BRIGADE ORDERS.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL TREVOR TERNAN, C.M.G., D.S.O.,

COMMANDING 123rd (TYNESIDE SCOTTISH) BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS, ALNWICK,

7th MARCH, 1915.

163 Command Temporary of Brigade

            Brigadier General Trevor Ternan, C.M.G., D.S.O., having proceeded to-day to York, in accordance with Northern Command Order 314 of the 4th inst., the Command of the Brigade temporarily devolves on Lieutenant-Colonel C.H. Innes Hopkins, 20th (Service) Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers (1st Tyneside Scottish).

164Northern Command Order

The attention of Officers Commanding Units is called to Northern Command Order No. 330.

165 Extracts from Northern Command Orders

NECESSARIES –

            It has been decided that the following additional items in the scale of necessaries for all soldiers enlisted in units raised by individuals or municipalities will be provided by the Army Ordnance Department:-

Brush, blacking                    1

    “       brass                         1

    “       clothes                      1

    “       polishing                  1

Button, brass                         1

Wax polish, tin of                 1

Indents for requirements to be put forward to the Chief Ordnance Officer, York, by units concerned.

Authority, A.C.D./Manch/673 (Q.M.G.7), dated 1st March, 1915.

C.R.N.C. No. 46405/O.S.  Northern Command Order No.328.

CHAPLAINS –

It is notified for information that in view of the pending moves of the New Army Divisions it has been decided that Chaplains at present attached to Brigades should continue to serve with the same Brigades, and should accompany them on transfer to other stations.

Authority, War Office letter No. Clergy/General Number/4185 (Chaplains), dated 27th February, 1915.

C.R.N. C. No. 45991 (M.S.).  Northern Command Order No.329.

DISCHARGE DOCUMENTS –

            It had been brought to the notice of the War Office that the completion of discharges of men by Officers in Charge of Records is much delayed through the following reasons:-

  1. Mistakes in documents prepared by units.
  2. Failure to close the mens’ accounts, the men being only partially paid up, and the final settlement of the balance left in abeyance.
  3. Neglect of units to send Part II Orders weekly to Officer in Charge of Records, in conformity with paragraph 1890 King’s Regulations.
  4. Delay in replying to queries from the Record Officer.

Commanding Officers should accelerate as far as possible the preparation of

all documents etc., of men due for discharge, in order that their discharge may be carried out without undue delay.

            It is very desirable, in the interests of the Army generally, as well as of units themselves, that men should not be sent back to civil life labouring under a sense of dissatisfaction at their treatment by the Military Authorities.

Authority, War Office letter No. 35/Gen. No./1450 (A.G.2.B.), dated 26/2/15.

C.R. No. 45993 (A).  Northern Command Order No.331.

COMMISSIONS FROM THE RANKS –

            It is notified for information that the very large number of names that have been submitted with a view to promotion to commissions from the ranks is far in excess of the number of commissions that can be allotted.

Selections have been made, and instructions will shortly be issued regarding the disposal of those Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers whose promotions have been approved.  Those who have not yet been selected will be considered from time to time as opportunities offer, and it is requested that no further recommendations may be forwarded unless very special reasons can be given in support of any individual case.

It is observed that in certain cases Non-Commissioned Officers have been recommended because their juniors have already been selected.  In no case, however, is this a valid reason for recommendation, which should be based solely on each man’s individual merits.

Authority, War Office letter No. 100/General Number/1492 (M.S.I.), dated 27th February, 1915.

C.R. No. 46035 (M.S.).  Northern Command Order No.332.

INSPECTION OF HIRED BUILDINGS –

            General Officers Commanding Divisions, Garrisons, Districts, and Brigades, 4th and 5th New Armies, will be responsible that a thorough inspection of all hired buildings, etc., occupied or used by troops under their command, is made weekly for the purpose of assessing all damages that may be reasonably considered as chargeable against the troops under their command.  Steps should immediately be taken to make good all such damages regimentally.

Northern Command Order No.333.

With reference to the above Order, Officers Commanding Units will render a report to this Office by first post on Mondays. 

T.L.B. SOUTRY, Captain,

Brigade-Major, 123rd (Tyneside Scottish) Brigade.

BRIGADE ORDERS.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL TREVOR TERNAN, C.M.G., D.S.O.,

COMMANDING 123rd (TYNESIDE SCOTTISH) BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS, ALNWICK,

6th MARCH, 1915.

161 Clothing Immediate Issue of, on Joining

            The War Office point out in circular letter 54/General Number/Q.M.G.7/, dated 3rd March, 1915, that in spite of constant and frequent communications having been made emphasising the necessity of completing troops with Service dress, the weekly reports received show invariably a number of men without Service dress.

The attention of O.C. Units of this Brigade has on previous occasions been drawn to this matter.  Officers Commanding Battalions will at once take steps to ensure that every man on the day of joining their Battalion is immediately clothed in Service Dress.  This order is to be rigidly carried out.  To ensure this being done without fail a sufficient stock of surplus clothing (and necessaries) will be kept in the Quarter Master stores both with the Headquarters of the Unit and with the Depot Company.

Should the Brigade Storekeeper be unable to supply at once the clothing, the Commanding Officer concerned will be held personally responsible that an indent is immediately forwarded to the Chief Ordnance Officer, York, for the supply required.  Should the stores be unobtainable from York, a report to that effect will be made to this office.

162 Extracts from Northern Command Orders

PERISCOPES – ISSUE OF –

            It has been decided to issue Periscopes, on the scale of 12 per Infantry Battalion, to all units of the New Armies and Territorial Force proceeding to the Continent of Europe.

The mobilization store table for these units, as detailed below, should be amended by inserting the above item under Section No. 15 B. and the equipments adjusted accordingly.

Army Form G. 1098-110, dated January, 1915.

Army Form G1098-43A, dated February, 1915.

Authority, 84/W/6063 (Q.M.GF. 10), dated War Office, 27th February, 1915.

C.R.N.C. No. 46157(O.S.).  Northern Command Order No.315.

AMENDMENTS –

The following amendment should be made to Army Form G/1096-34 Inventory Form for Wagons G.S. Special 14 feet long:-

Under sub heading of “Spare Parts” –

Insert Blocks, brake (Front 2, Rear 2), in seat box.

Brake Bars will be allowed spare at the rate of 5 per cent., but these items will not be mentioned on the inventory.  For purpose of Indents. The nomenclature of this store is:-

“Bar, brake wagon G.S. special, 14 feet long.”

Authority, 57/3/4503 (A.3), dated War Office 27th February, 1915.

C.R.N.C. No. 46144 (O.S.).  Northern Command Order, No.317.

BICYCLES –

            It has been decided that only the Service patterns Bicycle is suitable for service overseas, and that when units are ordered to proceed there, they may be so equipped.

Non-service machines are suitable for Home service, and any displaced by the issue of Service patterns should either be returned to store or passed to the Reserve Unit as directed in Command Order No. 252, dated 22nd February, 1915.

Authority, 57/Aldershot/8858 (A.3.), dated War Office, 27th February, 1915.

C.R.N.C. No. 38021/15/6 (O.S.).  Northern Command Order No.320.

APPLICATION FOR SUPPLY OF STORES –

            Attention is again called to the frequency with which application for Supply of stores and ordinary routine correspondence are forwarded to Headquarters. Northern Command.

Much unnecessary correspondence is caused thereby.

All such communications should be addressed to the Chief Ordinance Officer, York, under paragraph 18, Equipment Regulations, Part 1.

C.R.N.C. No. 46388 (O.S.).  Northern Command Order No.321.

ALLOTMENTS OF PAY – DEPENDANTS OF SOLDIERS –

            It is notified to all concerned that in all cases where a soldier offers an Allotment of Pay on A.F.O. 1838 in support of an application for Separation Allowance for a dependant under Army Order 440/14, the Officer Commanding should take steps to regulate the cash issues to the soldier in accordance with the amount allotted from the date of application (or date of  enlistment of [if] application is made within 10 days of that date).           

Authority, War Office letter No. 46/203 (Accounts 3 c), dated 24/2/15.

C.R.N.C. No. 45374.  Northern Command Order No.323.

T.L.B. SOUTRY, Captain,

Brigade-Major, 123rd (Tyneside Scottish) Brigade.

BRIGADE ORDERS.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL TREVOR TERNAN, C.M.G., D.S.O.,

COMMANDING 123rd (TYNESIDE SCOTTISH) BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS, ALNWICK,

5th MARCH, 1915.

156 Increased Accommodation

            No schools, halls, or other buildings at present occupied by Battalions of this Brigade are to be evacuated without written orders from this office.  Commanding Officers of Units will take immediate steps to ensure that in no case whatever is an allowance of space of less than 30 super feet per man available.  Should it be found after measurement that further accommodation is required, application will be at once made by telephone to this office.

157 Medical Aid on Furlough –

            The following extract from War Office letter is published for information:-

“A soldier on furlough who requires medical aid must apply, either in person or otherwise, to the nearest military hospital if he resides within two miles of the hospital.

“If he resides outside the radius of two miles, he may apply to a civilian medical practitioner.  The soldier must report the employment of the civilian doctor to his Commanding Officer by letter immediately.”

Authority, W.O. letter No. 93/1056 (F.2.), dated 23rd February, 1915.

158 – Attachment

In accordance with orders received the Unit named below will be attached to this Brigade from this date:-

12th (Service) Battalion Yorkshire Regiment (Tees-side).

Authority 20 – General No. – 3592 (A.G.I.)

159 – Arms – Issue of –

            An issue of M.L.E. rifles to the Battalions of this Brigade will be made as follows:-

600 per Battalion.

Sword bayonets, pattern ’88 will be issued in similar numbers.

Officers Commanding Units will submit indents at once to the Chief Ordnance Officer, York, showing the rifles and bayonets (if any) of this description already in possession, and demanding balance to complete.

Authority, telegram, O.1494 (A.D.O.S.) Northern Command.

160 – Barbed Wire

            Officers Commanding Units will indent on the Chief Ordnance Officer, York, without loss of time, for barbed wire required for (practice purposes) entanglements.

T.L.B. SOUTRY, Captain,

Brigade-Major, 123rd (Tyneside Scottish) Brigade.

BRIGADE ORDERS.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL TREVOR TERNAN, C.M.G., D.S.O.,

COMMANDING 123rd (TYNESIDE SCOTTISH) BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS, ALNWICK,

4th MARCH, 1915.

153 Infectious Diseases – Weekly Return of –

            Attention is again drawn to Northern Command Order No. 216 of 1915, and returns will be posted without fail so as to reach this office by first post on Friday.  “Nil” returns to be rendered when no cases have occurred.

154Soap Supplies of

             Officers Commanding Units will indent on the Chief Ordnance Officer, York, for the necessary supplies of soap, sanctioned, as a first issue, sanctioned under Para. 380, Equipment Regulations, Part 1, 1912.

For subsequent issues see Northern Command Order No. 224.

155 Extracts from Northern Command Orders

“LONDON GAZETTE”

The following extract from the Third Supplement to the “London Gazette” of Tuesday, the 23rd of February, 1915, is published for information:-

The Northumberland Fusiliers

23rd Battalion (4th Tyneside Scottish). –  The undermentioned temporary Second Lieutenants to be temporary Lieutenants:-

Joseph B. Cubey.  Dated 1st January, 1915.

Creassey R. Longhurst.  Dated 2nd January, 1915.

Frank Milburn.  Dated 4th January, 1915.

Henry D. Whittaker.  Dated 5th January, 1915.

Sydney Smith.  Dated 6th January, 1915.

Russell Phillips.  Dated 7th January, 1915.

Henry A. Bolton.  Dated 8th January, 1915.

Robert J. Dougal.  Dated 9th January, 1915.

John H. Patterson.  Dated 11th January, 1915.

AMMUNITION – BLANK –

It is notified for information of all concerned that the issue of blank ammunition for IV. and V. New Army Units cannot at present be Authorised, but the matter is receiving full consideration.

Authority, 54/General Number/1799 (M.T.2.), dated 23rd February, 1915.

C.R. No. 45127 (A.).  Northern Command Order No.306.

EXCHANGE OF FRENCH NOTES –

It is notified for information that arrangements have been made with the General Post Office for the acceptance and exchange at any Post Office in the United Kingdom, of French Notes sent or brought Home by soldiers from France.

The rate of exchange is 9 ½ d. (ninepence halfpenny) per franc.

Notices should be posted in all Military Hospitals to the above effect.

Northern Command Order No.310.

HORSES – DESPATCH OF FROM REMOUNT DEPOTS –

  1. It is notified for information that Remount Depots are experiencing great inconvenience owing to units wiring to say that they are not ready to take animals that are despatched to them.
  2. No animals are issued to units unless intimation has been received from the units or from the Divisional or Brigade Commanders concerned that they are ready for horses.  The number of horses and mules in various Remount Depots is very great, and the number coming and going to be dealt with is such that the organisation can only be handled if they are issued at once in accordance with orders received or co-ordinated from the War Office.  I am, therefore, to say that Remount Depot Commanders have been informed that the first and last communication that should pass between them and the unit to which they are issuing horses is a telegram from the Depot saying that the animals have been despatched and stating probable time of their arrival.
  3. Commanding Officers are directed to revive the horses sent to them, and if they have any objections to make to communicate them to Command Headquarters, and not to Deputy Assistant Director of Remounts of Circles or to Depot Superintendents.
  4. All applications for horses should be forwarded to Command Headquarters, stating in the case of horses for Officers their weight and height.  The name of the station to which horses should be consigned must always be stated.

Authority, War Office letter No. R.1418 (Q.M.G.4.), dated 26th February, 1915.

C.R. No. 46034 (R.).  Northern Command Order No.312.

LECTURES ON PRESERVATION OF HEALTH –

Arrangements have been made for lectures to be given to the Troops in all Garrisons on “Preservation of Health.”

Commanding Officers should communicate with Major T. Wardrop Griffith, Royal Army Medical Corps (T), Organizing Secretary, 43, Park Square, Leeds, stating date and hour when it will be convenient for their men to be lectured, when arrangements will be made accordingly by Major Griffith.

Northern Command Order No.313

T.L.B. SOUTRY, Captain,

Brigade-Major, 123rd (Tyneside Scottish) Brigade.

BRIGADE ORDERS.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL TREVOR TERNAN, C.M.G., D.S.O.,

COMMANDING 123rd (TYNESIDE SCOTTISH) BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS, ALNWICK,

3rd MARCH, 1915.

151 District Court-Martial

            The detail of officers as mentioned in Brigade Order No. 144, dated 26th February, 1915 will re-assemble at the Orderly Room, Newburn, on Saturday, March 6th, at 10 30 a.m., for the purpose of trying by a District Court-Martial the accused person named in the margin.

The accused will be warned, and all witnesses duly required to attend.

The proceedings will be forwarded to the G.O.C., 123rd (Tyneside Scottish) Brigade, “Alnbank,” Alnwick.

The Officers Commanding 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions, Tyneside Scottish, will each detail three officers to attend for instructional purposes.

The accused named in the margin was Regt. Sergt.-Major Alfred George Minter, 22nd Bn. Northumberland Fusiliers (3rd Tyneside Scottish).

152 Extracts from Northern Command Orders

STORE – PRICES OF

            It has been decided to adhere to Vocabulary Rates as the basis of unworn value in assessing charges for deficiencies against the soldier.

Authority, War Office letter No. 15/15 (Q.M.G.F.b.), dated 22nd February, 1915.

C.R. No. 43386 (O.S.).  Northern Command Order No.296.

CORRESPONDENCE – POSTAGE TO BE PREPAID –

Postage must be prepaid on all correspondence, etc., in ordinary “O.H.M.S.” covers sent to Command Headquarters and Departmental Offices by Units.

The payment of surcharges causes much inconvenience and delay, and should be avoided as far as possible.

C.R. No. 45649 (A.).  Northern Command Order No.297.

SICK LEAVE – OFFICERS –

To obviate the necessity of ordering medical boards on officers when the leave likely to be granted is under one month, Divisional and Brigade Commanders are empowered to grant leave up to one month on medical certificate, Army Form B. 175.

Command Order No. 973 is hereby cancelled.

C.R. No. 42898 (A.).  Northern Command Order No.298.

INFECTIOUS DISEASES – WEEKLY RETURN OF –

Attention is drawn to Command Order No. 216 of 1915, which must be strictly complied with.

Northern Command Order No. 301.

CANADIAN HORSES – UNITS ISSUED WITH –

            It is notified for information that Canadian horses issued to units have usually somewhat tender feet.  Great care should therefore be taken that they are not put to fast work on hard roads until their feet have time to get thoroughly hardened.

Northern Command Order No. 304.

BOOTS – ANKLE –

With reference to Command Order No. 256, dated the 22nd February, 1915, it has now been decided that in the event of regulation pattern boots not being available, the Standard No. 1 pattern may be taken by men proceeding to join the Expeditionary Force.

Authority, War Office letter A.C.D./Boots/10(R.A.C.D.), dated 23rd February, 1915.

C.R. No. 44617 (O.S.).  Northern Command Order No.300.

T.L.B. SOUTRY, Captain,

Brigade-Major, 123rd (Tyneside Scottish) Brigade.

March 1945

 

(Britain)

 

During October 1944 a string of crimes were committed near Staines in Middlesex culminating in the murder of taxi driver George Edward Heath. Karl Hulten, a Swedish born deserter from the U.S. Army met an 18-year-old Welsh waitress Elizabeth Jones and they joined forces and became partners. Both had troubling and unruly upbringings resulting in illusions of grandeur about their lives. He was awol from the army and considered himself to be a dangerous gangster, she on the other hand, was a potential stripper in a nightclub. After meeting and for six days beginning on the 28th October 1944 they lived out their fantasies. Driving a stolen army truck, they knocked over a nurse cycling along a country lane and robbed her. After, they picked up a female hitchhiker, knocked her unconscious, robbed her then threw her into a river. She did not drown and survived the ordeal. Finally, they murdered Heath, robbing him of £8.00, then stealing his taxi after abandoning the army truck. The murder became known as “The cleft chin murder” on account of Heath having a cleft chin. They were eventually caught with the taxi still in Hulten’s possession and both charged with murder. The Americans waived the “Visiting Forces Act” allowing him to be tried in a British court. They were both found guilty of murder and sentenced to hang. Hulten was executed at Pentonville Prison on the 8th March 1945 and Elizabeth Jones was reprieved and her ultimate fate is uncertain.

 

(Liberated Europe)

 

During October 1944, German V2 rockets and launching units had been relocated to the Dutch city of The Hague. The prime targets for the rockets were London and Amsterdam. On the 3rd March 1945 the Allies attempted to destroy the V2 launching sites plus any V2 rockets waiting to be launched. They were unsuccessful as the Allied pilots were given the wrong co-ordinates. By the 15th March 1945 V2 rockets continued to hit London and Antwerp. Over 3,000 V2 rockets were launched at England and the whole of liberated Europe. The final rocket exploded at Orpington in Kent, killing one civilian, on the 27th March 1945.

(Germany)

In retaliation for the bombing of London during the blitz of 1940/41, the Royal Air Force (RAF) bombed the city of Cologne on 262 separate air raids. During the second world war Cologne was the fourth largest city in Germany, and the largest city on the River Rhine. By the time the RAF carried out their last air on the 2nd March 1945, most of the city had been destroyed. Cologne was a heavily industrialised city producing war supplies and as such was an important military target. On the 5th March 1945, U.S. armoured and infantry divisions were approaching the city and on the 6th March 1945 they moved toward the city centre. A single German Panther tank ambushed two U.S. Sherman tanks, one of which was slowed down by a pile of rubble in a narrow street. Two shells from the Panther took out the first Sherman and a third shell hit the tracks of the second Sherman. A U.S. Pershing tank approached and destroyed the Panther as the German tank commander hesitated possibly believing it was a German tank. By the 7th March 1945 all of Cologne west of the Rhine was captured by the Allies. In 1942, RAF Commander-in-Chief Sir Arthur (Bomber) Harris made his now famous statement, “They sowed the wind, and now they are going to reap the whirlwind”. Rightly or wrongly the bombing of Cologne was Germany’s WHIRLWIND!![O1] 

The Battle of Remagen began on the 7th March 1945 when U.S. troops captured, intact, the Ludendorrf Bridge over the Rhine. For the next ten days the Germans tried many tactics to destroy the bridge, including aircraft.  By the 14th March 1945 the air offensive had failed. Hitler ordered that V2 rockets be fired against the bridge. When the bridge finally collapsed on the 17th March 1945, American combat engineers had built temporary bridges across the Rhine.  Over 125,000 U.S. combat troops and equipment crossed the Rhine and the eighteen-day battle ended on the 25th March 1945.

By March 1945 the Allies had advanced into Germany and approaching the River Rhine. The city of Mainz was bombed by the RAF on the 27th February 1945, damaging large parts of the city. However, the main targets of the air raids were the railway facilities, which were undamaged. Multiple Allied air raids had rendered approximately 80% of the city destroyed and many of the defenders withdrew across the Rhine. U.S. General George Patton’s troops captured the city on the 22nd March 1945 and what remained of the German defenders surrendered without a fight.

Rivalry between Patton and British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery dictated Patton’s next move. He sneaked U.S. troops across the Rhine at Oppenheim on the 22nd March 1945. The attack was successful as they were not opposed by German forces

On the 23rd March 1945, Operation Plunder was a joint British-Canadian-U.S. crossing of the Rhine and commanded by Montgomery. The operation was an attack of the lower Rhine and consisted of an airborne assault, an artillery barrage and Anglo-American bombers. On the 24th March 1945 Operation Varsity was launched, which consisted of over 16,000 Allied paratroopers. They landed east of the Rhine, consolidated, and finally met up with the Allied ground forces. Success in the lower Rhine region ensured an Allied victory for Operation Plunder on the 27th March 1945.

The Battle of Frankfurt began on the 26th March 1945. U.S. soldiers approached to city from the south and found the bridge crossing the River Main mostly intact. The River Main eventually merges into the Rhine River. Under fire and supported by U.S. tank artillery on the 27th March 1945, the U.S. troops fought the Germans in fierce house to house combat forcing them out of the city. The three-day battle ended on the 29th March 1945 when the Americans took control of Frankfurt. Accompanying the U.S. army was a female war correspondent, Lee Millar. She was the first correspondent, from the front line, to report to the U.S. press of the liberation of Frankfurt. Lee was one of six British and American War Correspondents who had been reporting events since 1936. Their theatre of operation was Europe and not the far east. Even then the U.S. assignments were regulated by the U.S. military.

With the Germans in general retreat, the Red Army was closing in on Germany from the east. Danzig (modern day Gdansk) is one of the oldest cities in Poland, which became a “Free City” following the Napoleonic wars. When Germany invaded Poland in 1939, they officially annexed the “Free City”. The Siege of Danzig occurred when the Red Army approached the city on the 13th March 1945 and ended on the 30th March 1945 when Danzig was captured.

Heinrich Himmler was one of the most powerful men in Nazi Germany. After joining the Nazi Party in 1923 he rose through the ranks to become Reichsfuhrer-SS in 1929. He also became a principal architect for the Holocaust, the extermination of the Jews and other so-called inferior races. Himmler was primarily a master organisational officer and under his leadership the Gestapo and Waffen-SS w developed. Hitler appointed him as commander of the hastily formed Army Group Vistula on the 25th January 1945. However, Himmler did not have the military and combat experience to halt the Red Army advance. Eventually, after some delaying tactics, a counter-attack was launched against the Red Army on the 16th March 1945. The attack was halted by heavy rain, mud, minefields and strong anti-tank defences. Under pressure from Hitler as to why the mission was not accomplished, Himmler was unable to provide a viable alternative. Accusing him of not following orders, Hitler held Himmler personally responsible. The military command of Himmler ended on the 20th Match 1945 when Hitler replaced him with General Gotthard Heinrici. Hitler’s response to Himmer’s failure marked a serious deterioration in the relationship between the two leaders

(Eastern Front)

In Denmark, resistance fighters in Copenhagen had asked for a long time for the British to conduct a raid on Shellhus in the city centre. The building was being used by the Germans as Gestapo headquarters. Plans were approved for a low-level raid, and code-named Operation Carthage. On the 21st March 1945 eighteen de Haviland Mosquito fighter-bombers conducted the raid. They were escorted by 30 Royal Air Force (RAF) Mustang fighters and two RAF Mosquito Film Production Units to record the results of the attack. The attack was conducted at roof-top level. On the first wave of six aircraft one Mosquito hit a lamppost and crashed into a school just short of the target. The crash set the school alight killing 123 civilians, many of them children. Shellhus was destroyed by the remaining aircraft, eighteen resistance prisoners escaped and Gestapo operations in Denmark were severely disrupted. Over 100 Danish employees of the Gestapo, Danish prisoners and German soldiers died during the attack. For the Allies, four Mosquito bombers and two Mustang fighters were lost and nine airmen died on the raid.

(Burma-Pacific)

Near the end of the Burma Campaign, two separate battles, the Battle of Meiktila and the Battle of Mandalay were decisive engagements. The Japanese supply lines had been extended and troops had suffered heavy losses in the mountains after the battles of Imphal and Kohima in 1944. The Allies were pursuing the retreating Japanese south along the Burma spine. The Japanese losses included conscripts who were not ready for battle. The air force was reduced to a few dozen aircraft and the tank regiment only had about twenty tanks to face the Allied advance.

With disastrous Japanese losses their military realised they needed to make sweeping changes to their commanders. On the 28th February 1945 the Japanese began preparing for the defence of Meiktila as they became aware of the threat of the Allied advance. The Indian 17th Division captured the city of Meiktila on the 3rd March 1945. The Japanese re-enforcement troops, when they arrived, were dismayed to find they would need to capture Meiktila again. Battle weary troops were weak after the preceding weeks heavy fighting. Meiktila was besieged and the siege ended when the Japanese commander was ordered to abandon the siege during the final days of March 1945. At the same time, they were ordered to prepare to resist further Allied advances to the south.

For his actions during the Battle of Meiktila on the 18th March 1945, Lieutenant Karamjeet Singh Judge was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross (VC). He was 21 years old and serving in the 4th Bn. 15th Punjab Regiment, Indian Army. The platoon he was leading was held up by machine-gun fire from tunnels and bunkers. With complete disregard for his own safety he went forward and directed the supporting tanks to destroy the first bunker. After ten bunkers had been destroyed another three were located. A smoke bomb directed a tank to the first bunker, he led a few troops to mop-up after requesting the tank to cease fire. Within a few yards of the bunker a machine-gun opened fire and he was mortally wounded.

Japanese troops had been ordered to abandon the Siege of Meiktila and reinforce the city of Mandalay, and defend the city to the last man. Japanese military honour would be a loss of prestige should the city be abandoned. South of the city, were large supply dumps, which the Japanese could not afford to lose. A battalion of 4/4th Gurkha Rifles stormed Mandalay Hill on the 8th March 1945. Fighting their way into the city the Gurkhas faced Japanese defenders who were located in tunnels and bunkers. The Japanese defenders were gradually over-run until Mandalay was liberated on the 20th March 1945. With the loss of Mandalay, the Burmese population turned against the Japanese. Guerilla forces would continue in Burma until the end of the war in September 1945

(Pacific)

The first raid on Tokyo was the daylight raid of the 25th February 1945 when 174 USAAF B-29 bombers dropped incendiary bombs destroying approximately 643 acres of the snow-covered city. On the 9th March 1945 the most destructive raid on Tokyo, code named Operation Meetinghouse, was conducted by the U.S. military. With a change of tactics, 324 B-29 bombers flew at night and at a lower altitude of 2,000-2,500 ft. (610-760 m). Mostly the bombs dropped were 500lb (230 kg) cluster bombs which contained incendiary bomblets. The first B-29’s to arrive dropped the bombs in a large “X” pattern in Tokyo’s city centre which included the dock area. Approximately 15.8 square miles of central Tokyo’s densely populated area was destroyed. The destruction was caused by individual fires mixing and creating one huge fire. The result was that approximately 100,000 were killed and over one million homeless. Of the 339 B-29s launched for Meetinghouse, 282 reached the target. What happened to the remainder is not known. 27 were lost by being caught up in fire updraft, mechanical failures or being shot down by Japanese air defences. Sometime during March 1945, Emperor Hirohito’s tour of the destroyed areas of Tokyo was the beginning of his involvement in the peace process between Japan and the U.S.A.                                                                             

In Nagoya, the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works was the major target for the USAAF a ir raids. The Doolittle Raid in April 1942 was the first raid. The second phase created the most serious bomb damage  during the aerial attacks of 1944 and 1945. Twenty-one separate raids dropped nearly 20,000 tons of bombs between the 13th December 1944 and the 24th July 1945. Prior to that another phase of precision bombing on Mitsubishi factories were launched on the 13th and 18th December 1944 respectively. Two further attacks were launched on 3rd and 14th January 1945. On two separate dates, the 11th and 18th March 1945, there were large scale air raids culminating into widespread firestorms. The raids on the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works in Nagoya continued into April 1945.

During the Battle of Iwo Jima, following the capture of the second Japanese built airfield on the 23rd February 1945, the U.S. marines slowly moved northward. Located at the extreme north of the island was Hill 363 where the marines encountered more Japanese defenders. Clearing the fortified ridges of Hill 363 and the area around Hill 382, known as the “Meatgrinder” was difficult as the defenders were often hidden underground. By the 7th March 945 the marines had taken both hills and Iwo Jima was finally declared secure on the 26th March 1945. However, a few Japanese soldiers remained in isolated strongholds until the end of March 1945. The suicidal defence of Iwo Jima by 20,000 Japanese troops was part of the Japanese code of not surrendering, but to die for the emperor. Of the 1,000 who did not die approximately 850 were taken prisoner, owing mainly to their injuries. For the marines the battle was the bloodiest in the Pacific Campaign. They had approximately 22,000 casualties of which 7,000 were killed in action. Their casualties were actually more than the Japanese casualties.

(Other Theatres)

 

Saudi Arabia was a neutral country during the course of the war, who rapidly expanded their petroleum industry. This expansion was largely due to investment from the Allies to ensure the supply of oil to the Allied forces. In February 1945 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt met the Saudi king and an agreement was reached that the Saudis would join forces with the Allies. On the 1st March 1945 with both the Axis powers in full retreat, Saudi Arabia declared war on Germany and Japan.    

During the course of the war Argentina had remained neutral. British investment in the country ensured that the two countries would both benefit from Argentina’s exporting foodstuffs and agricultural products to Britain. Resentment was growing in Germany and Italy of the British influence as they were not receiving pre-war trading facilities. However, Argentina declared war on Germany on the 27th March 1945 when they conceded to Allied pressure.

 

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 [O1]

Diary of 2/4th Battalion The Border Regiment

1915

16th February 1915. Captain V.S. Jones, 4 officers, and 167 other ranks proceeded to Fleetwood to provide the guards on the Arsenal and the Harbour.

22nd February 1915.  The Battalion was asked to volunteer for service in Burmah.  Practically every man volunteered, but owing to a considerable number being too young for Foreign Service, only 767 N.C.O.’s and men were available.  Japanese rifles had been received with which to arm the Battalion.  These were, however, never issued, and Lee-Enfield Mark 1* rifles were substituted.  Owing to the previous shortage of rifles, and the necessity of using a certain number for guard duties, very few men had fired on an open range, except some of those transferred from Sittingbourne, and a small number who were exercised at Fleetwood.

28th February 1915.  Captain F.W. Halton, T.D., promoted Major and appointed Second in Command.  Lieut. H. Thompson appointed Adjutant.

Notebooks of W. Allason.

All the notebooks were written on the right hand page and additions, photos, cartoons or other documents were added to the left hand page.

Book 2

This book commences Night 15 – 16 Feb 1915 and is obviously a continuation of an earlier volume, not part of this series.

miles deep at least in the firing line trenches.  The two supports were in places knee deep and only constant pumping kept the water down.  The men had no shelter from the weather and the firing line trenches suffered much from enfilade fire.  There was an apology of a wire entanglement to our front but the chief safeguard against attack was the swampy nature of the ground.  The Germans were very much top dog in sniping by day anything showing above the parapet attracted fire.  It was impossible to get from our trench to the other or back to the supports until dark.  The trenches on our left held by D Coy were even worse and the gum boots available had all been given to them.  Our predecessors had evidently given up all idea of improving the trenches and passed the hours they were there in abject hopeless misery.  On an average they had asked for 100 sandbags a night to replace those shot away.

16th Feb. 1915.         I demanded 2000 nightly and had the parapets thickened, traverses and shelters built after the surface slush had been removed and many hundred empty sandbags which had rotted away where they had been first thrown down, had been cleared away, we came upon a lot of floor boards.  Pulling up these and digging through about two feet of evil smelling rubbish we came to the original soil.  After making small channels leading to sump pits which could be easily drained out the boards were replaced.  From that time on the men were dry-shod in the trenches.  Our example infected by degrees the rest of the Bde and soon the trenches became fairly good.  A number of sniping posts were also constructed and we began to stop the Germans having it all their own way.  I arranged that the men should be in three reliefs by night No 1 lookout, No 2 waiting man No 3 working party.  This prevented any chance of surprise and ensured a third of the men working all night.

On the opposite page is a sketch map showing the position near Wulverghem.

They got what sleep they could during the day.  Close to the barbed wire in the intervals between the parapets listening posts were dug in.  They were relieved every three hours during the night and withdrawn by day.  Landon was killed the previous day in 13 trench while glancing over the parapet about 3 p.m.  I was holding 10 B, 11 A, 11 B and the two support trenches.  I arrived with a cold in the head but by getting wet up to my waist and remaining wet for 3 days the cold was driven away.  There was a good bit of shelling by the Germans during the day and the trenches on our left caught it.  Two English aeroplanes tried to chase off a German but it was like two owls after a swallow.  The German darted too & fro where she liked.

17th Feb. 1915.         Work was continued throughout the night I noticed that about three seconds after every German flare there was a rapid burst of fire.  Arguing that to fire the Germans must be exposing themselves I ordered all the lookout men to fire a round in the direction of every flare sent up and then take cover before the German bullets could reach them.  It seemed to have a good effect.  They shelled my group of trenches during the morning.  One shell burst right in my right hand trench but caused no casualties.

On the opposite page a Bainsfather cartoon “The Innocent Abroad” of a shelter.  It has been annotated “Just like my shelter.”

18th Feb. 1915.         We were ordered to stay a third night in the trenches.  I proposed changing round the men who had been in the worst trenches with others but Sgt. Newsome asked if he might be allowed to stay on as he hoped with another 24 hrs work to make his trench quite habitable.  Once let our men understand what requires doing and they are splendid.  Cpl. Puddifoot with 3 men crawled out in the dark to try & round up some snipers.  Cpl. Dunton found our wire had been cut and repaired it.  Going my rounds at night I got stuck in one trench sinking in up to my thighs.  My orderly was able to help me out.  We walked about with long poles to feel for Jack Johnson holes.  There were generally a good many loose bullets about and as we were on the crest of a slight ridge we must have shown up against the skyline.  It is extraordinary how little sleep one can do with.  After 3 nights without any I found a two hours doze quite sufficient.  No rations arrived for us on the 3rd day and then we heard that there would be no relief again.  It had been raining for 48 hrs on end.

19th Feb.1915.          However about midnight a Coy of the Dorsets came to take over and we marched back to the little farm house we had been in on the 12th & 13th where the shelling occurred.  The 25th British Indian Division at Ypres had been badly mauled and they wanted to bring them down to our part of the world where it was comparatively peaceful and send us up to take their place.  This required a certain amount of management – thus instead of a rest of 8 days – we were kept on 3 days over our time and then had 3 days rest at Dranoutre before returning for a spell of five days.  In Dranoutre we were to be ready to move off always in ½ an hour but a canvas bath had come out for me and I was able to get a good wash.

20th Feb. 1915.         We remained on in the little farm house making up for arrears of sleep and that evening marched to Dranouter or rather some very dirty farm houses beyond it.  Our mess was in an Estaminet, the meals being cooked in the room we fed in, on a small stove.

21st & 22nd     We remained there the next two days and then marched back to R.E. farm, close behind the firing line, by 8 p.m. 

23rd Feb. 1915.         D Coy was in “Burnt farm” close by.  A and B in the firing line. 

24th Feb 1915.           We stayed there the next day and the following evening took over 11A, 11B and the two supports.  Half the company had been in a redoubt behind the line on the two previous days so they not much rest.  Had the Germans rushed our front trenches they might have been on us within five minutes.  I had agitated at once to have the farm prepared for defence.  This was now being done by the R.E.  Just as we were marching off Capt. Ratcliffe was brought in.  Shot in the stomach (he recovered).  No work had been done to the trenches since we were last there except that the wooden cases of the ammn boxes we had carried up had been burnt for firewood thus exposing the cartridges to the weather.  I sent in a report.  The trenches were filthy tho’ we had left them clean.  I arranged for a certain proportion of hand grenades to be prepared for use only leaving the safety pin to be drawn.  Previously it had been the custom to have a box of them somewhere, the detonators (probably the wrong size) somewhere else and nobody told off in charge.  If there had been a German attack none of them could have been used.

25th Feb. 1915.         During the night there was a full moon and a sharp frost.  It seemed as light as day and going from trench to trench in the open to see how the work was progressing was no fun.  The Germans were about 300 yds off.

On the opposite page is a Bainsfather cartoon cut from Bystander.

26th Feb. 1915.         I got my feet very wet.  The Germans pitched a couple of shell 25 & 50 yard from the trench I was in, otherwise all was quiet. 

27th Feb. 1915.         During the night my listening patrols reported the Germans working in the open.  All the men were lined up ready and then I made a succession of flares burst right over them.  The men opened rapid fire and the Germans ran for cover.  During the day I was sitting in my bomb proof trying to warm my toes with a charcoal brazier when – bang – bang bang – a rapid succession of rifle shots sounded inside my bomb proof.  It was not easy to extract myself as the opening was very narrow but I muscled and pulled away the barrier.  An old battered ammunition tin was propping it up and this on examination proved to contain between 200 & 300 rounds a fortunate escape.  The following evening we were relieved and marched back to Bailleul.  I intended marching the whole way for exercise and to get rid of an attack of dysentery but after 3 miles I nearly fainted.  Luckily my horse was there and I managed to mount.  Arriving at Bailleul I could not stand and had to be taken into the nearest billet.  Here the Dr. gave me some medicine and next morning I was nearly all right again.

28th Feb. 1915.         My toes were a little frost bitten but in the course of a few weeks that wore off.  It is curious how all the inhabitants seem to be wearing army clothing.  My landlady tells me there is a large sale of mens’ boots.  A man issued with a new pair will sell them and go on wearing his old ones.  I personally saw every article issued to my men and made certain the discarded clothing was worn out and returned any surplus to the Qr Master.  The best boots were handed over to the Shoemaker Sgt for repair.  The next time the Bn went to the trenches.  He of course had his hands full while in Billets.  By this many hundred boots which would otherwise have been thrown away were saved.  Instead of going into the Grapperies again the men were put into dirty lofts.  The proprietor of the hothouses was claiming several hundred thousand francs indemnification if our men were to be kept there any longer as he wanted to start the vines in heat.  The French always billeted their men in schools & private houses, we never allowed men into private houses.  Major Roche went off on leave & I became Senior Major.

The Retreat of Stalag 7 from “JOE”

REPORT OF A FORCED MARCH MADE BY OCCUPANTS

OF STALAG LUFT 7. GERMANY.

On January 17th 1945 at approximately 11 a.m. we received notice of one hour in which to pack our kit and be ready to leave the camp by marching.  At the same time we were informed by Ober Feldwebel Frank that for every one man who fell out of the column on the march, five men would be shot.  This order was never given in writing.

The start was postponed until 3.30 a.m. on Jan 19th.  During the interval 68 sick men were evacuated to the civilian Slag at Kreigberg, and, we believe were later taken to Stalag 344 at Lansdorf.

Each man was provided with two and a half days marching rations, before leaving.  When the march began on Jan 19th no transport was provided for any sick who might have fallen out on the march, and the only medical equipment carried, was that carried by the M.O. and three sanitators on their backs.

DETAILS OF MARCH.

Jan 19th.  Left Bankau and marched to Winterfeld, a distance of 28 Km’s.  This was done under extremely trying weather conditions and severe cold.  The only accommodation at Winterfeld was small barns.

Jan 20th.  Marched from Winterfeld to Karlsruhe arriving at 10 a.m.  We set off at 5 a.m. and marched a distance of 12 Kms.  At Karlsruhe, we were housed in an abandoned brick factory.  Here for the first time we were provided with 2 field kitchens with which to cook for 1,550 men.  Each kitchen was actually capable of cooking food for 200 men.  The M.O. was also provided with a horse and cart for transport of the sick.  The cart was big enough to hold 6 sitting cases.  Half a cup of coffee (ersatz) per man was provided and after a rest period of 11 hours we were again ordered to move.  The Camp Leader and the M.O. protested against further marching until the men were adequately rested and fed.  We were told by the German Abwehr Officer that it was an order, and must be complied with.  The same night we left Karlsruhe and marched to Schonfeld, arriving at 9 a.m. on Jan 21st, covering a distance of 42 Kms.  The conditions during the night were extreme, the temperature being -13 degrees centigrade.  The M.O.’s wagon was filled after the first 5 Kms, and from then onwards men were being picked up on the road sides in a collapsed and frozen state, and it was only by sheer will power that they were able to finish the march.  After crossing the River Oder, a distance of 34 Kms, from Karlsruhe.  We were told that we would be accommodated, and that no move would be made for 2 days.

Jan 21st.  At Schonfeld we were accommodated in the cow sheds and barns of a farm.  A room was provided at Lassen for the sick.  Rations issued were about 100 grams of biscuits per man, and half a cup of coffee.

Jan 22nd.  At 3 a.m. orders were given by the Germans to prepare to march off at once.  It was dark and there was some delay in getting the men out from their sleeping quarters, because they could not find their baggage.  The guards were thereupon marched into the quarters and discharged their firearms.  The column was marching again by 5 a.m.  23 men, it was ascertained at this stage, were lost, and their whereabouts are unknown.  They may have been left behind asleep, or they may have escaped.  Also 31 men were evacuated (we believe) to Lamsdorf, but nothing further has been heard of them.  We marched to Jenkwitz, a distance of 24 Kms and were housed at a farm in barns.  Here we were issued with a total of 114 kms of fat, 46 tins of meat barley, and peas.  Soup was issued, the ration being about a quarter of a litre per man.  No bread was issued.

Jan 23rd.  Left Jenkwitz at 8 a.m. and marched to Wassen.  20 kms.

Jan 24th.  We were rested a day at Wassen, sleeping in barns.  The revier was in a cowshed.  31 sick were evacuated to Sagan.  400 loaves of bread issued.

Jan 25th.  Left Wassen at 4 a.m. for Heidersdorf and covered 30 Kms.

Jan 26th.  Spent the day at Heidersdorf.  Issued with 600 loaves of bread, to last for two days.

Jan 27th.  Left Heidersdorf and marched 19 kms to Pfaffendorf, where we arrived at night.

Jan 28th.  Left Pfaffendorf for Standorf at 5 a.m. and marched a distance of 21 Kms.  Issued with 24 cartons knackebrot, 150 kgms oats, 45 kgms margarine and 50 kgms of sugar.  22 sick were evacuated at Schweidnitz, and eventually reached Sagan.

Jan 29th.  Left Standorf at 6 p.m. and marched to Peterwitz a distance of 22 kms, where we arrived at 4 a.m. the following day.  This march was carried out in darkness under extreme conditions.  With a blizzard blowing the whole time.  The men arrived at Peterwitz in an utterly exhausted condition.  Before leaving Standorf we were promised that we would have to march no further as transport would be supplied at Peterwitz. 104 kgms of meat were issued, 1 sack of salt, 25 kgms of coffee, and 100 kgms barley.

Jan 30th.  At Peterwitz, 30 men from Stalag 344, who had been left without guards joined our column.  296 loaves of bread were issued, 50 kgms oats and 35.5 kgms of margarine.

Jan 31st.  We spent this day at Peterwitz.  We were told we would have to march to Goldberg before we got transport.  300 kgms of oats were issued, 50 kgms coffee and 40 Kgms of margarine.

Feb 1st.  Marched from Peterwitz to Pransvitz, a distance of 12 Kms.  We remained at Pransvitz form Feb 1st to the 5th.  On Feb 1st we were issued with 680 loaves of bread and 37.5 Kgms of margarine.  On Feb 3rd we were issued with 112.5 kgms of margarine, 250 loaves, 100 kgms sugar, 200 Kgms of flour and 150 kgms barley.  On Feb 4th the issue was 250 loaves.

At night on Feb 4th the German Commandant (Oberst Leutenant Behr) visited the farm and read out an order from O.K.W. to the effect that 5 men were to be released, and would be liberated at the first opportunity.  The reason for this we could not understand.

Feb 5th.  Before leaving we were issued with 500 loaves of bread, 95 kgms of margarine and 530 tins of meat.  We were marched from Pransvitz to Goldberg a distance of 8 kms.  On arrival at Goldberg we were put into cattle trucks 55 men to a truck.  By this time there were numerous cases of dysentery and facilities for men to attend to personal hygiene were inadequate.  The majority had no water on the train for two days.  When men were allowed out of the trucks to relieve themselves, the guards ordered them back inside again, and we had to be continually getting permission for them to be allowed out.  We were on the train from the morning of the 5th Feb to the morning of the 8th Feb.  Before commencing this journey we were issued with 1/3 of a loaf to last for 2 days.

The total distance marched was 240 kms.

SUMMARY

As a result of the march and the deplorable conditions, the morale of the men is extremely low.  They are suffering from an extreme degree of malnutrition, and, at present, an outbreak of dysentery.  There are numerous cases of frostbite, and other minor ailments.  They are quite unfit for any further moving.  Food and better conditions are urgently required.  We left Bankau with no Red X supplies, and throughout the march all rations were short issued.  The most outstanding being bread.  Which amounts to 2,924 loaves.

There is a map of the route taken on the last page.

BRIGADE ORDERS.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL TREVOR TERNAN, C.M.G., D.S.O.,

COMMANDING 123rd (TYNESIDE SCOTTISH) BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS, NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE,

26th FEBRUARY, 1915.

143 District Court-Martial

            The District Court-Martial directed to assemble in Brigade Order No. 132, of February 21st, 1915, of which Major P.B. Norris (3rd Battalion, Tyneside Scottish) was President, is hereby dissolved.

144District Court-Martial

            The details of officers as mentioned below will assemble at the Orderly Room, All Saints’ Hall, Linden Roar, Gosforth, 10-30 a.m., on the 1st day of March, for the purpose of trying by District Court-Martial the accused persons named in the margin:-

PRESIDENT

Major E.K. Purnell, 4th Battalion, Tyneside Scottish.

MEMBERS

A Captain of the 1st Battalion Tyneside Scottish.

A Captain of the 2nd Battalion Tyneside Scottish.

The accused will be warned, and all witnesses duly required to attend.

The proceedings will be forwarded to the G.O.C., 123rd (Tyneside Scottish) Brigade, “Alnbank” Alnwick.

Officers Commanding 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions (Tyneside Scottish) will each detail three officers to attend for instructional purposes.

In the margin.  No. 1451, Pte. J.T. Jackson, 23rd Bn, Northumberland Fusiliers (4th Tyneside Scottish), and No. 1388, Pte. J. Sparks, 23rd (Ser.) Northumberland Fusiliers (4th Tyneside Scottish).

145Stores Local Purchase of

            With reference to Northern Command Memo. No. C.R.N.C. 38485/1/5(G) of 24th inst. (copies of which have been issued to all units) Officers Commanding will forward without delay to this office a list of the articles referred in para. 3 which they are unable to obtain from Ordnance Stores.  Arrangements will be made in this office to purchase locally.

146ExpenditureHitherto unauthorized

            In future Commanding Officers will forward to Brigade Headquarters all recommendations which entail expenditure not hitherto authorised.

Such recommendations will on no account be forwarded direct to the Tyneside Scottish Committee.

147Army Orders

            The attention of Commanding Officers is called to the following Army Orders:-

Army Order 54, of 1915 (Appendix) –

“War establishment of an Infantry Battalion,” which authorizes certain increases in Establishment.

The note (b) in column of remarks does not apply, at present to the Battalions of this Brigade.

Army Order 68, of 1915 –

Arms and equipment of Officers.

Army Order 75, of 1915 –

Pay.  “How a soldier should get his pay.”

148Depot CompaniesTransfer to

            Officers Commanding Battalions will take immediate steps to transfer to their Depot Companies the following, who will be shewn as “extra to establishment.”

  1. All N.C.O’s and men found by the Medical Inspector of Recruits, Northern Command, to be unfit for service in the field, but fit for home service.
  2. All enlisted boys under the age of 19.  All vacancies thus caused in the Headquarter Companies will be at once filled up by drafts from Depot Companies.

149 Extracts from Northern Command Orders

BILLS FOR SUPPLIES – METHOD OF PASSING FOR PAYMENT –

It has been brought to notice that much inconvenience and delay has been caused both in the office of the Command Paymaster and this office, on account of bills for supplies, etc., obtained by local purchase not being properly endorsed before transmitting same for payment.

It should be noted for future guidance that such bills should be marked “Special Purchase – No Contract,” and when there is no Headquarter authority same must be obtained before passing the bills for payment in accordance with Command Order 1622, dated 16th November, 1914, to which attention is drawn.

Bills for supplies obtained under contract, and bills for supplies the offers for which though not under contract have already been actually approved under Headquarter authority, do not require any further approval, but the authority, i.e., the Command Headquarter number and date must be inserted on bills before transmission to Command Paymaster, Northern Command, York.

C.R. No. 45286 (S.T.).  Northern Command Order No.265.

BADGES OF RANK – WARRANT OFFICERS, CLASS II –

For the present the badge of rank of Warrant Officers Class II., remain as they were before the publication of Army Order 70 of 1915.

Authority, War Office letter No. 54/General No./1801 (Q.M.G.7), dated 13th February, 1915.

C.R. No. 43000 (A).  Northern Command Order No.266.

MOBILIZATION STORES TABLES – AMENDMENTS TO –

The following amendment is to be made to all copies of Mobilization Store Tables detailed:-

Army Form G. 1098 – 3, Headquarters of an Infantry Brigade.

Army Form G. 1098 – 3A, Headquarters of an Infantry Brigade (T.F.)

Army Form G. 1098 – 112, Headquarters of an Infantry Brigade (New Armies)

Insert under Section No. 27:-

Pistols, signal, Very cartridge, 6*

*Cartridges will not form part of unit equipment, but will be issued overseas as required.

Authority, War Office letter No. 121/Stores/915 (Q.M.G.10), dated 17th February, 1915.

C.R. No. 44616 (O.S.).  Northern Command Order No.273.

T.L.B. SOUTRY, Captain,

Brigade-Major, 123rd (Tyneside Scottish) Brigade.

NOTICE.

            On and after the 27th instant the Headquarters of the 123rd (Tyneside Scottish) Brigade will be –

“ALNBANK”

ALNWICK.