War Diary of AA Laporte Payne Feb 1919

EXTRACTED FROM.

Brigade Diary, Personal Diary, Operation Orders, Note Books, Memoranda

Correspondence

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R.P February 8 1919.

155 Army Brigade R.F.A.

B.E.F.

France

The above is my address. I have managed to get to Colonel Congreve’s Brigade, and at present I am commanding A Battery, but later I may go to C Battery.  I took three days on the journey here, and it was cold!  Now we have hard frosts and snow.  The Colonel is in bed ill, and is probably going away on leave soon.

February 13 1919

I am expecting orders to go to the 3^rd Division in Germany as the Colonel has recommended me as a battery commander in the Army of Occupation.  This Brigade is being demobilized and the Colonel goes home on a month’s furlough.

It is a bit too cold here. Everything is frozen hard.

We are going out pig sticking on Saturday, which promises to be rather amusing. It is rather a shoot in the French manner, as the French here get them up, and go out armed with guns, knives, swords, revolvers, and trumpets.

February 21 1919

I am still with the 155, Brigade, but expect to leave at any time. I have been told to hold myself in readiness.

This unit is gradually being demobilized. Horses and men trickle away slowly but surely.  Today we handed in the guns and ammunition wagons.  Life her is very dull, and it is sad to see the unit being broken up.  Next Saturday there is to be a real pig-sticking with the men as beaters.

February 26 1919

Just a visit to Amiens.

Report of Drifters off Mudros 28 February 1919

S.O. 9^th Div of Drifters

D “Northesk” II (91)

Mudros.

Feb 28/19

A.P. Office

H.M.S. “Europa”

The following small defects have developed in vessels in my Division, and it is requested they may receive attention before leaving for England: –

R.H. Palmer.

Lieut. R.N.V.R.

H.M.D. “Comely” No. 2387. (local No 96)

Engine defect: – Knocking in H.P. Valve covers require lifting.

Deck defects: – Compass requires refilling (very bad)

Hatch cover requires repairing as leaking badly through wear.

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H.M.D. “Hopeful” No, 2386. (local No 95)

Engine defect: – Bilge valve at ship’s side is leaking & requires attention.

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Report of Drifters off Mudros 28 February 1919

C.O.

1. “Northesk” II No 2022

Mudros.

Feb 28/19

A.P. Office

H.M.S. “Europa”

I beg to notify that no reliefs have been sent me for

1. Smith Dk Hd

& S.J. Williams Tel

Who were discharged to H.M.S. “Europa” on Feb 14^th.

It is requested that reliefs may be sent in order to complete complement.

I am without a signalman and am a W/T Operator short if these ratings could be sent me.

R.H. Palmer.

Lieut. R.N.V.R.

Report of Drifters off Mudros 28 February 1919

C.O.

H.M.D. “Northesk” II No 2022

Feb 28/19

A.P. Office

H.M.S. “Europa”

The following changes in the personnel of crew of H.M.D. “Northesk II” have taken place: –

H.M.D. “Northesk II” N2022.

2196. Banham Dk Hd discharged to D. 2196.
2197. Reynolds     “ “ “    D. 2196.
2198. J. Daly           “ “ “     T.284.

all P.M. Feb 28/19

2022. Bailey   Dk Hd reported for duty on D. 2022.
2023. Perry       “ “ “      “     “ D.2022.
2024. Nichols     “ “ “       “     “ D.2022.

all P.M. Feb 28/19

R.H. Palmer.

Lieut. R.N.V.R.

Report on Raid 27 February 1917

Between pages 40/41.

BRASS

Report of attempted Raid by Enemy on night 25/26 February 1917 on right Company sector & action taken by left Coy.

At 12.35 a.m. my H.Q. sentry reported a succession of green very lights being fired from the front line.

I immediately investigated the matter & decided that the S.O.S. was required. I fired 3 rockets (green) which all failed to ascend the sticks being stuck in the mud.

I loosened the 4^th which was quite satisfactory.

I then saw that the bombardment was more intense on my right than my left & accordingly wired S.O.S. Boyaux 6 (1.40 am)

I had previously in the evening discussed the question of a raid on the right coy & the factors pointing to it with 2/Lt Shury & I had thought that the bombardment at dawn 24/25 was directed in a line from Boyaux 6 to S of junction OLD BOOTS & MUNSTER PARADE which lead me to suppose that it was the N edge of a box barrage.

I sent accordingly a verbal message over the phone. The message sent arrived thus “From Mr GREEN he thinks C Coy are getting it”.

I then sent 2 orderlies to MUNSTER TUNNEL to ascertain the situation. They reported all clear.

I then went to O.C. A. Coy & obtained from him a squad 1 officer, 1 N.C.O. & 11 men issued them with Mills No 5 & ordered them to proceed up MUNSTER TUNNEL & establish connection with RAILWAY SAPS POSTS & left Right of Coy & if all clear to return & report to me.

I then ordered 2 Lt Shurry to go to O.C. A Coy & tell him to send a squad to my left post & if all clear to establish connection with Tunnel post & return via TUNNEL & report to me there.

I then proceeded to TUNNEL & found everything satisfactory except that one Lewis Gun was out of action. A message was sent to O.C. A Coy for another gun which arrived some hours afterwards.

All liaison patrols returned at 4 p.m. & garrisons replaced by 5 pm.

Casualties as far as known at present

1 Sergt.            Killed.

2 Pte                Missing believed killed (buried)

6 “                  Wounded

2 “                  *****

W.C. Green O.C. D Coy

8 a.m. 27.2.17

“A” Form

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

To        Camp Comdt (Adv)

Senders Number                     Day of Month             In reply to Number     AAA

G.B. 305                                             27

The Left Division attacked this morning at 5.30 am. enemy’s trenches from N.36D.4.2. to N.35.D.8.0. and ERSATZ point as ordered AAA From reports received from the air and other sources this attack appears to have been successful and all objectives have been taken except for that portion on the right of the attack from N.36.D.00.05. to N.36.D.4.2. where the situation still appears doubtful AAA Up to date 6 Officers 336 OR and 2 machine guns have been captured AAA Prisoners belong to 119 R, 121 R. and 11^th Bavarian R.I.R. AAA Prisoners state attack came as complete surprise AAA Our casualties reported to be small AAA Regiments who took part in attack were RASHER and REALM AAA Addsd C.R.A., C.R.E., TUMULT, TRAWL, TONE, TUBE, SENIOR SCHOOL and Divl Troops

From: TRUMPET

Place:

Time: 3 pm

1. Durrant S/Sgt *** G.S.

Signature of Addressee

? 27 Feb 1917

“A” Form

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

To                    Camp Cdt.

Senders Number                     Day of Month             In reply to Number     AAA

G.B.312                                              27

Situation now reported as quiet AAA All objectives have been captured and in addition posts have been pushed forward to N.36.C.6.95. and N.35.D.6.3.

From: TRUMPET

Place:

Time: 7 pm.

1. Durrant S/Sgt *** G.S

Signature of Addressee

? 27 Feb 1917.

TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DIVISIONAL ORDER.

REGARDING THE IMPROVEMENT OF FIRST LINE DEFENCE.

14. I.D.

No. 1.441                                                                                        MARQUILLIES, 27-2-15

The inspection of the position of the Division (14^th) by H.E. the General Commanding VII Corps, the Chief of the Corps Staff, and myself, leads me to make the following remarks:-

1. It must be clearly understood by everybody down to the last man in the company that shelter-trenches fully capable of use as fire-trenches must be made 50 to 100 metres behind the front line. Wherever possible the construction of these shelter-trenches should go hand-in-hand with that of the front line defences. Wherever this is not possible on account of standing water or the backward condition of the front line defences, the construction of these shelter-trenches should be taken in hand as soon as possible.I repeat emphatically that the front line must be held in all circumstances. When a commander voluntarily gives up a portion of the front line he exposes the adjoining sections to the danger of being outflanked and forced to surrender. This commander therefore takes upon himself more responsibility than he is entitled to.
2. I do not in the least underestimate the moral effect of a bombardment of the front line previous to an attack. The shelter-trenches are to be used from time to time for the occasional relief of the troops occupying the front line, to avoid heavy losses. There is the danger, however, that a reoccupation of the position in order to beat off an attack may become impossible when troops are withdrawn to a flank, or that a sudden change of fire-direction on the part of the enemy on to the densely occupied trenches on either flank, may cause heavy losses and intensify the moral; effect on the troops.
3. Considering my very clear instructions of 5^th February, Section 1, No. 300 (secret) paragraph 1 of the final remarks, I cannot understand how an officer commanding a battalion sector could tell the Corps Commander that he proposed to take up a position behind the front line, giving as a reason that his front line was too weakly held and not sufficiently fortified.
4. The instructions of 5-2-15, Section 1, No. 300 (secret), concerning the completion of the positions, have not been sufficiently carried out. The following details are noticeable: the parapets in many places are too low and too weak. There are not sufficient traverses or parados.
5. In many places banquettes are wanting, and a continuous firing line is not arranged for though these could have been provided long ago with little trouble. The possibilities of flanking fire have not been thought of sufficiently. Shelters on the rear side of the trench unless protected by at least 3 metres of earth are to be at once removed. Entrances to shelters are to be traversed.
6. Greater energy must be shown in pumping water out of the trenches and communication-trenches by means of the small pumps, the position of which should be occasionally changed. I further draw the attention of officers in charge of sectors to the necessity of pumping out old trenches and communications, which will save the labour of constructing extensive new ones.
8. Troops should not be content with a fairly dry trench, but should ensure that trenches and communication-trenches are kept entirely free of water, so that further rainfall may not lead to a dangerous state of affairs. Whenever the trench has been pumped dry, digging must continue in order to strengthen the parapet, especially in cases where the sole of the trench is on ground level.
9. I quite realise that great exertions are demanded of the troops, but I have noticed in many instances that the necessity for this amount of work is not sufficiently appreciated. In order to employ the available labour to the best advantage, the following procedure should be observed:- The forces holding the front line trenches are at full strength and must remain so. Any difference, exceeding 100 men, between the fighting strength and the strength shown on the ration return is not justifiable and should not exist. I draw the attention of Commanding Officers to this, and request them to prevent the unnecessary detailing of men for various duties which are not authorized by superior authority. Company Commanders and Colour Sergeants are to be strictly supervised in this matter.Section 1, No. 330). Company Commanders have, against my express orders, kept every loophole occupied and have ordered their men to fire every half hour or “every now and again”; this is an inadmissible alteration of my orders, and if it occurs again I shall have to take disciplinary action. Where these practices continue there is no possibility of sufficient work being done. It depends upon local conditions whether work on the first line trenches is best carried out by day or night. A good deal of work, construction of banquettes, levelling of ground, etc., can be carried out by day.Reserves when used as working parties, are to be at full fighting strength. Complaints have been made to the Corps Commander about the lack of material in the front trenches; this lack of material is mainly due to the fact that the materials were not indented for in time. Indents should be sent in some time ahead, as the Pioneer Parks are frequently unable to cope with demands at short notice.I expect strict compliance with my orders of 5-2-15, Section 1, No 300 (secret), and rely on officers in charge of Battalion Sectors to see that they are carried out.(Sd.) Von DitfurthSent to :-  14^th F.A.B.
11. Hauptmann Bindernagel
12. 79^th Infantry Brigade            11^th Jaeger and 2^nd Coy. 19^th Pioneer Btn.
13. 27^th Infantry Brigade for Regiments and Companies and 3^rd Company 7^th Pioneer Btn.
14. (Lt. Gen. Comdg. 14^th Divn.)
16. Battalion Commanders, and not their representatives who temporarily occupy posts in the front line, are responsible for the effective completion and repair of the trenches in their Battalion Sector.
17. It is the special duty of the Battalion sector Commander to see that repairing and building material is brought up into the front line in good time. The men detailed for this are not to be drawn from the troops in the first line trenches, but from reserves of each sector.
18. The troops in the front line are there for working purposes in the first instance; only a few posts are needed for the observation of the enemy and they should not fire unnecessarily (see special Divnl. Orders 8^th February,

Cambrin orders 26 February 1917

CAMBRIN 1917 Some routine orders & reports.

2Lt Laurens No 13 Platoon.

1. You will be relieved in trenches tonight by No 3 Platoon A Coy at 10 pm.
2. You will send a guide to Dug outs in High Street at 9.45 p.m.
3. Your Lewis Guns will hand over drums received from IRON.
4. After relief you will take over SIMS KEEP.
5. No person will leave their posts until properly relieved.
6. Empty Water Tins must be carried out by you.
7. Report to Coy H.Q. after relief.
8. Rations will be drawn after relief.

1. C. Green

a/Lt

O.C. D Coy

26.2.17

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No 15 platoon.

1. You will be relieved tonight at 10 p.m. by No 4 Platoon A Coy
2. Your Lewis Guns will hand over drums received from IRON.
3. After relief Lewis Guns team proceeds to Dug Out in OLD BOOT TRENCH where they will find equal number of Drums.
4. After relief you will detail 4 men to report to Sergt Downs to make him up to nine men without N.C.O.s.
5. The remainder of your platoon will after relief proceed to Dug out in OLD BOOT TRENCH between Lewis Alley & MAISON ROUGE.
6. Bring out all petrol tins & dump them at Coy H.Q.
7. No person will leave his post until properly relieved.
8. Report to Coy H.Q. when relief complete.
9. Rations will be drawn after relief.

W.C. Green

O.C. D Coy

26.2.17

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No 16 Platoon. Sergt Downs.

1. You will be relieved in Tunnel tonight at 10 p.m. by a part of Nos 1 & 2 Platoon A Coy.
2. After relief you will form a bombing post of yourself & 9men and proceed to Dug outs in High Street between BOYAR 10 & 11.
3. You will obtain the men to make up your strength from No 15 platoon.
4. The remainder of your N.C.Os will proceed to Dug out in OLD BOOTS TRENCH between LEWIS ALLEY & MAISON ROUGE.
5. N.C.Os will carry out petrol tins & dump them at Coy H.Q. They will report to me relief complete & will be responsible for drawing your rations & getting them up to you.
6. You must bring out all Rifles & equipment of wounded etc. You may call on No 15 to assist in this.
7. A guide will meet you in OLD BOOTS to conduct you to dug outs.
8. Your orders on Dugouts are to support A Coy in front of you in case of emergency.

W.C. Green

Lt O.C. D Coy

26.2.17

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2/Lt Desborough – No 14 Platoon.

Secret

1. You will be relieved from trenches tonight at about 10 p.m. by 1 & 2 Platoons A Coy under 2 Lt WARD.
2. You will send a guide to report to this Coy H.Q. by 8.30 p.m. tonight & I will instruct him in his duties.
3. The relief will come down MAIN GUAGE RAILWAY in order of posts at 2 minutes intervals.
4. Your Lewis Gun Team will hand over DRUMS received from IRON & will pick up equal number at Coy H.Q.
5. After relief your men will file out by posts & you will arrange to collect them at Junction of OLD BOOTS & MAIN GUAGE RAILWAY. Thence proceed N along top of OLD BOOTS to Dug outs on OLD BOOTS.
6. No man will leave his post until properly relieved.
7. All petrol tins, – rifles & equipment of wounded will be carried out by you & brought to Coy H.Q.
8. Report relief complete.
9. Password tonight HOPS.

W.C. Green Lt

O.C. D. Coy.

5.30 p.m.

26.2.17.

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BRASS

Herewith report on men recommended for mention in despatches.

No 31039 A/Cpl Trowell A. i/c Lewis Gun.  Has done continual good work in the trenches.  Is specially recommended by the Lewis Gun Officer.  Has been with the Battn since July 1916.

1038 A/Sergt Deyes G.  Has been with Bn since July 1916.  Has done continual good work always ready to help & *** an emergency.

31210 Cpl Spence J.  Has been with Bn since July 1916.  previously with Dardanelles Campaign.  Very reliable N.C.O.  Good patroller.

W.C. Green Lt.

O.C. D. Coy.

28.2.17.

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BRASS

Work & Wire report.

SAPs & CRATERS    Nil.

FRONT LINE            Cleared trenches between Boyau 6 & 7 after bombardment.

Support LINE             Nil.

RESERVE LINE       LATRINES Old Boots & SIMS KEEP put in sanitary condition.

COMMUNICATION TRENCHES.

Lewis Alley from junction with Old BOOTS to SIMS KEEP cleaned of MUD.

WIRE                          4 coils of wire put out in front line at gap between BOYAUX 10 & 11. – Wire examined here & found satisfactory.

Wire in front Old BOOTS & round SIMS KEEP satisfactory.

W.C. Green Lt.

O.C. D Coy

1.3.17 3 p.m.

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Secret.

1. Coy. BRASS. Ref Op Orders No 9 1.3.17

1. The Coy will be relieved by a Coy of 9^th K.O.Y.L.I. today at about 1 p.m.
2. After relief the Coy will proceed by platoons to ANNEQUIN, the Platoon Commander marching in rear of his command & taking great care to prevent straggling. Platoon must proceed in formed bodies.
3. All movements from CAMBRIN to ANNEQUIN must be at 200 yards distance between platoons.
4. The whole Coy must go out by LEWIS ALLEY.
5. Each platoon will report relief to Coy H.Q.
6. No 16 Platoon will not wait to be relieved but will join up with No 13 in SIMS KEEP at 12.30 p.m. sending one man to report to O.C. A Coy at the same time.
7. Lewis Gunners will leave drums as usual.
8. All Dugouts will be left thoroughly clean likewise latrines. ***

W.C. Green Lt.

O.C. D Coy

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BRASS

Ref return re wire-cutters & breakers I have at present 10 wire cutters and 8 wire breakers (rifle)

Deficient – 6 wire cutters.

W.C. Green 2/Lt.

O.C. D. Coy

2.3.17.

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BRASS

I certify that the rocket signals at my H.Q. are complete and correct. aaa.

2 more Port flares should be sent up in case of losses. aaa

W.C. Green Lt.

O.C. D. Coy.

2/3/17.

7 p.m.

BRASS.

Maps herewith as follows:-

FRANCE        36 C                1/10,000                      1

“                 36 B                1/10,000                      1

“                 36 C. N.W.      1/20,000                      6

“                36 B. N.E.       1/10,000                      6

LOOS             36 C. N.W.      1/10,000                      6

LABASSEE   36 C N.W.       1/10,000                      7

Belgium           Sheet 27                                              1

W.C. Green Lt.

O.C. D. Coy

6/3/17.

List of maps handed to Bⁿ H.Q. Gives date of move from BETHUNE Area.

SECRET.                                                                                            Copy No. —-

25^th Feby 1917

20^TH (LIGHT) DIVISION OPERATIONS.

INSTRUCTINS NO. 15.

The action of the Artillery on Zero Day will be as follows:-

1. (a) Vigorous counter-battery work by specially detailed Groups of Heavy and Siege Artillery.

(b) Bombardment of selected points.

(c) Barrages.

As regards (a) and (b), their action requires no explanation, but as regards   Barrages all ranks must be fully cognisant of the methods which will be   employed.

1. CREEPING BARRAGE.

This will operate according to the Barrage Map Attached.  Should our troops have pushed forward at such a distance beyond the STEENBEEK as to render it unsafe to open on first barrage line, then this will be omitted, and the barrage will open on the second line, remaining on this line until Zero plus 10 minutes.

Any line on which the barrage “piles up” so as to conform to its shape is called the “Piling up Line”.

The BROWN Line as shown on map, 200 yards from, and parallel to, each objective, are called the “Protective Barrage Lines”, as these are the lines on which the creeping barrage remains during the consolidation of the objective.

1. Before the lifting of a “Protective Barrage”, the rate of fire increases from half a round per gun per minute to three rounds per gun per minute for 5 minutes immediately prior to the lift.       This would be an indication to the Infantry that it is time to advance close to the barrage for the next forward bound.

1. STANDING BARRAGE.

The role of the Standing Barrage is to engage more definite objectives        than the Creeping Barrage, and to catch any of the enemy that may be retiring.       This barrage moves on in front of the Creeping Barrage from target to target,     and is never overtaken by it.  In this case it consists of five 18-pounder       batteries and probably two 4.5 How, batteries.  Certain 4.5 Hows. will be      employed to block the roads by advancing along them 200 yards in front of the      first wave.

The 18-pounder Standing Barrage will search 150yards in front and in rear of        the RED Line, whilst the Infantry occupy the GREEN Line.

1. BACK BARRAGE.

This consists of two 6” Howitzer batteries and probably two 4.5 How.        batteries.  These guns search the area from 300 yards to 1,200 yards in front of     the advancing Infantry to keep down enemy long-range machine gun fire.

1. SMOKE BARRAGE.

Should the wind be favourable, the Artillery has been ordered to form the following smoke screens:-

1. Along the GREEN Line at Zero plus 40 minutes to Zero plus 50 minutes. In this barrage no smoke will be fired South of LANGEMARK-WHITE HOUSE Road.
2. From Zero plus 1 hour and 30 minutes to Zero plus 1 hour and 50 minutes, on the RED Line from the Right Divisional Boundary to a point outside the Left Divl. Boundary.
3.       The smoke barrage on the GREEN Line is to cover the consolidation of the            BLUE Line, and on the RED Line to cover the consolidation of the GREEN      Line.

1. In the event of our Infantry being seriously held up in the advance, the creeping barrage will be stopped in order to recommence under orders of the Divisional Commander.

Every 18 Pdr. creeping barrage which is stopped and brought back will       invariably fire 4 rounds per gun per minute for the four minutes immediately       prior to the recommencement of the creep forward.  This will give the Infantry   the necessary warning that the advance is to be resumed.

When the barrage starts again after being brought back there will be no fire            within 100 yards of the flank of any Infantry who have got forward.

1. Troops detailed for any particular objective are not to be engaged in the capture of a previous objective without orders from Divisional Headquarters.

The B.G.C. concerned can, however, order up, on his own responsibility, one         Company (but not more) to reinforce any line held up, but this will only be done in case of urgent necessity.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

1. McD Haskard

Lieut. Colonel,

General Staff, 20^th Division.

11^th Aug 1917.

Issued to Signals at

Copies to –

No 1. 59^th Inf Bde.                           14. XIV Corps.

1. 60^th Inf. Bde.                          15. 11^th Division.
2. 61^st Inf. Bde.                           16. 29^th Division.
3. B.G. R.A.                                17. 38^th Division.
4. C.R.E.                                     18. XIV Corps R.A.
5. Div. Signals.                            19. XIV Corps H.A.
6. Div. Pioneers.                          20. No. 8 Heavy Arty. Group.
7. Div. M.G. Coy.                       21. No 9 Sqdn. R.F.C.
8. A.D.M.S.                                22. G.O.C.
9. A.P.M.                                                23. G.S.O.1.
10. A.A. & Q.M.G..                      24. G.S.O. 2.
11. D.M.G.O., 20^th Div.                25. War Diary
12. D.M.G.O., 38^th Div.                26. File.