Aug.                                                          INDEX 3.                                  10^th Long Course.

Issued in bulk to                                                                                                Green Paper.

DS for students

on 17 Aug.                               STAFF COLLEGE QUETTA

1944

INDOOR EXERCISE – JAPANESE IN BATTLE.

SUGGESTED SOLUTION.

OBJECT.

1. To examine certain aspects of the JAPANESE in battle.

CHARACTERISTICS AND PSYCHOLOGY.

• Before considering JAPANESE tactical methods it is essential to understand something of the characteristics and psychology of the men who comprise the JAPANESE army.

• Physique.

The JAPANESE army is drawn from people who live a simple, rough life and who are accustomed to physical hardship.  Men are still further hardened by severe army trg until they are capable of very considerable endurance.  They are able to move fast over long distances, across difficult country and carrying heavy loads.

• Courage.

The JAPANESE are a naturally brave race.  Courage has always been regarded as an essential virtue in a man and they are undoubtedly capable of suffering acute bodily pain.  But this does NOT mean that they are immune to fear.  There have been many instances in the face of our troops in which they have shown intense fear.

• Education.

The education of the JAPANESE offr and soldier makes them as well fitted for their duties in a modern army as their counterparts in the BRITISH or AMERICAN armies.  But, against this, the extreme uniformity of JAPANESE State controlled education has resulted in a marked lack of originality and initiative.

• Training.

The training of the JAPANESE army is thorough.  Lessons from past wars in all parts of the world have been studied, tactical doctrine is generally sound and ops are most carefully planned.  It is here, however, that lack of originality and initiative have been observed.  There is a strong tendency towards the employment of stereotyped methods and towards indecision, and even panic, when everything does not happen according to plan.  On the other hand, small parties are quick to react offensively to a surprise attack.

• Discipline.

Discipline is good.  The basis of it is the JAPANESE religion which is a mixture of ancestor-worship and State or Emperor worship.  On this foundation the army has built a code of discipline which is generally harsh.  But, though it is generally accepted, out of loyalty to the Emperor, there have been instances, incl entries in captured diaries, complaining of the inefficiency and brutality of offrs and comds, to show that this discipline is sometimes resented.  This is particularly so in the case of conscript soldiers now forming a large part of the army.

• Morale.

JAPAN has never been invaded.  The army, until very recently, has met with complete success. The JAPANESE have been made to believe they are a superior race with a divine mission to impose the will of their Emperor on the world.  Army trg and propaganda has emphasized these points and, in consequence, morale has been, and generally still is, very high.  But faith in JAPANESE invincibility cannot last indefinitely in the face of repeated defeats at the hands of the Allies.  They have suffered many defeats already and these have NOT been without effect.  JAPANESE comds on a number of occasions have found it necessary to issue special orders on the subject and there have been instances of a collapse of morale in more than one unit and fmn.  There has been evidence too of dissatisfaction and grousing about Allied material superiority.

• Attitude towards being captured.

The JAPANESE are taught to fight to the death.  By doing so, a soldier ensures that his soul reposes in the military shrine in TOKIO.  Added impetus is given by the knowledge that a soldier captured is officially notified as dead.  If he returned to JAPAN, he would find his civil rights gone and would bring shame on his family.  The result has been that we have taken few prisoners.

1. Recently, however, there have been indications that some JAPANESE are NOT made of stern enough stuff to live up to this standard.  Some diaries have revealed not quite a desire to surrender but an attitude of resignation to an inevitable death whose glory has grown slightly tarnished.  There have also been cases of JAPANESE making no great effort to avoid capture and cases of PW showing obvious happiness when refused permission to commit Hari-Kiri.

GENERAL TACTICAL CONCEPTION.

1. The whole conception of JAPANESE tactics is based on offensive action.  The other principles which he applies are maint of the objective, conc of force, mobility and surprise.  He makes full use of night ops, in which he is skilful, and employs every form of ruse and minor deception.  These, however, are now generally well known and he has NOT shown much ingenuity in inventing fresh ones lately.

ATTACK.

1. The forms of attack usually followed are :-
2. Enveloping or flank attack.
3. Frontal attack.

1. Enveloping or flank attack.

In the enveloping or flank attack the principles mainly applied are mobility and surprise.  Pressure is exerted frontally while the main effort is made round one or both flanks with the object either of making a direct attack from the flank or of securing a posn astride our L of C.

Attacks of this nature may involve a double envelopment, a small flanking attack being made with an objective 1 – 300 yds behind our FDLs whilst a further turning mov is made some miles behind them.  Such attacks cannot succeed if def posns are sited for all round def and provided adequate adm arrangements have been made to enable out tps to remain firmly in their posns.

1. Frontal Attack.

In the frontal attack the principles mainly applied are maint of the objective and conc of force.  Attacks are carefully prepared but often crudely executed.  Every effort is made to find a soft spot.  Fwd tps infiltrate, taking advantage of all available cover, and, when held up by fire, go to ground and bring LMG and mor fire to bear on any posns they have discovered.  The main attack is then launched with fresh tps in mass fmn who rely on weight of numbers, regardless of cas, to obtain success.  They adv in bunches, shoulder to shoulder, yelling, bayonets fixed, automatic weapons firing and rear ranks throwing hand grenades.

1. If the first attack fails, a diversion is made against another sector but the main attack always returns to the spot initially chosen.  Soft spots at widely separated pts are often selected but coordination in these attacks is seldom achieved.

1. Provided our tps are staunch, well dug in, have good fire discipline, adequate amn and a mob res, they have nothing to fear and have an opportunity of killing JAPANESE in large numbers.

1. Support.

Both types of attack are supported by mors, the fire of which may be directed on to targets by converging tracer fire from MGs.  In the past, there has been little arty sp but considerably more guns have been used recently. 

Long periods of slow fire are often employed rather than hy concs immediately before an attack.

1. Recce.

Both types of attack are always preceded by careful recce and by the employment of every form of ruse in an attempt to make us disclose our posns prematurely and shake our morale.

DEFENCE.

1. The JAPANESE conception of def does NOT differ basically from our own.  The principles of all round def is adhered to, posns are sited in depth and are mutually supporting.  His policy is to be offensive at every opportunity.  If part of a posn is overrun, an immediate counter-attack is launched or a hy conc of fire is brought down on the posn.  Outlying posts are often sited astride possible lines of approach and patrols are used offensively in rear of our fwd tps.

• Selection of positions.

A def posn is always based on a tk obstacle and, if possible, the flanks of the posn rest on natural obstacles.  High ground is always held, though the main posns are often on the reverse slope to avoid direct fire from tks or guns.  thick country is preferred and def posns frequently incl villages.

• Siting and Nature of Defences.

The siting, concealment and cam of defs is skilfully carried out, though their actual construction has NOT always been so good.  Fds of fire are sacrificed to concealment and fire is held until an assault has almost reached the posn.  Considerable use is made of alternative posns.  These factors make it extremely hard to pin point actual posns.

• Defs usually consist of a series of fox-holes (or weapon pits), holding one or two men each, or bunkers (dug-outs or pillboxes), holding many more.  The latter are strongly made so that hy mor fire can be brought down on them while our tps are trying to get in.

• Snipers.

Snipers are used extensively, firing from trees to which they are often roped.  They are difficult to locate and are of considerable nuisance value.

• Resistance to the last man.

Although there have been instances of withdrawal, both on orders and by individuals acting on their own, the JAPANESE teaching of resisting to the last man is frequently carried out, even hospital patients taking an active part.  A captured posn must, therefore, be carefully and systematically mopped up and steps taken to prevent enemy parties filtering back onto parts of the posn already captured.

• A Weakness.

Recent reports show that the JAPANESE are sometimes careless, giving us an opportunity of surprising him in his def posns.

PATROLLING.

• The JAPANESE make full use of both recce and fighting patrols.  The str of a recce patrol may be anything from one offr, with two local guides, all dressed in native clothing, to a sec.  The normal procedure is to adv about 100 yds and then halt for 5 mins to listen, but patrols are frequently careless about local security precautions, thus giving us good opportunities for successful ambushes.  Local porters are taken with patrols going out for three or four days and carrying everything except amn and weapons.  The str of a fighting patrol is usually about a pl but may be as many as 120 men.  This type of patrol usually works at night by infiltrating by twos and threes into our posns.

• Patrols are frequently used to engage us frontally while an encircling mov is taking place.  They make much use of cam and will often lie up for hrs in most uncomfortable posns.

CONCLUSION.

• While it is clear, therefore, that the JAPANESE is a good soldier who must NOT be underrated, it is equally clear that he is NOT a super-man and must NOT be overrated.

His savage beliefs have been exploited by trg and propaganda to produce a fanatical conception of service to the Emperor.  The high state of morale induced by this attitude of self sacrifice and loyalty has made the JAPANESE a formidable opponent.  But recent events have shown that his morale is NOT always strong enough to sustain him in the case of a local defeat.

• To look for a moment towards the future, it is difficult to say whether a series of major defeats will ultimately affect the morale of the whole army, but if it does the process will take a considerable time, since censorship and other security measures prevent the JAPANESE soldier from learning the true facts.  Local breaks in morale are more probable, but only as a result of really hard fighting.

J.F.W.

Jul 44.