JAPANESE IN BATTLE.

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INTRODUCTION

  1. Before one can understand the potentialities of the Japanese as a soldier and his behaviour in battle it is essential to consider the environment in which he has spent his whole life.  Although this is true to a certain extent when assessing the fighting value of any nation it is of vital importance in the case

Good. of the JAPANESE since their tradition and upbringing is quite unlike that of any other nation.  In this paper, therefore, it is proposed to consider first the factors which produce the Japanese psychology and characteristics, then to summarise those characteristics and finally to consider the actual tactical methods they employ in attack, defence and patrolling. 

CHARACTERISTICS AND PSYCHOLOGY.

  • The four factors which probably play the greatest part in moulding the character of any nation are:-
  • The nation’s historical past
  • The nation’s religious past.
  • The nation’s educational system and
  • The nation’s way of life.

We will therefore consider how each of these factors influences the Japanese youth from the cradle and see how, unlike the German who has little more than a decade to assimilate the Nazi doctrine, he has a similar doctrine inculcated into him through the tradition of centuries.

  • The historical past. 

The Japanese consider that their Empire was founded in 660 B.C. when a grandson of the Sun Goddess came down to earth to rule over them.  From that day forward the Japanese have always been ruled by a direct descendant of this first God – Emperor.  Consequently it follows that this Emperor is a God and all his people sons of the Gods.

(2)       [From this belief springs a tremendous pride in their country – this “Land of [the Gods” – a pride that is enhanced by the fact that throughout the whole of [her history her soil has never been sullied by the foot of an invader.  Save [only once, in the thirteenth centaury, when the invader was crushingly [defeated and expelled forever from her shores.  A sure sign, if one were [needed, of the invincibility of these demi-gods.

In 1638 a law was enacted in Japan which has undoubtedly had great influence on the moulding of the Japanese character.  The effect of this law was to isolate Japan from the rest of the world for 215 years.  No Japanese was allowed to leave Japan nor even to build a ship capable of taking him to the mainland.  Every foreigner was expelled or exterminated.  It is interesting to note the irony of the fact that it was an American, Commander Perry, who ended this isolation in 1854.

One result of this isolation has been that the Japanese have a very acute sense of racial purity, a feeling of exclusiveness and superiority over all persons or things foreign.  Another that until ninety years ago Japan was a feudal state ruled by Shoguns each with his armed following of Samurai.  Since at that time the Emperor was little more than a monk, all the power being wielded by the Shoguns.  Civil war was endemic.  Consequently the Samurai, who were the only class of commoners allowed to carry arms, were regarded as a class far above any other walk of life.  As a result of this warrior tradition it is today regarded as a great honour to be allowed to serve the Emperor in his army.  The day that a recruit joins the army is probably the greatest of his life for on that day in his own eyes he becomes a Samurai, a member of a privileged class.

Since rule in Japan has always been exercised by the possession of the greatest powers it is natural to find that the Army and Navy have played a very important part in the government of modern Japan and influenced the whole nation.  A factor which has increased the prestige of the Army and confirmed their belief in their invincibility is the number of successful wars and lucrative conquests which Japan has made since the restoration.

In brief the lessons of Japan’s history may be said to be that she is a nation of demi-gods, ruled by a God, a chosen people of invincible warriors, socially pure whose destiny it is to rule the world; a world of inferior beings.

  • The religious past. 

It has been said all religions are equally true to the people, equally false to the philosopher and equally useful to the Government, and of no religion is this more true than of Shintoism, the national religion of Japan.  It is the perfect religion for any fascist state and indeed the doctrine taught by Hitler bears many similarities to it.

The principal tenets are:-

  • The divinity of the Emperor who is the only God.
  • Worship of ancestors.
  • Blind obedience to superiors.

While this suppresses individuality it produces docile and obedient soldiers for his superior officers are exercising power delegated by his God.

Another vitally important aspect of Shintoism is its teaching as regards death.  Loss of life is not regarded by the Japanese as a sacrifice; it is merely the last act which that life serves.  The criterion therefore is that one’s death should serve a useful purpose and be a fitting gesture to close one’s life.  How better then, than to die in battle for one’s Emperor?  Besides, one will then go straight to a warrior’s paradise.

  • The educational system. 

The Japanese compulsory educational system is thorough.  There are only about five percent illiterates in Japan.

The system is run on good sound fascist lines designed to turn out a standard product drenched in the old warlike traditions and full of the knowledge of the invincibility of the Japanese and of their divine mission in life.  To this end retired Army and Navy officers are on the staffs of all Schools.  Dangerous ? thoughts are not tolerated and every effort is made to stamp out individualism.  The competitive spirit is not encouraged for everyone is naturally doing his best for his Emperor.  The system succeeds and produces stereotyped products lacking in originality or initiative but convinced of their divine mission.

As with the fascists, patriotism is extolled as a virtue of the highest order and practically any crime is excusable so long as it is committed in the name of patriotism.

  • The Way of Life. 

About eighty per cent of Japanese soldiers are recruited from peasants who normally lead a very frugal and penurious existence.  Campaigning is to them therefore little more rigorous than their normal life and living on short rations no uncommon hardship.  Generally the way of life is much as it was over two centuries ago.

  • Summary of Characteristics. 

To summarise the characteristics and outlook which this environment has produced it can be said that the Japanese:-

  • Regard themselves as:-
  • Demi-gods fortunate in being the only people in the world ruled by a God.
  • A chosen people whose mission it is to rule the world.  Thus any aggressive war is to them a jihad. ?
  • Invincible in battle.
  • Regard war as a natural and desirable state.
  • Are greatly honoured to be allowed to die for the Emperor in battle.
  • Are  frugal and hardy.
  • Assessment of the Individual Soldier. 

The above characteristics suggest that the Japanese would make excellent, fanatical and brave soldiers.  To a great extent this is true.  There are however three factors of which sight should not be entirely lost:-

  • Morale based on a false doctrine of invincibility is unlikely to stand up well to a succession of defeats.  Already there is evidence of individuals grousing at allied superiority of equipment and the morale of some units has been badly shaken by defeat.
  • Some Japanese, though admittedly few, do kick against their upbringing and think perhaps there is more future in being a live coward than a dead hero.  Thus some are now less anxious to avoid capture or to commit hara-kiri when captured.

(3)      (c) Japanese education has produced a stereotyped mind which is not good at  

improvisation when things go wrong or of thinking up new ideas.  He is essentially a  copycat.

TACTICAL METHODS

  • General Tactical Characteristics. 

In general principles Japanese tactics vary very little from those of any other civilized nation.  Greatest stress is probably laid on the following three principles:-

  • Mobility. 

As an example of the importance which the Japanese have always attached to mobility in their military teaching an American observer was present at some manoeuvres in Japan some years before the war.  In the narrative a Japanese column and an enemy column were depicted as starting at the same time and equidistant from some vital high ground yet the Japanese column was allowed to arrive and take the ground before the enemy column arrived.  When the American suggested that this was an unfair and unreal picture he was curtly told that given equal conditions the Japanese would always arrive first.  The success which the Japanese achieved with mobility at the beginning of the war showed that the above confidence was justified and has given them no cause to modify their doctrine.

  • Deception. 

The importance attached to deception has been more than amply illustrated during the war by the innumerable ruses employed by the Japanese to create a false impression.  Examples include excellent camouflage of all field works, employment of fifth column, shouting of false orders in English, movement through “impenetrable” jungle and the extensive use of noise to create a false impression of the number of troops employed.

  • Offensive Action. 

The doctrine of offensive action is entirely in keeping with the Japanese character, and indeed it must be a basic doctrine of any successful army.  As an example of the offensive spirit may be quoted the action of the remnants of the garrison of a Japanese held island.  An American raiding party had attacked the island and having fulfilled their mission and practically annihilated the garrison were withdrawing from the island when

(4)             they were attacked by about a dozen of the garrison who could still carry arms.

  1. Defensive Tactics.
  2. Generally.

The idea of being on the defensive is extremely odious to the Japanese and consequently their defensive tactics are essentially offensive and mobile.  They may resign themselves to being held frontally but they will develop threats to the flanks of superior forces opposing them.

  • Choice and Organization of Position.

A study of Japanese defensive positions has disclosed the following common features:-

  • Where possible one or both flanks rest on a natural obstacle.
  • Positions chosen whenever possible include a natural tank obstacle or a hole which can be made into one with little labour.
  • High ground is invariably strongly held no matter how obvious and prominent it may be.
  • Swampy ground is not an obstacle to the choice of a position.  If they cannot dig down they build up.
  • If his forces permit a Japanese commander occupies a position in depth.  If they do not permit he will sacrifice depth rather than frontage.
  • Similarly all round defence is adopted where possible but may be forgone.  Good.
  • Alternative positions are dug.
  • Conduct of the Defence.
  • Surprise is achieved by silence and concealment.  It is almost impossible to draw fire from a Japanese position until the attack is actually launched.  When fire is finally opened machine guns may be firing on fixed lines as little as ten yards in front of Japanese FDLs.
  • Overhead cover is provided wherever possible.  The Japanese will then bring down mortar fire onto his own positions when they are assaulted.
  • The Japanese launch immediate counter attacks against troops who have captured part of a locality.  These attacks may be mounted within five or ten minutes.
  • Defence is to the last man and last round.

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  1. Offensive Tactics. 

As is to be expected whenever possible the Japanese exploit their mobility to the full during the attack.  Particularly is this so when pursuing a withdrawing enemy, as in the first Burma campaign.  Wide enveloping movements were made bypassing our forward troops and seizing ground in the rear.  This left us with the alternatives of attacking him on ground of his choosing or withdrawing.

In other respects Japanese tactics in the attack are very similar to our own.  Attack is preceded by careful reconnaissance which tries to find the position of all enemy weapons.  It used to be preferred to develop the main attack round one or both flanks whilst holding the enemy frontally.  Now frontal attacks are becoming increasingly popular and repeated attacks may be launched against the same objective in massed formation.  He gains what success he achieves by the application of the principles of maintenance of objective and concentration of effort.

Whereas previously his artillery preparation used to be quite inadequate he is now using far more, usually in the form of long periods of slow fire rather than heavy concentrations immediately preceding an attack.

He uses tanks boldly in close cooperation with infantry, and makes excellent use of hull down positions.  He often moves his tanks into position by night and has them camouflaged before first light.

Since he is slow to follow a withdrawal it is usually simple to break contact though with his great mobility he may regain contact quicker than expected.

  1. Patrolling. 

The Japanese have used patrols extensively during this war for a variety of tasks.  They are generally lightly equipped armed with light automatics and grenades and are usually not more than a few dozen men in strength.  They may carry enough food to operate for several days.

During an advance patrols are frequently used to infiltrate and then to open heavy fire and use fireworks to try to persuade forward troops that they are surrounded so that they withdraw prematurely.  They may be used in a similar role when the Japanese are on the defensive in order to lower the morale of opposing troops and make them jittery.  A patrol on such a task may consist of only two snipers.

Fighting patrols may be sent out with explosives to try to wreck guns in our artillery areas.

Reconnaissance patrols are employed in the normal way.

Patrols generally move quietly and are well trained but they are on occasion careless and may afford us an opportunity to surprise them.

  1. Conclusion. 

Although the Japanese has absorbed a military outlook through centuries of tradition and is generally a brave, ruthless, fanatical soldier his fanaticism and morale are built on a foundation of sand.  Now that the weakness of this foundation are being exposed small cracks are appearing in the main structure.  His tactics are neither new nor unexpected.

We have in fact a soldier not unlike the Nazi bully but less well equipped.  We, in this Division have already proved our ability to defeat the Nazis:  We shall shortly prove our ability to defeat the Japanese.

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