32A

H.Q. R.F.C.

G/112/40.

INFORMATION

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2nd Corps.

            The following notes on defensive measures taken during the recent fighting in front of YPRES may be of assistance to other troops.

The section of defence held by the Division was in wooded country.  The tracks through the woods became almost impassable owing to mud, the whole area was under constant shell fire and wires were constantly cut.  Communication was therefore slow and difficult.  It was found that when the enemy made a breach in the line it was a slow and costly business to turn him out, if he was given time to establish himself.  On the other hand, immediate counter attack was almost always successful.

Local reserves were therefore placed close up with orders to counter attack with the bayonet whenever the enemy penetrated the line.  Small supporting points were established close behind the line, prepared for all round defence, wired in all round, and, as far as possible, concealed from observation.  These posts had garrisons of from 20 to 40 men.  They should be under an officer or selected N.C.O.  It was found that they broke up the attack and checked it sufficiently to enable a successful counter attack to be organized.

The general experience of the fighting was that a field of fire was of far less importance to infantry than freedom from exposure to artillery fire.  The portion of the line held by the West Kents and K.O.S. Borderers had a field of fire of from 30 to 40 yards.  It was well wired in and never seriously troubled because the enemy could not bring his guns to bear on it.  All the enemy’s attempts to attack were repulsed with heavy loss.

It was found in places where the line was exposed to artillery fire that the two lines of trenches, connected by zig-zag communications were of value.  On several occasions our men were shelled out of one line but by moving back to the other avoided loss and were able to prevent the enemy’s infantry from occupying the abandoned trenches.  The forward line was usually re-occupied without difficulty when the shelling ceased and was invariably occupied at night.

Loopholed iron plates were found very useful for snipers when the enemy had established himself close to our line.

With reference to G.H.Q. No. O.A.401 some rabbit netting was put up over the trenches round YPRES but when our left had not undergone an actual test by “Minenwerfere”.  Both the infantry and cavalry in the trenches objected to it on the ground that it prevented them using their bayonets, in which objection I entirely concur, and consider it an inseparable one.  I think it should not be used either in fire or support trenches, except over machine gun emplacements and with outposts where it might be useful.  It might also be used over reserve trenches and would there also form a good support for some form of protection against the weather.

I do not think any form of protection against “Minenwerfere” can be designed for the fire trenches which will not have the same objection to its use.  As it appears almost impossible to spot them so that they can be dealt with by artillery, the only method of dealing with them would seem to be to make a sortie in the neighbourhood they are supposed to be in.

(Sd) W. Salmond

Major, G.S.

H.Q. R.F.C.

1-30 p.m.

            29/11/14.

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