussia. They continued their advance and on the 16th October 1944 the Red Army was on the German territory of East Prussia.

German occupation of Greece began in April 1941. On the 14th October 1944, with the Allies advancing the Germans evacuated Greece and Athens was liberated when the British arrived.

In Yugoslavia the Red Army and Yugoslav partisans liberated the capital city of Belgrade on the 20th October 1944. The whole of Yugoslavia was liberated from the Axis powers by the Red Army and Yugoslav partisans on the 25th October 1944.  

(Pacific)

The five day Formosa Air Battle began on the 12th October 1944 and ended on the 16th October 1944. The battle was a series of aerial engagements by the U.S. Navy Carrier Task Force against the land based Japanese army and moored naval aircraft carriers. During the day, Japanese military installations and infrastructure on Formosa (Taiwan) were attacked by fighters from the U.S. aircraft carriers. At night the Japanese conducted air raids against U.S. ships. From over 1,500 aircraft the Japanese launched against the U.S. fleet, in the region of 300 to 550 were lost. These figures are only estimates. Formosa suffered heavy damage to military installations and infrastructure. U.S. casualties were 89 lost out of 1,000 aircraft, one cruiser severely damaged, one destroyer and two light cruisers slightly damaged. Despite Japanese propaganda that the Formosa Air Battle was a victory, they were forced to review their options. The false sense of victory resulted in the Japanese officers ordering an all-out pursuit of the U.S. fleet, which ended in another huge loss of aircraft. For the on-coming Battle of Leyte Gulf, organised kamikaze attacks were proposed.   

In the Philippines the Battle of Leyte was an amphibious landing by American forces against the Imperial Japanese Army. On the 20th October 1944 U.S. General Douglas MacArthur led the landing troops onto the beaches. In February 1942 when the Japanese were over-running the Philippines, MacArthur was ordered by U.S. President Roosevelt to relocate to Australia. Upon arriving at Australia, his comment was “I came through and I shall return”. With the successful landing MacArthur had honoured his statement that he would return. The Battle of Leyte ended on the 26th December 1944 and was a U.S. victory.

The four day Battle of Leyte Gulf began on the 23rd October 1944 and ended on the 26th October 1944. The battle was the largest naval battle of the Second World War. The Americans had approximately 300 ships of all descriptions and the Japanese had 67 available ships. The Americans had about 1,500 carrier-based planes for combat with the Japanese total of 300 carrier and land based planes. Japanese organised kamikaze attacks were in operation for the first time. Kamikaze attacks were pilot suicide missions who flew their aircraft into the U.S. warships. The overall aim was to sink or destroy the warships. The Japanese committed their ships into three separate areas in an effort to lure the U.S. fleet away from the Battle of Leyte. On the 25th October 1944, aircraft of the northern, central and southern forces of the Japanese fleet fought with U.S. aircraft on three separate air engagements. The result was the defeat of the Japanese navy whose casualties were 17 ships damaged, 11 destroyers sunk and the loss of all 300 plus aircraft. They also had 12,000 naval personnel killed or wounded. The U.S. had 3,000 naval personnel killed or wounded, ten ships damaged, two destroyers sunk and 255 aircraft lost. On the 26th October 1944 the remaining Japanese fleet retreated to their bases in Japan and the result was the loss of the Philippines.

From June to August 1944, six airfields were under construction during the Mariana Islands campaign. The Japanese-held islands of Guan, Saipan and Tinian had been captured by the U.S. army. By the 23rd October 1944 Tinian airfield was ready to receive Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers. Tinian Island, 1,500 miles (2,400 km) south of Tokyo, allowed the B-29s to attack the home islands of Japan and return without refuelling. With hundreds of B-29s based at the airfield, systematic bombing of Japan began.

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