George Ryan’s letter home dated 30 July 1915
(Cossipore)
Dum-dum.
India.
30 July 1915

Dear M & F,

Received your letter of July 2. I suppose you don’t know the post leaves London a day earlier now, that’s why I’m getting your letters a week late. You should post early Thurs morning or Wed night, but perhaps you will have found it out before you get this. I can’t do anything this end about the parcel of cigarettes you sent; I can only write & complain. Several fellows have written but it doesn’t seem to do much good.

Uncle Jack might have had my violin for Reg. You had better get rid of it; it’s no good keeping it.

I’m at Cossipore again this week, among the ants & mosquitoes. Shall be glad to get back to Dum-dum on Monday. I can sleep alright there but very few fellows can get much sleep here at night-time.

We’ve got our pith helmets at last. They are a bit lighter than the others, which we only wear for ceremonial parades now. (Church Parades etc.)

The Prickly Heat hasn’t improved. I got a bit wet coming back from Calcutta Mon night, that did it a bit of good. Rain doesn’t cure it but it eases it a bit. Chaps that have got it all over run out when it rains at night-time.

Heard from Bert again this week; I’m glad he’s being kept at home for a bit.

Hope you are all well.
Love to all,
Yr affec son
George

Notes of Message from Army Commander 27 July 1915
27th July 1915
In the course of his remarks, when addressing the Troops, the Army Commander said that he had not come there that morning to hold an inspection parade, but rather to say a few words to the Brigade before it left to join the new Army to which it was being transferred.
He was glad to say that, the long period during which the men had been engaged in Trench Warfare, had not caused them to forget how to stand still and to handle their Arms; their Clothing was against them and it would not have pleased those who were used to Aldershot Parades, but those who really knew soldiers, were able to judge, in spite of Clothing, and the Brigade had turned out as it ought to have done.
The General went on to say that, he need not remind his hearers of what they had done in the past, for that would be found written in the records, which would form the History of the War. Those, however, who were acquainted with the facts, knew the part which the 5th Division and the 14th Infantry Brigade had taken, in the early part of the War, and they knew that part had been at least an arduous one.
During the period that the Brigade had been in the Sector which it was then leaving, it had been occupied with Trench Warfare rather than with active operations against the Enemy, with one or two exceptions when although not actually employed as a Brigade, two of its Battalions – the Devons and the East Surreys – had been very hotly engaged at “Hill 60”, and by their efforts, had contributed very greatly, to the retention of that Hill.
Since that time, the Brigade had continued to be engaged in Trench Warfare, but Trench Warfare was not to be rated the dull sort of fighting that some were prone to think, as Army Commanders knew full well. Comparisons, the General remarked, were odious, but he had no hesitation in saying that, so far as the 2nd Army was concerned, and for that matter, so far as the Expeditionary Force was concerned, no Brigade had won so high a reputation for Trench Warfare as had the 14th Brigade, under General Maude.
During the operations that had taken place in the YPRES Salient, the 14th Brigade had been engaged in fighting which might be characterized as “Dull” from the Newspaper point of view, but the General reminded his hearers that unless a Commander can rely on the Troops that are holding the Line, he cannot withdraw troops as he otherwise might, for fighting else where. Whilst commanding the 5th Corps, he knew that the Line occupied by the Brigade was absolutely safe, and, he added, it was to the Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and men whom he was addressing that he ascribed as much credit as he did to those who were engaged in the more active fighting.
The Army Commander concluded by saying that the Brigade was going to a new Army under General Monro and to a new Corps under General Morland, respectively, both of whom knew full well, the reputation of the Brigade.
On those whom he was addressing would devolve the responsibility of living up to the reputation which they had made and of forming the nucleus of the new Army, for they would be the veterans, and the 14th Brigade standard would be the standard which other Brigades would emulate; it must and it would be a high one, and if all the other Brigades reached it, both the Army and the Corps Commander would have confidence.
The General then expressed his sorrow that the Brigade was parting from the 2nd Corps and the 2nd Army, and wished them the best of luck.

Translation of a Memorandum, dated 11th July, 1915,
drawn up by General CASTELNAU, Commanding the Group of Armies
of the Centre.
The Commander-in-Chief in a recent memorandum laid down general principles to be applied and the steps to be taken to deal with the type of attack as practiced at present by the enemy.
These attacks are invariably preceded by a heavy and prolonged bombardment.
Experiments carried out both by ourselves and by the Germans lead one to the conclusion that it is merely a question of employing the necessary amount of heavy artillery in order to ensure the destruction of hostile trenches. Defensive organisations are demolished. Judiciously placed shell-proof casemates and subterranean dug-outs, of which the Germans have rightly made such extensive use, are alone capable of resistance.
Hence it is no longer a question of spreading men all along a line which was considered proof to any attack; it is necessary to keep a large proportion of them in hand so that they can be brought up wherever they may be required.
For an army acting on the defensive the battle has only begun, when the enemy has crossed the front trenches. It lies with the Commander to have in hand the necessary resources in infantry and artillery, to enable him to intervene at the right moment.
Therefore, Army Commanders should take the necessary steps:-
1. To diminish the numbers in occupation of the front line trenches. The onus of defence should fall on small groups, judiciously distributed, supported by machine guns. The number of observation posts, shell-proof flanking casemates and subterranean dug-outs should be increased.
2. To organise sector reserves along the whole front.
3. To keep in reserve complete formations which can be easily moved.
4. To be able to reinforce rapidly the artillery on the front attacked. This implies the preparation of numerous emplacements, the allotment of zones of fire in advance, (destruction of enemy trenches and counter-batteries, tir de barrages.)
But it is not sufficient to pre-arrange the composition of sector and army reserves; it is essential that they should be able to come into action when and where they are wanted.
As a violent and continued bombardment, which is intended to destroy the front lines, generally begins one or more days before the attack proper, the local commander can anticipate this and make his preparations accordingly.
If the front line trenches are demolished, their garrison will be transferred to swell the numbers in the support trenches or redoubts and “points d’appui” situated to the rear. (Defensive organisations in depth are essential).
It is here, that it will be possible to check the enemy’s attack and to counter-attack so as to drive the enemy back. The success of a counter-attack depends on surprise and determination.
If delivered by the sector reserves, it must take place immediately. This is feasible:
1. If the details of execution have been minutely prepared in advance.
2. If these reserves are thoroughly familiar with the sector.
3. If their moral is unshaken (this entails their being kept immune from bombardment).
4. If they are well provided with grenades.
5. If our own artillery has kept up a continuous fire on the trenches which have been lost in order to prevent the enemy from establishing himself there, and has opened a tir de barrage to prevent the arrival of supports.
The counter-attack, carried out by Army reserves, should be as rapid as possible. For this purpose it is necessary to have studied and prepared their mode of action and employment in good time.
The enemy should not be allowed time to reorganize on the ground they have occupied, otherwise the whole thing will have to be started afresh like an ordinary attack against an organized front, which requires working out and preparing in every detail.
In order to use reserves in this way, it will be necessary:-
1. To have been able to withdraw them, if possible, from the effects of the bombardment and of the asphyxiating gasses (numerous alarm posts and shelters).
2. To be able to use them in spite of the enemy’s tir de barrage, (a study being made beforehand of their mode of employment; numerous communication trenches, a proportion of which will be strictly reserved for evacuation of wounded, dividing the ground into sectors etc.)
3. To have foreseen and prepared the action of the batteries specially entrusted with supporting the counter-attack (reinforcing batteries, preparation of emplacements, allotment of zones of fire etc.)

Whether carried out by Sector or Army reserves, the counter-attack must always be driven home. Exploit to the full the confusion and disorganization likely to arise in the enemy’s ranks, in order not only to drive him back to his own line but also to gain as firm a footing as possible in the hostile trenches.
An Army should deal with an attack delivered by a few brigades with its own reserves, without having to draw upon the reserves of the group of armies. The employment of the latter is worthy of consideration for such tasks as penetrating still further into the enemy’s position in the track of the Army reserves, and breaking the front, if opportunity offers.

The last page/pages are missing.