TABLE “A”. 21 August 1917

TABLE “A”.

Date Unit From To Time to pass Starting Point Starting Pt. Gun positions Route Remarks
22nd Aug H.Q. 275 Bde

A/275 Bty

B/275 Bty

C/275 Bty

D/275 Bty K.9.c.0.0.

K.14.b.6.9.
K.15.a.5.9.

K.8.d.9.9.

K.7.b.9.0.
K.8.b.1.9.

K.8.a.8.5.
K.8.b.0.6.
K.8.b.1.4.
K.8.b.2.2.
K.8.b.2.1.
K.8.c.2.7.
J.3.c.1.3. G.4.d.8.2.

Lines previously occupied by 173 Bde R.F.A. 8.55 a.m.

9 a.m.

9.30 a.m.
10 a.m.

10.30 a.m. K.4.d.3.6.

-do-

-do-

-do-

-do- WIELTJE (on taking over)

I.4.d.98.85

I.4.b.60.10

I.5.a.20.60.

I.5.a.30.30. ABEELE N. of POPERINGE
Switch Rd

-do-

-do- Distance of 500 yds will be maintained between sections of batteries & subsections D.A.C.

-do-

-do-
22nd Aug H.Q. 276 Bde

A/276 Bde

B/276 Bde

C/276 Bde
D/276 Bde K.13.b.9.2.

K.7.c.5.4.

K.13.a.9.0.
K.13.a.7.1.
J.18.b.9.7.

K.7.c.8.8.
K.13.a.0.2. G.10.b.3.8.

Lines previously occupied by 276 Bde R.F.A.

5.33 a.m.
6 a.m.

6.30 a.m.

7 a.m.
7.30 a.m. -do-

-do-

-do-

-do-
-do- WIELTJE (on relief)
C.22.c.50.05.

C.22.d.15.15.

C.22.d.25.45.
C.22.c.05.25. -do-

-do-

-do-

-do-
-do- -do-

-do-

-do-

-do-
-do-
23rd Aug

24th Aug 55th D.A.C.

95th Coy A.S.C. WINNEZEELE Area
-do- H.9.d.6.8.

G.4.b.5.2. 6 a.m.

9 a.m. -do-

-do- –

– -do-

-do- In relief of 36th D.A.C.
To take over billets vacated by No1 Coy A.S.C. 36th Div Train.

Advertisements

Notes on Operations. 20th Division 21 August 1917

SUBJECT: Notes on Operations. 20th Division No. G.840.

XIVth Corps.
——————-
In reply to your G.25/5 of the 16th August.
1. Generally speaking it was not too fast; it was only in the very boggy ground that the waves were unable to keep up with the barrage.
All the Officers and men whom I have talked to are loud in their praise of the barrage.

2. Yes.

3. As regards the Right Brigade front:-

(a) Ground very deep in mud and cut up by shell fire throughout. From the BLUE LINE Westwards and Southwards for about 400 yards was a regular bog.
Several men, including the Commanding Officer of the 6th K.S.L.I. were stuck thigh deep in the mud and had to be pulled out by other men.
(b) It was impossible to advance across the bog leading to the BLUE LINE in any formation other than some half dozen single file columns which wound their way between the pools of mud and water. This afforded some favourable opportunities for hostile machine guns.
(c) On the whole the state of the ground broke up formations and also impeded the individual. It therefore called for a special effort from all officers and N.C.Os. in leading their men on as well as special determination on the part of every individual to get forward through the mud. It made the subsequent tasks of carrying parties extremely difficult.
(d) On the other hand the soft state of the ground undoubtedly saved us many casualties from shell fire. This was especially the case during the forming up of the 6th K.S.L.I. and 12th K.R.R.C. before ZERO hour West of the STEENBEEK. They were very heavily shelled. They could not take cover even in shell holes for these were full of water, yet their casualties at this period were very few.

As regards the Left Brigade front, the advance was retarded as far as the GREEN LINE, especially on the extreme left. The hour’s halt on the GREEN LINE saved the situation in that it allowed everyone to reach their proper position in time.

4. There are several points I propose to bring to notice in a subsequent letter.
The following are in the nature of preliminary observations:-
(a) The concrete blockhouses appear to have only a narrow arc of fire as a general rule. At least one blockhouse which was giving trouble surrendered as soon as an organised party of men rushed up to it in a determined way.
(b) The importance of visual signalling does not yet seem to be fully appreciated.
(c) The work of the Artillery F.O.O’s, was admirable, and the liaison between artillery and infantry all that could be desired.
(d) A considerable quantity of S.A.A. was expended by Lewis Gun and rifle fire against low flying aeroplanes, with the result that there was a shortage of ammunition when required to repel counter-attacks. (This has already been dealt with in your G.4/29 of the 18th August).
(e) The necessity for consolidation to be put in hand at once on the attainment of an objective, whether the Officer in charge of the party is there or not. When elated by success our men are apt to neglect consolidation and to walk and sit about in the open.
(f) It is important for a Battalion Commander to have a company under his own hand.
(g) When halted under the barrage men should stand and not kneel. A man kneeling in a shell hole is apt to stop there.
(h) The YUKON pack was freely used on the Left Brigade front and was a great success. It was found that one man could carry a box of S.A.A. and a box of bombs.
(i) The concentration on the East bank of the STEENBEEK was admirably carried out under intermittent artillery fire and machine gun fire from AU BON GITE, the garrison of which fired off Very Lights throughout the night; yet at Zero the waves were in their places and ready to go forward. I think this most difficult manoeuvre reflects the greatest credit on Brigadiers and C.O’s.
(j) The question of providing Trench Wireless Sets for communication between F.O.O’s and Artillery has been suggested by my B.G., R.A. Severe losses have taken place nearly every time among F.O.O. parties in their endeavours to maintain a long line under a heavy fire. One instrument with each attacking Divisional Artillery would assist enormously, and save the loss of many Officers and men, whose services cannot be replaced by untrained reinforcements.

(sd) W. DOUGLAS SMITH,
Major General
Commanding 20th Division.
21st August, 1917.

55 Divisional Artillery OO No 53 21 August 1917

SECRET.
55th Div Arty B.M/1809

TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF
55th DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY OPERATION ORDER No 53.
—————————————————————————–

Headquarters of 55th Divisional Artillery will close at K.8.a.0.3. at 12 noon on the 22nd inst, and reopen at the same hour at K.10.d.5.7.

***************
Major R.F.A.
Staff Captain 55th Divl Artillery.
21st Aug 1917.

55th Divisional Artillery Operation Order No 53, amendment 21 August 1917

SECRET.

TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF 55th DIVISIONAL
ARTILLERY OPERATION ORDER NO 53.
———————————————————–

Reference 55th Divisional Artillery Operation Order No 53, the following amendments are made:-

AMENDMENT NO 1.
275 Bde R.F.A. will move to their old Wagon Lines at G.9.b.7.9. and G.9.b.6.4. and not as stated in Table “A” of the above order.

AMENDMENT NO 2.
Reference para 11. These wagons must be returned to the 55th D.A.C. on the evening of the 22nd inst, and not on the morning of the 23rd.

AMENDMENT NO 3.
Reference para 6, add :- “Gun history sheets must be handed over with the guns”.

AMENDMENT NO 4.
Table “A” 22nd August “Route”. For “ABEELE N of POPERINGHE Switch Road” read “ABEELE – POPERINGHE”.

Acknowledge

*******************
Major R.F.A.
Staff Captain 55th Divl Artillery
21st Aug 1917.

Casualty Report 20 Division 20 August 1917

CASUALTY REPORT.
PERIOD 6th AUG: to 19th AUG: 1917.
UNIT OFFICERS OTHER RANKS.
K. W. M. K. W. M.
20th DIVNL. HEADQUARTERS
DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY
DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS –
2
– 1
5
5 –

– –
18
2 –
90
35 –

59th INFANTRY BRIGADE
10th K.R.R.C.
11th K.R.R.C.
10th Rifle B.
11th Rifle B.
59th M.G. Coy
59th T.M. Bty.

1
7


1
2
1
9
7
2

4

1
1


20
31
15
37
4
3
66
135
152
167
20
15
84
20
26
50


TOTAL 59th Infantry Brigade 9 21 6 110 555 180
60th INFANTRY BRIGADE
6th Ox. & Bucks L.I.
6th K.L.S.L.I.
12th K.R.R.C.
12th Rifle B.
60th M.G. Coy.
60th T.M. Bty.


4
1


4
5
5
11

1


2



31
39
43
31
6

153
168
152
165
26

8
6
51
10


TOTAL 60th Infantry Brigade. 5 26 2 150 664 75
61st INFANTRY BRIGADE
Headquarters
12th King’s Liverpool Regt.
7th Somerset L.I.
7th D.C.L.I.
7th K.O.Y.L.I.
61st M.G. Coy.
61st T.M. Bty.

2
2
2
3

1
1
9
12
4
8
2
1

1


1



45
47
24
27
5
3

239
206
151
238
43
4

26
21
16



TOTAL 61st Infantry Brigade 10 37 2 151 881 63
11th Durham L.I. – 3 – 7 22 –
217th M.G. Coy 1 4 – 5 18 4
R.A.M.C. Field Ambulances – 1 – 3 31 –
GRAND TOTALS 27 103 10 446 2296 322

55th Divisional Artillery Operation Order No. 53. 20 August 1917

Appendix C

SECRET.
Copy No..31
Reference Map Sheet
28 N.W. 1/20000 &
HAZEBROUCK 1/100000

55th DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY OPERATION ORDER No. 53.
—————————————————————

1. The 55th Divisional Artillery will relieve the 36th Divisional Artillery in the line on August 22nd and 23rd, relief to be completed by 6 a.m. on the 24th inst.

2. One Section per battery will relieve on the 22nd and the remaining two sections on the 23rd August.
Relief will be carried out by daylight, to be complete by 9 p.m. on the 22nd and 4 p.m. on the 23rd inst.

3. 276 Bde R.F.A. will relieve 153 Bde R.F.A. and 275 Bde R.F.A. will relieve 173 Bde. R.F.A.
On completion of relief, Brigades and 55th Divl Ammunition Column will come under the orders of the B.G.R.A. 61st Divisional Artillery for tactical purposes.

4. All ammunition on charge at gun positions and vicinity will be taken over by relieving units, and ammunition transferred and brought in will be wired to Staff Captain R.A. 61st Divisional Artillery by noon on the 23rd inst.

5. Ammunition supply will pass from 36th Divisional Ammn Column to 55th Divisional Ammn Column at 12 noon on the 23rd inst. O.C. 55th Div Ammn Column will detail one officer to report to Staff Captain R.A. 61st Divl Artillery on 22nd inst to take over details of ammunition supply.

6. Guns will be exchanged stripped except for dials sights, sight clinometers and aiming posts, under arrangements to be made between Officers Commanding concerned.
Where guns with recuperators are taken over, pumps will also be taken over.

7. Brigades, Divisional Ammn Column and Trench Mortars will move to new Wagon Lines in accordance with attached March Table “A”.

8. All area stores at gun positions and wagon lines including tarpaulins, water-carriers, petrol tins, packsaddles, camouflage, and Yukon Packs will be taken over by units of the 55th Divisional Artillery.

9. Parties will proceed to take over all tents, shelters, and area stores from wagon lines of 153rd and 173rd Brigades R.F.A. on the 23rd inst. Wagon Lines of 173 Bde R.F.A. at H.10.d.2.2., and wagon lines of 153rd Bde R.F.A. at H.9.d.9.6.
These stores etc will then be moved to wagon lines given in Table “A”.

10. All tents, shelters, pumps, troughs, and other area stores on charge in the WINNEZEELE Area will be returned before leaving to store at the following locations:-
Pumps. Troughs Tents To caretakers at
R.A. H.Q. – – 8 K.13.d.9.3.
275 Bde R.F.A. 2 15 33 K.14.b.9.9.
276 Bde R.F.A. 2 15 33 K.13.d.9.3.
D.A.C. 2 16 33 K.2.c.1.6.
Div Train – – 7 K.14.b.9.9.
Commandant WINNEZEELE Area will arrange to have two P.B. men at each of the above locations on the morning of the 22nd inst. O.C. 275 Bde R.F.A. will detail an N.C.O. to be in charge of the six caretakers, and he will remain behind with them until relieved by the 36th Divisional Artillery. They will report to the Commandant WINNEZEELE Artillery Area on the morning of the 22nd inst with two days rations after all stores have been handed in by units.

11. O.C. 55th Divl Ammunition Column will detail 5 G.S. Wagons together with teams and drivers to report to each F.A. Brigade on the 21st inst. These wagons will return to the 55th Divl Ammn Column on the morning of the 23rd inst.

12. On 22nd inst, Supply Refilling Point will be as usual. On 23rd inst, O.C. 95th Coy A.S.C. will make arrangements to deliver supplies to billets by lorries. On 24th inst O.C. 95th Coy A.S.C. will arrange to recommence delivery by horse transport and will inform all units hour and place of refilling on that date.
13. On the evening of the 24th, inst supply lorries will return to the 34th Divl Supply Column.

14. 55th Divisional Trench Mortar personnel will move with and remain attached to 55th Divl Ammn Column for accommodation, rations and discipline.

15. Completion of relief will be wired to this office and 61st Divisional Artillery by the word “RIGHT”.

16. Baggage wagons will report to units on the evening of the 21st inst.

17. All applications for R.E. material and camouflage should be made to 61st Divisional Artillery.

18. On the 23rd inst, units will come under D.A.D.O.S. 61st Division for Ordnance Stores.

19. Acknowledge.

Signature unreadable.
Major R.F.A.
Staff Captain, 55th Divl Artillery.
20th August 1917.

Copies to :-
No 1. XIX Corps R.A. 9. 275 Bde R.F.A. 17. S.S.O. 55th Div.
2 2. 55th Div “G” 10. 276 Bde R.F.A. 18. 95 Coy A.S.C.
3. 55th Div “Q” 11. 153 Bde R.F.A. 19. 55th Div Signals
4. 36th Div “G” 12. 173 Bde R.F.A. 20. D.A.D.O.S. 55th Div
5. 36th Div “Q” 13. 55th D.A.C. 21. D.A.D.O.S. 36th Div
6. 36th Div Arty. 14. 36th D.A.C. 22. D.A.D.O.S. 61st Div
7. 61st Div “Q”. 15. D.T.M.O. 55th Div 23. A.D.V.S. 55th Div
8. 61st Div Arty 16. A.P.M. 55th Div. 24. A.D.M.S. 55th Div
25. Senior Chaplain C of E.
26.Senior Chaplain Non C of E.
27. Area Commander BRANDHOEK AREA.
28. “ “ WINNEZEELE ARTILLERY Area.
29. Staff Captain R.A.
30 & 31 War Diary.
32. XIX Corps G.
33. File.