VII Corps H.Q., PHALEMPIN, 25-12-14.
THE CAPTURE OF THE ENGLISH POSITION EAST OF FESTUBERT on 20-12-14
The front of attack was about 900 metres wide, situated on a flat ridge which commands the ground east and west of it. About 50 metres behind the position was a well-built English cover trench. Between the first line and the cover trench, and parallel to them, runs a natural ditch, which had not been touched. The position of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 57th Infantry Regiment was about 80 – 150 metres in front of the enemy’s firing line.
Here, as well as in the neighbouring sectors, saps had been dug out from our line to within, in places, 3 metres of the enemy’s position. The enemy, who were very active in throwing hand grenades, had forced us to cover in our sapheads. He himself had made no saps in the region of the attack.
From the 10 sapheads in the zone of attack, mines were laid under the enemy’s trenches, each charged with 50 kilograms of explosive. To ensure the ignition of the mines, the attack was arranged for 9 a.m. so that the leads could be tested by the Company Commander and his second in command and that any improvements which appeared necessary could be made by day-light. A mine was also laid under a house held by the enemy on the right of the front of attack (Quinque Rue) and was charged with 300 kilograms (660 lb.) of explosive.
All the telephone communications were manned to ensure the neighbouring sectors commencing the attack simultaneously in the event of their being any delay in the explosion. Actually, the explosion did not take place till 10.25 in the morning owing to special difficulties in connection with one of the leads. When it was reported to the senior pioneer officer on the front of attack that all the mines were ready, he had three flare signals fired simultaneously. This signal was only meant for the pioneers who then fired all the mines including the one under the house in the Quinque Rue. At the same time a number of “Minenwerfer” directed their fire on to the cover trench.
The explosion was the signal for the attack, which was carried out as follows by the 2nd & 3rd Battalions of the 57th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd and 3rd Companies of the 7th Pioneer Regiment (less 2 sections) and the 1st Battalion of the 19th Pioneer Regiment (less 1 company).
A storming party of half a section of infantry with 12 pioneers was in readiness in each of the 10 saps. They rushed into the enemy’s trench, searched it for mines, and cleared it with hand grenades and incendiary torches (Brandrohren).
A second storming party (in strength, a section of infantry between every 2 saps) rushed simultaneously across the open from their own position on both sides of the saps (sortie steps had been prepared for this) and reached the cover trench behind the enemy’s position.
A third party – a company from each battalion – occupied our own trench in case of counter-attack.
A working party in reserve – the remaining sections of the six attacking companies with pioneer detachments and materials for providing cover (shields, sandbags, etc.) – followed the attacking party into the enemy’s cover trench for the purpose of reconstructing this into a new position facing west. Every battalion had therefore sent forward three companies in echelon for the attack and retained one in rear for holding our original position against counter-attacks.
Up to the moment of the explosion, the allotment of targets and the task of the artillery remained the same as they had been on the previous days, so as not to excite the attention of the enemy.
Not until the mines were fired were the neighbouring sectors to engage the enemy by increased fire action. Use was to be made of any advantages which appeared obtainable. The medium “minenwerfer” were to attack the enemy’s machine guns, which were dug in and arranged for flanking fire into the neighbouring sector to the left. The field artillery was to shell the enemy’s approaches. The 21 cm mortar battery was to subdue the enemy’s artillery and machine guns, which were intended to afford flanking fire from positions known to us in the village of GIVENCHY; 3 batteries of heavy field howitzers were held in readiness to return the fire of any new hostile batteries which might come into action.
The whole operations was carried out according to plan. The 10 mines exploded simultaneously. With the help of the over-powering effect produced by them, our attacking parties, who had immediately rushed forward, succeeded in getting into the enemy’s cover trench with few losses, and took up a position there. The enemy, English and Indians, who fled from the position suffered heavy losses.
The forces in both neighbouring sectors joined in the attack, for the most part by means of a charge across the open, which led to the capture of so-called “Heckenhaus” in the Rue de Caillaux and of the English position east of GIVENCHY. On the previous day the “Heckenhaus” had been destroyed by a heavy “Minenwerfer”; on the day of the attack gaps were made in the wire entanglement round it by means of two mines, each with 50 kilogram (110 lb) charge, and its garrison was rendered “ripe for attacking” (sturmreif) by two rounds from the “Minenwerfer” being directed on to the ruins of the “Heckenhaus”.
The effect of the attacks on the enemy were such that he immediately brought up the 9th Indian Cavalry Brigade which was in reserve near BETHUNE and part of the 142nd French Territorial Regiment and “alarmed” the 1st Infantry Division (English) which belonged to his Army reserve and was in the vicinity of HAZEBROUCK. This division was brought up by rail and motor to BETHUNE and used for heavy counter-attacks on the 20th, 21st and 22nd, all of which were repulsed with heavy losses.
Six machine guns and eleven small trench mortars were captured and 1* officers and 815 men taken prisoner. According to a reliable estimate, over 3,000 of the enemy lay dead upon the battlefield.
In the dug-outs of the trench which was destroyed by the mines, a large number of Indian corpses was found still sitting: they had apparently been suffocated. In view of the success we obtained, our own losses in the actual assault (10 officers and 452 men wounded, now in the hospitals of the Army Corps, 459 slightly wounded, and about 250 killed) were not great and in the attack itself they were inappreciable. Apart from the bravery of the troops, success was due to the minute and detailed tactical preparation by both the infantry and the pioneers and to the accurately timed co-ordination of the mines, “Minenwerfer”, infantry assault and artillery fire.
A plan was for a moment considered for drawing the enemy into his front trenches by increasing our fire before exploding the mines, and thus attracting larger bodies of the enemy over the mines. This, however, was discarded because it was feared that we should, in consequence, meet with so much opposition to our attack against the front trenches as would delay us from penetrating into the cover trench, which was our objective. Also, we wished to avoid attracting the enemy’s attention prematurely.
(Signed) v. CLAER,
General Officer Commanding.
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