64th H.D. No. 109 (G).

COPY.

NOTES ON THE LOCALIZATION OF HOSTILE BATTERIES.

It having been decided that the Survey Department of each Army is to have an Artillery Observation Section, the following notes are written with a view to suggesting how information obtained by this Section can be rapidly utilised, in conjunction with information from other sources, so as to enable G.O.C. R.A. Division or Heavy Artillery Group to engage hostile batteries without delay.

It is assumed that there will be a sub-section of the observation Section, under an officer, for each frontage of approximately two Army Corps with from 4 to 8 outlook posts.

The accompanying diagram represents two Corps, each with two Divisions in the front line and the position of the sub-section officer and 6 look our posts.

Owing to many reasons the proportion of bearings from outlook stations that produce intersections are very small compared to those that are indeterminable in themselves, and yet these latter in many cases would intersect with flash bearings taken from battery O.P.s.

It would be impossible for the officer in charge of a sub-section of the Observation Section to deal with Hostile Artillery reports of two Corps, but as these reports are compiled in Divisions, information obtained by outlook posts should also be communicated to Divisions.

Referring to attached diagram, the subaltern officer cannot communicate each flash from station A to F to the R.A. of each Division even supposing he had direct lines to them, but in most if not every case, there is a Battery O.P. or a battery in action fairly close to each of these stations to which they should be linked up by telephone and by this method information could be passed on to the Divisional R.A. in the shortest space of time.

Information for the Heavy Artillery Groups would be communicated by the sub-section officer either direct or through the Corps.

2. COMPILATION OF REPORTS ON HOSTILE ARTILLERY FIRE.

Hitherto this has been undertaken by Brigade Majors, R.A. but the writer after 3 months experience is of opinion that the other duties of Brigade Majors are so important and arduous that he has not the necessary time to thoroughly work out and dovetail together the various reports collected from many sources.

For this work the Staff of an R.A. Division should have an Intelligence Officer selected from one of the Batteries of the Division.

The sources of information at his disposal would be as follows:-

Reports from outlook stations.
Daily Battery Reports.
Daily Infantry Reports.
Reposts from R.F.C. communicated by Corps.
Aeroplane photographs.

All bearings to flashes or smoke spurts would be telephoned in to him; other reports should reach him by 9 a.m. and include the period from 6 a.m. to 6 a.m.

From these reports he should first make a compilation of areas shelled, the times they were shelled and the directions from which the shells came.

He would then see what intersections (if any) coincided with time and direction.

In the event of a flash bearing without any intersection, he should take the aeroplane photos and follow the direction of the ray noting down likely or possible positions and see if they coincide in any way with Battery or Infantry Reports. If time from “flash to report” has been correctly noted, by allowing 370 yards per second as the velocity of sound he should be able to determine the position of a howitzer within 5%.

In the case of a gun the “ondu du choc” has to be considered, corrections for this vary with the different natures of guns *

* The “sound expert” might be asked to write a short note on this.

He should keep a book with the “History” of each hostile battery showing how and where its position was suspected or determined, the dates it fired and the objectives.

It is very necessary to note positions suspected even on vague information as the “History” will show on what date it was suspected and a reference to the daily log book will give full details.

Having located the battery, the next thing is to determine nature and number of guns and by degrees work out the zone of fire.

The Intelligence Officer should then mark out on a tracing – for the use of G.O.C. and Brigade Major – all hostile batteries located and the direction of their zones of fire, different coloured chalks being used for the different natures of guns.

He should copy on to his map aeroplane photos, hedges, trees, entrenchments, tramways and other detail not already shown. The study of these photos and comparing those taken recently with older prints means several hours work, but is time well spent.

Battery Daily Reports.

The information contained in them should be as a rule fuller and more definite; the trouble arises from most battery commanders trusting solely to F.O.O.s instead of having in addition “Look out” men.

With a battery of four officers, one of whom may be temporarily absent, the manning of an O.P. from 5 a.m. to dusk is no light work, the presence of an officer is necessary in case the battery has to fire but he ought to have look out men to relieve him of the continuous strain in watching for flashes, etc.

Both the French ad the Germans make use of Senior N.C.O.s for this purpose and must we acknowledge that our N.C.O.s are less capable?

In most batteries there are aspirants for commissions and part of their training to qualify them for officers should be the manning of O.P.s.

During a “Strafe” the F.O.O. cannot fire his battery and look out hostile batteries at the same time and yet this is the very time when most flashes might be seen. On page 319 F.A.T. the duties of “Look out” men are clearly laid down but it has apparently been assumed in some batteries that their services are not required during Trench Warfare. Occasionally there is firing at night when flashes are most visible but few batteries report them as there is no one observing from the O.Ps.

As the number of men qualified and available for look out duties in any one battery is limited, the best plan would appear to be for the batteries of a Brigade or Group to take over this duty in turn for 24 hour spells.

It must be distinctly borne in mind that the observation stations have not been organised to supplant battery look outs but rather to supplement them, and the more flash bearings that can be obtained from different stations, the greater the facilities for locating hostile battys.

How to locate a flash.

The difficulty of locating hostile batteries has been greatly increased by the introduction of smokeless and flameless powders. A great deal can be done by sound bearings and, absurd as it may at first seem, a telescope is of great assistance in locating a battery by sound. First point the telescope in the direction from which the sound is thought to come, subsequent reports may make one think it is more to the right or left, ultimately the sound is laterally bracketed and a sharp look out can then be kept on this area.

During sunlight flashes from guns are seldom seen but by careful watching one may observe a “smoke spurt” or so called “air concussion” and one is lucky a premature may be discovered.

With guns the smoke spurt rises but little and merely shows as a light bluish haze, with howitzers it appears to be projected upwards in the shape of a candle flame. With dummy flashes by day the flash is as a rule brighter than that of a howitzer and the smoke is in the form of a roundish cloud.

At night the detection of dummy flashes is far more difficult, but as it is almost impossible without electrical apparatus to fire a dummy flash simultaneously with a gun, they can generally be detected by variations in the time from flash to report when the flashes are all on the same bearing. All dummy flashes ought, however, be reported with a note to this effect.

When a flash is seen the best method of recording it is for the battery look out man to use a director clamped at zero on some distant object clearly recognisable on the map, and give a bearing X^o right or left of this.

(The writer has had experience of angles Right or Left of chimneys of haystacks which the observer himself has been unable to locate on the map).

When a flash is seen, a record of the time from flash to report of gun is most important, particularly in the case of howitzers. Every battery has a Government stop watch but no not one in ten ever uses it for this purpose.

Again the noting of times of flashes and fall of shell leaves much to be desired. “Several flashes between 10 and 11 a.m.” might mean anything from 10 to 100. Again “20 flashes at 11 a.m.” is obviously false. It may be impossible to note the exact time of every flash but the statement that about 30 flashes were seen between 10 and 11 and 5 noted at the following times would be far more valuable and very little more trouble, or again “20 flashes commencing at 10.37 and continuing till 11 a.m.”. Battery commanders in many cases fail to realise the importance of these returns and seem to think that they are merely required for the compilation of statistics which though of academic interest to higher authorities are of no particular value, and it should be the duty of the I.O., R.A. to inform B.C’s of each flash reported by them can be traced to a located hostile battery. Once B.C’s begin to see tangible results and appreciate what is being done, there will be an improvement in their daily reports.

Daily Infantry Reports.

On first undertaking this work the writer found that but few of the reports contained information that was of any value, to some extent due to but little trouble being taken with them but chiefly because junior officers had very vague ideas of what was required, why it was required, and how it should be reported.

It is impossible when Divisions are in the front line to give instructions on these points but from the lectures under Lt.-Col. Koebel at Bailleul it is evident that the Infantry are anxious to learn how they can help the Artillery, and a system of lectures followed by a discussion while Divisions are in reserve appears to be most desirable.

When the forward trenches are being badly shelled and call for retaliation, the Artillery can best retaliate on the offending batteries if they know their zone of fire, and the determination of this depends greatly on daily reports sent in by the infantry.

It is realised that in the trenches, with a limited outlook through a periscope and no trench maps, the infantry officer has not the same facilities for observing or reporting as an F.O.O. in a comfortable O.P., but his report ought to be edited and amplified if possible by the Infantry Brigade Intelligence Officer, before being forwarded to the R.A.

As an example:-

“Flash seen near a farm-house between 11 and 12 bearing 73^o from “Bay 6 trench 256, shells falling near cemetery several blinds lying about” .

In this form it is of but little value for the following reasons:-

The time is too vague.
Nothing to show whether the bearing is True. Sheet Line or Magnetic, or how it was taken.
The R.A. do not as a rule possess maps showing trench numbers much less bays. The map square point is required before the angle can be correctly plotted.
There may be 3 or 4 cemeteries near the Divisional front.
Although “blinds” were handy, no attempt was made to describe the nature of the gun.

An example of a valueless report hardly creditable to an N?C?O. much less an officer, the following was actually received:-

Time of firing … … … … All day.

Nature of gun … … … … All sorts.

Direction from which hostile fire came … Everywhere

Objective if known … … … All round me.

The only heading left blank being “The position of observer”.

The chief points to which attention should be paid are:-

Accurately noting time and direction of every flash or smoke spurt.
If possible note time from flash to report of gun. (Time from report of gun to arrival of shell is useful only when the shells fall near observer and their calibre is known)
Time and place of shells that fall, with if possible direction from which they came, stating how estimated, such mean line of successive shell holes, the line between a short and over-ranging rounds, shell scoops &c.
It is more important to know the calibre of the shell than whether it was H.E. or Shrapnel. The former can be measured from blinds or from curves of fragments of the base. All fuzes should be sent on for inspection and labelled for return.
Avoid local names and always give map squares.

The following apply equally to Artillery and Infantry Reports:-

Should fire take during the night after daily reports have been made up, send in a supplementary report either by telephone or special messenger as soon as possible the next morning.

Certain batteries have been located as firing at night, but as no reports were received of areas shelled during these hours, it has been impossible to fix their zones of fire, Compass bearings should be given only in such cases as no better method is available for recording direction for the following reasons:-

Every compass has an error of its own.
There may be iron in the neighbourhood which deflects the needle.
Unless carefully placed on a level rest, it is almost impossible for the average observer to get a correct reading.
An officer was found who believed that a “True Bearing” was the true reading of his compass, and there may be others like him.

In the event of an F.O.O. in the forward trenches becoming a casualty while observing the fire of his battery, the nearest Infantry Officer should be able to carry on till a relief is sent down, and this has been done on more than on one occasion, but only where there had been complete co-operation between the F.O.O. and the Company officers.

The above notes are written on the basis of trench warfare, but afford excellent training for field warfare when the difficulties of collecting information will be increased and the facilities for plotting angles, &c greatly lessened.

The next page in the original has the chart referred to which I cannot produce here.

Frontage of two Corps in line each Corps with two Divisions in Front Line.

ONDE DU CHOC.

The Onde du Choc is the name given to a phenomenon which occurs when a projectile is fired from a gun with an initial velocity greater than the velocity of sound in air, which is 1134 feet per second.

When a gun is fired, it is a matter of common experience that when one is in front of the gun and within a certain angle of the line of fire, a very distinct double report is heard. There is a sharp crack of great intensity, followed at a short interval by a heavy thud. This effect is very noticeable with guns with a high muzzle velocity, such as the six inch Mark VII. The first crack is very loud and often distressing to the ear. The thud which follows has a much deeper note, does not distress the ear in the same way, but seems to have a much greater volume behind it from the way it rattles the windows, shakes buildings etc. With the six inch Mark VII an Observer about 1500 yards in front of the gun hears the two sounds at about one second interval.

With an 18 pr. gun the two sound follow so quickly that it is often hard to separate them, although they can sometimes be clearly distinguished. If one is in a building in front of an 18 pr. battery which is firing, the report of the gun is heard a few instants before the building is felt to vibrate. This indicates the existence of the two reports, only here they are separated by a much shorter interval of time. The double report is often very noticeable when a German 7.7 c.m. battery is firing.

The two sounds are caused in the following way:-

The second report is in each case caused by the discharge of the gun, it is the true gun report. It consists of a sound wave of great length and amplitude, so that it is accompanied by big pressure changes, and this explains its effect in shaking buildings, rattling windows, etc. The first report on the other hand is caused by the shell moving through the air. It is called by the French the “Onde du Choc” or “Wave of Concussion”. Just as a boat, which is moving through the water, creates a bow-wave shaped like the letter V, so a shell moving through the air creates a conical bow-wave in the air. It is this wave which is heard as the heard as the first report, it is a very short wave of great intensity, like a whip crack. The shell only makes this bow-wave when travelling with a velocity greater than of sound. As its velocity falls, the vertex of the cone becomes blunter, until finally the velocity of the shell drops below that of sound and it ceases to make a bow-wave or “Onde du Choc”.

Since the shell moves initially with a velocity greater than that of sound, the shell gets well ahead of the wave spreading from the gun, which represents the report of the discharge, and so the Onde du Choc is set up in the air in front of the gun report. Both then travel together with the velocity of sound. In this way an Observer in front of the gun hears first the “Onde du Choc” or “Shell wave”, then the report of the gun. The Onde du Choc is always very much louder than the true gun report; in fact it is only occasionally that the actual discharge of a German gun can be distinguished at all. What is generally taken for the gun report is in reality the “Onde du Choc”.

This must be considered when an Observer tries to get the range to a German gun by measuring the time between seeing its flash and hearing its report, or timing the interval between the report and shell burst. When an Observer is directly in the line of fire of the gun the Onde du Choc precedes the shell burst by intervals which vary from ½ second for 7.7 cm. gun firing at a range 4000 yards to six seconds for a 13 cm. gun firing at a range of 8000 yards. These corrections must be made to the time recorded before exact deductions can be made as to the distance of the gun from the Observer.

All the above remarks apply only to guns whose muzzle velocity is greater than the velocity of Sound. They do not apply to Howitzers which have a muzzle velocity of less than 1134 feet per second. The report heard when a howitzer fires is the discharge itself.

The Onde du Choc is only heard by an Observer in front of a Gun within a certain angle of the line of fire. An Observer, to a flank, or behind does not hear it. When the wave is set up it moves through the air in a direction at right angles to its wave front, and so is not propagated to a flank or behind the gun.

(Sgd) W.L. Bragg, 2/Lieut.

O.C. Sound Ranging Section.

4/3/1916

FEBRUARY 1916.

Feb28

Tuesday 1^st.

Working on Wire this morning. Foggy had to quit at 12. At 2.45 went up to E.2. Essex trenches to see what was required. Thorne & I took our sections out at 5 p.m. and worked till 12.30 under heavy fire. Got the trench repaired and revetted. Bed at 2 a.m.

Wednesday 2^nd

Working at wire this morning as it was foggy, a shell dropped in my wire without exploding so I set it off with guncotton.

This afternoon we rested and at 11.30 paraded to march to K. Redan to build a new trench 300 yds in front of 1^st line. Got the section up safely.

Thursday 3^rd.

Wrote to Irene. At 1.30 a.m. arrived at K. Redan and proceeded to site of new trench which we worked at til 6 a.m. and practically finish. The rifle shots were frequent but no casualties as the Germans did not spot us. We had to do a lot of walking about in the open and the bullets came unpleasantly near us very often. We got back to billet at 7.30 a.m. & slept till 3 when I had to march the men out to a new piece of work, a communication trench.

Friday 4^th.

First parade 7 a.m. took the men for a bathe. At 9 a.m., took the men to commence work on the new Com trench and stayed at it till 4.30. Then payed the men 10 Francs each. There was a heavy cannonade by our batteries as many as 6 batteries of 4 guns all going off together. The Germans got their shells close to one of our guns & it was moved away at a gallop. Received orders at 9 p.m. to move to Gorges starting 10 a.m. Saturday.

Saturday 5^th.

Started at 9.45 a.m. & travelled along the Amiens R^d to Querrieux arriving there at 3.15. Stayed the night there sleeping in an Armstrong Hut. I bought an old clock for 10 francs, as a curiosity. The men were very tired tonight.

Sunday 6^th.

Started at 10 a.m. and continued our march. Stopped for lunch at Villers Bocage then on to Wargnies where we stayed overnight.

Monday 7^th.

Started off at 10 a.m. and marched through to Gorges arriving at 12.45. Found it a very small uncomfortable place though very picturesque. It lies in the heart of a wheat growing section.

I have only just room to stand in my room alongside the bed. It is the worst billet yet.

Tuesday 8^th.

Spent the day fixing up horse lines and finding place for rifle range. Thorne went to practice demolition. Lieut Col. Craster, C.R.E., called and as Major was away I had to show him round. Rather cold today & a very heavy hailstorm. My application for transfer sent forward today to C.R.E.

Wednesday 9^th.

Thorne & I making reconnaissance of village. About noon Major B got orders to move tomorrow. Snowstorm early this morning.

Worked this afternoon getting ready for move.

Thursday 10^th.

Started at 9 a.m. and joined the 116 Brigade at 10 a.m. marching in rear of it.

Reached Thiervies at 4 p.m. very tired having done 15 miles very slowly.

Friday 11^th.

Started at 9 a.m. & reached Humbercamp at 1 p.m. billeted with Rifle Brigade and spent a very pleasant evening yarning with the officers.

6 mile march.

Saturday 12^th.

Marched to Pommier then on to Beaumetz les Loges leaving the Coy at Pommier, I & my Section being detailed to take charge of R.E. Park at Beaumetz. I was the first Englishman in Beaumetz which was occupied by the French & I had a great time making them understand A French General fixed up my billets.

Sunday13^th.

Went round the works & got my men’s hut fixed up. They have got the best quarters they have had so far. Duel of airplanes over head 2 bombs dropped close to

Monday 14^th.

A few shells came in to town & the billet first allotted me was shattered. Several men killed.

The 165 Brigade Staff moved in to Beaumetz & I reported to them.

Tuesday 15^th.

Gen Greene Wilkinson called to see me. General Jeudwine 55^th Div. O.C. sent for me to ask what improvements were wanted in the trenches and ordered my suggestions adopted. Went round the gun batteries to examine strength of dug outs left by French men. Found them poor. C.R.E. came & ordered me to get transport out. Major Brown countermanded it.

Wednesday 16^th.

General McMahon sent for me for a report on Howitzer epaulments. C.R.E. came twice today. I took charge of the town pumping stations petrol and steam pumps. Got in a lot of stores & divided them up amongst Inf & Artillery.

Thursday 17^th.

Went round Beaumetz with Interpreter locating buildings for demolition. Then to the Major. This afternoon I rode over to Monchiet and Gouy. Saw C.R.E. and adj’t D’Aeth at the last place then rode out to the batteries on the Arras R^d to choose place for Signals Dugout. Received & issued a lot of stores. Had a row with officer of 7^th King’s Lpool who was helping himself to stores. Made him put them back. Brig Gen Wilkinson sent for me at night to report on supplies.

Friday 18^th.

Gen Greene Wilkinson sent for me to Basseux so I rode over this morning but found him gone. His Staff Capt wanted me to go & report on some trenches. Busy day loading & unloading stores. C.R.E. wired to me to go & see him which I did at 7 o’clock. He told me Gen Jeudwine would not agree to me going as infantry man but they would transfer me from Major Brown & make me Field Engineer as soon as another Lieut could be secured.

Saturday 19^th.

Handed over care of stores to the 1/4 South Lancs Pioneers Battⁿ II Lieut Walmsley taking charge. Arranged a church service for the men for tomorrow.

Rode out with Sergt M^cDonagh to find timber for trench boards & found a lot. Stayed in at night writing. Zeppelins over. Heavy cannonade.

Sunday 20^th.

Church parade at 9. Sent off a party to the Gunners and one to demolish houses. This afternoon Sergt McDonagh & I went round the works. Fixed up billet papers & sent them in to Coy Hdquarters. Wrote to Frank.

Monday 21^st.

Went round the batteries this morning. This afternoon went to Gouy to get plan of beehive dug out. At 9.30 p.m. Adjt came for me to go and fix up a water plant. Took 12 men & tools & worked all night getting home at 6 a.m. but finished the work.

Wrote to Maud, Dauberry John.

Tuesday 22^nd.

Snow today. Did very little this morning as I was very tired. The Section was on Dugouts, Duckwalks and collecting timbers. 78 Duck Walks up to now have been made.

Wrote to Gerald.

C.R.E. wrote for statement of my experience as C.S. for the Chief Engineer 7^th Corps so I sent him my history since 1893.

Wednesday 23^rd.

Got wire telling me to report to CR.E.’s when I got there I was ordered off to Solernau to make arrangements for getting water out of a deep well. Found a most interesting lot of chambers and stairways cut in the chalk under the Chateau. The stairs went away down below water level which was 54 feet down. Went on to Couturelle to advise the Col of Wessex Fld Ambulance about some work he wanted done. Reported to C.R.E. on the way home. Freezing hard at night. Lots of snow fell today.

Thursday 24^th.

Very cold. Went to Gouy this morning & had to wait all morning in C.R.E.’s office. This afternoon I went to look over the Artillery dugouts we are building. Drew Fr 100 from Field Cashier. Wrote to Gerald for ****. Wrote to Irene at night.

Friday 25^th.

Rode to Fosseux this morning to arrange for a water supply. A wet miserable day. The men were busy at trench boards and on the signal dugout. Called at C.R.E.’s office on my return.

Saturday 26^th.

Company H.Q. and N^o 3 Section came over today and the same old worry of faultfinding recommenced. The Major has been very nice to me since he has heard I am leaving him. Went to Gouy this morning.

Sunday 27^th.

Took the wagons to Gouy & sent them on to Mondicourt for R.E. stores. Back to Beaumetz to see the gun dugouts.

Monday 28^th.

Rode to Gouy then by MT to Mondicourt for water troughs but could not get any, so I took the MT to La Herliere where it got stuck in the snow and I had to walk home 8 miles or more to Beaumetz. 1^st Field Co marched in tonight.

Tuesday 29^th.

Went to Gouy this morning then to within 4 miles of Arras to report on some dugouts that were falling in. This afternoon I was busy with a model machine gun emplacement that was ordered by the General. Major Brown & the others marched back to Grosville.

Diary of 2/4th Battalion The Border Regiment

Feb28

1916

7^th February 1916. “D” Company proceeded to Shankargarh for company training. Returned 19^th February, 1916.

14^th February 1916. Inspection of Allahabad Detachment by Major-General May, G.O.C. the 8^th (Lucknow) Division.

18^th February 1916. “A” Company proceeded to Sooradavee for company training. Returned 4^th March, 1916.

Letter to Rev Walters from W Cooke

Feb28

Monday 28/2/16

D Coy 25

Leic Regt

Dear Sir,

I now take the liberty of writing this letter to you hoping to find you all in the best of health and spirits. Well I cannot very well say it leaves me the same as I am at present suffering from boils on the inside of my thighs so I am far from being in good spirits as they are not nice things to have when you are at home where you can by and ease them so we have to by as we can in a barn but we do not mind that a bit as it is preferable to the trenches any time. Well [no] doubt you remember me writing to you but it was many months ago before we went up in the Ypres salient as they call it out here. Well since then we have spent nearly four months in the Ypres salient and we spent six days in Ypres itself being billeted in the Barracks which is far as I could see then was about the only place left standing but they had been knocked about and had got several rooms with shell holes through the roof. At that time the Cloth Hall was nearly down to the ground and the spire of the Cathedral was on its last legs in fact it was a wonder how it stood as when we looked at it we passed the remark that a good shove would send it over but still it defied the best effects of the German gunners and up to the time we came away it was still there a mark of their Kultur. Since then we have been in action at Loos and we made a name for ourselves doing the charge (although we were not the first over) at the Famous Hohenzollern Redoubt. This redoubt had changed hands several times being held by the Guards but they has to retire back so it lay to us to retake it which we did and what was more we held on to it but we suffered heavily over it. Well after that we had ten days rest or suppose to as the General came and spoke to us and told us a good tale and they sent one or two on leave and we all expected to be going home on leave before going in action again. Next morning the first of our supposed rest they had us out doing Batt Drill at seven o’clock in the morning that was the first day rest and it was the same for nearly a week and then leave was stopped. The next week we were reviewed by the King and while we were cheering him he had the misfortune to have his accident which you have no doubt heard of. Well we moved from there and shortly after we were in some trenches not far from Neuve Chapple and we only used to have twenty four hours in the firing line at the time as the trenches were full of water coming right up our thighs and me being on the small side it came over the top of my rubber boots which we were supplied with. Well we did not have a very long stay in this part of the line but the move come as a surprise to us. I here was not much doing up these trenches and though it is hard to believe when we were being relieved at night the chaps used to get out and walk to their posts on the top of parapets sooner there walk up trench through the mud and water and it was very rare you heard a shot come over and I don’t think all the time we were up there our losses amounted to half a dozen so that will tell as we never went up the trenches in the Ypres Salient without we had fifty or sixty casualties during the time we where up through we used to do eighteen days at a stretch. Well we came out of these trenches for our six days rest and then we went in for a further six days but we only do one night and then the next night we were relieved by some of the New Army and we had one night in our old billets and then we marched away to an unknown destination although rumours were rife some said we were going to Servia then Egypt and such like. Well we were moving all about the country for a month and then early in the new year we entrained for Marseilles so they said but we were not sure about that and we were residing in Cattle Trucks for three days and nights when we arrived at Marseilles. Well our first impression of it was not a great I can tell you as we arrived early on Sunday morning and we had got to help unload the Transport wagons off the trucks and then march to the Camp which was about six miles away. Well we had a rough journey to the Camp which was situated on a hillside over looking the sea and we had to march all along the sea front and it was a very rough night and the wind blew the shingle in our very faces and it cut now and then. Anyhow we got to the Camp at last and we were under canvas and we were soon down on the bare ground and asleep. When we wakened it was a lot different and the sun was shining grand and we could ly in the tents and see the ships coming in and going out as it was quite a novel sight to us after being in the trenches. Well of the City itself I will not say much although it is a very wicked place but all reports are as a rule. Well we seen men of all nationalities and colours during our stay there. We had a very easy time as we done very little work of a morning and then we were allowed out of camp from two o’clock till nine so we had plenty of time to look round. Well the change was something to talk over and it was that warm the chaps even bathed in the sea and hardly a week before we had been up to our knees in mud and water and in the same country and it made us think of the trenches we had left behind us as we thought. Well we have about a fortnight there and then we had the order that we were going on board the ship the next day that was Thursday night and we marched away from the Camp early on Friday morning and we were all on board just after eight. Well we were all looking forward to a nice voyage and we had each got a bunk to ourselves and I was soon under the Blankets. When they came round with orders we had another surprise as they told them all they had got to be off the ship again early next morning. When morning come a great many who had expected being on the way to Egypt were more surprised than us as they were asleep when they come round and told us on the night. Well we marched off the ship and back to the Camp again and then after having a week there we entrained again up the line again so you can tell we have been about France pretty well. It is just twelve today by the date since we landed in France and I think our only grievance is about the leave. What makes it worse is this you pick up the local papers and there you see Pte So and So as been on leave and then when you run your mind back he had only just joined it the time we came out here but of course he belongs to the New Army and that makes the difference as they are getting their leave every three months and us poor Terriers who come out to bear the brunt of the fighting while they were living in luxury in England well it seems to me as though we are not known as there is over two hundred of our Batt now who are still waiting for a leave as for myself I think I shall get one if the war keep on long enough. I cannot say where the fault lys or whose fault it is that we are not getting our leave but they ought to look after us better than they are doing over it. Well you can publish this letter in your Magazine if you like but keep back what you think fit by what I can see I think there is going to be a big move on but at present I cannot say whether we shall be in it or not but I expect it will be so. Well I should be very pleased if you would kindly send me a Magazine now and then as I like to hear about the old Place. Well I hope you will excuse the writing and mistakes so I will now close. With Best Wishes to you All

Yours sincerely

Pte. W. Cooke 2557

5th Lincs Regt.

In green envelope addressed to The Rev T.W. Walters, The Vicarage, Whitwick Leicestershire. England.

Letter postmarked FIELD POST OFFICE 138 2 MR 16.

Letter to Rev Walters from R. C. Whitmore 27 Feb 16

Feb27

27^th Feb 1916

Dear Sir,

May I take the pleasure of writing a few lines to you while I have a little chance with it being Sunday we have a little more time for writing unless we are moving, we have often taken to the road on Sunday which doesn’t give us a chance for a Church parade. All the boys like the Church parade but I think some of them like it because it is short & they get more time for writing letters etc. Our battalion are not at present in the trenches & I couldn’t say if we shall be in again for a while. We have had three weeks down at Marseilles bound for another Country but the orders were cancelled & we returned up north again. I am pleased to see of Petty Officer A.J. Wilson’s quick promotion which I noticed in the Coalville Times. I dropped across Driver James the other night & wished me to remember him to you if I wrote. I suppose you know who I mean. Well sir I must close now hoping you enjoy the best of health the same as myself. You will remember me as one of the boy scouts who played the side drum in khaki at the annual tea which you gave them last year.

From Yours R.C. Whitmore

4161 Pte R.C. Whitmore

16 Platt D Coy

5^th Leicesters

B.E.F.

France.

In green envelope addressed to Rev. T.W. Walters, The Vicarage, Leicester Rd, Whitwick, Leicestershire. England.

Letter postmarked FIELD POST OFFICE 46. 28 FE 16.

THIRD ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL OF INSTRUCTION.

Feb25

SYLLABUS.

LEADERSHIP. (a) Its meaning.

(b) How to acquire the gift of.

DISCIPLINE. (a) General behaviour and conduct of the Officers.

(b) Personal appearance – Physical Fitness – Punctuality – Saluting.

MORAL. Its meaning and importance – Responsibility of Officers

and N.C.O.s regarding it – Patriotism – Esprit de Corps – Esprit de Brigade – Esprit de Division – Esprit d’Armee – Psychology of the War.

DISCIPLINE & COMMAND. Necessity of System of Command so as to

ensure continuity – bearing of Officers and N.C.O.s towards their men.

ORGANISATION. Battalion – Brigade – Division – Chain of Responsibility.

CARE OF ARMS. Rifles, Bayonets, Ammunition – Equipment – Smoke

Helmets – Clothing – Iron Rations.

SANITATION. (a). In trenches, Billets, Bivouacs, Line of March.

(b). Care of feet: Standing Orders on the Subject.

(c). First aid, use of Field Dressings.

(d). Evacuation of the wounded, general principles of.

Billet Life. How to care for and get the best out of the men in billets

– N.B. This is a special subject with a very special importance, which was not realised at the commencement of the last winter campaign.

DUTIES OF In camp, bivouac and billets.

PLATOON & (a) System of billeting.

SECTION COMDRS (b) On the line of march (discipline).

(d) In the Attack.

PROTECTION. Advance guard, Rear, Flank, and Outposts.

PRINCIPLES OF (a) Organisation previous to.

ATTACK NORMAL. (b) Distribution of troops for.

(d) Formation with regard to fire.

12. FIRE DISCIPLINE. (a) Combination of Fire with Movement.

(b) Fire Control.

(d) Use of Range finders.

DEFENCE NORMAL. (a) Principal lines of defence.

(b) Taking up a defensive line.

(d) Telling off and distribution of working parties.

TRENCH WARFARE. (a) Organisation for an attack from the trenches. (attack) Supply of Ammunition, grenades, rations, water.

DECENCE. (a) Construction of Trenches.

(b) Construction of Parapets.

(d) Revetting, sandbags, fascine, wire, hurdle and other

expedients.

(e) Construction of Splinter Proof.

(f) Loopholes, sighting and construction of.

(g) Sniping Posts.

(h) Listening Posts.

(i) Sapping, principles of.

(j) Entrenching tools, use of.

(k) Entanglements.

(l) Use of telescopes and periscopes.

(m) Sniping, use and methods to be employed in.

Trench Orders. (a) Absolute necessity for.

(b) Organisation of work.

MACHINE GUNS. (a) How to fire the Lewis Maxim Gun.

(b) Principles of employment in attack and defence.

GRENADES. (a) Description of.

(b) Handling of.

(d) Use in attack and defence.

(e) Training of Grenadiers.

(f) Organisation of Grenadiers in the attack.

Organisation of Grenadiers in defence.

(g) Carrying of.

(h) Supply of.

PATROL WORK. (a) Importance of.

(b) How to organise.

MAP READING. (a) Simple scales and meaning of.

(b) How to read a map. (Explain how it should be looked

upon as a book and not as a puzzle.

Magnetic into true bearings

(d) Setting a map by compass and by other methods.

Co-operation Importance of, and method of.

of other Arms Co-operation between Staff and Regimental Officers.

MASSAGES & (a) Official letters, writing of.

REPORTS. (b) Memoranda.

(d) Field Messages, method of writing.

(e) Verbal messages, limitations of.

(f) Reports, how to be written.

(g) Reconnaissance, simple form of.

(h) Trench reports.

ARREST. (a) Rules for.

(b) Telling off and disposal of prisoners.

(d) Field General Courts Martial.

(e) Army (suspension of sentences) Act 1915.

INTELLIGENCE. (a) Service of security.

(b) Information.

(d) Their treatment and disposal.

G.R.O. Extracts from, Secrecy, Dress, Discipline,

Correspondence etc.

GAS. Use of protectors, methods of dealing with, organisation

of attack.

SYSTEM of (a) Ammunition.

SUPPLY. (b) Supplies.

DRILL. (a) Importance of as a means to an end.

(b) Squad with arms.

(d) Company.

Physical Training. (a) Bayonet Fighting.

(b) Football.

REVOLVER. (a) Method of using.

(b) Short course in the use of.

—————————————————-

COPY.

Feb24

INDIRECT LAYING SYSTEM IN USE BY BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN FRANCE.

The site for the Battery and general directions in which fire will be required having been ordered, the line of guns are placed approximately at right angles to this line.

If covered emplacements are built, it is very important that each dial sight should be able to see the aiming point.

The gun on one flank is usually chosen as directing gun. The corrections for the other guns will be simpler if the aiming point is at right angles to the line of fire, but it is very difficult to make a covered emplacement which allows of this. In the battery I saw, the aiming point was 45^o right of rear.

The exact position of the directing gun is then marked very accurately on the map, and a line drawn through it for a normal axis of fire. This is called the zero line. Also a line on the aiming point – the angle between these two is then measured by the dial sight.

If the zero line can be laid on a seen object marked on the map, there will be a chance to check accuracy. The distance between the guns is then carefully measured, and the angle between the aiming point and the zero lines calculated. This should bring all the zero lines parallel, and pickets on which lamps can be hung are placed to mark them.

A line is drawn on the map behind the enemy’s position at right angles to the normal axis of fire; and degrees right and left set off along it, as calculated from the directing gun.

A paper straight edge is pivoted at the directing gun, and when this is brought over the target, the angle right or left of the normal axis of fire can be read off on the scale of degrees.

A scale of ranges, allowing for the shooting qualities of the cordite in use, is marked on the edge of the paper straight edge, and immediately gives the range of the target from direction gun. When this is known, the correction in line to concentrate the other guns on target is easily got from a table.

To get the exact line – only a cross wind need now be allowed for.

To get the elevation – a headwind, barometer and thermometer corrections must be made. Also for difference of level of gun and target, if any.

After the first shot, the forward observing officer signals corrections.

Aeroplanes directing guns first signify the target by the usual map nomenclature by wireless.

After the first shot, they signal the angle from north and the distance of the spot where they wish the next shot to fall.

The Battery Commander has a scale and circular protractor device by which he can readily calculate the necessary corrections in angle and in elevation for his guns.

(Sgd.) P.F. Molony Major.

R.E.

24/2/16.