20th Division 6 August to 25th September 1917,

A manuscript document reporting 20th Division 6 August to 25th September 1917, I think.

On the 6th August the 20th Division took over the right Divisional Sector of the 14th Corps from the 38 Division.
The task before the Division was the capture of Langemarck village and a portion of the enemy’s GHELUVELT – LANGEMARCK Line beyond the village. Before proceeding with the attack on Langemarck it was necessary to obtain the mastery of the STEENBEEK which was held by the enemy. This stream was liable to sudden floods and its steep banks presented a considerable obstacle. In addition to this there were many concrete blockhouses at intervals along the eastern bank of the river, the largest one constructed in the ruins of a house called AU BON GITE formed more or less the key of the position, and commanded all the approaches to the river from our side. The 59th Bde., which was holding the line, with the 60th & 61st Brigades in support and reserve was to carry out this operation, but the two latter Brigades took no active part in the fighting. The first attempt was made on the 11th August and was unsuccessful, the enemy having discovered the concentration & opened a heavy fire on our troops as they were assembling. The second attempt on 14th August made by the 10th and 11th Rifle Brigade was more successful and a line was established 200 yards east of the stream, but Au Bon Gite still held out. At one period it was captured and a number of the enemy after heavy fighting were killed, but our men were again driven out by a counter attack from a N.E. direction. The crossing of the Steenbeek had however been made good and it was now possible to arrange for the main concentration to take place east of the stream. The two battalions engaged in the above operation carried out the attack with great gallantry; the attack was made over boggy ground across a stream which was too wide to jump and bridges had to be carried & put into position; all this was done under fire and it is safe to say that had the crossing not been seized the main attack in Langemarck would have been a far more dangerous undertaking and in all probability would have failed.
The 59th Brigade had suffered heavily and in the night of the 14/15 it was relieved by the 60th & 61st Brigades in order from the right. On the night of the 15/16 these two Brigades were deployed into their battle positions east of the Steenbeek. It was a pitch dark night, the ground over which the troops had to move was very boggy and the concentration had to take place close under Au Bon Gite whose garrison at any moment might give the alarm and so prevent the deployment taking place. So silently was this carried out & without a vestige of confusion that the enemy heard and saw nothing to arouse their suspicion, but they kept up machine gun fire from Au Bon Gite most of the night, making the assembly still more difficult. This was one of the most difficult operations the two Brigades had ever been asked to carry out & it reflects the greatest credit on all ranks. The attack commenced at 4.45 am, Au Bon Gite being rushed by two companies of the 11th R.B. under Captain Slade who displayed great courage & coolness which had been left in position the previous night. Covered by a heavy artillery barrage the attacking waves moved forward, the chief centres of resistance being REITRES FARM on the left of the 61st Bde. and LANGEMARCK itself with the houses to the east of the village all of which concealed many machine guns. The chateau grounds had been reduced to a swamp by the recent rains and the advance of the infantry on the left was greatly impeded; the whole country east of the Steenbeek for a great distance was a swampy crater field. Banbury’s 61st Brigade which had never been known to fail to take its objective, captured the village & established a line beyond it. The 12th King’s Liverpool & 7 Somerset, D.C.L.I., & K.O.Y.L.I. were the levers of this exploit and in spite of bog and bullets fought gloriously.
On the right the attack of the 60th Brigade went through without a hitch in spite of considerable resistance, the 12/King’s Royal Rifles being on the left in touch with the King’s Liverpool while the 6th Shropshire L.I. were on their right, & the 6th Oxford & Bucks cleared up numerous pill boxes near the Steenbeek. The German Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battn. 261 R.I.R. was captured in Langemarck; other prisoners captured during the day numbered about 20 officers and 400 other ranks, captured trophies included a section of 4.2 howitzers, ** 7.7 m.m. gun, and 20 or 30 machine guns, many more machine guns trench mortars were buried in the debris. The number of enemy killed and wounded is difficult to estimate but it was known that two battalions were almost annihilated in addition to others which suffered heavily. From captured documents it would appear that during the 16 August the enemy’s forces on the 20 Division front were greatly disorganised; prisoners were captured from no less than five divisions on the front, where normally there would only have been two divisions.
On the night of the 17/18 the 38 Division relieved the 20 Division, & the latter was withdrawn to refit and reorganize.

Capture of EAGLE TRENCH.
On the 11th September the 20th Division took over the right Divisional Sector of the XIV Corps front from the 38th Division. The 51st Division (XVII Corps) was on the right and the Guards Division on the left. The next task of the 20th Division was to capture EAGLE and KANGAROO and BEAR trenches & included ‘t GOED TER VESTEN FARM; the Guards Division had for their objective a line between the SCHREIBOOM – KORTEBEEKE road and the LANGAMARCK – STADEN railway. The attack of the 20th Division was carried out by the 60th Brigade on the right and 59th Brigade on the left. The 61st Brigade was in Divisional reserve on the Canal.
Preparatory to the infantry attack the artillery kept up a hurricane bombardment of the enemy positions for 24 hours.
It was known that Eagle trench was strongly held; it was full of concrete machine gun emplacements & dugouts & was well sited for field of fire. Although it had been shelled by heavy calibre guns some days before, many of the dugouts were not injured and it was felt that it would be a tough fight before it could be captured. Arrangements were made to discharge 300 oil drums from projectors on to the portion of Eagle trench near the cemetery shortly before the assault. The assaulting waves attacked at 5.40 am on the 20th September. Reports showed that the advance had not been everywhere successful; the right of the 59th Brigade & the left of the 60th Brigade had been held up by the enemy in Eagle trench; the right had advanced a little, but the enemy in Eagle house & Louis farm were holding them up. On the left Bear trench had been reached.
An order was issued to renew the attack at 6.30 pm. In the meantime the attackers in front of Eagle trench had to find what little cover they could & were being exposed to heavy fire from hostile artillery the whole day. The 60th Brigade at 8 pm gained the trenches round Eagle House & captured about 70 prisoners. By 9 pm our whole line had been advanced & a portion of Eagle trench had been captured.
By midnight the 59th Brigade had got their objective with their right flank refused. Early on the 21st Sept a contact aeroplane reported Germans holding the northern portion of Eagle trench. A third attack was ordered to take place at 5.30 am on the 22nd Sept. The men all this time had been under heavy artillery & machine gun fire & were unable to move out of the muddy holes in which they were trying to get shelter, but they were as eager as ever to come to close grips with the enemy.
Tanks were to co-operate with this attack, but owing to the terrible state of the roads they were unable to reach their rendezvous, & the attack had to be postponed. During the 22nd the situation remained the same & a fresh attack was ordered for the 23rd. It was felt that unless we could take Eagle trench at once the Germans would bring up fresh troops for counter attack which if successful would necessitate the whole operation being carried out again with great loss of life. At 7 am on the 23rd Sept the attack was to be tried again & Eagle trench to be assaulted from the west & south; this was to be preceded by a heavy bombardment with Stokes mortars. At 6.25 am on the 23rd the enemy attacked our posts near Louis farm & the Cemetery; they were driven back by machine gun fire & 23 prisoners captured. Soon after this our attack began; it was carried out by detachments of the 12 K.R.R. and 10 R.B. The Stokes bombardment was most effective & under a rifle grenade barrage our assaulting infantry rushed in from the south. While the enemy in Eagle trench were fighting the rifle men, the 10 R.B. came in from the west and captured the rest of this trench. We captured about 100 prisoners & many machine guns. Most of the prisoners belonged to picked troops of the 208 Division who said that they had been ordered to attack that morning assisted by detachments of the 185 Infantry regiment; an attack on the 23 Sept forestalled it & thanks to this success the German counter attack failed completely.
Both the 185 Infantry Regiment and the Storm troops of the 208 Division had suffered heavily and the third battalion of the latter was almost wiped out.
The 20th Division was relieved on the 28 September by the 4th Division.
The capture of Eagle trench was a splendid performance; the men were exposed to heavy firing for the best part of 4 days; the ground was wet & muddy & there was very little cover; in spite of this the 59 Brigade (Hyslop) and 60th Brigade (Butler) managed to bring to a successful issue the task which was set them in the face of determined resistance by picked enemy troops. The 20th Division received the congratulations of the Army & Corps Commander.

41st Divisional Artillery Operation Order No. 18. 26 September 1916

SECRET
Ref. FLERS – GUEUDECOURT
Sheet 1/10,000
41st Divisional Artillery Operation Order No. 18.
I. INTENTION. G.O.C., 55th Division intends to take the GIRD TRENCH and SUPPORT from N.26.a.5.9. to N.19.b.3.2.

II. ZERO HOUR and date will be notified later (probably noon September 27th.)

III. BARRAGES.
(a) There will be a Stationary and creeping barrage in the present Left, Left Centre, and Right Centre Zone.
(b) There will be a stationary barrage only in the Right Zone.

IV. CREEPING BARRAGE will be carried out by the 189th , 190th., 187th. Brigades R.F.A., each in its own zone.
The whole STATIONARY BARRAGE by the 21st Divisional Artillery each Brigade in its own zone with the exception that 95th Brigade extends up to a line NORTH and SOUTH through N.19 central.

V. The 183rd Brigade, R.F.A., will be allotted special tasks vide para. VIII.

VI. CREEPING BARRAGE will be placed
(a) At zero hour 150 yards NORTH of our present line which runs as follows:- N.20.d.1.0. – N.19.c.9.2.
(N.B. this line must be carefully verified by liaison Officers with the Infantry)
(b) At 0.3 Creeper advances at 50 yards per minute to line :- N.20.c.75.30. – N.20.c.7.51/2. – N.20.c.5 ½ .8. – N.20.a.2 ½ .0. – N.19.b.4.4 ½ .
And remain on this line till further orders.

VII. STATIONARY BARRAGE.:-
(a) At 0.0 hour on line:-
N.20.d.9½.2. – N.20.d.2.3½. – N.20.d.1½.8. – N.20.c.8½.8½ . and remain in this line till further orders.
(b) (1). At 0/.0 hour on line:-
GIRD TRENCH from N.20.c.2½.2. to N.19.d.0.9.
(2). At 0.3 hours:-
Stationary barrage from N.19.d.9½.4½. – N.19.d.0.9. lifts direct on to GIRD SUPPORT from N.20.c.½ .7½. to N.19.b.0.2½.
(3). At 0.3 hours stationary barrage from:-
N.19.d.9½.4½. to N.20.c.2½.2.
searched back 50 yards per minute to a line N.20.c.8 ½.8 ½. – N.20.a.2.3.,
and remain till further orders.
(4). At 0.7 minutes stationary barrage in b (2) Advances from line N.20.c. ½ .7½. – N.19.b.0.2½. – N.19.b.0.9. and remains till further orders.
N.B. Right flank of Stationary barrage follows a line:-
N.20.a.2½.2. – N.20.c.4.4½. – N.20.c.8½.8½.

VIII. 183rd Brigade R.F.A. will carry out the following tasks:-
(a). Search LIGNY-TILLOY-FACTORY CONNER ROAD from N.19.b.5.8.
as far north as possible.
(b). Search tracks from N.20 Central and N.20.b.7.0., Northwards towards LIGNY TILLOY.
(c). Search track from N.20.b.7.0. towards N.15.a.5.0.
Above will be dealt with with sharp bursts of fire at frequent intervals from zero onwards.
(d). Will sweep to cover all dead ground between above mentioned tracks and roads.
(e). Officer Commanding, 183rd Brigade, will detail a special Battery to engage any fleeting targets.

IX. RATES OF FIRE for all Barrages.
(a). From 0.0 to 0.3 hours 2 rounds per gun per minute.
(b) “ 0.3 to 0.8 hours 3 “ “ “ “
(c). “ 0.8 to 0.38 hours 2 “ “ “ “
(d). “ 0.38 to 1.38 hours 1 round per gun per two minutes
(e). “ 1.38 onwards bursts of fire equivalent to 1 round per gun per four
minutes.
X. (a). 4.5” HOWS of all Brigades will carry out a slow and methodical bombardment of GIRD TRENCH and GIRD SUPPORT from N.30.c.2½.1½. – N.19.b.3.2. from 5 hours before zero to zero hour.
D/187 assisting D/189 in Left zone.
D/183 “ D/190 in Left Centre Zone
Hows of 94th and 95th Brigades on Left and Left Centre zones.
Special attention being paid to strong points at:-
N.19.d.3.9½.
N.19.b.3.2.
N.19.b.4½.8. and
N.13.b.8.3.
(b). From Zero hour onwards 4.5” Hows will deal with all strong points, sunken roads, and road junctions, in their original Brigade zones North of the final line of creeping barrage.
RATES of FIRE for HOWS.
(a). during bombardment
1 round per gun per 4 minutes.
(b). after zero hour, as in (a) except for special targets of fleeting opportunities.

XI. Forward guns of 183rd Brigade and 95th Brigade will assist close support to our Infantry and deal with favourable targets as offered.

XII. There is no limit to Ammunition (18 pdr or 4.5” How).
Every endeavour should be made to have a dump of:-
450 rounds per 18 pdr. Gun
300 “ “ 4.5” How.
At or near the guns at zero hour.

XIII. During the bombardment by 4.5” Hows., i.e. from -5 hours to 0.0 hours 18 pdrs will carry out normal day firing, searching all dead ground in their own zones at a slow rate of fire.

XIV. Diagrams of barrage will, if possible, be issued.

XV. Watches will be synchronised at a convenient hour before zero hour.

XVI. Arrangements as to Liaison Officers:-
Divisional Artillery O.P. and M.T.Ms will be the same as for attack on September 25th. (vide 41st Divisional Artillery Order No. 17 and Appendices).

XVII. ACKNOWLEDGE by Wire.
C.M. Ling***
BRIGADE MAJOR,
41st Divisional Artillery.
26.9.16.
HHP