Category Archives: World War I

Ornate Royal Coat of Arms.

BRIGADE ORDERS.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL TREVOR TERNAN, C.M.G., D.S.O.,

COMMANDING 123rd (TYNESIDE SCOTTISH) BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS, NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE,

5th FEBRUARY, 1915.

100. Entrenching Tools–

200 Picks and 200 Shovels per Battalion may now be indented for from the Chief Ordnance Officer, York.  Indents should be forwarded at once.

101. Signalling Equipment–

The following Signalling Equipment, pre Battalion can now be indented for from the Chief Ordnance Officer, York, and should be demanded at once.

Cases, message book                                    5

Flags, signal, army –

Blur, 2 feet square                             48

White, with stripe 2 feet square       58

Poles, 3 feet 6 inches                     158

            Compasses, prismatic                                     5

Cases,             do                                             5

102. Diet Sheets–

Officers Commanding Units will arrange with Contractors for weekly diet sheets to be submitted to them in advance, for approval.  Copies of the sheets will invariably be posted up in prominent positions outside the Billets, one copy to be forwarded to this Office.

103. Medals–

Commanding Officers will cause nominal rolls to be prepared of all ranks in their Units in possession of medals.  A copy of the roll to be sent to this Office.  The roll should show for what campaign the medal was granted.

T.L.B. SOUTRY, Captain,

Brigade-Major, 123rd (Tyneside Scottish) Brigade.

Ornate Royal Coat of Arms.

BRIGADE ORDERS.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL TREVOR TERNAN, C.M.G., D.S.O.,

COMMANDING 123rd (TYNESIDE SCOTTISH) BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS, NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE,

4th February, 1915.

95 – Officiating Clergyman – Appointment of –

            The undermentioned gentleman has been appointed Officiating Clergyman to the Brigade:-

The Rev. H.G. Attwater.

Authority, C.R.N.C. 13/297/100/A., dated 30th January, 1915.

96 – Demands for Stationary.  The attention of Officers Commanding Units is called to War Office letter 26/2720 C.2., circulated herewith.

97 – Men Medically Unfit – Nominal Rolls of all men who have been attested and subsequently rejected as medically unfit, are to be forwarded to this Office with as little delay as possible.  The place and date of attestation and the name of the Doctor who made the initial medical examination, should be stated.

98 – Billets – Care of Bedding, etc. – The following procedure with reference to blankets and palliasses is to be observed:- (1) Blankets are to be taken out daily and well shaken before being folded up.  (2) Palliasses are to be aired in the open several hours at a time during each week as weather permits.  They should be shaken and the straw changed once every month.  The old straw is to be burnt.

99 – Extracts from Northern Command Orders –

“LONDON GAZETTE” –

The following extract from the Second Supplement to the “London Gazette,” dated Tuesday, the 26th January 1915, is published for information:-

The Northumberland Fusiliers –

23rd Battalion (4th Tyneside Scottish), Captain John C. Campbell, 5th Battalion, The Royal Irish Rifles, to command the Battalion and to be temporary Lieutenant-Colonel.  Dated 27th November, 1914.

SOLDIERS COMMITTED TO DETENTION BARRACKS – INCOMPLETE KIT – it has been brought to notice that men who are committed to Detention Barracks arrive there with incomplete kits, and, in a large number of cases, even without a change of washing.

It is essential that men should be in possession of change of clothing, as well as their other kit, and considerable trouble and expense are incurred in writing to units for the deficient article.

Every soldier committed to Detention Barracks should take with him clothing and necessaries, completed to Active Service scale, and articles of equipment as provided in paragraph 646 King’s Regulations, where such latter are in possession of the man.

Authority, War Office letter No. 23/Southern/201 (A.G.3), dated 27th January, 1915.

C.R.N.C. No. 41493/A.  Northern Command Order No. 145.

Extracts from Northern Command Orders- continued –

SURPLUS STORES NOT TO BE RETAINED.

The attention of all Commanding Officers is drawn to the necessity for immediately returning to the Army Ordnance Department all stores not being used.

A large number of issues have also been made of stores probably required for a short time only, and these should not be retained if not in use.  Camp equipment of all sorts is also included in this order.

C.R.N.C. No. 40756/O.S.  Northern Command Order No. 147.

SCHOOL OF INSTRUCTION, CHELSEA – All ball ammunition will be collected from Non-Commissioned Officers before they are sent to join the School of Instruction, Chelsea.

ANTI-TYPHOID INOCULATION

The following Enteric Fever statistics are published for general information.

This order should be re-published in Divisional, Brigade, Garrison and Regimental Orders:-

“Of the first 421 cases of Typhoid Fever in the present campaign amongst British troops, 305 were of men who were not inoculated.  In the 421 cases there have been 35 deaths.  Of these deaths 34 were men who had not been inoculated within two years.  Only one death occurred among patients who were inoculated, and that man had only been inoculated once…”

In view of this unanswerable evidence, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief is confident that no soldier with the welfare of his country at heart will hesitate to be inoculated.

Those who do not accept this simple prevention are furthering the interests of the enemy, as well as becoming a source of danger to their comrades.

C.R. No. 42006 (M)  Northern Command Order No. 149.

CLOTHING AND NECESSARIES –

With reference to Command Order Number 1853, dated the 31st December, 1914, it has been decided that, in the case of units raised by individuals or municipalities all renewals of clothing and necessaries after the initial issue is completed will be obtained from Army stocks.

Commanding Officers will obtain their requirements as directed in Army Order 373 of 1914, and issues to soldiers will be governed by the instructions in the same Army Order.

Repairs to clothing and boots will be carried out as laid down for the Territorial Force in Army Order 335 of 1914.

Authority, 54/General No. /1775 (Q.M.G.7), dated War Office, 27th January, 1915.

C.R.N.C. No. 38987/6/3 (O.S.) Northern Command Order No. 150.

T.L.B. SOUTRY, Captain,

Brigade-Major, 123rd (Tyneside Scottish) Brigade.

Diary of 2/4th Battalion The Border Regiment

1915

5th January 1915.  A draft of 30 men arrived from the Depot at Kendal.

12th January 1915.  The Battalion together with the remainder of the Brigade was inspected by Lieut.-General Sir R. Pole-Carew, K.C.B., Inspector-General of the Territorial Force, and on the 15th a special Brigade Order was published congratulating all units of the Brigade on their satisfactory appearance at the inspection.

22nd January 1915.  A draft of 17 men arrived from the Depot at Kendal.

29th January 1915.  A draft of 53 men arrived from the Depot at Kendal, completing the strength of the Battalion.

            In January the Battalion was asked to supply a draft to the 5th Battalion The Border Regiment proceeding to France, but the request was finally cancelled.

(Translation of a German Document)

VII Corps H.Q., PHALEMPIN, 25-12-14.

THE CAPTURE OF THE ENGLISH POSITION EAST OF FESTUBERT on 20-12-14

The front of attack was about 900 metres wide, situated on a flat ridge which commands the ground east and west of it.  About 50 metres behind the position was a well-built English cover trench.  Between the first line and the cover trench, and parallel to them, runs a natural ditch, which had not been touched.  The position of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 57th Infantry Regiment was about 80 – 150 metres in front of the enemy’s firing line.

Here, as well as in the neighbouring sectors, saps had been dug out from our line to within, in places, 3 metres of the enemy’s position.  The enemy, who were very active in throwing hand grenades, had forced us to cover in our sapheads.  He himself had made no saps in the region of the attack.

From the 10 sapheads in the zone of attack, mines were laid under the enemy’s trenches, each charged with 50 kilograms of explosive.  To ensure the ignition of the mines, the attack was arranged for 9 a.m. so that the leads could be tested by the Company Commander and his second in command and that any improvements which appeared necessary could be made by day-light.  A mine was also laid under a house held by the enemy on the right of the front of attack (Quinque Rue) and was charged with 300 kilograms (660 lb.) of explosive.

All the telephone communications were manned to ensure the neighbouring sectors commencing the attack simultaneously in the event of their being any delay in the explosion.  Actually, the explosion did not take place till 10.25 in the morning owing to special difficulties in connection with one of the leads.  When it was reported to the senior pioneer officer on the front of attack that all the mines were ready, he had three flare signals fired simultaneously.  This signal was only meant for the pioneers who then fired all the mines including the one under the house in the Quinque Rue.  At the same time a number of “Minenwerfer” directed their fire on to the cover trench.

The explosion was the signal for the attack, which was carried out as follows by the 2nd & 3rd Battalions of the 57th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd and 3rd Companies of the 7th Pioneer Regiment (less 2 sections) and the 1st Battalion of the 19th Pioneer Regiment (less 1 company).

A storming party of half a section of infantry with 12 pioneers was in readiness in each of the 10 saps.  They rushed into the enemy’s trench, searched it for mines, and cleared it with hand grenades and incendiary torches (Brandrohren).

A second storming party (in strength, a section of infantry between every 2 saps) rushed simultaneously across the open from their own position on both sides of the saps (sortie steps had been prepared for this) and reached the cover trench behind the enemy’s position.

A third party – a company from each battalion – occupied our own trench in case of counter-attack.

A working party in reserve – the remaining sections of the six attacking companies with pioneer detachments and materials for providing cover (shields, sandbags, etc.) – followed the attacking party into the enemy’s cover trench for the purpose of reconstructing this into a new position facing west.  Every battalion had therefore sent forward three companies in echelon for the attack and retained one in rear for holding our original position against counter-attacks.

Up to the moment of the explosion, the allotment of targets and the task of the artillery remained the same as they had been on the previous days, so as not to excite the attention of the enemy.

Not until the mines were fired were the neighbouring sectors to engage the enemy by increased fire action.  Use was to be made of any advantages which appeared obtainable.  The medium “minenwerfer” were to attack the enemy’s machine guns, which were dug in and arranged for flanking fire into the neighbouring sector to the left.  The field artillery was to shell the enemy’s approaches.  The 21 cm mortar battery was to subdue the enemy’s artillery and machine guns, which were intended to afford flanking fire from positions known to us in the village of GIVENCHY; 3 batteries of heavy field howitzers were held in readiness to return the fire of any new hostile batteries which might come into action.

The whole operations was carried out according to plan.  The 10 mines exploded simultaneously.  With the help of the over-powering effect produced by them, our attacking parties, who had immediately rushed forward, succeeded in getting into the enemy’s cover trench with few losses, and took up a position there.  The enemy, English and Indians, who fled from the position suffered heavy losses.

The forces in both neighbouring sectors joined in the attack, for the most part by means of a charge across the open, which led to the capture of so-called “Heckenhaus” in the Rue de Caillaux and of the English position east of GIVENCHY.  On the previous day the “Heckenhaus” had been destroyed by a heavy “Minenwerfer”; on the day of the attack gaps were made in the wire entanglement round it by means of two mines, each with 50 kilogram (110 lb) charge, and its garrison was rendered “ripe for attacking” (sturmreif) by two rounds from the “Minenwerfer” being directed on to the ruins of the “Heckenhaus”.

 The effect of the attacks on the enemy were such that he immediately brought up the 9th Indian Cavalry Brigade which was in reserve near BETHUNE and part of the 142nd French Territorial Regiment and “alarmed” the 1st Infantry Division (English) which belonged to his Army reserve and was in the vicinity of HAZEBROUCK.  This division was brought up by rail and motor to BETHUNE and used for heavy counter-attacks on the 20th, 21st and 22nd, all of which were repulsed with heavy losses.

Six machine guns and eleven small trench mortars were captured and 1* officers and 815 men taken prisoner.  According to a reliable estimate, over 3,000 of the enemy lay dead upon the battlefield.

In the dug-outs of the trench which was destroyed by the mines, a large number of Indian corpses was found still sitting: they had apparently been suffocated.  In view of the success we obtained, our own losses in the actual assault (10 officers and 452 men wounded, now in the hospitals of the Army Corps, 459 slightly wounded, and about 250 killed) were not great and in the attack itself they were inappreciable.  Apart from the bravery of the troops, success was due to the minute and detailed tactical preparation by both the infantry and the pioneers and to the accurately timed co-ordination of the mines, “Minenwerfer”, infantry assault and artillery fire.

A plan was for a moment considered for drawing the enemy into his front trenches by increasing our fire before exploding the mines, and thus attracting larger bodies of the enemy over the mines.  This, however, was discarded because it was feared that we should, in consequence, meet with so much opposition to our attack against the front trenches as would delay us from penetrating into the cover trench, which was our objective.  Also, we wished to avoid attracting the enemy’s attention prematurely.

(Signed) v. CLAER,

General Officer Commanding.

Letter from Mildred Aldrich.

La Creste, Huiry

Couilly (S. et M.)

Esbly.

Dec 9 1914.

Commander

Bedfordshire L.I.

British Expeditionary Force

Sir.

From around September 3 to sunrise September 4, on the eve of the Battle on the Marne I had a picket guard from your regiment (Capt Edwards’ Company) in the road about my house, and although I did not know one of the men by name, I feel a personal interest in them and feel like trying to send a greeting to the brave boys so far away from home at Christmas time.  I am sending a package of cigarettes, some chocolate and playing cards which I ask you to add to your Christmas ** in memory of the days when they came here and of the trying days that followed, where from my garden I watched the battle between Panchard and Barry on the opposite bank of the Marne.  You will know how to distribute my humble little offering and pardon me sir, I am sorry for troubling you.  I wish I could sent a personal greeting to every one of the boys who lives to remember his visit back here, after the retreat, – & for that matter to every man in the field.

            Sincerely yours

                        Mildred Aldrich.

ORDERLY ROOM

B/5583

2nd Bn. THE BORDER REGT.

SOME NOTES ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL 7TH DIVISION.

Nov. 1st.         On November 1st, the enemy again renewed his attacks and by mid-

day the whole of the line was heavily engaged, some ground had to be given but the front remained intact on the general line VELDOEK Cross roads – Farm 1 mile East of KLEIN ZILLEBEKE.

“  2nd.  An intercepted wireless massage this day announced the arrival of the Kaiser

on this front and as was expected, at about noon on November 2nd another desperate effort to break through was made by the enemy from the direction of GHELUVELT against the 1st Division and against the right of the 20th Infantry Brigade.

The attack succeeded in driving back the 1st Division and all its available reserves were used up without result.  The last reserves of the 7th Division were then sent forward to try and preserve the flank of the 20th Infantry Brigade.  The fighting this day was particularly fierce – the finest troops of the German Army, under the eyes of the Kaiser, hurled themselves in vain against the battered line of the 7th Division.

This was really the last big attack the enemy made – for although he continued to bombard and attack our line, it was only in a half-hearted manner.

Some idea of the severity of the fighting the Division had taken part in may be formed by examining the fighting strength of Brigades at this time.  The 20th Infantry Brigade was reduced to 18 Officers 900 other ranks; the 21st Infantry Brigade 13 Officers 910 other ranks; the 22nd Infantry Brigade 13 Officers 586 other ranks.

“ 5th.    On November 5th, the Division was relieved with the exception of the 22nd

Infantry Brigade which remained as a reserve for the

“ 6th.    1st Corps, and on November 6th this Brigade made a very successful counter-

attack at a critical period.  This Brigade was now so reduced in strength that one Battalion was formed out of the remnants of the Brigade, the 4 Battalions of the Brigade becoming Companies and the whole Battalion being known as No. 1 Battalion, 22nd Infantry Brigade.

“ 8th.    On November 8th the 22nd Infantry Brigade was finally relieved.

What the outside world thought of the doings of the 7th Division at this period

can be gathered from the following extract taken from one of the British papers at the time:- “There is no finer passage in the annals of the British Army that the world has known, than that which has been written concerning the deeds of the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division in Flanders.

30,000 strong, these two Divisions undertook the defence of YPRES, the key to CALAIS, until reinforcements should arrive.  Against them was arrayed the flower of the German Army, in the proportion of 8 to 1, and day after day this overwhelming force was hurled against our gallant band in vain.

When relief at last came, and the shattered remnants of the two Divisions were enabled to withdraw, there remained of 400 Officers of the 7th Division but 44, and of the 12,000 men but 2,336.  Those figures are more eloquent of the splendid courage of our men than any words.  Reduced to less than one fifth of their original numbers they still held out, YPRES remained, and still remains, uncaptured, and the losses of the enemy were vastly greater than our own.

Perhaps the most remarkable testimony to the vigour and accuracy of the British fire is conveyed in the words of a German Officer who tells us that the enemy believed that 4 British Army Corps were holding the positions actually maintained by less than one”.  

17A

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

TO Royal Flying Corps       Indian Corps

Senders Number                  Day of Month                                    In reply to Number

G.Q./21/1                                           21

Please carry out following reconnaissance on AVRO LILLE SECLIN DOUAI LENS AAA

Send report to R.F.C. H.Q. AAA  Cancel Capt Jackson’s message concerning Capt Cholomondeley.

From:

Place: Commanding No. 3. Squadron.

Time:  

(Sd) W. Salmond, Major. G.S.

Signature of Addressee

===========================

18A

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

TO G.H.Q.

Senders Number                  Day of Month                                    In reply to Number

G.194.                                                21

Enemy biplane containing two German officers landed at Le Touret this afternoon owing to engine trouble and were captured AAA All quiet on front of Indian Corps.

Org C.G.S.

Copy I.

R.F.C

From: Indian Corps

Place:

Time:  5.4 0p.m.

18B

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

TO Indian Corps

Senders Number                  Day of Month                                    In reply to Number

G.Q.21/11                                          21

Please preserve German aeroplane intact AAA  Expert will inspect machine tomorrow AAA

From: R.F.C., H.Q.

Place:

Time:  7.45 p.m.

(Sd) W. Salmond. Maj. G.S.

Signature of Addressee

32A

H.Q. R.F.C.

G/112/40.

INFORMATION

==========

2nd Corps.

            The following notes on defensive measures taken during the recent fighting in front of YPRES may be of assistance to other troops.

The section of defence held by the Division was in wooded country.  The tracks through the woods became almost impassable owing to mud, the whole area was under constant shell fire and wires were constantly cut.  Communication was therefore slow and difficult.  It was found that when the enemy made a breach in the line it was a slow and costly business to turn him out, if he was given time to establish himself.  On the other hand, immediate counter attack was almost always successful.

Local reserves were therefore placed close up with orders to counter attack with the bayonet whenever the enemy penetrated the line.  Small supporting points were established close behind the line, prepared for all round defence, wired in all round, and, as far as possible, concealed from observation.  These posts had garrisons of from 20 to 40 men.  They should be under an officer or selected N.C.O.  It was found that they broke up the attack and checked it sufficiently to enable a successful counter attack to be organized.

The general experience of the fighting was that a field of fire was of far less importance to infantry than freedom from exposure to artillery fire.  The portion of the line held by the West Kents and K.O.S. Borderers had a field of fire of from 30 to 40 yards.  It was well wired in and never seriously troubled because the enemy could not bring his guns to bear on it.  All the enemy’s attempts to attack were repulsed with heavy loss.

It was found in places where the line was exposed to artillery fire that the two lines of trenches, connected by zig-zag communications were of value.  On several occasions our men were shelled out of one line but by moving back to the other avoided loss and were able to prevent the enemy’s infantry from occupying the abandoned trenches.  The forward line was usually re-occupied without difficulty when the shelling ceased and was invariably occupied at night.

Loopholed iron plates were found very useful for snipers when the enemy had established himself close to our line.

With reference to G.H.Q. No. O.A.401 some rabbit netting was put up over the trenches round YPRES but when our left had not undergone an actual test by “Minenwerfere”.  Both the infantry and cavalry in the trenches objected to it on the ground that it prevented them using their bayonets, in which objection I entirely concur, and consider it an inseparable one.  I think it should not be used either in fire or support trenches, except over machine gun emplacements and with outposts where it might be useful.  It might also be used over reserve trenches and would there also form a good support for some form of protection against the weather.

I do not think any form of protection against “Minenwerfere” can be designed for the fire trenches which will not have the same objection to its use.  As it appears almost impossible to spot them so that they can be dealt with by artillery, the only method of dealing with them would seem to be to make a sortie in the neighbourhood they are supposed to be in.

(Sd) W. Salmond

Major, G.S.

H.Q. R.F.C.

1-30 p.m.

            29/11/14.

34A

            Programme of Work done by No. 6 Squadron with 11nd Corps.

———————————————–

19-11-14:       No work possible owing to severe snowstorm.

20-11-14:       B.E. 493 – Artillery observation with Vth Division.

                        Other machine started, but forced to return owing to carburettor

                        trouble.

21-11-14:       B.E. 493 – Artillery observation with Vth Division.

                        Other machines started for Artillery observation and tactical

                        reconnaissance, but returned owing to carburettor trouble

Wireless Flight arrived.

22-11-14:       B.E. 241 & B.E. 468 – Artillery observation with Vth Division.

                        B.E. 493 & B.E. 646 – Artillery observation with 3rd Division.

                        B.E. 636 – Tactical Reconnaissance

                                                            (Report attached).

23-11-14                                                                                (Sd): J.H.W. Becke, Maj.

Cdg. NO. 6 Sqdn. R.F.C.

——————————————-

35A

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE ENEMY 23/11/14.

————————————-

(Enclosed with original).

G.H.Q. 1.,                                                                                      (Sd) G.M.W. Macdonogh,

23/11/14                                                                                            Brigadier General,

General staff.

WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Hour,DatePlaceSummary of Events and InformationRemarks and references to Appendices
27. 28. 29.   30. 31. 32.     33. 34. 35. 36. 37.   38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50 51. 52. 53. 54.22/11 “ “
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23/11
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“ 24/11
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“ 25/11
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“ 26/11“
“ “ “		ST. OMER -Do- -Do-   -Do- -Do- -Do-     -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do-   -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do- -Do-Orders to No. 6 Squadron, 2 Corps. Telegram to Second Corps re guns located – their reply & action. Work done by No. 5 Squadron and reasons for failing of Artillery Observation.  Map of Gun position. Information about Enemy. Orders for Reconnaissance. Memorandum by G.O.C. 3rd Div., on Defensive measures at YPRES.  (Note: General Henderson left on Appointment to command 1st Div.  Col. Sykes took command). Report of failure of Strategical Reconnaissance. Report on Work done by No. 6 Squadron. Information re the enemy. Orders for Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance Reports received & communicated to G.H.Q.   Map Tracing from No. 5 Squadron. Report of failure of Strategical Reconnaissance. Message from IVth Corps re Wireless machine – & action. Report on Day’s Work from No. 5 Squadron. Report on Day’s Work from No. 6 Squadron. Information re enemy. Orders for Reconnaissance. Reports received & communicated to G.H.Q. Report on Work done by No. 6 Squadron, with IInd Corps. Report from O.C. No. 3 Squadron, with Indian Corps. Report from O.C. No. 5 Squadron, with III Corps. Summary of information re enemy. Orders for Reconnaissance. Message to R.F.C. with II, III, IV and Indian Corps. Information re Russian Operations. Work done by No. 6 Squadron Report. Work done by No. 5 Squadron Report.27A. 28A., 28B., 28C. 29A., 29B., 29C., 29D.   30A. 31A. 32A.     33A. 34A. 35A. 36.A. 37A. C(Reconn. 781,781A, &B.) 38A. 39A. 40A. 41A. 42A. 43A. 44A. 45A. – C. (Reconn 782-784) 46A. 47A. 48A. 49A. 50A. 51A. 52A. 53A. 54A.