B.E.F.

28-5-18

Dear Madam,

I am in receipt of your letter dated 17^th inst. but regret to say that I am unable to give you any further information regarding Pte A.A. Smith.

The only information I have is that he went into action on 21^st March last & was afterwards reported as missing.  I am sorry to say nothing more of him has been heard but it is quite possible that he was taken prisoner of war.

Trusting this will relieve your anxious time.

I remain

Yours sincerely

M Wood Capt

                                    o/c A Coy

K.J. Bunting Capt.
Issued down to Divisions
(for distribution down to Battalions)
T/9
NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 12
(Issued by the General Staff)
The following points were brought out during the recent operations on the front of a Corps in the First Army:-
1. Rapid rifle fire was the decisive factor in these operations. The men had confidence in their rifles and knew how to use them. The personnel of Trench Mortar and Field Batteries used their rifles freely. One Field Battery when the enemy had got round its flank, beat off the attack at a range of under 200 yards, and a forward section of artillery successfully engaged the enemy with rifle fire at short range while he was working round the rear of our infantry.
2. Concreted elephant shelters, although subjected to a very heavy bombardment proved invaluable as battalion H.Q. and as shelters for assembling troops. They were placed inside ruined houses and were protected by 3 ft of reinforced concrete. In making these shelters, care should be taken that the elephant shelter actually rests on a bed of concrete. The walls, roof and floor should form a box of concrete round the steel of the elephant shelter.
3. The main principle to be remembered in any system of wiring is to organize the defended area into a series of compartments in order to hold up the enemy if he succeeds in penetrating the line and prevent him from obtaining anything but a local and limited success.
4. It is most important that the exits from tunnels should be within works arranged for all-round defence. This enables the garrison to deal quickly and effectively with parties of the enemy working round their flanks or rear.
5. The value of trench mortars during a hostile attack was amply proved. If they are distributed so as to cover communication trenches leading from the front, the enemy, if he succeeds in penetrating our lines, will be obliged to advance over the open and will be exposed to our rifle fire.
Trench mortars also proved useful in support of immediate counter-attack. If a close liaison is maintained between the infantry and the Trench Mortar Batteries, it should generally be possible to arrange fore the co-operation of the Stokes and 6” Trench Mortars in this form of counter-attack.

23rd of May, 1918.

Printed in France by Army Printing and Stationary Services. PRESS A-5/18.

K.J. Bunting Capt.

Issued down to Divisions

(for distribution down to Battalions)

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 11.

(Issued by the General Staff)

Attention is called to the following points with regard to the employment of mounted troops :-

1. Whether in attack or defence cavalry and cyclists, if they are to be used to the best advantage, must work in the closest co-operation with the other arms and the fullest use must be made of their mobility.
2. In mobile warfare one mounted man who knows how to use his rifle is, owing to his mobility, of more than three equally well trained men on foot. One bullet from the flank has more effect than three bullets from the front. Recent operations have emphasised the fact that a sudden burst of fire from a comparatively few rifles coming from a flank can disorganize a hostile attack far more effectually than a much larger body of fire coming from the front. Cavalry, owing to its power of combining fire action with mobility, can, if properly used, always delay the advance of the enemy’s infantry. Cavalry, therefore, even when employed as infantry in the line, should never be far from its horses.
3. Dismounted cavalry cannot be used to the best advantage if brigades and regiments are broken up and sent in small detachments to reinforce infantry units. Every effort, therefore, should be made when cavalry is put into the line to keep brigades and divisions intact with their machine guns, R.H.A. and R.E. It will then be possible for the cavalry commander to maintain a mobile reserve to be employed wherever the tactical situation may require. The value of such a reserve was brought out on several occasions during the recent operations. In the fighting between the Somme and Marcelcave from the 27^th of March to the 3^rd of April, a mounted force varying from one regiment to one brigade was retained as a mobile reserve by the cavalry divisional commander. The situation on our right was always uncertain and sometimes critical. This mounted force supported the infantry as far south as Aubercourt and Hangard and the reconnoitring detachments which it provided did valuable work south and south-east of Villers-Bretonneux.
4. The cavalry, R.H.A. batteries and M.G. squadrons found it surprisingly easy to break off an engagement. This was largely due to the maintenance of the mobility of these units and to the training in open warfare which they had received. A cavalry division was holding the line north of the Somme from Sailly Laurette to the west of Morlancourt on the 26^th and 27^th of March. Although hotly engaged with the enemy in front of Sailly Laurette on the evening of the 27^th the division was able, upon receiving orders to do so, to break off the engagement at 4.35 p.m., and at 10.30 p.m. was assisting in the defence of the line from Warfusee Abancourt to the Somme at Bouzencourt.
5. Throughout the recent operations invaluable work was done by small officers’ patrols. Experience has proved that reconnaissance by mounted patrols is probably the best means of obtaining the necessary information with regard to the enemy’s movements and the position of our own troops. It is impossible to attach too much importance to the training of officers and men in this work.
6. The following points with regard to the work of mounted troops in action were noticed during the recent operations:-

1. There was a tendency when coming into action to dismount too soon. When galloping up to a position units should remain mounted up to the last possible moment.
2. A senior officer should always be left in charge of the led horses, and he should have a few spare mounted men to act as messengers. The position of the led horses has frequently to be changed owing to shell fire, and, unless the closest liaison is maintained with the fighting troops, there is a danger of losing touch.
3. The Hotchkiss gun proved a most useful weapon. Its fire was invaluable in covering the withdrawal in rearguard actions. All reports shew that pack horses must always accompany troops when dismounted. The Hotchkiss gun and ammunition must be brought up on pack as near to the firing line as possible. Casualties among the Hotchkiss gunners were heavy. It is necessary, therefore, that a large reserve of these gunners should be trained.   Printed in France by Army Printing and Stationary Services.                                                                                          PRESS A-5/18.
6. 21^st of May, 1918.

‘Manorfield’

100 Arcadian Gardens

Bowes Park

N 22

17^th May

The Commanding Officer

Sir,

I venture to ask if you can possibly give us any further information regarding Pte A.A. Smith No 142687 of the M.G.C. formerly 53^rd Coy 18^th Batt.  He was posted as “missing” as from March 21^st & we have heard nothing more.

Should you know anything beyond this we should feel so thankful if you will acquaint us.

His father is so very anxious about him.

Yours respectfully

(Mrs) J Smith

On Active Service

WITH THE BRITISH

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

YMCA Headed notepaper

15.5.18

BEF

Dear F&M

                        Just a line or two to let you know I am still gogging along A1 at present.  The weather is really great and the countryside is at its best.  Some of the boys have commenced swimming but the water is a bit too deep for your humble.  There is very little to report beyond that I am having plenty of diversion and could do with a couple of pounds as my expenses have been rather heavy just lately and I had the good fortune to get a pass for the day and do a little shopping in a decent sized place.  Had a letter from Will the other day see he’s seen another pal off to his matrimonial bliss.  How is the allotment going on suppose some of the vegetation is already showing signs of life.  The gardens and fields round here are very well advanced.  Does Par managed to take a rest in the Tool House occasionally I wouldn’t mind looking after the tools but I am afraid I should wander on the Bowling Green behind.  Suppose a few of the old sports are still as enthusiastic as ever.  How is Gladys getting along with her studies hope she finds time for a little recreation it’s simply ideal weather for tennis and sport generally.  We even boast a cricket team & have a decent team but we don’t get the same chance to practice as some less mobile units do.  Still we get the sport out of the game and that’s the main thing.  Well I think I’ve said all this journey.  Hoping you are all well.  Have you heard from Jack lately it’s some time since I got a word from him.

Cheerho

Fred

Spr F Hammond

RE 62210   

Signals document W.C. Green 13 May 1918.

SECRET

B.M. 374

1^st E. YORK. R. – 5 Copies

9^th K.O.Y.L.I –       5      “

15^th Durh L.I. –      5      “

64^TH T.M. Bty –     2     “

The following light signals between Infantry & Artillery will be taken into use at 12 noon on 16^th May, by Division on left all troops in this Corps:-

(a) S.O.S.                    Rocket, or light, bursting into three white stars.

(b) Gas Attack                        Bouquet of white, green, and red lights.

(c) “We wish to           1 red light.

advance, lengthen range.”

(d) “We are here”        1 white light.

(indicating position of infantry.)

(e) “Our Field Artillery           Worm light.

is firing on us.”

(f) “Our Heavy Artillery         1 coloured light followed by a Worm light.

is firing on us.”

(Sgd) E.D. AIGER

Captain

Brigade Major 64^th Infantry Brigade

13,5,18

13/5/18

My dear dad,

What do you think of my writing! Bit better than my usual scrawl isn’t it?  I am writing with my latest toy – a topping Waterman Edie sent me.  She also sent me a pair of socks & a pipe, so I am well off.  The pipe is the nicest bit of wood I have seen for a long time.  I am going to get her to buy all my pipes in future.

Well how goes it dad. My latest information is that you were a bit better on the 10^th.  I hope to have a line from Win tomorrow.

I think I told you last night that I was applying to return. Curiously enough G.H.Q. rang up last night & said my own people were applying for me & they were sending an order along for me to go back.  So that makes assurance doubly sure.

It is a dirty miserable wet day here. I should like an armchair, a good fire & a clack with you.

I have no news dad. This is only just to pass the time of day with you.

With very best love

Your loving son

Geoff.

M.G.C.

91 York Street,

Westminster

S.W. 1

R/64/ 36484

8/5/18

Madame,

I beg to acknowledge your communication dated 1.5.18 regarding No 142687 Pte A.A. Smith.

The number 27521 was his old regimental number the No 142687 was given to him on being transferred to the M.G.C. 53^rd Coy now 18^th Batt.  I note the change of address & will have the alteration made in the records.

1. Carfon

Lieut

For Lt. Colonel

i/c Machine Gun Records

Mrs. J. Smith,

Manorfield,

100 Arcadian Gdns,

Bowes Park.

N 22

K.J. Bunting Capt.

Issued to Corps

(for distribution down to Divisions and Batteries R.A.)

T/9

NOTES ON RECENT FIGHTING – No. 10.

The Creeping Barrage.

(Issued by the General Staff)

1. The principles laid down by the enemy approximate to our own, but there is less insistence upon making the barrage as deep as possible in order to deal with defence in depth.
3. The enemy’s plan of calling the beginning of the preliminary bombardment zero hour makes it necessary for his infantry to start by the watch instead of making the assault simultaneous with the opening of the barrage. The latter, which is the practice employed by us, is the simpler system, and, therefore, has much to recommend it. On the other hand, recent operations show that the enemy usually attacks in artillery formation, taking tactical advantage of the ground, rather than in extended lines, so that possibly an exact synchronization between the infantry attack and the beginning of the barrage is less essential.
5. With regard to paragraph 4, the barrage described is not a true creeping barrage, the smallest “lift” being 200 yards. It is obvious, therefore, despite the remarks in paragraphs 1 and 6, that the enemy attaches less importance than ourselves to the close following of the barrage by the attacking infantry. It is pointed out, however, that as the arrangement of a barrage must be dependent on the number of guns available and the nature of the country, the enemy’s tendency to close up his creeping barrage and to employ in it every type of weapon, including the 15 cm. how., is probably dictated by the fact that he has not so many guns with which to support the infantry as we usually have. In some of our operations last year Corps had a gun (all types included) to every five or six yards of frontage. In an attack on a 50 miles’ front, such as that of the 21^st of March, if artillery were provided on this scale it would necessitate the concentration of some 15,000 guns, which is out of the question.
7. It would appear from the German “Notes” that the whole of the enemy’s so called “creeping barrage” is concentrated as close in front of the attacking infantry as the safety limits of the different shells permit. With us, on the other hand, the various guns and howitzers usually fire in separate barrages (all creeping), although the fire of 18-pdr and 4.5-inch howitzer is occasionally mixed, and the zone of the barrage extends to a depth of 1,000 yards or more. Our system, therefore, undoubtedly gives more protection against distant machine guns.
8. The timing of the bounds, to which allusion is made in paragraph 5, has no reference, apparently, to the estimated rate of the infantry advance.
10. The order as to quickening the barrage by means of signals (paragraph 9) is vague. The definition of a “considerable distance” is left to the battalion commander. The “echeloning” of a barrage is decidedly dangerous, especially if the covering guns are firing obliquely, or if hostile machine guns are sited for enfilade fire, as would often be the case. It is not altogether clear under what circumstances a battalion commander would be able to decide whether it was of any advantage to hurry on. In the general obscurity caused by smoke and dust, it must be very hard to know what is going on either in front or to the flanks.
11. There is a widespread notion that the Germans are able to control their artillery by means of light signals, and doubtless they attempt to do so. It is pointed out, however, that the occasions when this method of communication with the artillery can be carried out successfully must be rare, particularly if the fire of the attacking batteries is heavy. In practice, it must be extremely difficult to ensure that the battery or batteries which are really concerned see and respond to the signal, and that other batteries which are firing ignore it.
12. The other methods of regulating the creeping barrage (paragraph 10) are excellent in theory. The difficulty in practice is to ensure any communication at all between liaison officers and artillery commanders behind.
13. The instructions contained in the same paragraph that any portion of the creeping barrage which has to be brought back is afterwards to catch up the remainder of the barrage can only be carried out if the remainder halts sufficiently long to enable that part of the attacking infantry which has been held up to regain its place in the line at the normal rate of progress.
14. Attention is drawn to the last sentence of paragraph 11. The moral is that artillery officers should go forward, not as liaison officers with battalion commanders, but with the object of establishing communication between themselves and their batteries, in order to assist the infantry with observed fire, the value of which is incalculably greater than that of any mechanical barrage. (See Artillery Notes No. 4, Section VI., para. 10 (iii).)   Ia/47795 Iam/Art. Nr. 237                                                                                             8/3/18Printed under the                                                                 Recipient is personally officer.                                                                                           custody.
16. supervision of an                                                                 responsible for its safe
17. Very secret mob.                                                                                 Copy Nr. 1061
18. Headquarters 18^th Army                                                                         ARMY H.Q.
19. NOTES ON THE CREEPING BARRAGE.
20. TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT.
21. Printed in France by Army Printing and Stationary Services.
22. 6^th of May 1918.
23. When an attack has progressed to a considerable depth it may be expected that most of the enemy’s original gun positions will have been over-run and his fire considerably reduced. Consequently, communication will be more easily maintained. Conditions approximating to those of open warfare will exist, and the duty of the artillery is then to apply observed fire to known centres of resistance and to preserve the closest touch with the attacking units of infantry. The onus of keeping touch must, however, be shared by the latter. (F.A.T., Sections 147 (3), 153 (5), and 156 (1), (2), (5).)

• Tasks for the creeping barrage – The object of the creeping barrage is to force the enemy to keep under cover during the assault, and to give our own infantry the opportunity of surprising him in this state. It should thus paralyze the enemy, but cannot destroy him. Its effect will only be fully utilised if the infantry fully exploits the enemy’s temporary inaction by following close up under the barrage, without fear of a few splinters.  

1. 1. A single hostile machine gun which becomes active again does much more damage than a large number of our own splinters.

• Batteries taking part in the barrage. – All batteries which are not engaged on special tasks during the infantry attack, such as counter-battery work, neutralization of strong points and rear lines, fire on back areas, batteries in readiness to engage fleeting targets and batteries accompanying the infantry.The actual creeping barrage will only be put down by field guns, 10.5 cm. and 15 cm. howitzers and light Minenwerfer. 

1. 1. Owing to their considerable backward splinter-effect, 21 cm. howitzers and super-heavy flat trajectory batteries should, in principle, be put on to targets which are ahead of the creeping barrage; their fire lifts in bounds from line to line (strong point to strong point) in front of the creeping barrage. Medium and heavy Minenwerfer remain silent.
   2. When special tasks are being allotted, it must always be remembered that the creeping barrage must be kept as dense as possible.

• Start of the creeping barrage at the points of concentration.(Times of flight to be taken into account! Watches must be synchronized!)

1. 2. At zero hour (*) + 300 minutes. The creeping barrage starts exactly at the right second.

• Advance of the creeping barrage. – The barrage lifts by bounds.The further bounds of the light artillery…………………..200 metres.(taking their lower rate of fire into consideration)….…..400 metres.

1. 2. Of the heavy artillery
   3. First bound of the light batteries (field guns and 10.5 cm. howitzers) and heavy batteries (15 cm. howitzers)………………………300 metres.

• Timing of the bounds. – After the first bound, the light artillery remains stationary for 3 minutes, the heavy artillery only for 2 minutes. After the subsequent bounds, the light artillery remains stationary for 4 minutes on each occasion, and the heavy artillery for 8 minutes on each occasion. 

1. 1. Thus the heavy batteries will always lift off the mutual stopping places 1 minute earlier than the light artillery, so that the advancing infantry will not be endangered by splinters flying backwards.

• Halts of the creeping barrage. – Fire must remain longer on certain definite lines, and in some circumstances also on places in the intermediate area (for example. On the rear trench of the first line, on the intermediate line, on the edges of villages and ridges between the intermediate and the second line, etc.). The object of this is partly to force the garrison to keep sufficiently under cover before our infantry penetrates the line and partly to give our infantry enough time to close up right under the barrage, and to give it time to breathe.

• Situation and duration of the various halts. – These will be determined by the various Corps, and will be issued by them on tracings.! (Tracing No. 5 issued by the Army will only be sent to the Corps as a general guide.) The Corps will make mutual arrangements for a uniform movement of the creeping barrage at Corps boundaries, so that the infantry may not run into hostile enfilade fire.

• Advance of the creeping barrage after each halt. – By the clock: Heavy batteries will lift 1 minute before the light batteries. 

1. 1. Not the duration of the halt, but the time of moving forward is to be laid down.

• Quickening the barrage by means of signals. – A light signal (“Lift”) will be laid down in case it is necessary for the creeping barrage to move more quickly. This signal will only be given on the order of a battalion commander, and only after going a considerable distance. It is only intended to enable a temporary and local quickening of the advance to be made. Subsequently the creeping barrage will conform again to the times and distances laid down, unless the “Lift” signal is given continually.

1. The following will be the signal for “Lift” on the day of attack:-

1. Green light signals (with or without clusters)
2. Vertical puffs sent up from small “Flammenwerfer.”Before sending up this signal, it must always be considered that by such action the uniform advance of the creeping barrage is interrupted, and the fire becomes echeloned; this endangers the flanks of any infantry which are advancing more rapidly. (flanking machine gun fire).
4. On receiving these signals, light and heavy batteries lift once for 200 metres.

• Other methods of regulating the creeping barrage. – Apart from regulation by time and signals, artillery commanders, and the auxiliary observers advancing with the infantry, are justified in regulating the fire of their own batteries on their own responsibility, in accordance with the situation, if they recognise the necessity for such action by reason of their own observations or of observations made by auxiliary methods (aeroplanes, balloons, etc.)Example:- If the creeping barrage has passed over single strong points, nests of machine guns, etc., while the infantry has not been able to follow the creeping barrage owing to the opposition from such points, then the auxiliary observers or artillery liaison officers can, by informing the artillery commanders, direct the fire of certain batteries or groups of batteries on to these targets, thus bringing their fire back from the barrage. This will only be necessary if the batteries accompanying the infantry and the minenwerfer are not equal to the task. If no special period of time is given for such fire, then the batteries in question will keep on these targets until the signal “Lift” is given, or until they receive information by telephone or lamp signal. They then catch up the creeping barrage. 

1. 1. If, however, targets begin or continue to offer resistance after our infantry has passed over them, then their engagement becomes entirely a question for the accompanying batteries and the Minenwerfer. It is not permissible to fetch back fire from the barrage over our own infantry.
   2. Continual watching of the creeping barrage by ground and aerial observation is of the greatest importance.

• Duration of the creeping barrage. – The duration of the creeping barrage is dependent on the ranges of the batteries taking part in it. Our battery positions have been pushed far enough forward for the creeping barrage to cross the 2^nd line everywhere. When crossing the enemy’s battery positions, the creeping barrage is made denser by the insertion of the batteries which have up to then been engaging the enemy’s artillery. Similarly, when crossing the 2^nd line, the barrage is made denser by the batteries which have been engaging this line since the moment of assault. 

1. 1. On the other hand, more and more batteries fall out towards the end, as every battery becomes silent as soon as, in lifting, it reaches its maximum range; thus, finally, the observed fire of a single batteries takes the place of the creeping barrage.

• Further artillery support. – Apart from the fire of heavy and super-heavy flat-trajectory batteries, which can fire for a longer period from their old positions, fire preparation and fire protection will be controlled by visual observation and by special orders, issued by the higher command to the artillery which has been moved forward, as soon as the limit of the creeping barrage has been reached. Such artillery must at all costs be at the right place in time; its communication with the attacking infantry cannot be too close.(Sd) v. SAUBERZWEIG.Issued down to Batteries and Companies.General Headquarters, 

1. 29^th March, 1918.
2. General Staff (Intelligence)
3. Chief of the General Staff of the Army
4.  

* Beginning of the general bombardment. Zero hour will be notified later.

! These tracings must be given the number 5, as this number is quoted in orders and lists of targets.

Printed in France by Army Printing and Stationary Services.                                                                     PRESS A-5/18-6277S-4,000

War Office letter to Mrs Dick-Conyngham dated 5 May 1918

WAR OFFICE

LONDON S.W. 1

M.S.3.Cas/518. A.                                                                              5^th May 1918

The Military Secretary presents his compliments to Mrs Dick-Conyngham, and begs to inform her that, from information contained in a telegram sent to the Central Prisoners of War Committee, London, by the British Red Cross Society, Copenhagen, and submitted to the War Office for consideration, it appears that Brigadier-General J.K. Dick-Conyngham, C.M.G., D.S.O., (previously reported missing on the 12^th April, 1918), is a prisoner of war in good health in German hands.

The camp in which he is interned is not yet known, but as soon as this information reached the War Office, Mrs. Dick-Conyngham will at once be informed.

It has been accepted for official purposes that Brigadier-General Dick-Conyngham is a prisoner of war, and a notification to this effect will appear in the casualty lists in due course.

The Military Secretary is desired by the Secretary of State for War to congratulate Mrs. Dick-Conyngham on the safety of her husband.

Mrs Dick-Conyngham,

28, Coleherne Court,

S.W. 5.