Stamp of HEADQUARTERS HIGHLAND DIVISION T.F.

No. 3642 19 NOV 1914

FURTHER NOTES ON ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT WAR.

Speaking generally, it may be said that Field Artillery Training in the light of experiences up to date requires remarkably little alteration.  Both the general principles laid down and the detailed instructions given have been proved to be correct, with hardly any exceptions.

Some notes on various sections of the Training Manual follow:-

Chapter VII., Section 146. – Concealment assumes greater importance than ever.  It is not merely desirable but essential, and in modern war concealment means cover from view from the enemy’s observers, whether on the ground or in the air.  In addition to concealment when in position the approach to the position must also be hidden from air observers.  If hostile aeroplanes are observed guns must remain perfectly still along the edge of woods, &c., where they may escape observation; during movement there must be look-out men on the watch for the approach of the enemy’s aircraft.

Owing to the great height at which these fly, i.e., about 6,000 to 7,000 feet they cannot usually be detected unless first heard approaching.  The look-out man should therefore be placed where the approach of an aeroplane would be audible, e.g., away from roads.  It is possible to distinguish between the enemy’s and friendly machines by means of the coloured designs painted on the under plane.  The French have red, white and blue concentric rings, and the English a union jack in addition to the rings.  The German machines show a black cross almost similar to a Maltese cross.

It is usual when possible to stop firing when the enemy’s aeroplane is overhead until it disappears owing to the importance of keeping gun positions secret.  When they are located the enemy do not seem to find much difficulty in shelling them and inflicting casualties both on personnel and material.

Much may, however, be done to mislead the enemy’s air observers by the use of partially concealed emplacements and puffs to represent the flash and report of guns.  These must, however, be sparingly used, and, as a rule, be under the direction of the Divisional Artillery Headquarters.

It is quite as important to conceal completely wagon and gun teams as the guns themselves, and they are best placed, if possible, out of range altogether.  Where it is not possible to conceal them, their position must be changed directly it has been located by an observer, if casualties are to be avoided.

Even when positions are effectually hidden it must be remembered that if the locality can be described accurately by spies, just as effective fire can be brought to bear as if the position had been plainly visible.  The chief considerations, then – given concealment – should be

  • The selection of a position difficult to locate accurately on a map.
  • The occupation of the position in such a way as to increase the difficulty of hitting any gun or emplacement, viz., by placing guns at wide and irregular intervals, and even at varying ranges.

Section 147.  Economy of force. – The necessity for this has been well exemplified according to all reports and personal observation.   The enemy’s guns and observing stations are so well concealed and so constantly changed that it is nearly always advisable to reserve guns to deal with later contingencies.  That this is not sufficiently practiced is perhaps due to peace training, but it has assumed great importance in war, and great stress must be laid on it during training.  The labour of taking up a position and entrenching is great, whereas, often, it may have been completed only just before a change is shown to be desirable.

The bigger the calibre of the gun the more important this factor of economy.  If howitzers are required for a task, four may often be sufficient, or even two; while heavy guns should hardly ever be in larger units than sections.

            The bigger the calibre the greater also the difficulty of the ammunition supply.  It may therefore sometimes be advisable to attach an 18-pr. gun to heavier natures to assist in ranging and registering.  It is true this introduces complications, but nevertheless it may sometimes be worthwhile.

            In modern battle fronts the extent of ground is so great that the character of the country will vary in different parts of the position.  At the battle of the Aisne the British Corps were extended over a front of some 15 miles or even more.  In some portions only could howitzers be profitably utilized, while in others guns could do all that was required.

Section 148.  Protection, sub-paragraph 5. – The carrying of rifles on wagons in the artillery appears to have been justified by their having been made use of on more than one section.

Section 149.  Intercommunication. – Communications are perhaps the greatest difficulty that units have to contend with owing to the almost exclusive use of the telephone.  Flag signalling is rare, but has been used both by field and heavy artillery on suitable occasions when there was no chance of observation by the enemy.

Buzzing on the telephone is very much resorted to and is invaluable.

It was perhaps not sufficiently recognized in the Royal Artillery in peace how much training is required to keep telephone communication uninterrupted.  The difference in the working of the telephones by the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery is most marked.  The Royal Engineers succeed and the Royal Artillery to some extent fail.

The necessity for an efficient telephone service cannot be too strongly impressed on those now training.  Men require much training in speaking, which is an acquired art, as well as in keeping the instruments and line in good working order.  Casualties amongst these men, who do not hesitate to go out and repair lines under the hottest fire, are bound to occur, and there should therefore be plenty under training.  Every telephonist must know the Morse code and be able to use the buzzer.

When laid out the wire should be dug in if time permit, as such frequent interruptions occur from the wire being cut.  The digging in is best arranged by ploughing a furrow with an ordinary plough, if available, and there are many about in the fields.

The lamp is useful, but it also requires highly skilled signallers.

Megaphones are useful.  Section commanders sometimes use them to make themselves heard above the noise of bursting shell.

Section 163A.  Artillery in wood fighting. – Most guns in the recent battle have been inside or just on the edge of woods.  If woods did not accommodate the guns, young trees were cut down and planted around the batteries so as to screen them.  In the winter, except where firs are available, these methods will not, perhaps, be so effective.  Wagon teams were always concealed in woods if possible.

Artillery will do well to keep clear of all villages, if within range of hostile guns.  Villages aid the location of targets by description, and are apt to draw shell fire.

It may be well here to emphasise the necessity of much practice with maps, e.g., locating places in strange country, using the map for obtaining range, line and angle of sight.

Section 164.  Night operations. – The chief work to be carried out at night is the occupation of positions and entrenching.  Practice in peace training is all important.  Ammunition is constantly replenished at night, and changes of gun positions or the position of the teams are nearly always effected at night.  Suitable artificial light is a great help.  The showing of lights would generally be unobjectionable if positions are well concealed from the target direction.

Firing by night in more indulged in by the enemy than ourselves, but it has been attempted on certain occasions against targets to which the range had been ascertained by day.  The enemy make frequent endeavours to shell villages or buildings known to be occupied by our troops after dark, but the effect would not appear commensurate with the expenditure of ammunition; at least, we should not consider it so.

Chapter VIII., Section 181.  Reconnaissance. – From the information available on this subject, it would seem that the battery commanders have had more tactical control of their units than is contemplated by Field Artillery Training.  This is due mainly to the difficulty of communication in the field.  Battery commanders have certainly very often done the whole of their reconnaissance, making their choice of position on the information and instructions received from brigade headquarters.  Space appears for the most part not to be confined, but, since batteries are always concealed, observing stations are nearly always distant.  No account is taken of the danger angle.  The “position in observation” is much used, but the “position in readiness” finds no place in the modern battle.

Section 186.  Allotting objectives is effected either by the map or by personally pointing out localities visible from observing stations.

A howitzer brigade is seldom used as such, and howitzer batteries are further much split up into sections, or even single guns on occasions.

Chapter  IX., Section 192.  Reconnaissance of a position. – Complete concealment in the reconnaissance and in the approach to and occupation of the observing station is absolutely essential.  A background is necessary to the observing station, and there should be as few people present there as possible.  All required must be dug in to complete cover, and a view of the battery is likely to be impossible.  The use of observation wagons would seldom be desirable or possible, except sometimes in a flat country where it is necessary to raise the eye of the observer.  But it should then be remembered that the shield of the observatory is no protection against high explosive shell.  A battery commander would be as secure, on the whole, in a tree as raised up on a ladder provided with a shield, and at the same time better supported.

The first object of the reconnaissance is, contrary to paragraph 3 of this section, almost always a position for the guns that will defy discovery as long as possible.  The position of the observation station is subservient, being selected as occasion demands, and is normally in front of the guns.

It is hardly ever necessary to mark the line of fire with aiming posts.  The line is generally obtained roughly from the map and a trial shot fired from which to make a correction.

Section 193.  Methods of occupying a position. – In the above circumstances the “special method” is more often followed than the ordinary.

Occupations of position by night require special treatment, the method being adapted to circumstances.

Whatever the method or whatever the position, digging should commence at the earliest possible moment.

Section 195.  Advance for action. – This section requires slight modifications in accordance with the above.  The wagon line should be as far away from the battery as possible, convenient with ammunition supply, which will probably be by ammunition carriers by hand, or else take place after dark.

Section 196.  To come into action. – Batteries may require to have either both wagons in action at the same time or to have the wagon on one side of the gun and the limber on the other, if reliance is placed on the vehicles to afford cover.  Normally, however, cover is obtained by digging.

Section 198.  Laying out the line of fire. – Method of obtaining the line has been alluded to in the remarks on Section 192, the governing fact is, of course, that the battery is not likely to be visible from the observing station.  The compass is most useful.  Maps even more so.

The procedure adopted is somewhat as follows:-

Place the map on a plane table, or on some flat surface, in the battery.  Set the map accurately either by means of two known points located on the map or by the compass, taking into account the magnetic variation.

The battery commander measures with a protractor the angle between the target and some object shown on the map, such as a church, and telephones the object selected to the battery leader, who is thus enabled to fix a line on the map by means of two pins, viz.: – the line battery – church.

Suppose the battery commander orders the line of fire 10 degrees right of the fixed line, the battery leader will lay his director set at 10 degrees right on the line joining the two pins in his map.  The director is then swung round to zero, when it will be in the required line of fire.  Individual angles may then be given to guns or an aiming point selected in the ordinary way.

When working in conjunction with aircraft the line should be obtained by clamping the director on the aeroplane when immediately over the target.  A good method of signalling when the machine is over the target is that adopted by the enemy, whose observers fire a small smoke ball which shows very clearly, and could be laid easily on with a director.

Sections 203 – 205. Co-operation of aircraft. – Air observation is greatly used both by ourselves and the enemy.

Both the battery commander and observer are provided with a map, the larger scale the better, and the position of target on the map is given by the observer.  The battery then lays out the line by the aid of the map and observations are signalled back after each round fired.  Effective fire can be reached within some 10 minutes of the first round fired.

The first necessity of any system is speed, on account of the exposure of the airman to hostile fire throughout the operation.

This system is slow, and experiments have been undertaken with a view to devising other systems.  (See Appendix I.)

Wireless telegraphy has been found the quickest and most satisfactory system of communication.  The use of Very’s lights is resorted to on occasions when wireless telegraphy is not available, and some fair results are believed to have been obtained with them.

The German method of giving the line to the battery by firing a smoke ball over the target is most effective: it appears to be only a part of a somewhat elaborate system.  The resulting fire is generally most accurate.

Section 207.  Ranging. – Section ranging is the method that is employed as being the simplest, with percussion or long corrector, the former for choice, owing the there being less chance of error.  False crests do not abound in the north-east of France.  The general aspect of the country is not unlike Wiltshire, and often remarkably like Salisbury Plain.  There is a bigger sprinkling of woods, and they are larger.  The features are bolder and the valleys wider and deeper.  Time shrapnel ranging, which is so suitable for overcoming the difficulties met with where there are many small dips and depressions, is not apparently required by the conditions prevailing.

Fuzes have sometimes burst at irregular heights.  This is usually due to one of the following reasons –

  • Sights getting slightly out of adjustment.
  • Want of exact precision in the use of the gears when adjusting sights.
  • Development of increased play in equipment.
  • Bubble not being accurately centred before firing.

The importance of paying attention to these points must be impressed on all concerned with training.

The heights of burst given in the Manual must not be exceeded if fire is to be effective.

Section 215.  Searching. – Searching is much resorted to, in spite of the expenditure of ammunition entailed.  On the Aisne the lie of the land in the enemy’s position was soon fairly well known and constant reports sent in from aeroplanes increased the value and effect of searching.

Section 216.  Sweeping. – Sweeping has been employed on at least one occasion, and the effect appeared to be satisfactory.  The method adopted was an adaption of that laid down in this section, the object being to avoid regularity of fire against which the hostile detachments can easily protect themselves.

Section 219.  To register a zone. – Cases of registering a zone by single batteries, so far as is known, have been rare.  Either targets have been presented by bodies of troops moving in an area in such a way that they were capable of being dealt with by following them up as they moved, with shrapnel fire, or else the artillery have been employed in shelling certain held portions of a position which may or may not be visible from the observing station.

Registration would seem to have been more the task of the artillery of a division as a whole, that is to say, a division is made responsible for a certain zone and all the portions in that zone are ranged on, watched and shelled as required by the various batteries concerned, under divisional arrangements.

Sections 220 – 226.  Objectives. – The artillery duel appears to have returned, and one of the principal tasks of our artillery has been the silencing of the enemy’s guns.

The destruction or effectual shelling of an observing station requires all the skill of an experienced battery commander; similarly, infantry shelter trenches require most accurate fire to be brought against them, but for each case such as those mentioned there will probably be many where it is required to bring fire to bear on an area behind a ridge, a wood, a village, a ravine, or to keep quiet guns posted in an invisible locality.  In such cases accuracy in the service of the gun is as necessary as ever, but extreme accuracy of observation loses some of its importance.

A few batteries have made use of walls of fire, and at Caudry, in August, batteries built walls of fire which held up all movement for a considerable length of time.  Indeed, the wall was impenetrable so long as it lasted.

In dealing with situations similar to those at the Aisne, where the opposing infantry trenches were within a few hundred yards of each other and the guns of either side concealed in rear, often as far back as 2,000 or 3,000 yards, or even more, the advanced observation posts mentioned in section 153, paragraph 11, can be used with very great effect.  An artillery officer sent on to the infantry trenches may be able to see a target which is invisible from near battery, and, therefore, able to direct accurate fire.  Telephonic communication is usually essential.

The enemy’s trenches are not usually sited on the tops or forward edges of slopes but are apt to be thrown back behind the crest, in order that they may be difficult to reach with shell fire.  When so sited, if aircraft are not available, it is almost always necessary to employ a distant observing station and telephones necessitating long lengths of wire to control the fire.

Chapter XI.,  Section 238. – Entrenching and concealing guns. – A type of cover for guns which has been found useful is given in Appendix II.  Gun pits and epaulments both have their uses, according to the ground, the weather, &c.

The chief considerations to be borne in mind are:-

  • A good and sufficient platform for the gun.
  • Cover from view from in front and from overhead.
  • Protection for the detachments as far as possible when serving the guns.
  • Complete cover when not actually serving the guns.
  • Overhead protection against bad weather.

Chapter V., Laying. – A few notes on this subject may be useful.

Most of the time available should be devoted to learning thoroughly two methods –

  • Indirect without variations.
  • Direct.

Indirect is the most important and usual method employed.  Direct will be only rarely required, and either the open sight or the telescope may be used.

The exact method in indirect laying will depend on the sighting gear available.

The necessities are –

  • Simplicity.
  • Quickness.
  • Cover for the layer.

It is hardly ever feasible to place aiming posts to the front.

Discipline. – The following note on discipline, issued by the C.R.A. of one division, is worthy of attention:-

  • It is of the greatest importance that a high standard of discipline be maintained.  Strictness on the part of officers and non-commissioned officers is necessary on such points as cleanliness, falling out on the march and straggling.   In each unit every man must be detailed to a definite duty with non-commissioned officers properly in charge.  Roll call twice a day is essential.
  • States and returns must ,be carefully rendered.
  • Commanding officers must exercise the greatest care that equipment is not wasted.  Harness and saddlery and other stores whether bulky or small, if not required, must be returned to the Ordnance.

APPENDIX I.

Experiments were carried out on Salisbury Plain on 3rd November.  The following systems of obtaining line and range to the hidden targets were tried:-

  • The aeroplane flew from over the battery straight over the target.
  • When vertically above the target a signal was given.
  • By the aeroplane making a sudden dip.
  • By wireless.
  • By smoke ball.
  • By a coloured light or lights.
  • The position of the aeroplane when making the signal was obtained
  • By intersection with two theodolites from a measured base of 600 yards.
  • By intersection with two directors from a measured base.
  • By obtaining the line by means of a director and the range by means of a one man range-finder.
  • By obtaining the line by means of a director and the range by measuring the vertical angle, provided the aeroplane was flying at a known and prearranged height.

Of the methods in (2.) above –

  • was found by far the best, the dipping was very easy to see.
  • was very successful provided the message got through all right, but was only of use in connection with a theodolite or director alongside the receiving station, joined by telephone to the other end of the base.
  • and (d) were found unsatisfactory, the signal often being missed.

Of the methods in (3.) –

  • was accurate but theodolites are delicate instruments for use on service.
  • was accurate provided a good long base, 500 yards or more, was used.
  • was accurate provided the range-taker was an expert.
  • could not be satisfactorily tried because clouds prevented the aeroplane flying sufficiently high.

Generally, the results obtained were that the line could be ascertained with considerable accuracy, i.e., within one or even half a degree, while the error in the range varied from 50 to 300 yards.  It is necessary to estimate the angle of sight unless the latter can b e obtained from the map.  Given a good large scale map it would seem that intersections of the aeroplane when over the target by means of two directors from two points which can be located accurately on the map would fix the target as accurately as is possible.  If the battery or batteries can also be located on the map, the true range can then be measured off.

To obtain accurate fire subsequent observation from aeroplanes would appear to be necessary.  This was tried from an aeroplane fitted with wireless and worked well.  Practice in observation from above is essential.

Appendix 2.

ROUGH SKETCH OF GUN EMPLAULMENT.

Illustration on full page.

Prisoner of War postcard received 16th November 1944.

Kriegsgefangenenpost

Postkarte                  

                                                                                    Stamp GEPRUFT 33

Stamp. Postmark Little Lever Bolton Lancs. 16 NO 44. 

An                   Mrs. E. Wilkinson                            Stamp PASSED P.W. 7916

Gebuhrenfrei!

                                                1068 Bury Rd.

                        Empfangsort:  Little Lever Nr BOLTON Breightmet

                        Strasse:          84 Settle Street  Bolton

                        Land;              LANCASHIRE ENGLAND.

Absender:

Vor und Zuname:

Ernest Wilkinson Sgt.

Gefangennummer: 136.L.7

Lager-Bezeichnung:

            M.-Stammlager Luft 3.

Deutschland (Germany)

Kriegsgefangenenlager.                                                                             Datum: 28.7.44

Sweetheart.  Just a few lines to say I am still in the best of health, and I hope that you are the same, and your mother is keeping well too.  We are getting organised here now we have a cricket league, baseball league.  We play football, badminton and other games.  We also have a whist drive and a concert every week.  This is all for now Darling.  Look after yourself.  I love you.  Your always  Ernest xxxxxx

ORDERLY ROOM

B/5583

2nd Bn. THE BORDER REGT.

SOME NOTES ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL 7TH DIVISION.

Nov. 8th.         On November 8th the 22nd Infantry Brigade was finally relieved.

What the outside world thought of the doings of the 7th Division at this period

can be gathered from the following extract taken from one of the British papers at the time:- “There is no finer passage in the annals of the British Army that the world has known, than that which has been written concerning the deeds of the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division in Flanders.

30,000 strong, these two Divisions undertook the defence of YPRES, the key to CALAIS, until reinforcements should arrive.  Against them was arrayed the flower of the German Army, in the proportion of 8 to 1, and day after day this overwhelming force was hurled against our gallant band in vain.

When relief at last came, and the shattered remnants of the two Divisions were enabled to withdraw, there remained of 400 Officers of the 7th Division but 44, and of the 12,000 men but 2,336.  Those figures are more eloquent of the splendid courage of our men than any words.  Reduced to less than one fifth of their original numbers they still held out, YPRES remained, and still remains, uncaptured, and the losses of the enemy were vastly greater than our own.

Perhaps the most remarkable testimony to the vigour and accuracy of the British fire is conveyed in the words of a German Officer who tells us that the enemy believed that 4 British Army Corps were holding the positions actually maintained by less than one”.  

ORDERLY ROOM

B/5583

2nd Bn. THE BORDER REGT.

SOME NOTES ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL 7TH DIVISION.

Nov. 6th.         1st Corps, and on November 6th this Brigade made a very successful

counter-

attack at a critical period.  This Brigade was now so reduced in strength that one Battalion was formed out of the remnants of the Brigade, the 4 Battalions of the Brigade becoming Companies and the whole Battalion being known as No. 1 Battalion, 22nd Infantry Brigade.

ORDERLY ROOM

B/5583

2nd Bn. THE BORDER REGT.

SOME NOTES ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL 7TH DIVISION.

Nov. 5th.         On November 5th, the Division was relieved with the exception of the

22nd Infantry Brigade which remained as a reserve for the

HEADQUARTERS,

FIRST CANADIAN ARMY

To all soldiers serving in First Canadian Army

Our victories in the battle of the Schelde Estuary and opening of the port of ANTWERP mark a decisive step in the final defeat of Germany.  There should be no questioning of this fact.  It is testified by the following extracts from a captured order issued by the German Army Commander:-

“The defence of the approaches to ANTWERP represents a task which is decisive for the future conduct of the war…… After overrunning the Schelde fortifications, the English would finally be in a position to land great masses of material in a large and completely protected harbour with this material they might deliver a death blow at the north German plateau and at Berlin before the onset of winter………….And for this reason we must hold the Schelde fortification to the end.  The German people is watching us.  In this hour, the fortifications along the Schelde occupy a role which is decisive for the future of our people.”

The fighting has had to be conducted under the most appalling conditions of ground and weather.  Every soldier serving in this Army – whether he has fought along the banks of the Schelde or in driving the enemy from the north eastern approaches to ANTWERP – and every sailor and every airman who has supported us – can take a just and lasting pride in a great and decisive victory.

In the name of the Army Commander, I thank all commanders and troops for the loyal and able exertions which have contributed in such important successes.

G.G. Simonds

Lt Gen

4 Nov. 44

CFG-10

I MPS/11-2 (176)

15 F

Reconnaissance NO. 773                                                                21st. November. 1914.

Aeroplane: No. B.E. 242.                                                                      

Squadron No.  4.                                                                                                      

Pilot:  Capt Soames.

Observer.                                                              Ref Map:  N.W. Europe, Sheet 1

Hour commenced: 12. noon.                                                                     1/250,000

Hour concluded:    3-55. p.m.

================================================================

Time                                       Place                          OBSERVATION

—————————————————————————————————————-

2-30. p.m.      FORET D’HOUTHULST.                The snow in and about the villages

round the forest was very trodden in.  There were also a lot of exercise circles.

                        STADEN.                                           Rolling stock for three trains.  Anti

                                                                                    aircraft guns.

2-55. p.m.      CORTMARER.                                 Rolling stock for 7 trains.  One train

                                                                                    running through THOUROUT.  One

train near ZAREN running towards CORTEMARER.

3-10. p.m.      THOUROUT.                                     Rolling stock for about 10 trains.  No

movements seen.  Two trains in LICHTERVELDE with steam up, one on the up and the other on the down line.

The road to BRUGES & railway were clear as far as I could see.

Height. 5.000.

Observation.  Good

(Sd): A.W. Soames, Capt.

            Observer.

Capt Paterson (3)

HIGHLAND DIVISION T.F. No. 4387 (G).

CONFIDENTIAL.

            The following extract from a letter from an Artillery Officer, serving with the Allied Forces, is circulated.  All the information is confidential, and is not to be circulated outside the Highland Division:-

2.11.14.

…..”This battle has been going on for some time, and my battery has been under fire more or less continually for five days and nights now.

“To show you what sort of show it is, Number 4, at out No. 3 gun loaded by himself, in our first position yesterday, three and a half tons weight of 4.7” B.L. Q.F. shell.  Of course, this is the most in our battery in one position, so far; but it gives one an idea of the show.

“You cannot really imagine the roar that goes on continuously day and night here.

“My first advice to fellows coming out here is to teach your men to take every conceivable cover from aeroplanes, i.e. have straw, etc., tied to all the spokes of wheels, rims of wheels wrapped up in old grain sacks, and gun covered in straw mattresses with loose straw on top.  Cover the ground all round with straw for 20 yards.

“Never bring your battery into action in line, but always in a very eccentric way, with a field and hedges in between guns.  Have all communications by telephone.

“Directly you see a German aeroplane, stop firing; so that they cannot see the flashes of your guns.  If they see you they signal back to their “Black Marias” the square and position on it of your guns are on, and in half an hour you will be having hell on earth, and will have to abandon.

“Just called up to fire again.  All right, we are back again in our funk-holes.  These should be at the side of every gun, and dig them very narrow.  You can generally undercut this soft clay soil, and so get extra cover.

“The Black Marias generally arrive on end, in bunches of three; then a pause of three seconds, and three more.  The range generally varies about fifty to seventy-five yards.  Their shooting is very accurate, and if your position is found you must leave the guns and get under cover.

“Never stay for more than one day in the same position, as, otherwise, spies give information of where you are.

“I suppose one will get used to it in time, but some of the shell-fire here is bad for the nerves, especially at night.

“Another good way to dodge aeroplanes is to come into action behind a wood by night, and build, by planting trees in the battery, a wood round the battery.  It seems that these air fellows cannot notice the change in the slight increase in the wood.

“We always have a squad of men told off to fire on air-craft with rifles, as soon as identified as German.

ORDERLY ROOM

B/5583

2nd Bn. THE BORDER REGT.

SOME NOTES ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL 7TH DIVISION.

Nov. 2nd.        An intercepted wireless massage this day announced the arrival of the

Kaiser on this front and as was expected, at about noon on November 2nd another desperate effort to break through was made by the enemy from the direction of GHELUVELT against the 1st Division and against the right of the 20th Infantry Brigade.

The attack succeeded in driving back the 1st Division and all its available reserves were used up without result.  The last reserves of the 7th Division were then sent forward to try and preserve the flank of the 20th Infantry Brigade.  The fighting this day was particularly fierce – the finest troops of the German Army, under the eyes of the Kaiser, hurled themselves in vain against the battered line of the 7th Division.

This was really the last big attack the enemy made – for although he continued to bombard and attack our line, it was only in a half-hearted manner.

Some idea of the severity of the fighting the Division had taken part in may be formed by examining the fighting strength of Brigades at this time.  The 20th Infantry Brigade was reduced to 18 Officers 900 other ranks; the 21st Infantry Brigade 13 Officers 910 other ranks; the 22nd Infantry Brigade 13 Officers 586 other ranks.

SECOND WORLD WAR

November 1944

(Britain)               

The first V-2 Rocket (“Vengeance Weapon 2”) was successfully launched against London on the 8th September 1944, in retaliation for the bombing of German cities by the Allies. By the 10th November 1944 the Nazis launched up to eight V-2s daily against Britain. From October 1944 to March 1945 when the war ended a total of 3,172 V-2 Rockets were fired at Britain, Belgium, France and the Netherlands

(Liberation of Europe)                                                                                                                                                         

Following the success of the Battle of Normandy (D-Day) the Allies began a series of rapid advances into the low-countries. All supplies were being brought into Cherbourg in north-west Normandy. As they were so far away from the front line the Allies supply line was totally stretched. British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery decided that Operation Market Garden (Battle for Arnhem) was to be prioritised after Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk had been liberated. When the failed Operation Market Garden was called off, the intention to liberate the port of Antwerp was the next priority.

The port of Antwerp had been captured by the Allies on the 4th September1944. Access to the inland port from the North Sea is the River Scheldt running along the west coast of the island of Walcheren. The island and surrounding areas were vigorously defended by the reinforced Germans who were aware the Allies needed to have access to have access to the port of Antwerp. The Allied advance was slow due to the supply chain from Normandy. On the 2nd November 1944 Belgium was liberated and the port of Zeebrugge was captured. The day before, the 1st November 1944, 0peration Infatuate II (Battle of the Scheldt), began. The attacks of Infatuate II were amphibious landings at Westkapelle, Walcheren. The landing craft were “Buffalo” developed to negotiate water-logged conditions. They transported assault troops and conventional armoured vehicles who otherwise would not be able to advance. In the shallow waters, naval support was required to assist the landings in the form of Support Squadron Eastern Flank (SSEF). Additional support was from a battleship and two monitors. Monitor vessels were gun platforms whose guns outranged German heavy shore batteries. As the landings began, due to bad weather conditions, no air support was available or spotter aircraft to guide the shallow draught naval guns on to the German defences. Fully alerted, the German coastal artillery took a toll on the SSEF where twenty ships were either sunk or too badly damaged to be repaired. The Canadian First Army with Polish and British assistance used landing craft and specialised armoured vehicles to gain superiority on the island. The defences, known as “Fortress Walcheren” were being overrun with both the towns of Westkapelle and Domburg being captured on the 3rd November 1944. Minesweepers were ordered to begin to remove mines from the river on the 4th November 1944 in anticipating the fall of “Fortress Walcheren”. Numerous amphibious attacks were slowed down when the Germans flooded vast land areas in the estuary. On the 6th November 1944 the island’s capital Middelburg was captured by “Buffalo” tanks forcing an end to German resistance. With the Germans facing overwhelming forces they surrendered on the 8th November 1944. The Scheldt Estuary had been cleared of all naval mines and underwater obstacles by Royal Navy minesweepers by the 28th November 1944. The first convey led by Canadian freighter Fort Cataraqui entered Antwerp on the 28th November 1944. Antwerp became the major supply route from Britain.

During the Alsace/Lorraine Campaign, in France, the cities of Metz and Strasbourg were liberated on the 23rd November 1944. The Battle of Metz was fought between the U.S. Third Army commanded by Lt. General George Patton and the German Army commanded by General Otto von Knobelsdorff. With the Germans retreating, Allied command had halted the advance of the Allied armies south of the supply route to Arnhem. The halting of the advance enabled the Germans to fortify Metz and surrounding forts. The U.S. army resumed their advance on the 3rd November 1944. Despite heavy fighting with huge losses to both sides the Americans entered Metz on the 18th November 1944. Hostilities formally ended on the 23rd November 1944, however, a number of isolated forts continued to hold out. In order to preserve ammunition for advance into Germany direct assault on the forts were forbidden. By the 29th November 1944 most of the forts surrendered one by one and the last to surrender was Fort Jeanne d’Arc on the 13th December 1944. Meanwhile further to the east the Liberation of Strasbourg was about to begin. The French 2nd Army Division, commanded by General Philippe Leclerc, arrived at the city of Strasbourg on the 21st November 1944. The Leclerc led 2nd Army raised the Free French tricolor over Strasbourg Cathedral on the 23rd November 1944. The raising of the tricolor was considered by the Allies to be the last major objective in the Liberation of France,

(Germany)

In February 1941 Nazi Germany’s Battleship Tirpitz was commissioned and entered service into the Kreigsmarine (Navy). She was the second of two Bismarck-class battleships and was similarly armed as her sister ship Bismarck. With the sinking of Bismarck in May 1941, Tirpitz received a series of modifications adding an additional 2,000 tons to her structure. Not only was she heavier than her sister ship but the heaviest in Western Europe. In 1941 Tirpitz was deployed to Norway in order to attack convoys bound for the Soviet Union. Fuel shortages frequently kept Tirpitz at her anchorage and she became known as the “Lonely Queen of the North” as she was rarely deployed. The Royal Navy retained sufficient ships in the area to contain her. Tirpitz had been seriously damaged by British mini-submarines in September 1943, and by April 1944 had been repaired. British Enigma decrypts revealed that Tirpitz was to conduct sea trials immediately. 40 Barracuda dive bombers dropped armour-piercing bombs, of which 15 scored direct hits and two near misses. She was again repaired and as a consequence had anti-aircraft guns fitted. Various RAF bombing attempts to destroy the vessel were unsuccessful. By September 1944 Lancaster bombers, each carrying one 12,000 lb “Tallboy” bomb were to be deployed to penetrate the ship’s heavy armour. On the 15th November 1944, 32 Lancaster bombers, flying from their base in Russia, attacked Tirpitz and one “Tallboy”penetrated the ship and exited through the keel. A second “Tallboy” hit amidships and caused severe damage by blowing a hole in the ship’s side and bottom. The hole caused the ship to list 30 to 40 degrees before her captain gave the order to abandon ship. The list increased to 60 degrees and shortly after a large explosion completed the task of sinking Tirpitz. Up to 1,200 German sailors lost their lives with the sinking of the ship and approximately 200 sailors survived. “Tirpitz lived an invalid’s life and died a cripple’s death” was the comment Ludovic Kennedy wrote in his history of Tirpitz.

In June 1941 in readiness for the German invasion of the Soviet Union, (Operation Barbarossa), the Nazi Party required a military headquarters in Eastern Europe. The site was to be close to the front line, but safely enough away from the enemy. The site near Rustenburg in East Prussia was chosen. The complex was known as the “Wolf’s Lair” and completed in June 1941. Fuhrer Adolf Hitler arrived for the first time a few days later. On the 20th November 1944, with the Red Army approaching East Prussia, Hitler retreated to Berlin and left the “Wolf’s Lair” for the final time. 

(Eastern Front)

In Poland, the Sonderkammndo Revolt had been suppressed in Auschwitz Concentration Camp by the German Waffen-SS in late October 1944. The Sonderkammndos (special work force) were approximately 1,000 segregated Jews whose task was to feed the murdered Jews into the furnaces of the crematoria. The last mass transport of Jews arrived at Auschwitz on the 30th October 1944. On the 2nd November 1944 Reichfuhrer- SS Heinrich Himmler ordered the SS to halt the gas chamber murders. Finally, realising Germany was losing the war, on the 26th November 1944 Himmler ordered the Auschwitz site to be destroyed. The remaining Sonderkammndos began to clear the site and dismantle the buildings.

The Baltic Offensive, which began on the 14th September 1944, was a battle between the Red and German armies in the Balkan States. Beginning on the 27th September 1944 the Moonsund Landing Operation was an amphibious landing on Estonian Islands. On the 25th November 1944 the Moonsund Landing Operation ended with the Red Army victorious.

(Pacific)

In December 1941 Japan entered the Second World War after the attack on Pearl Harbour. During February 1942 they captured the island of Singapore, resulting in the surrender of British and Commonwealth forces. On the 5th November 1944 the first of eleven long range air raids by U.S. bombers were conducted against Japanese-occupied Singapore. 76 B-29 bombers were despatched from their bases near Kharagpur. India. Each B-29 carried two 1,000lb bombs owing to the extreme range to the target. King George VI Graving Dock was the primary target, with a secondary target of Pangkalan Brandan refinery in Sumatra. With only two bombs on board the bombers were instructed to fly lower than normal bombing height for greater accuracy. The raider’s accuracy was such that the dock was rendered un-serviceable for three months. Damage to the dock ensured that the stricken battleships from the Battle of Leyte Gulf could not be repaired. Seven B-29s attacked the refinery and lost two from flying accidents. Japanese anti-aircraft guns were minimal. The next raid on Singapore was on January 1945.

During the Battle of Leyte Gulf, U.S. aircraft carrier USS Lexington was pursuing the retiring Japanese fleet on the 5th November 1944. She was struck by a Japanese kamikaze aircraft near her control island structure. Most of the carrier island structure was destroyed and fire from the kamikaze aircraft was sprayed in all directions. She was able to continue normal flight action within twenty minutes when all major fires were under control. An American fighter was able to take off and shoot down a kamikaze pilot. Arriving in Ulithi on the 9th November 1944 for battle damage repairs the crew heard that Tokyo had once again claimed Lexington had been sunk. During the kamikaze attack Lexington’s losses were 50 killed and 132 wounded.

Departing from their recently built airfields on the Mariana Islands, 111 Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers attacked Tokyo for the first time on the 24th November 1944. The Mariana Islands are located 1,500 miles (2,400 km) south of Tokyo. The B-29 was capable of reaching the target and returning without having to refuel. The aircraft were capable of reaching speeds up to 350 mph (560 km/h) and altitude of 31,800 ft. (9,700 m) whereby Japanese fighter aircraft could not catch them. Very few Japanese fighters were able to reach that altitude and were easy prey to defensive gunners. The attacks were continued until the end of the war. The attack against Tokyo on the 24th November 1944 was the first attack since the Doolittle Raid in April 1942.

U.S. aircraft carrier USS Intrepid was another carrier involved in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. On the 27th October 1944 Intrepid was hit on the port side gun position by a Japanese kamikaze suicide fighter. The damage to the carrier was minimal. On the afternoon of the 25th November 1944 Intrepid was again struck by two kamikazes causing a serious fire. Whilst the carrier remained on station the fires were extinguished within two hours. During the kamikaze attack 69 U.S. sailors lost their lives. On the 26th November 1944 she departed for repairs in San Francisco arriving on the 20th December 1944

(Other Areas)

Field Marshall Sir John Dill was a senior British Officer who served in both the Great War and Second World War. At end of 1941 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill posted Dill to Washington D.C. as his personal representative. He attended many conferences as Churchill’s representative. He was also immensely important in getting the Chiefs of Staff of both countries to function to joint satisfaction. He was particularly friendly with American General George Marshal and the two exercised a lot of influence on President Roosevelt. Whilst stationed in Washington, on the 4th November 1944 Dill died of Aplastic Anaemia. A memorial service was held in Washington National Cemetery as a mark of respect and affection he had earned. The route to Arlington National Cemetery was lined by thousands of troops including his friend George Marshall who was visibly stricken. Following a simple service at the graveside, American Joint Chief of Staff sent a message of condolence to their British colleagues. An equestrian statue of Sir John Dill was erected over his grave. His statue is one of only two at the cemetery, the other being Major-General Philip Kearny, a Union officer during the American Civil War. In 1944 Dill was posthumously awarded the American Army Distinguished Medal.

The 32nd President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt was first elected in 1933 and by the time the U.S. entered the war in 1941 he was in his third presidency. War production under his administration was healthy.  With the war in the Pacific against the Japanese and in Europe against the Axis powers, Roosevelt decided to run for his fourth term of office. On the 7th November 1944 Roosevelt was re-elected and chose Harry Truman as his deputy.                        

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