TABLE “A”. 21 August 1917

TABLE “A”.

Date Unit From To Time to pass Starting Point Starting Pt. Gun positions Route Remarks
22nd Aug H.Q. 275 Bde

A/275 Bty

B/275 Bty

C/275 Bty

D/275 Bty K.9.c.0.0.

K.14.b.6.9.
K.15.a.5.9.

K.8.d.9.9.

K.7.b.9.0.
K.8.b.1.9.

K.8.a.8.5.
K.8.b.0.6.
K.8.b.1.4.
K.8.b.2.2.
K.8.b.2.1.
K.8.c.2.7.
J.3.c.1.3. G.4.d.8.2.

Lines previously occupied by 173 Bde R.F.A. 8.55 a.m.

9 a.m.

9.30 a.m.
10 a.m.

10.30 a.m. K.4.d.3.6.

-do-

-do-

-do-

-do- WIELTJE (on taking over)

I.4.d.98.85

I.4.b.60.10

I.5.a.20.60.

I.5.a.30.30. ABEELE N. of POPERINGE
Switch Rd

-do-

-do- Distance of 500 yds will be maintained between sections of batteries & subsections D.A.C.

-do-

-do-
22nd Aug H.Q. 276 Bde

A/276 Bde

B/276 Bde

C/276 Bde
D/276 Bde K.13.b.9.2.

K.7.c.5.4.

K.13.a.9.0.
K.13.a.7.1.
J.18.b.9.7.

K.7.c.8.8.
K.13.a.0.2. G.10.b.3.8.

Lines previously occupied by 276 Bde R.F.A.

5.33 a.m.
6 a.m.

6.30 a.m.

7 a.m.
7.30 a.m. -do-

-do-

-do-

-do-
-do- WIELTJE (on relief)
C.22.c.50.05.

C.22.d.15.15.

C.22.d.25.45.
C.22.c.05.25. -do-

-do-

-do-

-do-
-do- -do-

-do-

-do-

-do-
-do-
23rd Aug

24th Aug 55th D.A.C.

95th Coy A.S.C. WINNEZEELE Area
-do- H.9.d.6.8.

G.4.b.5.2. 6 a.m.

9 a.m. -do-

-do- –

– -do-

-do- In relief of 36th D.A.C.
To take over billets vacated by No1 Coy A.S.C. 36th Div Train.

Notes on Operations. 20th Division 21 August 1917

SUBJECT: Notes on Operations. 20th Division No. G.840.

XIVth Corps.
——————-
In reply to your G.25/5 of the 16th August.
1. Generally speaking it was not too fast; it was only in the very boggy ground that the waves were unable to keep up with the barrage.
All the Officers and men whom I have talked to are loud in their praise of the barrage.

2. Yes.

3. As regards the Right Brigade front:-

(a) Ground very deep in mud and cut up by shell fire throughout. From the BLUE LINE Westwards and Southwards for about 400 yards was a regular bog.
Several men, including the Commanding Officer of the 6th K.S.L.I. were stuck thigh deep in the mud and had to be pulled out by other men.
(b) It was impossible to advance across the bog leading to the BLUE LINE in any formation other than some half dozen single file columns which wound their way between the pools of mud and water. This afforded some favourable opportunities for hostile machine guns.
(c) On the whole the state of the ground broke up formations and also impeded the individual. It therefore called for a special effort from all officers and N.C.Os. in leading their men on as well as special determination on the part of every individual to get forward through the mud. It made the subsequent tasks of carrying parties extremely difficult.
(d) On the other hand the soft state of the ground undoubtedly saved us many casualties from shell fire. This was especially the case during the forming up of the 6th K.S.L.I. and 12th K.R.R.C. before ZERO hour West of the STEENBEEK. They were very heavily shelled. They could not take cover even in shell holes for these were full of water, yet their casualties at this period were very few.

As regards the Left Brigade front, the advance was retarded as far as the GREEN LINE, especially on the extreme left. The hour’s halt on the GREEN LINE saved the situation in that it allowed everyone to reach their proper position in time.

4. There are several points I propose to bring to notice in a subsequent letter.
The following are in the nature of preliminary observations:-
(a) The concrete blockhouses appear to have only a narrow arc of fire as a general rule. At least one blockhouse which was giving trouble surrendered as soon as an organised party of men rushed up to it in a determined way.
(b) The importance of visual signalling does not yet seem to be fully appreciated.
(c) The work of the Artillery F.O.O’s, was admirable, and the liaison between artillery and infantry all that could be desired.
(d) A considerable quantity of S.A.A. was expended by Lewis Gun and rifle fire against low flying aeroplanes, with the result that there was a shortage of ammunition when required to repel counter-attacks. (This has already been dealt with in your G.4/29 of the 18th August).
(e) The necessity for consolidation to be put in hand at once on the attainment of an objective, whether the Officer in charge of the party is there or not. When elated by success our men are apt to neglect consolidation and to walk and sit about in the open.
(f) It is important for a Battalion Commander to have a company under his own hand.
(g) When halted under the barrage men should stand and not kneel. A man kneeling in a shell hole is apt to stop there.
(h) The YUKON pack was freely used on the Left Brigade front and was a great success. It was found that one man could carry a box of S.A.A. and a box of bombs.
(i) The concentration on the East bank of the STEENBEEK was admirably carried out under intermittent artillery fire and machine gun fire from AU BON GITE, the garrison of which fired off Very Lights throughout the night; yet at Zero the waves were in their places and ready to go forward. I think this most difficult manoeuvre reflects the greatest credit on Brigadiers and C.O’s.
(j) The question of providing Trench Wireless Sets for communication between F.O.O’s and Artillery has been suggested by my B.G., R.A. Severe losses have taken place nearly every time among F.O.O. parties in their endeavours to maintain a long line under a heavy fire. One instrument with each attacking Divisional Artillery would assist enormously, and save the loss of many Officers and men, whose services cannot be replaced by untrained reinforcements.

(sd) W. DOUGLAS SMITH,
Major General
Commanding 20th Division.
21st August, 1917.

55 Divisional Artillery OO No 53 21 August 1917

SECRET.
55th Div Arty B.M/1809

TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF
55th DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY OPERATION ORDER No 53.
—————————————————————————–

Headquarters of 55th Divisional Artillery will close at K.8.a.0.3. at 12 noon on the 22nd inst, and reopen at the same hour at K.10.d.5.7.

***************
Major R.F.A.
Staff Captain 55th Divl Artillery.
21st Aug 1917.

55th Divisional Artillery Operation Order No 53, amendment 21 August 1917

SECRET.

TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF 55th DIVISIONAL
ARTILLERY OPERATION ORDER NO 53.
———————————————————–

Reference 55th Divisional Artillery Operation Order No 53, the following amendments are made:-

AMENDMENT NO 1.
275 Bde R.F.A. will move to their old Wagon Lines at G.9.b.7.9. and G.9.b.6.4. and not as stated in Table “A” of the above order.

AMENDMENT NO 2.
Reference para 11. These wagons must be returned to the 55th D.A.C. on the evening of the 22nd inst, and not on the morning of the 23rd.

AMENDMENT NO 3.
Reference para 6, add :- “Gun history sheets must be handed over with the guns”.

AMENDMENT NO 4.
Table “A” 22nd August “Route”. For “ABEELE N of POPERINGHE Switch Road” read “ABEELE – POPERINGHE”.

Acknowledge

*******************
Major R.F.A.
Staff Captain 55th Divl Artillery
21st Aug 1917.

Casualty Report 20 Division 20 August 1917

CASUALTY REPORT.
PERIOD 6th AUG: to 19th AUG: 1917.
UNIT OFFICERS OTHER RANKS.
K. W. M. K. W. M.
20th DIVNL. HEADQUARTERS
DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY
DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS –
2
– 1
5
5 –

– –
18
2 –
90
35 –

59th INFANTRY BRIGADE
10th K.R.R.C.
11th K.R.R.C.
10th Rifle B.
11th Rifle B.
59th M.G. Coy
59th T.M. Bty.

1
7


1
2
1
9
7
2

4

1
1


20
31
15
37
4
3
66
135
152
167
20
15
84
20
26
50


TOTAL 59th Infantry Brigade 9 21 6 110 555 180
60th INFANTRY BRIGADE
6th Ox. & Bucks L.I.
6th K.L.S.L.I.
12th K.R.R.C.
12th Rifle B.
60th M.G. Coy.
60th T.M. Bty.


4
1


4
5
5
11

1


2



31
39
43
31
6

153
168
152
165
26

8
6
51
10


TOTAL 60th Infantry Brigade. 5 26 2 150 664 75
61st INFANTRY BRIGADE
Headquarters
12th King’s Liverpool Regt.
7th Somerset L.I.
7th D.C.L.I.
7th K.O.Y.L.I.
61st M.G. Coy.
61st T.M. Bty.

2
2
2
3

1
1
9
12
4
8
2
1

1


1



45
47
24
27
5
3

239
206
151
238
43
4

26
21
16



TOTAL 61st Infantry Brigade 10 37 2 151 881 63
11th Durham L.I. – 3 – 7 22 –
217th M.G. Coy 1 4 – 5 18 4
R.A.M.C. Field Ambulances – 1 – 3 31 –
GRAND TOTALS 27 103 10 446 2296 322

55th Divisional Artillery Operation Order No. 53. 20 August 1917

Appendix C

SECRET.
Copy No..31
Reference Map Sheet
28 N.W. 1/20000 &
HAZEBROUCK 1/100000

55th DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY OPERATION ORDER No. 53.
—————————————————————

1. The 55th Divisional Artillery will relieve the 36th Divisional Artillery in the line on August 22nd and 23rd, relief to be completed by 6 a.m. on the 24th inst.

2. One Section per battery will relieve on the 22nd and the remaining two sections on the 23rd August.
Relief will be carried out by daylight, to be complete by 9 p.m. on the 22nd and 4 p.m. on the 23rd inst.

3. 276 Bde R.F.A. will relieve 153 Bde R.F.A. and 275 Bde R.F.A. will relieve 173 Bde. R.F.A.
On completion of relief, Brigades and 55th Divl Ammunition Column will come under the orders of the B.G.R.A. 61st Divisional Artillery for tactical purposes.

4. All ammunition on charge at gun positions and vicinity will be taken over by relieving units, and ammunition transferred and brought in will be wired to Staff Captain R.A. 61st Divisional Artillery by noon on the 23rd inst.

5. Ammunition supply will pass from 36th Divisional Ammn Column to 55th Divisional Ammn Column at 12 noon on the 23rd inst. O.C. 55th Div Ammn Column will detail one officer to report to Staff Captain R.A. 61st Divl Artillery on 22nd inst to take over details of ammunition supply.

6. Guns will be exchanged stripped except for dials sights, sight clinometers and aiming posts, under arrangements to be made between Officers Commanding concerned.
Where guns with recuperators are taken over, pumps will also be taken over.

7. Brigades, Divisional Ammn Column and Trench Mortars will move to new Wagon Lines in accordance with attached March Table “A”.

8. All area stores at gun positions and wagon lines including tarpaulins, water-carriers, petrol tins, packsaddles, camouflage, and Yukon Packs will be taken over by units of the 55th Divisional Artillery.

9. Parties will proceed to take over all tents, shelters, and area stores from wagon lines of 153rd and 173rd Brigades R.F.A. on the 23rd inst. Wagon Lines of 173 Bde R.F.A. at H.10.d.2.2., and wagon lines of 153rd Bde R.F.A. at H.9.d.9.6.
These stores etc will then be moved to wagon lines given in Table “A”.

10. All tents, shelters, pumps, troughs, and other area stores on charge in the WINNEZEELE Area will be returned before leaving to store at the following locations:-
Pumps. Troughs Tents To caretakers at
R.A. H.Q. – – 8 K.13.d.9.3.
275 Bde R.F.A. 2 15 33 K.14.b.9.9.
276 Bde R.F.A. 2 15 33 K.13.d.9.3.
D.A.C. 2 16 33 K.2.c.1.6.
Div Train – – 7 K.14.b.9.9.
Commandant WINNEZEELE Area will arrange to have two P.B. men at each of the above locations on the morning of the 22nd inst. O.C. 275 Bde R.F.A. will detail an N.C.O. to be in charge of the six caretakers, and he will remain behind with them until relieved by the 36th Divisional Artillery. They will report to the Commandant WINNEZEELE Artillery Area on the morning of the 22nd inst with two days rations after all stores have been handed in by units.

11. O.C. 55th Divl Ammunition Column will detail 5 G.S. Wagons together with teams and drivers to report to each F.A. Brigade on the 21st inst. These wagons will return to the 55th Divl Ammn Column on the morning of the 23rd inst.

12. On 22nd inst, Supply Refilling Point will be as usual. On 23rd inst, O.C. 95th Coy A.S.C. will make arrangements to deliver supplies to billets by lorries. On 24th inst O.C. 95th Coy A.S.C. will arrange to recommence delivery by horse transport and will inform all units hour and place of refilling on that date.
13. On the evening of the 24th, inst supply lorries will return to the 34th Divl Supply Column.

14. 55th Divisional Trench Mortar personnel will move with and remain attached to 55th Divl Ammn Column for accommodation, rations and discipline.

15. Completion of relief will be wired to this office and 61st Divisional Artillery by the word “RIGHT”.

16. Baggage wagons will report to units on the evening of the 21st inst.

17. All applications for R.E. material and camouflage should be made to 61st Divisional Artillery.

18. On the 23rd inst, units will come under D.A.D.O.S. 61st Division for Ordnance Stores.

19. Acknowledge.

Signature unreadable.
Major R.F.A.
Staff Captain, 55th Divl Artillery.
20th August 1917.

Copies to :-
No 1. XIX Corps R.A. 9. 275 Bde R.F.A. 17. S.S.O. 55th Div.
2 2. 55th Div “G” 10. 276 Bde R.F.A. 18. 95 Coy A.S.C.
3. 55th Div “Q” 11. 153 Bde R.F.A. 19. 55th Div Signals
4. 36th Div “G” 12. 173 Bde R.F.A. 20. D.A.D.O.S. 55th Div
5. 36th Div “Q” 13. 55th D.A.C. 21. D.A.D.O.S. 36th Div
6. 36th Div Arty. 14. 36th D.A.C. 22. D.A.D.O.S. 61st Div
7. 61st Div “Q”. 15. D.T.M.O. 55th Div 23. A.D.V.S. 55th Div
8. 61st Div Arty 16. A.P.M. 55th Div. 24. A.D.M.S. 55th Div
25. Senior Chaplain C of E.
26.Senior Chaplain Non C of E.
27. Area Commander BRANDHOEK AREA.
28. “ “ WINNEZEELE ARTILLERY Area.
29. Staff Captain R.A.
30 & 31 War Diary.
32. XIX Corps G.
33. File.

George Ryan’s letter home dated 20 Aug 1915

George Ryan’s letter home dated 20 Aug 1915

On headed notepaper with regimental crest 9th Middlesex Regt.
1945 “D” Co.
9th Middlesex
Dum-dum.
India.
20 Aug 1915

Dear M & F,

Thanks for your letter of July 22nd. You say the letter post does not leave London till Friday. I think you are mistaken as I received your letter a week late again this week. By what I can make out you should still post Thurs evening.

Sorry to hear Edie has had to have her front teeth out. Mine have not got much worse so I have not had them seen to. (The stopping came out of one, eating those Dog Biscuits on the boat.)

I’m having a little rest from Guards as I’m on Police Duty, taking the place of a Policeman detained in Hospital. I don’t suppose it will be for long as he is only in there with skin disease. I’m on duty from 4.30 to 9.30 in the evening then 5.45 to 10.0 next morning. After that I don’t go on till 4.30 pm the following day. We don’t have so far to go as we did up at Jalapahar, just round the barracks & down the Bazaar. It makes a change, as Parades are getting so monotonous & of course it’s quite nice to have a few days rest from Guards, so I shan’t mind if I’m kept on for a week or so.

Went to the “Empire” in Calcutta last Sat & saw Horace Goldin give “The Tiger God”. I expect Dad has seen him in London. It was very good; quite the best programme we’ve seen out here. We went back to Cossipore by taxi as it was too late for a tram & a “garrey” would have taken too long besides costing almost as much. It was just like an open Touring car, not like the boxed up vehicles you’ve got in London. We did go at a rate, it only took just over 20 min.

I heard from Bert this week.
Love to all,
Yr loving son
George

TABLE “A” August 1917

TABLE “A”

Date. Unit. From. To. Time from S.P. Starting Pt. Route.
6th Aug

“ H.Q. 275 Bde.

A Battery

B Battery

C Battery

D Battery
G.9.b.6.4.

G.9.b.7.9.

G.9.b.7.9.

G.9.b.7.9.

G.9.b.6.4. K.9.c.0.0.

(K.14.b.6.9.
(K.15.a.4.9.

K.8.d.9.9.

(K.7.b.9.0.
(K.8.c.1.9.

(K.8.a.8.5.
(K.8.b.0.6.
(K.8.b.1.4.
(K.8.b.2.2.
(K.8.b.2.1.
(K.8.c.2.7.
(K.3.c.1.3.
5.55 a.m.

6 a.m.

6.30 a.m.

7 a.m.

7.30 a.m. G.3.c.8.3.

-do-

-do-

-do-

-do- Switch Road, N of POPERINGHE, ABEELE.
-do-

-do-

-do-

-do-

6th Aug



“ H.Q. 276 Bde

A Battery
B Battery

C Battery
D Battery G.2.b.2.7.

G.4.c.4.4.
G10.b.1.7.

G.10.b.3.7.
G.10.a.9.6. K.13.b.9.2.

K.7.c.5.4.
(K.13.a.9.0.
(K.13.a.7.1.
(J.18.b.9.7.

K.7.c.8.8.
K.13.a.0.2. 8.55 a.m.

9 a.m.
9.30 a.m.

10 a.m.
10.30 a.m. G.3.c.8.3.

-do-
-do-

-do-
-do- Switch Road N of POPERINGHE, ABEELE.
-do-
-do-

-do-
-do-

XIVTH CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. 86 16 August 1917

G.O.C.
THIS SUMMARY IS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE AND MUST NOT BE
TAKEN BEYOND BATTALION OR BATTERY HEADQUARTERS.
XIVTH CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.
*=*=*=*-*-*=*=*-*=*=*
No. 86.
*=*=*=*=*
1. ENEMY ACTIVITY.
Artillery.
Retaliation for our barrage this morning is reported as not having been heavy; a heavy barrage was, however, put down along the line of the STEENBEEK at 4.50 p.m. this afternoon.
Other details of shelling are as follows:-
Areas shelled No of Nature of Ordnance. Group firing.
rounds.
B.11.c. 15 10.5 cm. Gun )
U.27.c. 50 “ “ )
B.12.a. 100 10.5 & 15 cm. Hows.)
(shrapnel & gas) ) POELCAPPELLE
INTERNATIONAL) )
CORNER and ) Intermittent Big H.V. Gun )
vicinity ) )
U.21.a. Heavily at intervals. 15 cm. How. )
B.22.a. 60 “ “ BROENBEEK.
2. IDENTIFICATIONS.
Companies.
214th Div. 363 I.R. 2, 7, 8, 9, & 2nd & 3rd M.G. Coys. N. of WIJDENDRIFT.
(Prisoners).
358 I.R. 9, 10, 11, 12, & 3rd M.G, Coys. N of LANGEMARCK.
(Prisoners).
50 I.R. 1. 2, 3, 4, 7, & 1st & 2nd M.G. Coys. N of LANGEMARCK.
(Prisoners).
424th Minenwerfer Company (Prisoners).

79th Res. Division.
261 R.I.R. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12 & ) S.W. LANGEMARCK (Prisoners).
1st & 2nd M.G. Coys. )
262 R.I.R. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, &) S.W. LANGEMARCK
2nd & 3rd M.G. Coys. ) (Prisoners).
279th Minenwerfer Company (Prisoners).
541st Sanitas Company. (Prisoners).
26th Division.
119th Gren. Regt. 1, 2, 5, 7, 8 Coys. LANGEMARCK. (Prisoners).

183rd Division.
184th I.R. 1, 4, 9, 10 Coys. LANGEMARCK. (Prisoners – strayed out of their sector).

3. ORDER OF BATTLE.
The order of battle from north to south is –
46th I.R. – 119th Division
363rd I.R. )
Elements (50th I.R. ) 214th Division.
(358th I.R.)
Elements (261st R.I.R.)
(262nd R.I.R.) 79th Reserve Division.
263rd R.I.R.)
214th Division.
The order of battle on this front was undergoing a change when our attack took place and the sector held by the 50th I.R. was being taken over by the 358th I.R., which had been withdrawn from the BIXSCHOOTE Sector.
79th Reserve Division.
The 261st R.I.R. and 262nd R.I.R. were found to be occupying the front from the STADEN Railway to the Military Road in U.28.d., while the 263rd R.I.R., which was in process of relief by the 184th I.R. (183rd Division), was holding the sector south of the road.
26th Division.
Men of the 119th Regt. and captured documents belonging to an officer shew that this division is arriving to take over at least part of the 79th Reserve Division’s front.
The prisoners state that they form the advance party of the 119th Regt. and that the regiment was to occupy the sector held by the 262nd R.I.R., 79th Reserve Division.
As these men were to take over the sector immediately south of the STADEN Railway, it is possible that the front formerly held by one regiment of the 79th Res. Division with two battalions in the front line is now to be held by two regiments of the 26th Division.
183rd Division.
Statements of men of the 184th I.R., who lost their way and were captured at LANGEMARCK, tend to strengthen the supposition that the enemy intends to thicken his line in this sector.
The 184th I.R. was in process of relieving the 263rd R.I.R., 79th Reserve Division.

4. RELIEFS.
The 184th I.R., 183rd Division, was in process of relieving the 263rd R.I.R. this morning.
The 262nd R.I.R. and 261st R.I.R., 79th Res. Division, will probably be relieved to-night (16th/17th inst) by the 119th Regt., 26th Division. It is highly probable that another regiment, either the 121st I.R. or 125th I.R. of this division will move in south of this regiment to-night.
The 358th I.R., 214th Division, was relieved in the BISCHOOTE sector on the 12th inst. and moved into the line immediately north of the STADEN Railway to relieve the 50th I.R. on the night of the 14th/15th instant.
The 26th Division was relieved in the MONCHY-le-PREUX sector on the 25th July.

5. MOVEMENTS OF THE 26TH DIVISION.
The 26th Division was withdrawn from the MONCHY-le-PREUX sector on the 25th July and moved into rest in the LILLE area.
The 119th Regt. rested at LOOS, near LILLE and entrained there on 15th August for ROULERS, via TOURCOING and COURTRAI.
From ROULERS the 2nd Bn. marched to HOOGLEDE, arriving there on the evening of the 15th instant.
The advance party left HOOGLEDE at 9.0 p.m. for the front line, travelling by light railway as far as WESTROOSEBEKE, thence by march route as given in yesterday’s summary under “Routes and Approaches”.

6. ROUTES AND APPROACHES.
Prisoners of the 358th I.R. followed the following route from ONDANK Camp to KOEKUIT:-
ONDANK to P.21.c.70.20., thence south along STADENREKE – VYFWEGEN Road to VYFWEGEN, thence re-crossing railway through P.33., P.32., HOUTHULST Forest to O.36.d., thence south to cross-roads in U.6.d.

7. REST BILLETS.
Prisoners of the 358th I.R. were withdrawn to rest at ONDANK Camp.
Documents shew that the SCHAAP BALIE Camp is still in use.

8 STADEN – ZONNEBEKE LINE.
Prisoners of the 358th I.R. state that the wire on this line in the ONDANK sector was being strengthened by a Labour Battalion on the 13th instant.
They know of no other work being done in this sector and as regards digging it is found to be almost impossible under the present conditions. Their own (the soldier’s) opinion is that they are better off in shell holes than they are in trenches under heavy artillery fire.

9. SECTORS.
YPRES Group – North to south – LANGEMARCK to ST. JULIEN
(Captured document dated 15/8/17)

10. HEADQUARTERS.
3rd Bavarian Army Corps …. ISEGHEM. ) Captured documents
(YPRES Group) ) dated
26th Division ….. ….. ARDOYE ) 15th august.
214th Division …. ….. …. GITS … (Prisoner’s statements.)
79th Reserve Brigade ….. ….. Chateau – 20.P.35.c.90.80
(Captured document)

11. PIONEER PARK.
Main Pioneer Park ….. GEITE (ST. JOSEPH) – 20.K.32.a.
Pioneer Park ….. …. VYFWEGEN (contains a large amount of wire
entanglements &c. &c.) (Captured documents).

12. AMMUNITION DEPOT.
GEITE (ST. JOSEPH) …. 20.K.32.a. (Captured documents).

13. MORAL.
The 261st R.I.R. and 262nd R.I.R. were quite demoralised during our attack and fled in batches to the rear, where they undoubtedly fell victims to our artillery fire. The cause for the complete breakdown of the moral is stated by senior N.C.Os to be the unreliability of the 1918 Class, which is well represented throughout the companies and cannot stand heavy shelling.
The men of the 119th Regt. express the greatest contempt for the behaviour of these regiments, who, to use their own words, “flocked to the rear” and made little attempt to defend their positions.
Documents shew that a counter-attack was planned for the night of the 15th/16th inst., to drive us over the STEENBEEK. This did not materialise, owing to the complete exhaustion of these regiments, lack or moral and also our artillery fire.

14. EVACUATIONS.
Prisoners confirm that the civilian population has been evacuated from STADEN.
15 1919 CLASS.
Prisoners state that the 1919 Class was called up in the II Corps District in the beginning of June.
16. Statement of prisoners passed through the Advanced Corps Cage during the past 24 hours:-
Officers. Other Ranks. Companies.
214th Division.
50th Inf. Regt. 2 36 1,2,3,4,7,1st &
2nd M.G. Coys.
363rd “ “ 1 35 2,7,8,9, 2nd & 3rd
M.G. Coys.
358th “ “ 3 187 9,10,11,12, & 3rd
M.G. Coy.
424th Minenwerfer Coy. – 5

79th Reserve Division.
261st R.I.R. 3 141 1,2,3,4,5,7,11,
12, 1st and 2nd
M.G. Coys.
262nd “ 9 106 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,
10,11,12, & 2nd & 3rd M.G. Coys.
541st Sanitas Coy. – 1
279th Minenwerfer Coy. – 5

26th Division.
119th Gren. Regt. – 14 1,2,5,7,8 Coys.

184th Division.
183rd Inf. Regt. – 6 1,4,9,10 Coys.

Total 18 officers, 536 other ranks.

In addition, the following have been admitted to Casualty Clearing Station:-

Officers. Other ranks.
10 107

17. CAPTURED MATERIAL.
One 5.9” Howitzer.
Two 4.2” Howitzers
Ten Machine Guns.

Signature unreadable.
Major, G.S.,
for Brigadier-General,
General Staff, XIV Corps.
16th August, 1917.
PART II
PART II – INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES.
(From Fifth Army Summary of 16/8/17)

GERMAN ARTILLERY METHODS. (Communicated by the Army on our left).

I. Relation borne by number of battery emplacements to the actual number of batteries.
Prisoners’ statements, which are confirmed by documents captured in an artillery command post, show that in August, 1916, in the YPRES sector there were four times as many emplacements as there were batteries. On the 1st June, 1917, there was an average of three emplacements available for each battery.
Owing to the great number of emplacements available the enemy is able to
(a) Move batteries from their normal emplacements in case of need to emplacements already prepared.
(b) In case of a retirement move batteries to a prepared position in rear.
(c) Provide prepared emplacements for reinforcing batteries.
On the 28th August, 1916, there were 32 emplacements available for seven batteries in the KORTEKEER area. Each battery had four emplacements.
(1) Normal emplacement (FEUERSTELLUNG).
(2) Alternative emplacement (AUSWEICHSTELLUNG).
(3) Normal rear emplacement (RUCKWARTIGE HAUPSTELLUNG).
(4) Alternative rear emplacement (RUCKWARTIGE AUSWEICHSTELLUNG).
The seven batteries included,
2 batteries 7.7 cm.
2 batteries 8.8 cm.
1 battery 10 cm.
1 battery 10.5 cm.
1 battery Russian howitzers.
A captured order dated 1st June 1917 states:-
To all batteries:-
All batteries will send a sketch 1/20,000 showing:-
(i) Battery emplacement.
(ii) Alternative emplacement.
(iii) Reinforcing emplacement (VERSTARKUNGSTELLUNG).
These sketches will show the principle and alternative observation posts and the nearest available observation post.

II. Provisional emplacements.
The following order shows that the enemy at times moves sections into provisional emplacements, with a view to attracting the enemy’s attention, so that another battery whose position has probably not been discovered can carry out effective fire.
The 8th Battery of the 23rd Artillery Regiment will move a section into emplacement No. 104 (a). This section will take 400 rounds with it. The intention is that this section shall distract the enemy’s attention from the 1st Battery of the 29th Artillery Regiment which will carry out effective fire, probably on Battery R 43.

Prisoners have stated on several occasions that the enemy brings batteries forward at night to fire on our front lines and withdraws them to rearward positions as soon as they have finished shooting.

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