As part of the Solomon and New Guinea Campaigns the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay was fought on the 2nd November 1943. It was a naval battle between the U.S. and Japanese navies. U.S. marines had landed on Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville on the 1st November 1943. The marines were backed up by four light cruisers and eight destroyers of U.S. Task Force 39. The Japanese held Rabaul responded with an air attack by 100 aircraft, also a powerful naval force of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and six destroyers were despatched. Hastily assembled from whatever ships were available, the Japanese experienced problems as many in the formation had never trained or fought together before. Meanwhile, U.S. reconnaissance aircraft had detected the Japanese fleet and began steaming north from Vella Lavella to intercept.The previous day they had been shelling Japanese positions near Baku in northern Bougainville. In the early hours of the 2nd November 1943 the Americans blocked the entrance to Empress Augusta Bay. Japanese heavy cruiser Hagura was struck amidships by an American aerial attack at 01:30. A significant reduction in speed of the Japanese fleet was the result of the damage inflicted on Hagura. U.S. radar contact was made about 02:30 and American Rear Admiral Aaron S. Merrrill ordered his ships into three columns. The three columns were designated “Groups 1, 2 and 3”. Merrill commanded the light cruisers of “Group 1” and turned about to remain out of Japanese torpedo range. Four destroyers of “Group 2” were sent to attack the Japanese northern flank. The remaining four destroyers of “Group 3” were ordered to attack the enemy’s southern flank. “Group 2” fired a salvo of torpedoes towards the Japanese ships. In the meantime, ten Japanese ships fired eight torpedoes against the U.S. ships of “Groups 2 and 3”. Each torpedo was detected and both groups were able to avoid the torpedoes. In the confusion of the battle in the dark the Japanese fleet became separated and out of formation. Merrill then ordered “Group 3” to attack. Unprepared, destroyer USS Foote was separated from the group as their orders were misinterpreted. She was in danger of colliding with other “Group 3” ships and was effectively unable to join in the fight. At about 02:50 cruisers of “Group 1” opened fire on the Japanese fleet when it became apparent that their torpedo attack had failed to achieve complete surprise. Japanese light cruiser Sendai was disabled when rudder was jammed after being hit by U.S. shellfire. Following the Japanese torpedo attack destroyers Samidore and Shiratsuyu collided and were forced to retire from the battle. Heavy cruiser Myoko also collided with destroyer Hatsukaze whose bows were sliced off. Myoko also received significant damage from the collision. The U.S. destroyers USS Spence and Thatcher of “Group 3” also collided but were able to continue in the battle. Foote became a navigational hazard after a torpedo blew off her stern, which killed 19 men and wounded 17 others. Striving to keep afloat and fighting off enemy air attacks, Foote was busy for the remainder of the engagement. At about 03:20 Japanese shellfire became increasingly heavy and accurate. The American cruisers of “Group 1” hid behind a smoke-screen successfully interfering with the Japanese gunnery. “Groups 2 and 3”were having difficulty keeping in contact with each other owing to night actions even though they had superior radar facilities to the Japanese. Several times they came close to firing on friendly ships. “Group 3” turned north and concentrated onJapanese Sendai. Believing he had sunk a U.S. cruiser Japanese Admiral Sentaro Omari ordered a retreat as he did not want to be caught at daylight by U.S. carrier aircraft. In response “Group 1”closed on the Japanese forces withdrawing to the west. They engaged the damaged Japanese destroyer Hatsukaze at a range of 17,500 yards (16,000 m) without hitting the target. Around 04:00 “Groups 1 and 2” engaged the retreating Japanese stragglers and the damaged cruiser Sendai was sunk. USS Spence of “Group 3” was fired on in error from U.S. fleet but suffered no damage. Spence had a fuel problem and fell out of formation. At 05:19 ”Group 2” came to the aid of Spence. At around the same time damaged Hatsukaze exploded and sank. At daybreak both navies retired, the Japanese back to Rabaul and the U.S. to rendezvous with Foote. Over 100 Japanese aircraft were launched from Rabaul and converged on Foote. They suffered heavy losses from shore based from U.S. and New Zealand aircraft. However, the Japanese did score two hits on cruiser USS Montpelier of “Group 1” and wounded nine sailors. The battle was a complete victory for the U.S. navy and was one of the last naval actions of the Solomon Islands Campaign. 0n the 5th November 1943 two U.S. aircraft carriers raided Rabaul inflicting heavy damages to four heavy cruisers. Aircraft attacks were also conducted against Rabaul on the 11th and 25th November 1943. Japanese losses ranged from 198 to 658 killed, and up to 25 aircraft shot down. They had one heavy cruiser and one destroyer sunk. Damage to the ships were one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser and two destroyers. For the loss of 19 men killed and 26 wounded and three damaged ships the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay was a resounding success for the U.S. Navy. No survivors were found from Hatsukaze but some were rescued from Sendai when a Japanese submarine was subsequently sent out to look for survivors.
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The Bay Museum & Research Facility 